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Judgment
S.N. Variava, J.—Some of these Appeals are filed by the Collector of CentralExcise. Other Appeals are filed by Iron or Steel ManufacturingCompanies. In all these Appeals common questions of law arise.Therefore all these Appeals are being disposed of by this commonjudgment.
Briefly stated the facts are as follows:
Under Section 2(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 "Ironand steel including manufacture of products of iron and steel" areessential commodities. Section 3 of this Act enables the CentralGovernment to control production, supply and distribution of essentialcommodities. One of the manners of control could be by regulatingprice at which the essential commodities are to be bought or cold.
Pursuant to the powers given u/s 3 of the EssentialCommodities Act, 1955 the Government of India issued the Iron andSteel (Control) Order, 1956. Clauses 15 and 17 (b) of the said Orderreads as follows:
"15. Power to fix price. - (1) The Controller may formtime to time by notification in the Gazette of India, fix themaximum prices at which any iron or steel may be sold (a)by a producer, (b) by stockholder including a controlledstockholder and (c) by any other person or class ofpersons. Such price or prices may differ for iron and steelobtaining from different sources and may includeallowances for contribution to and payment from anyEqualisation Fund established by the Controller forequalising freight, the concession rates payable to eachproducer or class of producers under agreements enteredinto by the Controller with the producers from time to timeand any other disadvantages. The Controller may also, bya general or special order in writing, require any person orclass of person enumerated above to pay such amount onaccount of allowances for contribution to any EqualisationFund, within such period and in such manner as theController may direct in this behalf:
Provided that the Controller may, with the approvalof the Central Government, fix maximum prices for sale ofiron or steel (a) by a producer, (b) by a stockholderincluding a Controller Stockholder and (c) by any otherperson or class of persons for export outside India andsuch prices may be different from the maximum sellingprices fixed for sale for other purposes.
Provided further that the Controller may, with theapproval of the Central Government, fix maximumcontroller prices for sale of iron or steel by the RegisteredProducers and Controlled Stockholders to themanufacturers of engineering goods for fabricatingproducts for export, at prices lower than the maximumselling prices fixed for sale for other purposes.
(2) For the purpose of applying the prices notifiedunder Sub-clause (1) the Controller may himself classifyand iron and steel and may, if no appropriate price hasbeen so notified, fix such price as he considersappropriates:
Provided that where any stocks are required by aspecial order of the Controller to be moved from one placeto another or are to be sold at a place which is notconnected with any railhead, the Controller may direct thatthe maximum prices fixed under Sub-clause (1) or (2)shall not apply to such stocks and may, in respect of suchstocks, specify the maximum prices at which the iron orsteel may be sold.
(3) No producer or stockholder or other person shallsell or offer to sell, and no person shall acquire, any iron orsteel at a price exceeding the maximum prices fixed underSub-clause (1) or (2).
17-B. Power of Central Government to set upcommittees, etc. - (1) For the purpose of giving effect tothe provisions of this order, with respect to any category ofiron or steel, whether such category is subject to orexempt from the operation of all or any such provisionsthe Central Government may, by notification in the OfficialGazette, set up, from time to time, such committeesbodies or authorities as it may consider necessary.
(2) The committee, body or authority set up underSub-clause (1) shall carry out such functions as may bespecified in the notification under which such committee,body or authority is set up."
Thus it is to be seen that what could be fixed is the price. TheCommittees which were to be set up were only to carry out suchfunctions as would be specified in the Notification under which they areset up.
By a Notification bearing No. SC(1)-1(5)/71-B dated 7th April,1971, a Joint Plant Committee (JPA) and Steel Priority Commit(SPC) were set up. Clause 8 of this Notification reads as follows:
"(8) The Committee may determine, announce and listprices (base prices as well as extras) from time to time ofall categories of iron or steel not subject to price controlunder Clause 15 of the Iron and Steel (Control). Order,1956. The prices so determined will be ex-works prices.The Controller shall add a fixed element of equalisedfreight to the ex-works prices announced from time to timein order to ensure that buyers of steel all over the countrypay the same railway freight irrespective of the distancefrom the source of supply. The Committee may take suchmeasures as it considers necessary or desirable to ensurethat buyers of iron or steel al over the country pay thesame price."
