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Padmanabhan, J.—The above writ appeals have been filed by the State against the interlocutory order made by the single Judge of this Court to the above writ petitions. All the writ petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment. In the writ petitions the Petitioners have prayed for a declaration that Clause 3 (1-A) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1982 as amended by G.O. Ms. No. 293, Food and Co-operation Department dated 11th May 1983, is unconstitutional, illegal void. and unenforceable. On 22nd October 1982 the State Government promulgated Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order 1982 (for short the Order). This Order was promulgated in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) Order G.S.R. 800, dated 9th June 1978. Clause 3 of the said order states:
3(1) No person shall transport, move or otherwise carry or prepare or attempt to transport move or otherwise carry on aid or abate in the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the State by road mil or otherwise except under and in accordance with the conditions of a permit issued by an Authorised Officer.
Clause 3(4) of the Order conferred power to grant permit. Then the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 42, Food and Co-operation dated 22nd February 1983. The G.O. provided that in Thanjavn District the entire marketable surplus of paddy and rice shall be purchased only by the Government and there shall not be any purchase by the private traders in Thanjavur district. The Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation will make purchase as an agent of the Government. The procurement price per quintal of paddy was also fixed. Another notification was issued on 16tb February 1983,,namely G.O. Ms. No. 84, Food and Co-operation Department By this notification the restriction of sale of paddy was extended to two taluks of South Arcot district and four taluks of Tiruchi district. Thereafter on 11th May 1983 the State Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 293, Food and Co-operation Department. By this G.O. after Sub-clause 3(1) in the Order, Clause 1-A X was introduced. That is to the following effect:
1A No person shall transport, move or otherwise carry or prepare or attempt to transport, move or otherwise carry or aid or abet in the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the places notified under Clause 3 or the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Restriction of Trade) Order 1974 by road, rail or otherwise.
There was a further amendment by GO. Ms. No. 413, Food and Co-operation Department, dated 20th June 1983 to Clause 2(1-A). The amendment reads as follows:
No person shall transport, move or otherwise carry or prepare or attempt to transport, move or otherwise carry or aid or a bet in the transport movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the Tnanjavur district, Chidambaram and Kattumannar koil and Musiri, Kulithalai, Lalgudi and Tiruchirappalli taluks in Tiruchirappalli District.
It is the conational validity of Clause (13A) of the order as amended by G.O. M. No. 293 and 413 is challenged in this batch of writ petitions.
Mr. G. Ramaswami, learned Counsel for the the Petitioners raised the following contentions:
(1) Clause 3 (1-A) of the Order is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(2) Clause 3 (1-A) is in excess of the power of delegation conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act on the Stat under G.S.R. 800 dated 9th June 1978. There can not be a total prohibition but only a regulation.
(3) The restriction placed on the movement of paddy on the Thanjavur District is violative of Article 19(1) (g) and Article 301 of the Constitution of India as it is unreasonable.
Another contention was also raised by Mr. G. Ramaswami, on the ground that the order is against the provisions of Rice and Paddy (Southern Zone) Movement Control Order 1976 However he did not press the same in view of the fact that the learned Advocate-General drew his attention that the said order is no longer in force.
We shall consider the contention of the learned Counsel in striatum. The argument of Mr. G. Ramaswami is Clause 3 (1-A) of the Order as already extracted places an embargo on the transport or movement or preparation or a attempt to transport or move paddy outside the Thanjavur district. Mr. G. Ramaswamis contention is that by Clause 3(1-A) the restriction is planed only on the movement of paddy outside the Thanjavur District. On the other hand, there is no such restriction on the movement of paddy outside the other districts excepting certain taluks mentioned in Clause 3(1-A) itself. This amounts to unreasonable classification. There is no nexus between the subject of classification and the objects sought to be achieved thereby the learned Counsel also laid emphasis on the fact that there is no prohibition in the movement of paddy from Thanjavur district outside the State provided a permit is obtained. On the other band, there is a total prohibition of movement of paddy outside Taanjavur district. The learned Counsel also pointed out that in the case of parsons in places other than Tnanjavur district, the producers are able to get much higher price, while in Thanjavur district the producers are obliged to sell only to the Government, with the result it is not possible for them to take the advantage of the price that is available.
