The Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. vs Bihar State Electricity Board and Others

Ajit Kumar Sinha, J.—The present writ petition has been filed by Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. for the following reliefs :

(a) For quashing the order dated 19.4.2000 relating to the financial year 1972-73 communicated to the petitioner vide letter No. 584 dated 19.4.2000 passed by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area, Jamshedpur whereby and whereunder he has been pleased to reject/dismiss the entire claim of the petitioner, interalia, for the financial year 1972-73 under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement.

(b) For a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to remission in Maximum Demand Charges for the financial year 1972-73 under the following heads:

(i) Remission for the period of non-supply of energy.

(ii) Remission for the period of load restriction as the petitioner was prevented from using electricity during the said period as per requirement and the production was hampered due to such load restrictions.

(iii) Remission for the period during which the petitioner was though supplied at full load but the duration was so short trial it was impossible for the petitioner to operate the plant and machinery to a level sufficient for the production and consequently the petitioner was prevented from using the same for the reasons beyond its control.

(c) For a direction upon the respondents to immediately refund the excess amount deposited by the petitioner against the maximum demand charges for the year 1972-73 after giving effect to the aforesaid claim of remission under Clause 13 of the Agreement with interest at the rate of 2% per month, especially in view of the fact that the said claim was pending before respondent No. 4 for a long time wholly due to the lapses on the part of the respondents.

(d) For restraining the respondents from raising any fresh bill pursuant to the impugned order dated 19.4.2000 passed by the respondent No. 4.

The petitioner has challenged the common order dated 19.4.2000 whereby and whereunder respondent No. 4 has been pleased to dispose of the claims of the petitioner under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement relating to different financial year while rejecting the claims of the petitioner in totality. The following chart as supplied is indicative of the case number and related financial year in question in nine writ petitions preferred by the petitioner TISCO which is being disposed of by this common order:

Case No.

Year

C.W.J.C. 1688 of 2000

1972-73

C.W.J.C. 1692 of 2000

1973-74

C.W.J.C. 1691 of 2000

1974-75

C.W.J.C. 1699 of 2000

1975-76

C.W.J.C. 1701 Of 2000

1977-78

C.W.J.C. 1690 of 2000

1978-79

C.W.J.C. 1689 of 2000

1979-80

C.W.J.C. 1694 of 2000

1980-81

C.W.J.C. 1700 of 2000

1981-82

The facts, in brief, are set out as under:

The petitioner is a Public Limited Company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at 24, Homi Mody Street, Fort, Mumbai and it has integrated Steel Plant at Jamshedpur. The main business/activities of the petitioner is to manufacture iron and steel and steel products and further to supply electricity in the township of Jamshedpur. The petitioner require regular supply of electricity in bulk quantity and also require regular supply of electricity for manufacturing electricity at Adityapur and for mining activities at Noamundi, west Bokaro and Jamaddoba and it also require the same for running the pelletising Plant at Noamundi.

The respondent Bihar State Electricity Board, as it then was (hereafter referred to as ''Board'') is a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner is a consumer under the Bihar State Electricity Board drawing power from the respondent Board. The petitioner is also a sanctioned holder of channel and supply of electricity under the Indian Electricity Act 1910 for the purposes of operating the Noamundi Iron Mines. The petitioner entered into an agreement with the Board for supply of High Tension Electricity at 33,000 volts, 3 phase, 3 wire and 50 cycles having a contract demand of 5000 KVA i.e. maximum kilovolt ampere required by the petitioner for the purposes of running the Noamundi Palletising Plant. The petitioner entered into an agreement on 8.4.1969 with the Board for supply of High Tension Electricity having a contract demand of 8000 KVA at 33,000 volts, 3 phase, 3 wire and 50 cycles, the total contract demand of the petitioner for running the iron ore mine and the palletising plant. The total contract demand of the petitioner was 13000 KVA (5000 KVA for Iron ore mine+ 8000 KVA for pelletising plant) to be supplied by the Board at 33,000 volts, 3 phase, 3 wire and 50 cycles from Noamundi Receiving Station. A minimum of 48000 KVA was required to operate Noamundi Iron Ore mine and a minimum of further 5000 KVA was required to operate one of the units of pelletising plant. Thus, for the purposes of utilizing the energy a minimum of 98000 KVA was required by the petitioner. The palletizing plant of the petitioner was to run round the clock with workers working in three shift. The relevant Clause 4 and Clause 13 of the said agreement is reproduced herein below for ready reference:

Clause-4(a) the consumer shall pay to the Board for the energy so supplied and registered as aforesaid at the rates given in the schedule provided that minimum charges as specified in the schedule appended hereto shall be paid irrespective of whether energy to that extent has been consumed or not.