It must be mentioned that the Committees constituted under theNotification consisted of a Chairman, i.e. the Iron and Steel Controller,one representative of each of the main Steel Plants i.e. one fromTISCO, one from the Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, one fromthe Hindustan Steel Limited, Raurkela, one from the Hindustan SteelLimited, Bhilai, one from the Hindustan Steel Limited, Durgapur and arepresentative of the Railways. Thus the majority of members inthese Committees were from the Iron and Steel Companies who arebefore this Court.
By another Notification dated 27th December, 1998 the earlierNotification was amended. Sub-clauses (9A) and (9B) were added.These read as follows:
"(9A). The Committee may add an element to the ex-works prices determined under Sub-clause (8) forconstituting a fund for modernisation, research anddevelopment with the object of ensuring the production ofiron and steel in the desired categories and grades by themain steel plants. In the matter of operation of this fund,the Committee shall perform its functions in accordancewith the subject to, such regulations or directions as maybe issued by the Central Government, from time to time.
(9B). The Committee may also add any other element tothe ex-works prices determined under Sub-clause (8) toenable it to discharge its functions and to implementspecific scheme entrusted to it by the CentralGovernment."
At a meeting held by JPC on 16th January, 1992 note was takenof a Notification No. SC/16(6)/91. It was resolved that the memberssteel plants would add to their ex-works prices certain elements. Therelevant Clause of the Notification reads as follows:
"(4) The Committee may from time to time require themember steel plants to add the elements listed below totheir ex-works prices of all or any of the categories of ironand steel and to remit the same to the Committee withinsuch periods as may be specified:
(i) an element of price towards the SteelDevelopment Fund for financing schemes,projects and other capital expenditures frommodernisation, research and development,rehabilitation, diversification, renewals andreplacement, balancing, additions to capacity,major new investments or any other programmesfor improving the quantum of technology orefficiency of productions of Iron and Steel or theirquality.
Explanation: The Committee shall perform itsfunctions relating to the Steel Development Fundin accordance with the subject to such orders asdirections or may be issued by the CentralGovernment in this behalf from time to time.
(ii) an element of price for enabling the Committee todischarge its functions and to implement specificschemes entrusted to it by the CentralGovernment;
(iii) An element of price towards the EngineeringGoods Export Assistance Fund." (emphasissupplied)
Pursuant to this Notification these Companies started adding thatelement to their ex-works price. The Excise Department claims thatexcise is payable even on this component.
The questions which therefore arise are (i) whether the elementsrequired to be added by the members steel plants, as per the decisionof the JPC, are admissible deductions u/s 4(4)(d)(ii) of theCentral Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter called the said Act) i.e.whether they fall within the definition of the term "other taxes" and (ii)whether such addition, which is a compulsory impost, can beconsidered and be price on which excise duty is payable by the parties.
Mr. Desai has submitted that the Iron or Steel Companies haveto compulsory add this element to the ex-works price. He submittedthat this therefore is a compulsory exaction. He relied upon the caseNiyantaran Adhiniyam, 1964. This Act regulated storage, gradation,price, supply and distribution, in Uttar Pradesh, of molasses producedby the sugar factories. Section 8(4) of the Act provided that sugarfactories would be liable to pay to the State Governmentadministrative charges as may from time to time be notified. Theseadministrative charges were based on the quantity of molasses soldand supplied by the sugar factories. Section 5 of the Act enabled thefactories to recover these charges from the person to whom themolasses were sold. The question before the Court was whether thiscompulsory exaction fell within the term "other taxes" in Section4(4)(d)(ii) of the Central Excise Act. This Court held as follows:
"7. u/s 4(4)(d)(ii) of the Central Excise Act whatis to be excluded from the assessable value is the amountof duty of excise, sales tax and "other taxes". Taxes, assuch, are not defined in the Central Excise Act. If theexpression "tax" is to be understood in the absence of anydefinition, it would certainly cover any levy. In D.G. Gose and Co. (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala and Another, , broad meaning had been given to theexpression "tax". In such an event, administrative chargeswould be covered u/s 4(4)(d)(ii) as "othertaxes" because it is a compulsory exaction made under anenactment and, therefore, a duty or impost and suchimpost must be held to be in the nature of a 'tax' coveredby the aforesaid provisions."