It forbid classification. Permissible classification must satisfy two conditions viz.,(1) it must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) the differential must have a rational relation to the subject sought to be achieved by the statute in question. Even a single individual may be in a class by himself on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others. A law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual who is in a class by himself. Further in permissible classification mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required. The decision of the Supreme Court in M.A. Rasheed v. State or Kerala (1975) 2 C.W.R. 71 is authority for the proposition that classification based on geographical situation is permissible provided it is reasonable. In that case, the State of Kerala issued a notification prohibiting the production of fiber from cocoanut husks by the use of machinery in the district of Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey. One of the contentions by which the validity of the notification was challenged was that the notification offended Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground a similar notification was not made applicable to other eight districts in Kerala. The Supreme Court rejected the argument based on Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the classification was reasonable and bore a nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned notification.
In Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Others, the following propositions have been laid down: (Vide page 295 of Constiutional Law of India by H.M. Seervai third edition, volume 1)
(1) The State, in the exercise of its Governmental power, has of necessity to make laws operating (sic) on different groups or classes of person within its territory to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies and it must possess for that purpose, large powers of distinguishing and classifying persons or things to be subjected to such law.
(2) The constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The Courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary.
(3) Classification necessarily implies the making of distinction or discrimination between persons classified and those who are not members of that class. It is the essence of a classification that upon the class are cast duties and burdens different from those resting upon the general public. Indeed, the very idea of classification is that of inequality so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in HO manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
It is in the light of these principles that we have to consider whether the amended Clause 3(1-A) of the Order which prohibited the movement of paddy outside Thanjavur district is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. It is seen that Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act enables the authority to regulate or prohibit the production, supply of distribution of essential commodities for the purpose of maintaining or increasing supplies of essential commodities, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability or fair prices. In the State of Tamil Nadu there was a system of imposing levy on purchases made by traders since 1970. This was imposed big Clause 3(5)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice Dealers (Licensing, Regulation and Disposal of Stocks) Order 1968. The said order empowered the State Government to impose and collect upto 50 per cent of the stock by way of levy on purchases by dealers on payment of price specified from time to time. The said order was replaced by the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Price (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1974, who also under Clause 5(1) empowered the State Government to impose and collect a levy upto 50 percent of the purchases of paddy and rice. This clause was amended in 1976. The distribution was on the basis of family cards. It is stated in the counter affidavit that there are about 118 lakhs family card-holders throughout the State arid the public distribution system was worked through nearly 17760 fair price shops. A review of the food situation in the later half of 1980 and the beginning of 1981 revealed that the stock would not be adequate to meet the requirements under the public distribution system. In the circumstances, the Government decided to enforce the levy on traders by G.O. Ms. No. 33, Food and Co-operation Department dated 20th January 19S1. A 40 percent levy was imposed on purchases of paddy rice by dealers. The Government also fixed the price of paddy to be delivered by traders towards levy year after year. Thereafter, the, Government increased the rate of levy from 40 percent to 50 percent from kuruvai season 1981 under G.O. Ms. No. 785, dated 1st October 1981 There was failure of monsoon in 1981 and 1982. It is stated that the water level in Mattur reservoir be In Thanjavur District a one the acreage in paddy cultivation was reduced from 4.35 lakhs acres to 2.97 lakhs acres. The north east monsoon also failed causing further deficit in the circumstances the Government issued GO Ms. Nos. 42 and 84, dated 22nd January 1983 and 16th March 1983 respectively directing that all purchases of paddy and rice in Thanjavur district, Chidambaram and Kattumannar koil Taluk of South Arcot district and Masiri, Kulitbalai, Lalgudi and Tiruchirappalli district be made by the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited as an agent of the State Government and thus banning the purchase of paddy by the private dealers. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that consequent of the issue of G.O. Ms Nos. 42 and 84, the traders encouraged the producers to move. paddy outside the district and began effectively to defeat G.O. Ms. No. 42 and 84. It is in these circumstances, the Government were compelled to amend Clause 3 of the Order to be movement of paddy from Thanjavur district. