The State of Tamil Nadu vs M. Ramaswamy

K. Raviraja Pandian, J.—The issue involved in these writ appeals is squarely covered by the Division Bench judgment of this Court dated

23.2.2007, made in W.P. No. 28461 of 2003, wherein the Division Bench, following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of

Tamil Nadu and Another Vs. P. Krishnamurthy and Others, , has passed an order to the following effect:

...2. Similar matter came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy reported in 2006

4 L.W.635, therein, while the Court upheld the validity of Rule 38A, which vests the exclusive right to quarry sand in the State Government and

that part of Rule 38A, which purports to terminate quarrying leases/ permissions, observed as follows:

In regard to mining leases subsisting as on 2.10.2003, we have read down Rule 38A as terminating such leases in terms of the contract (lease

deeds) by six months, without assigning cause and without any liability to pay compensation. Such of those writ petitioners (respondents herein)

whose leases were subsisting on 2.10.2003 (and whose activities were stopped with effect from that day) will be entitled to carry on the quarrying

activities for a period of six months or for the actual unexpired period of the lease (as on 2.10.2003), whichever is less. This benefit will be

available to even those who have orders of court for grant of mining leases, but where mining leases were not executed for one reason or the other.

It is, however, made clear that the State Government is at liberty to prematurely terminate the leases for any of the causes mentioned in Section

4A(2), by giving a notice and hearing u/s 4A(3), if they want to terminate any lease within the said period of six months.

We, accordingly, allow these appeals in part. In place of the conditions stipulated by the Division Bench while upholding the validity of Rule

38A, we hold and direct as follows:

(i) That part of Rule 38A which vests the exclusive right to quarry sand, in the State Government, is upheld.

(ii) That part of Rule 38A which purports to terminate quarrying leases/permissions forthwith (from 2.10.2003) is read down in terms of Para 26

above.

(iii) The provision in Rule 38A for refund of proportionate lease amount for the unexpired period of lease and unadjusted seigniorage fee, shall

remain undisturbed.

(iv) It is made clear that except to the limited relief as a consequence of reading down as per para 26 above, the respondents will not be entitled to

any other reliefs which have been granted by the High Court.

(v) Parties to bear their respective costs.

The present case being covered by the Supreme Court decision rendered in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy reported in

2006 4 L.W.635 (stated supra), this Writ Petition is also disposed of with same and similar terms. Consequently, the connected W.P.M.P. No.

34768 of 2003 is closed. There will be no order as to costs.

The Supreme Court in the above referred judgment granted relief to the lease holder and others which reads as under:

In regard to mining leases subsisting as on 2-10-2003, we have read down Rule 38-A as terminating such leases in terms of the contract (lease

deeds) by six months, without assigning cause and without any liability to pay compensation. Such of those writ petitioners (the respondents herein)

whose leases were subsisting on 23-10-2003 (and whose activities were stopped with effect from that day) will be entitled to carry on the

quarrying activities for a period of six months or for the actual unexpired period of the lease (as on 2-10-2003), which ever is less. This benefit will

be available to even those who have orders of the court for grant of mining leases, but where mining leases were not executed for one reason or

the other. It is, however, made clear that the State Government is at liberty to prematurely terminate the leases for any of the causes mentioned in

Section 4-A(2), by giving a notice and hearing u/s 4-A(3), if they want to terminate any lease within the said period of six months.

Here in this case also, the appellant has obtained an order from this Court for alternative site. However, lease deed was not executed.

Therefore, in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled

to the relief as ruled out by the Supreme Court, which we have extracted above.

With this observation, the writ appeals are allowed to that extent on similar terms as held by the Supreme Court. However, there is no order as

to costs.