Strongly relying on these observations, Mr. Desai submitted that itthis case also there is a compulsory exaction and therefore suchcompulsory exaction is in the nature of "tax" and is covered by thewords "other taxes" in Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the Central Excise Act
Mr. Desai also draw the attention of this Court to the case of Ispat Industries Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India and Others, .In this case the Petitioner who was also a manufacturer of iron andsteel claimed that they were entitled to financial assistance from theSteel Development Fund. This Court set out all the relevant provisionsand then held as follows:
"11. As seen above, SDF was created by notificationissued under Clause 17-B of the Control Order. Main steelplants form the primary units of the Joint Plant Committee.It wee only the members steel plants or the main steelplants who were subjected to add an element of their ex-works price and remit the same towards SDF. SAIL andTISCO were the member steel plants. SAIL was havingfour plants at Bhilai, Bakaro, Durgapur and Rourkela.Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. subsequently gotmerged with SAIL. By notification dated 16-1-1992 theCentral Government withdrew the price restrictions underthe Control Order and thereafter by notification dated 21-4-1994contributions by the member steel producerstowards SDF was also discontinued. It is the CentralGovernment, which exercises control over SDF thoughthere is no backing of any statutory provision for creationof SDF. The primary object of SDF was to enable the mainsteel producers for modernization, research anddevelopment with the object of ensuring the production ofiron and steel in the desired categories and grades by themain steel plants. Other steel producers who were knownas secondary producers were not members of the JointPlant Committee. They were not subjected to add anelement of ex-works price of steel but could add anyelement of their choice and not to make remittance of thesame to SDF. It does not stand to reason as to how thesesecondary producers are entitled to claim any amount fromthe corpus of SDF or to get some directions issuedrespecting the use of SDF. The petitioner startedproduction only in April 1998 when four years prior to thatremittance to SDF had been discontinued. It is notdisputed that the petitioner was not a member of the JointPlant Committee and did not remit any amount towardsthe corpus of SDF. The question is if in thesecircumstances the petitioner could advance a claim orexercise a right on SDF in any manner.
It were the members of the Joint PlantCommittee who were made bound to add an element ofex-works price and to remit that amount for theconstitution of SDF. It has been stated by the firstrespondent, Union of India, through the affidavit filed bythe fourth respondent, Joint Planat Committee, that fundsout of SDF were disbursed to the member steel plants bythe SDF Managing Committee as per directions issued bythe Central Government from time to time. It is thensubmitted that since early 1990s there has been a generalrecession in the steel industry. SAIL had approached theCentral Government for its financial and businessrestructuring. SAIL had taken over Indian Iron and SteelCompany Ltd., a sick company in the year 1978. IndianIron and Steel Company Ltd. is a wholly-owned subsidiaryof SAIL. The proposal given by SAIL to the CentralGovernment contained various components and measuresincluding wolver of loans from SDF made over to membersteel plants which were under SAIL. It will be noticed thatthe amount of SDF was not in fact remitted to the CentralGovernment in the books of SAIL and its member steelplants. This proposal of SAIL, it would appear, has sincebeen accepted by the Central Government by its letterdated 18-2-2000 which we have reproduced above.
While there was price control under the ControlOrder during the period 1978-94 when the remittance toSDF was made by the main steel producers, the petitionerwas nowhere in the picture and was not subjected to anyprice control like the main steel producers. The petitionerand other steel producers were free to produce and sell theIron and steel products in the market on the prevailingprices. It has been pointed that the price fixed by thepetitioner of its products was much higher than the controlprice which included elements of SDF. While the collectionand remittance to SDF has been discontinued w.e.f. April1994, the petitioner made its claim for the first time in1999 which would appear to be rather incongruous. It issubmitted that the claim made by the petitioner is notbona fide and the writ petition has been filed with ulteriormotives, which are not difficult to fathom. SAIL hadstressed immediate need for restructuring and modernizingall the main steel plants. Due to recession, SAIL has beenpassing through a severe financial position and has tosuffer a loss of Rs. 1574 crores in 1998-99. It has furtherto suffer the burden of interest to the tune of Rs. 2017crores per annum for modernization. In the aforesaidcircumstances, the petitioner does not have any right toclaim any relief in the writ petition pertaining to utilizationof SDF. It is quite apparent that from the very nature ofthe creation of SDF, the manner of remittance to SDF andpurpose of its utilization, it is a fund created ultimately forthe utilization by the member steel producers only."