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the amendment was necessitated to secure more quantity of paddy available in the paddy growing areas to cater to the needs of the vulnerable section of the public in public interest. It is also stated that the District of Thanjavur produces the maximum quantity of paddy in the State. We are, therefore, satisfied that the course of action adopted by the State is reasonable. The fact that the State has been subjected to conditions of drought for more than two years is a matter of which judicial notice can be taken. It cannot be disputed that Thanjavur district produces the largest quantity of paddy in the State than any other district. In fact, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner himself referred to the district as the granery of the State. We are not very much concerned with the mathematical accuracy of the quantum of production of paddy in Thanjavur district and the other districts in the State. Once we are satisfied that the District of Thanjavur produces the maximum quantity of paddy available in the State, it is only reasonable to assume that the grounds urged by the learned Advocate-General in support of the validity of the amended Clause 3(1-A) have to be accepted. We are satisfied that the classification is reasonable and it bears a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Mr. G. Ramaswami argued that under Clause 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order 1982 a person can transport move or otherwise carry or prepare or attempt to transport move or otherwise carry or aid or aid (sic) It in the transport movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the State by rail or road or otherwise under a permit issued, by a license. The result, according to the learned Counsel is at person can move transport paddy outside the State from Thanjavur district with a permit but he cannot move paddy under Clause 3(1-A) outside the district. Though at the first blush the argument appeared to have some substance, on a closer scrutiny it is devoid of any merit. When Clause 3(1-A) imposed a ban on the movement of paddy outside Thanjavur district it is inconceivable that paddy would be allowed to be transported from Thanjavur district outside the State under a permit. The learned Advocate-General himself stated that no such permit is being granted. Mr. G. Ramaswami referred to the fact that producers in other districts, are able to get better price for their paddy, while agriculturists in Thanjavur district get only the price fixed by the Government. But this cannot in any way invalidate Clause 3(1-A) of the Order when we come to the conclusion that it does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We therefore reject the first of the contentions of Mr. G. Ramaswami.
The next contention urged by the learned Counsel is that G.O. Ms. No. 293 as amended by G.O. Ms. No. 413 is in excess of the delegation conferred on the State Government by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act under G.S.R. No. 800 dated 8th June 1978. u/s 5 of the Essential Commodities Act according to the learned Counsel the Central Government may by notification direct that the power to make or issue notifications u/s 3 shall in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any as may be specified in the direction be exercisable also by (a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or (b) such State Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a State Government as may be specified in the direction. According to the learned Counsel the State Government being a delegate, its powers can only be those. that are delegated to it by the Central Government u/s 5 of the Act. Under G.S.R. No. 800, dated 9th June 1978 the Central Government has only delegated the powers conferred on it by Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act to make order to provide for the matters specified in Clauses (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (b) (i) and (ii) and (j) (i) of Sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. According to the learned Counsel the Central Government has not delegated its powers u/s 3(1) to the State Government. What has been delegated to the State Government is a power to make an order providing for various matters mentioned in Sub-section (2) except Clause (g). The learned Counsel submitted that prohibition would not fall u/s 3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act. Section 3(2)(d) would take in only regulation of storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition use or consumption of an essential commodity and it cannot therefore take in prohibition of transport. On the other band, the learned Advocate-General stated that what has been delegated is the power u/s 3 viz., the power to provide by order for regulating or prohibing the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. The learned Advocate-General submitted that the various matters mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 are only illustrative without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) Section 3. Section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act is as follows:
If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, or for securing any essential commodity for the defense of India or the efficient conduct of military operations it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.
Section 3(2) of the Essential Commodities Act provides:
Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1), an order made there under may provide ... (d) for regulating by licenses, permits or otherwise the the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of any essential commodity.
...
G.S.R. No. 800, dated 9th June 1978 reads thus:
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955, and in super session of the Order of the Order of the Government of India, in the late Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) No. G.S.: 316(E), dated 20th June 1972, the Central Government hereby directs that the powers conferred on it by Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act to make orders to provide for the matters specified in Clauses (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (h) (i) and (ii) and (j) of Sub-section (2) thereof shall, in relation to food stuffs be exercisable also by a State Government subject to the conditions.
