High CourtsSingle Bench(1992) 07 P&H CK 0078

The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs Lajja Ram Garg and Sons and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 20 July 1992 · Citation: (1992) 102 PLR 702 : (1992) 2 RCR(Rent) 376

HON’BLE JUDGES
N.K. Kapoor, J
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision No. 3212 of 1991

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

4 paragraphs · 1,031 words

N.K. Kapoor, J.—This revision petition is against the order of the Additional District Judge, Ambala, dated 10.5.1991 vide which his application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing of the appeal was dismised and resultantly the appeal was also ordered to be dismissed.

2.

Briefly put, the plaintiffs filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 35,393.26 on account of a contract entered into between the parties which claim was decreed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 12.9.1988. The defendants feeling dissatisfied with the decretal of the claim of the plaintiffs with interest to file an appeal applied for obtaining certified copies of the judgment and decree on 14.9.1988 and were able to get the copies of the judgment and decree on 28.9.1988. The appeal, however, was filed on 4.1.1989 i. e. beyond the period of limitation. The petitioners filed an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The revision for condonation of delay was that as per law prevalent in Uttar Pradesh an appeal against decretal amount of Rs. 20,000/- and above is to be filed in the High Court and so the petitioners thought that the period of limitation for filing appeal is 90 days. Besides, a communication was addressed to Law Department of Haryana so as to advise in the matter. Reply of the Law Department, Haryana, reached the government counsel on 9.12 1988. Thus, it is thereafter that the Chief Conservator of Forests, the concerned department, wrote to the Uttar Pradesh Government (Law Department) for seeking their opinion. It is thereafter that the Legal Remembrancer to the Government of Uttar Pradesh requested the Legal Remembrancer to the Government of Haryana vide memo dated 22.12.1988 to file the appeal and so the appeal was filed on 4.1.1939 i. e. after the winter vacations. The respondents opposed this application on the ground that only the period spent in obtaining copies has to be excluded for counting the period of limitation and this way the appeal is beyond limitation and there is no valid ground to condone the delay. The lower appellate Court did not find any justification in condoning the delay and so dismissed the application.

3.

The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the Court had erred in law in ignoring the various factors which lead to the delay in filing of the appeal. As has been stated by the petitioners that the copies of the judgment and decree were received only on 6.12.1988 whereupon this matter was referred by the Chief Conservator of Forests to the Law Department of Uttar Pradesh on 6/ 17.12.1988, thus it cannot be said that the petitioner did not take suitable measure in this regard. In fact, according to the counsel for the petitioners, the department acted very swiftly i. e. as soon as it got the instructions to challenge the judgment and decree by way of appeal, moved in the matter and sent the papers without any unnecessary delay. In support of his contentions the counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, and Punjab Higher Qualified Teachers'' Union (Non-Petitioners) and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, .

4.

I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel and finds merit in it. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the State Government has to act through various agencies which consequently leads to delay. It has been observed by the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another''s case (supra) that, "in fact on account of an impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file pushing, and passing on the buck ethos, delay on part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve." Similarly, in G. Ramegowda s case (supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that, therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitute ''sufficient cause'' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, by somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural-red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible", As has come on record affer the decision of the case on 12.9.1988, the Law Officer of the Uttar Pradesh Government sent the necessary communication to the Legal Remembrancer to Government of Haryana who in turn sent to Uttar Pradesh Government memo dated 4.10.1988 (received by the government on 10.10.1988). It is, thereafter on 13.10 1988 that Shri B. S. Kandari, Deputy Ranger, was deputed to examine this matter and since copies of the judgment and decree had not been received, the Law Department addressed another communication to the Legal Remembrancer to Government of Haryana, for expediting the necessary information and sending the copy of the judgment and decree. The department, however, under a bona fide mistake that the appeal is maintainable in the High Court since the decretal amount exceeds Rs. 20,000/- erroneously took the period of limitation for filing such an appeal to be 90 days instead of 30 days as in the instant case. The application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act details various grounds which led to the delay in filing of the appeal. The cumulative effect of various reasons assigned for the delay in filing the appeal can be construed as a sufficient cause in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The trial Court has either ignored or side-tracked and thus has refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under law. I accordingly accept the revision petition, set aside the impugned order and remit the case back to the Additional District Judge, Ambala, who will admit the appeal and decide the same on merits. Since the matter has already been delayed on account of pendency of the revision petition, it is directed that the appeal be disposed of most expeditiously, preferably within six months. No costs.