Mr. Desai submitted that this case shows that what was being addedwas an element to the ex-works price and that the exaction was acompulsory exaction. He submitted that the manufacturers had nooption but to add this element to the ex-works price and to then remitthat amount to JPC and the SPC. He submitted that these compulsoryexactions were clearly having the nature of a tax.
In order to understand the submission, the provisions of Section4 of the said Act need to be look at. The relevant provisions of Section4 read as follows:
"4. Valuation of excisable goods for purposes ofcharging of duty of excise. - (1) Where under this Act,the duty of excise is chargeable on any excisable goodswith reference to value, such value shall, subject to theother provisions of this section, be deemed to be--
(a) the normal price thereof, that is to say, theprice at which such goods are ordinarily soldby the assesses to a buyer in the course ofwholesale trade for delivery at the time andplace of removal, where the buyer is not arelated person and the price is the soleconsideration for the sale:
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
(4). For the purpose of this section,-
(a) "assesses" means the person who is liable to pay the duty of excise under this Act and includes his agent;
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
(d) "value" in relation to any excisable goods,-
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
(ii) does not include the amount of theduty of excise, sales tax and other taxes,if any, payable on such goods and,subject to such rules as may be made,the trade discount (such discount notbeing refundable on any accountwhatsoever) allowed in accordance withthe normal practice of the wholesaletrade at the time of removal in respect ofsuch goods sold or contracted for sale;"
It is thus to be seen that under the said Act excise duty is chargeableon the value of the goods. The value is the normal price i.e. the priceat which such goods are ordinarily sold by the assesses to a buyer,where the buyer is not a related person and the price is the soleconsideration for sale. From the price at which the assesses sells tothe buyer the only deductions permissible are those under Sub-clause 4(d)(ii)i.e. excise, sales tax and other taxes and in certain cases tradediscounts. It is nobody's case that the extra element is an excise or asales tax or a trade discount. The only question is whether it wouldfall within the meaning of the term "other taxes".
In Kisan Sahkari Chinni Mills Ltd.'s case, to give a broadmeaning to the term "tax", reliance was placed upon the case in D.G. Gose and Co. (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala and Another, . In D.G. Gose's case the question was regarding the validity oftax imposed by the Kerala State on buildings by virtue of the KeralaBuilding Tax Act, 1975. The validity of this Act was challenged, interalia, on the ground that this was the tax on the capital value andassesses of an individual or a Company ad therefore fell within thescope of Entry 86 of List 1 of the VII Schedule of the Constitution andnot under Entry 49 of List 2. On this basis it was urged that the Statedid not have the statutory authority to impose such a tax. In dealingwith these questions this court held as follows:
"5. The word 'tax' in its widest sense includes all moneyraised by taxation. It therefore includes taxes levied bythe Central and the State legislatures, and also thoseknown as 'rates", or other charges, levied by localauthorities under statutory powers. "taxation hastherefore been defined in Clause (28) of Article 366 of theConstitution to include "the imposition of any tax orimpost, whether general or local or special", and it hasbeen directed that "tax" shall be "construed accordingly"."
Thus it is to be seen that even though the term "tax" has been given awide interpretation to include all monies raised,t he levy still has to beby the Central or State legislatures or by some statutory authority. InKisan Sahkari Chinni Mills Ltd.'s case the imposition was under astatute enacted by the State of Utter Pradesh. Thus the levy was bythe State. It was thus held that that levy fell within the definition ofthe term "other taxes".
In the present case, it has already been held by this Court inIspat Industries' case that there is no backing of any statutoryprovision for the creation of these funds. Further it has already beenheld, and in our view correctly, that these main steel plants were theonly member steel plants. The levy was only on them and the fundwas created for the utilization by these member steel plants only.Also to be noted that even though the Essential Commodities Actempowers regulation of price, it does not empower imposition of anytaxes. The addition of an element to the ex-works price has nostatutory backing or force. It is not by the Central Government or theState Government or any local authority. It is a levy by a Committeemajority of whose members are representatives of the steel plants.The purpose of creating funds is for the benefit of these member steelplants. Such a levy, even though, it may be compulsory can never be"tax".