According to Mr. G. Ramaswami what has been delegated it only the power to make orders to provide for the matters specified in Clauses (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)''(h) (0 (ii) and (j) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 and not all the powers in Sub-section (1) of Section 3. Mr. G. Ramaswami heavily relied on Sujan Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1968 P&H 363 and State v. Suraj Bhan AIR 1972 A11 401. In Sujan Singh Matu Ram Vs. The State of Haryana, ; the scope of G.S.R. No. 906 dated 9th June 1966 which was issued by the Central Government u/s 5 of the Essential Commodities Act rose for consideration. The said G.S.R. stated that in exercise of the powers...directs that the powers conferred on it by Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Central Act to make orders to provide for the matters specified in Clauses (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (h) (i) (ii) and (j) of Sub-section (2) thereof shall in relation to food-stuffs be exercisable also by a State Government subject to certain conditions. This notification is similar to G.S.R. No. 800 dated 7th June 1978. The Punjab and Haryana High Court observed thus:
There is no doubt that Section 5 of the Central Act empowers the Central Government to delegate the power to make orders u/s 3, but Section 5 itself lays down that no general delegation is permitted, but that the notification whereby a delegation is made must specify the matters in relation to which the powers may be exercised by the State Government. It is, therefore, apparent that the Central Government is not expected to notify u/s 5 of the Central Act that all the powers vested in it under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be exercised by a particular State Government. The notification u/s 5 would bi valid only if it specifies the matters in relation to which powers u/s 3 are authorised to be exercised by the State Government. The notification, dated June 9th 1966 is valid as it has clearly specified the matters in relation to which the delegation has been made. As the matter covered by the imp(sic) order does not admittedly fall within any of the various clauses of Sub-section (2) of the Section 3 specifically referred to in the notification u/s 5 of the Act the impugned order is liable to be struck down on that short ground.
In State v. Suraj Bhan the notification by which the power was delegated to the State Government was identical. Under the said delegated power the State Government of U.P. issued the U.P. Food grains (Restrictions on Hoarding) Order 1966 whereby some restrictions were placed by the State Government on the storage of food grains. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act gave power to regulate and prohibit an essential commodity. Then the learned Judges proceeded to consider the question which are the powers delegated to the State Government u/s 3(2)(d) The learned Judges held that the powers of the Central Government u/s 3 been delegated to the State Government. The learned Judges stated:
The notification issued by the Central Government directs that it''s powers under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 to make orders to provide for the matters specified in Clause (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (h) (i) (ii) and (j) of Sub-section (2) shall in relation to food stuffs be exercisable also by a state Government. It is clear therefore that what was delegated was the power to make orders in respect of the matters specified in the clauses referred to above and not in respect of the totality of powers that fall under Sub-section (1). We may illustrate this point further by pointing out that the power specified in Clause (g) of Sub-section (2) has been specifically omitted from the notification. It cannot therefore be said that all the powers comprised in Sub-section (1) had been delegated when there is explicit indication that at least one was reserved. Again if the Central Government intended to divert itself of all its powers in relation to foodstuffs and delegate them to State Government the notification would not have been worded in the manner in which it has been worded. It would have said that the powers conferred on the Central Government by Sub-section (1) of Section 3 to make orders to provide for regulating or prohibiting the production supply and distribution and trade and commerce therein in relation to foodstuffs shall be exercisable also by a State Government. The Central Government did not say so in the notification. In fact therefore the power under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 not made the subject-matter of delegation.
These decisions undoubtedly support Mr. G Ramaswari However the learned Advocate-General argued that both Punjab and Haryana and the Allahabad High Courts were not correct in holding that all the powers u/s 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act could not be delegated to the State Government by Section 4 of the Act. According to the learned Advocate General delegation does not amount to abdication or parting with the powers of the authority delegating the powers but it only confers power on the delegate to perform acts which other-wise he would not be in a position to do it himself. The learned Advocate-General submitted that under G.S.R. No. 800 dated 9th June 1978 what has been delegated is all the powers to make an order providing for regulating or prohibiting the production supply and distribution of an essential Commodity and trade and commerce therein. In our opinion the learned Advocate-General is right in his submission. WILLS, J. said in Huth v. Clarke 1890 25 O.B.D. 391 extracted in Gwalior Rayon Mills v. Asst. Comm S.T. AIR 1977 S.C. 1660 states thus:
Delegation as the word is generally used does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself It is never used by legal writers so far as I am aware, as implying that the delegating person parts with his power in such a manner as to denude himself of his rights.
In Gwalior Rayon Mills v. Asst. Commr., S.T. AIR 1977 S.C. 1660 the Supreme Court has observed as follows (at page 1673):
Delegation is not the complete handing over or transference of a power from one person or body of persons to another. Delegation may be defined as the entrusting, by a person or body of persons, of the exercise of a power residing in that person or body of persons, to another person or body of persons, with complete power of revocation or amendment remaining in the grantor or delegator. It is important to grasp the implications of this for much confusion of thought has unfortunately resulted from'' assuming that delegation involves or may involve the complete abdication of (sic) gation of a power. This is precluded by the deiaitio B. Delegation often involves the granting of discretionary authority to another but such authority is purely derivative. The ultimate power always remains in the delegator and is never renounced.
The Gujarat High Court bad occasion to consider the notification No. G.S R. 906, issued by the Central Government on 9th June 1966 in Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi Vs. Collector of Bulsar and Others, . The Gujarat High Court held that under the said notification the State Government obtained all the powers of the Central Government u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. To quote Talati J., who spoke for the Bench-
The above notification is issued by the Central Government u/s 5 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955. In view of that notification the State Government got all the powers which the Central Government had u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Reading Section 5 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955, it becomes clear that the Parliament itself delegated the power to the State Government through the Central Government and therefore there is no question of excessive delegation.
G.S.R. No. 800 as already state disinpari material with G.S.R. No. 906 which was considered by the Gujarat High Court in the above decision via., Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi Vs. Collector of Bulsar and Others, ; State v. Suraj Bhan A.I.R.1972 A11 401 We are of the view under the above notification all the powers of the Central Government u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act have been delegated of the State Government in terms of Section 5 of the Act. We are unable to agree with the Bench decision of the Allahabad right Court in State v. Suraj Bhan that what has been delegated under notification are only certain enumerated powers u/s 3(2) of the Act. in our opinion, the words without erejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) found in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 are significant. Sub-section (1) deals with the powers to provide by order for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of an essential commodity and trade and commerce therein. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 contains only illustrations of the powers contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 3. On a reading of the notification (sic) Whole, we are unable to agree with the contention (sic) by Mr. G. Ramaswami that the Central Government has only delegated the powers enumerated under Sub-section (2). We are equally unable to accept the correction that if the notification is interpreted in such a manner that all the powers u/s 3 have been assigned it amount to abdication of the powers of the Central Government. We therefore reject the second of the contentions of Mr. G. Rainaswami.
The learned Advocate-General contended in the alternative that even assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. G. Namaswami was correct in his submission that what has been delegated under G.S.R. 800 is only the power of the Central Government to provide for matters (sic) in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 other than Clause (g) order will be valid as it will fall fall under Clause (d) of Sub-section (2) of section 3. Clause (d) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 deals with
regulating by licenses permits or otherwise the storage transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition use or consumption of any essential commodity.
The argument of the learned Advocate-General is regulation in certain context will include prohibition as well while the connection of Mr. G. Ramaswami is regulation can not take in prohibition. In Narendra Kumar and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, ; while dealing with reasonable restrictions Occurring in Article 19(f) and (g) of the Constitution of India the Supreme Court observed as follows:
It is reasonable to think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word restriction to be sufficiently wide to save laws ''inconsistent'' with Article 19(1) or taking away the rights conferred by the Article provided this in consistency of taking away was reasonable in the interests of the different matters mentioned in the clause. There can be no doubt therefore that they intended the were restriction to include cases of ''prohibition'' also. The connection that a law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved cannot therefore be accepted. It is undoubtedly correct however, that when as in the present case the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition special care has to be taken by the Court to use that the test of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Court.
The Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Hind Stone and Others, had occasion to consider the scope of the word regulation used in Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957. Section 15 of the said Act authorised the making of rules for regulating the grant of mining leases and not for prohibiting them. Rule 8(c) of the Rules provided that the State Government themselves may engage in quarrying black granite and leases may be granted in favour of a corporation wholly owned by the State Government. Rule 8(c) provided that leases for quarrying black granite in favour of private persons are banned. It was contended before the Supreme Court that Section 15 of the Act authorised the making of rules only regulating leases and not prohibiting them and hence Rule 8(s) was ultra vire of Section 15 In this context the Supreme Court observed as follows:
Well known cases on the subject right from Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo and Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion (1896) A.C. 348 up to State of U.P. and Others Vs. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and Others, ; were brought to our attention. We do not think that Regulation has that rigidity of meaning as never to take in ''prohibition''. Much depends on the context in which the expression is used in the Statute and the object sought to be achieved by the contemplated regulation. It was observed by Mathew J. in G.K. Krishnan and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, The word regulation has no fixed Connotation. Its meaning differs according to the nature of the thing to which it is applied. In modern statutes concerned as they are with economic and social activities, regulation must of necessity receive so wide an interpretation that in Certain situations it must exclude competition to the public sector from the private sector. More so in a welfare State it was pointed out by the Privy Council in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales (1950) A.C. 235 and we agree with what was stated therein that the problem whether an enactment was regulatory or something more or whether a restriction was direct or only remote or only incidental involved, not so much legal as political, social or economic consideration and that it could not be laid down that in no circumstances could the exclusion or competition so as to create a monopoly, either in a Slate of Common wealth agency be justified. Each case it was said, must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting of time and circumstances and it might be that in regard to some economic activities and at some stage of social development, prohibition with a view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable manner of regulation. The statute with which we are concerned the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act is aimed as we have already said more than ones at the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals. Surely, in the case of a scarce mineral to permit exploitation by the State or its agency and to prohibit exploitation by private agencies is the most effective method of conservation and prudent exploitation. If you (sic) to conserve for the future you must prohibit in the present We have no doubt that the prohibiting of leases is certain oases is part of the regulation contemplated by Section 15 of the Act.
We are of the view that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court with regard to the connotation of the word regulati (sic) applies to the case on hand as well. The object of the Essential Commodities Act is to provide for the control of production supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in commodities which are specified in the Act, as set out in the (sic). It aims at equitable distribution of essential commodities. The order itself has been passed in the interest of the general public Consequently in the context of the situation, the word regulate on in Clause (d) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act must also mean prohibition. This is all the more so when Section 3(1) itself speaks of regulating or prohibiting. We are not impressed with the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that since the word regulate as found in Clause (d) in contra distinction with the word prohibition in Clause (c) the word regulating in clause must not be given the (sic) of prohibiting. We therefore accept the contention of the learned Advocate-General that even if we assume for the sake of argument that Mr. G. Ramaswami is right in his submission that what has been delegated to the State Government is only the power enumerated under Sub-section (2) of Section 3, under Clause (d) the State Government will be entitled to make an order prohibitions the transport of an essential commodity.
In view of the opinion we have formed on the above Contentions of the learned Advocate-General, it is unnecessary for us to consider the other alternative, contention of the learned Advocate-General that the validity of the Order can be sustained under Article 162 of the Constitution read with Entry 33 of List III. In this connection we may only refer to the fact that the learned Advocate-General cited the decisions in Badri Prasad v. State Sarkari Sasta Ananj Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P and Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, .
The third contention of Mr. G. Ramaswami was that the prohibition contained in Clause 3 (1-A) of the Order is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and that it is violative of Article 301 of the Constitution as well. According to the learned Counsel it amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade. In M/s Laxmi Khandasari v. State of U.P. AIR 1981 S.C. 8731 the Supreme Court observed as follows:
Fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution are neither absolute nor unlimited but are subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the State in pubic interest under clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19 As to what are reasonable restrictions would naturally depend on the nature and circumstances of the case, the character of the statute, the object which it seeks to serve the existing circumstances, the extent of the evil sought to be remedied as also the nature of restraint or restriction placed on the rights of the citizen. It difficult to lay down any hard or fast rule of universal application hut in imposing such restrictions the State must adopt an objective standard amounting to a social control by restricting the rights of the citizens where the necessities of the situation demand. Further restrictions may be partial, complete, permanent or temporary but they mast bear a close (sic) with the object in the interest of which they are imposed. Another important consideration is that the restriction must be in public interest and are imposed by sriking a just balance between the deprivation of right and the danger or evil sought to be avoided. Thus, where restrictions are imposed on a citizen carrying on a trade or commerce in an essential commodity the aspect of controlled economy and fair and equitable distribution to the consumer at a reasonable price leaving an appreciable margin of profit to the producer is undoubtedly a consideration which does not make the restriction unreasonable.
In M/s. New India Sugar Works v. State of U.P. the Supreme Court observed as follows:
It is manifest that individual interests, however precious they may be, must yield to the larger interest of the community, namely, in the instant case, the large body of the consumers of sugar. In fact, even if the Petitioners have to bear some loss there can be no question of the restrictions imposed on the Petitioners being unreasonable.
In Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI), this Court observed as follows:
If fair price is to be fixed leaving a reasonable margin of profit, there is never any question of infringement of fundamental right to carry on business by imposing reasonable restrictions.