Mr. Desai then submitted that what was being added was anelement to the ex-works price. He submitted that this element cannotbe considered to be price on which excise duty has to be paid. It waspointed out to us that, on this question, the Customs, Excise and Gold(Control) Appellate Tribunal, Delhi (CEGAT, Delhi) had, in the case of 1997 (70) ECR 212 reported in , heldthat as the manufacturers were compelled by law to collect this chargeover and above the price without right to appropriate it for themselvesand with duty of making it over a third party i.e. the JPC, the chargescould not be regarded as part of the consideration for the sale price ofthe goods. It was held that these charges could not be added fordetermining the assessable value.
It was pointed out that another matter appeared before theCalcutta branch of CEGAT. The earlier Judgment of CEGAT was shownto the Calcutta branch. The Calcutta branch in the case of SAIL and Anr.v. Collector of Central Excise, Bhubaneswar reported in 1998 (24) RLT394 (CEGAT) differed with the earlier Judgment and held that thisaddition was nothing but an element of price and that therefore thesame had to be included in determining the assessable value forpayment of excise duty.
In view of these conflicting decisions, the question was referredto a larger Bench of CEGAT. In the case of 2000 (70) ECC 785 reported in , the largerBench held that the normal price was a price at which the goods wereordinarily sold by the assesses to the buyer. It was held that if anypart of the amount paid by the buyer to the assesses was not to beappropriated by the assesses then consequently that part cannot betermed as value for the goods. In coming to this conclusion the largerBench had relied on Judgments of this Court which are set outhereinafter.
In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal Vs. Tollygunge Club Ltd., , the question was whether a surcharge collected by theassesses Club from all race goers but which had been earmarked forcharity could be deemed to be an income of the assesses andtherefore includible in the taxable income of the assesses. It was heldby this Court that income tax was a tax on income. It was held that"income" is what reaches the assesses and that it is that income whichis intended to be charged to tax under the Income Tax Act. It washeld that every receipt by the assesses is not necessarily income in hishands. It was held that the surcharge collected by the assesses wasfor the purposes of being paid over to local charities. It was held thatthis surcharge was clearly impressed with an obligation in the natureof trust for being applied for the benefit of charities. It was held thatthis surcharge was diverted before it reached the hands of theassesses and did not become part of the income of the assesses. Itwas held that such a surcharge would therefore not be regarded asincome assessable to tax.
In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), New Delhi Vs. Bijli Cotton Mills (P.) Ltd., , the question was whether certain amounts realized by theassesses on account of "Dharmada" (Charity) in addition to the pricefrom his customers could be stated to be income in the hands of theassesses which were assessable to income tax. It was held by thisCourt that though amount of "Dharmada" was undoubtedly a paymentwhich the customers were required to pay in addition to the price ofthe goods purchased from the assesses. It was held that the purchaseof the goods was only an occasion and not the consideration for the"Dharmada" amount. It was accepted that without payment of the"Dharmada" amount the customer would not be able to purchase thegoods from the assesses. It was held that this did not make thepayment involuntary because the purchaser purchased the goods ofhis own volition. It was held that the amount of "Dharmada" wasbeing collected for purposes of giving to charities and were held by theassesses under an obligation to spend them for charitable purposes.It was held that these therefore did not form income of the assesses.It was held that these amounts were not part of the price of the goodsbut were payments for specific purpose of being spent on charitablepurposes.
In the case of 2000 (70) ECC 785 , relying upon the above mentioned twodecisions of this Court CEGAT, Delhi held that "Dharmada" (charity)receipts were not includable in the assessable value u/s 4 ofthe Central Excise Act. Mr. Desai submitted that an SLP filed againstthis order was summarily rejected by this Court.
Mr. Desai submitted that all the above authorities including the larger Bench decision of CEGAT and the decision of CEGAT in Mohan &Co.'s case clearly show that when there is a compulsory impost orexaction, the assesses has to collect but the assesses cannot retain forhimself and he has to pass on the same, then such a compulsoryexaction cannot be included in the value for purposes of assessingexcise duty. He submitted that such imposts cannot be deemed to beprice. Mr. Desai submitted that the minutes of the JPC dated 16thJanuary, 1992 as well as the Notification of the same date, make itclear that what was being added/levied was an element to the ex-worksprice. He submitted that the price remained the ex-works price.He submitted that the Companies sold to the customers at the ex-worksprice. He submitted that the additional amount was merelycollected by the Companies for and on behalf of JPC and SPC. Hesubmitted that they did not retain this amount. He submitted that thiselement could not be considered to be price.
On the other hand, Mr. Rohtagi submitted that the principlesunder the Income Tax Act cannot be made applicable to the CentralExcise Act. He submitted that under the Income Tax Act what istaxable is the actual income received by the assesses for his ownbenefit. He submitted, with reference to Section 4 of the said Act, thatunder the Central Excise Act excise duty is chargeable on the value ofthe goods. He submitted that the value is the price at which the goodsare ordinarily sold by the assesses to the buyer. He submitted thattherefore the price which the buyer pays is the price on which exciseduty is leviable. He submitted that from the price that the buyer pays,the only deductions can be those set out in Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of thesaid Act. He submitted that this levy is not a "tax" and does not fallwithin the meaning of the term "other taxes". He submitted that thiselement cannot be deducted from the assessable value of the goods.
Mr. Rohtagi further points out that the element which has beenadded is an "element of price". He relied upon the Notification dated16th January, 1992 (which has been reproduced hereinabove) andpoints out Clauses 4(i), 4(ii) and 4(iii) which clearly show that whathas been added is an element of price. Mr. Rohtagi submitted thatthis element could only have been added as price because the JPC andSPC are established by virtue of the Iron and Steel (Control) Order.He submitted that the Iron and Steel (Control) Order is based on theEssential Commodities Act and under that Act there was no power tomake any levy or impose any tax on a purchaser. He submitted thatthe addition being an element of price it has to be included in theassessable value for purposes of excise duty.
We have heard the parties. In our view, Mr. Rohtagi is right.Principles on which "income" is to be determined under the IncomeTax Act cannot apply when determining "value" for purposes of ExciseDuty. Under the Income Tax Act, tax is payable on income whichreaches the assesses. On the other hand, Section 4 of the said Actshows that excise is payable on the price at which goods are ordinarilysold to the buyer. Thus the principles on which Bijli Cottons Mills case and Tollygunge Club's case were decided would not beappropriate and would not apply for deciding "value" for the purposesof the said Act. In our view the decision of CEGAT in Mohan & Co.'scase cannot be said to be good law.
We are supported in our view by the decision in the case of Hindusthan Sugar Mills Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, . In this case the question was whether the assesses was liable topay Sales Tax on the amount of railway freight collected by them fromthe purchaser. It was held that the assesses was bound to pay SalesTax on such amounts. In the case of E.I.D. Parry (I) Ltd. Vs. Asstt. Commr. of Commercial Taxes and Another, itwas held that the purchase price is the total amount of considerationfor the purchase of goods. It was held that this would include priceand also other amounts payable by the purchaser. These authoritiesare under the Sales Tax Act. The principles for computing value forpurposes of Sales Tax are similar to those of computing value forpurposes of Excise Duty. It is these principles which would apply.
In any event, a plain reading of the Notification makes it clearthat what has been added is an "element of price". Neither JPC northe SPC could have made any compulsory exaction from thepurchaser. They could only regulate prices as the powers which theyderived are only those which are conferred on them by the Notificationwhich established them. Clause 8 of the Notification dated 7th April,1971 only gave a power to determine the price. The amendedClauses (9A) and (9B), which were introduced by Notification dated27th December, 1978, also empowered them merely to add elementsto the ex-works price. In other words the ex-works price could beincreased by adding an element to it. Thus what was being added wasto the price. Another aspect to be kept in mind in ultimatebeneficiaries of these amounts are the steel plants themselves.
In our view therefore the view expressed by the larger Bench ofCEGAT, Delhi cannot be said to be the correct view. In our view, thedecision of 1997 (70) ECR 212 reported in is correct.
In this view of the matter, the Appeals filed by the Revenue areallowed. The Appeals filed by the Companies against the Judgment, inthe case of 1997 (70) ECR 212 are dismissed.
We are told that in some of the matters the question of a propercalculation of the duty also arises. We are told that CEGAT did notundertake the exercise of proper calculation as they held in favour ofthe assesses. In those cases where a question of re-calculation arises,the matters will necessarily stand referred back to CEGAT fordetermination of the exact amounts in accordance with law. Parties tojointly intimated the Office, a list of such matters. In case of disputeliberty to apply.
With these directions the Appeals stand disposed of. There willbe no order as to costs.