In determinating the reasonableness of a restriction imposed by law in the field of industry, trade or commerce it has to be remembered that the mere fact that some of these who are engaged in these are alleging loss after the imposition of law will not render the law unreasonable.
Similar view was taken by this Court in the case of Prag Ice and Oil Mills and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI), where the Court speaking through (sic), C.J., observed as follow:
It has also to be remembered that the object is to secure equitable distribution and availability at fair prices so that it is the interest of the consumer and not of the producer which is the determining factor in applying any objective tests at any particular time.
We have already referred to the fact that the order itself has been promulgated to maintain equitable distribution of paddy at fair prices to the vulnerable sections of the community. In order to achieve this object it is necessary that the Government should have sufficient "supply of paddy particularly in the context of the present drought conditions of which judicial notice can ''be taken. It is equally not disputed that Thanjavor District is the largest paddy producing district in the State. Naturally therefore the Government felt it necessary to prevent transport of paddy from this district so (bat this paddy cannot be sold in other district at very huge prices where the production is smaller or practically nil. Further, the order itself is temporary. We cannot also ignore the economic production and distribution of paddy. The feet that in such a process the margin of profit to the producer is low would not make the restriction unreasonable. We there fore reject the third of the contentions of Mr. G. Ramaswami.
The last of the contentions of Mr. G. Ramaswami is that Clause 3(1-A)of the Order is violative of Article 301 of the Constitution of India. This contention of Mr. G. Ramaswami is answered by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Shobha v. State where the U.P. Paddy (Restriction of Movement) Order 1958 was sought to be challenged as ultra "vires and hit by Articles 301 to 304 of the Constitution of India. The Allahabad High Court observed as follows:
Many orders similar to the impugned order were framed u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and so far it has not been held by any Court that they or any one of them is invalid because of the provisions of Articles 301 imposed by striking a just balance between the deprivation of right and the danger or evil sought to be avoided. Thus, where restrictions are imposed on a citizen carrying on a trade or commerce in an essential commodity the aspect of controlled economy and fair and equitable distribution to the consumer at a reasonable price leaving an appreciable margin of profit to the producer is undoubtedly a consideration which does not make the restriction unreasonable.
In M/s. New India Sugar Works v. State of U.P. the Supreme Court observed as follows:
It is manifest that individual interests, however precious they may be, must yield to the larger interest of the community namely, in the instant case, the large body of the consumers of sugar. In fact, even if the Petitioners have to bear some loss there can be no question of the restrictions imposed on the Petitioners being unreasonable.
In Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI), this Court observed as follows:
If fair price is to be fixed leaving a reasonable margin of profit, there is never any question of infringement of fundamental right to carryon business by imposing reasonable restrictions.
In determinating the reasonableness of a restriction imposed by law in the field of industry, trade or commerce it has to be remembered that the mere fact that some of these who are engaged in these are alleging loss after the imposition of law will not render the law unreasonable.
Similar view was taken by this Court in the case of Prag fee and 0il Mills v. Union of India where the Court speaking through (sic) C.J., observed as follows:
template by Article 301. They are excluded from and purview of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution for the simple reason that they do not hamper trade, commerce or intercourse but rather facilitate them. The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act is, without doubt a regulatory measure. Parliament having enacted it for the express purpose of the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. The Act and the rules properly made there under are therefore outside the purview of Article 301. Even otherwise Article 302 which enables Parliament by law to impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest also furnishes an answer to the claim based on the alleged contravention of Article 301. The Mines and Minerals, (Regulation and Development) Act is a law enacted by Parliament and declared by Parliament to be expedient in the public interest.
The same principle will apply to the Order impugned herein. It is made in the exercise of the powers conferred u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. The order itself is a regulatory measure and we agree with the learned Advocate-General that Articles 301 to 304 stand excluded. We therefore hold that the Order is not hit by Article 301 of the Constitution of India.
In the result, the writ appeals are allowed and the writ petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
The order of the Court was made by Singh C.J. After the judgment was pronounced in the above case an oral prayer was made by Mr. Doraisami learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondent Petitioners, for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court wader Article 133(1) of to Constitution of India. We do not however consider that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance which, in our opinion, needs to be decided by be Supreme Court. The prayer for certificate is accordingly refused.