(b) For the purpose of this agreement the maximum demand of the consumer for each month shall be highest large total amount of Kilo volt ampere (KVA) delivered to the consumer at the point of supply during any consecutive 30 minutes in the month.

(c) Maximum demand charges for supply in any month will be based on the maximum KVA demand for the month or 75 percent of the contract demand whichever is higher, subject to provision of Clause 13. For the first twelve months'' service the maximum demand charges for any month, will however, be based on the actual monthly maximum demand for the month.

Clause 13- If at any time the consumer is prevented from receiving or using electrical energy to be supplied under the agreement either in whole or in part due to strikes, riots, fire, floods, explosions, Act of God or any other cause reasonable beyond control; or if the Board is prevented from supplying or unable to supply such electrical energy owing to any reason or all of the causes mentioned above then the demand charge and guaranteed energy charge set out in the schedule shall be reduced in proportion to the ability of the consumer to take or the Board to supply such power and the decision of the Chief Engineer, Bihar State Electricity Board, in this respect shall be final.

The contract demand of a consumer is the maximum KVA (kilo volt ampere) for the supply of which the Board undertakes to provide facility from time to time and the Board was under a legal obligation under Clause 1(a) of the Agreement to provide for making a constant supply of electricity at the given pressures to the consumers including the petitioner. The High Tension consumers, inter alia, are liable to pay the following two charges to the Board subject to remission as provided under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement:

(i) "Energy charges" to be realized each month on actual consumption of units in a month (over this actual consumption Clause 13 of the agreement should not apply).

(ii) "Minimum base charges" (over this charge Clause 13 of the agreement applies).

(a) "Demand Charges" (commonly known as Maximum Demand Charges) i.e. KVA charges realized every month in the monthly energy bills as KVA charges)

(b) Annual Guaranteed energy units charge (commonly known as AMG charges) to be realized annually in case of shortfall in consumption of guaranteed units in a year by raising a separate bill known as AMG bill.

(c) "Demand charges" is the amount chargeable per month in respect of Board''s readiness to serve the consumer at the contract demand irrespective of whether he consumes any energy or not and is based upon the maximum demand and/or the contract demand of the consumer. However, such charges realized is subject to remission under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. Likewise "Annual Guaranteed energy units charges" is the minimum guaranteed units of energy which a consumer undertakes to consume during a year irrespective of whether he actually consumes the same or not. However, this charge is also subject to remission under Clause-13 of the High Tension Agreement.

Clause 4 of the aforesaid agreement provides that for the purpose of the agreement the maximum demand of the consumer for each month shall be the highest total amount or Kilo volt ampere (KVA) delivered to the consumer at the point of supply during any consecutive 30 minutes in a month. Clause 4 of the agreement also provides that the maximum demand charge for supply in any month will be based on maximum kilo volt ampere demand for the month or 75% of the contract demand whichever is higher subject to the provision of Clause 13. As per the provision of Clause 13 of the said agreement the consumer is entitled to proportionate reduction/remission in the demand charges and guaranteed energy charges if he has been prevented from receiving energy to be supplied under the agreement or prevented from using the electrical energy to be supplied and or if the Board is unable to supply such electrical energy under the agreement.

Sri Binod Poddar, learned Senior Counsel appearing fur the petitioner submits that immediately after installation of the palletising plant in the year 1971 the Board imposed load restriction due to less power availability. The power restriction imposed were illegal, erratic and the full power was available only for a very restricted period which affected the plant itself and led to shut down in the year 1972-73 and the petitioner was forced to lay off of its workers. This fact was brought to the notice of the respondent Board and representations were also given on 21.4.1973 followed by 4.5.1973 and also meetings were held on 17.11.1976 to ensure uninterrupted supply of power. The power problem led to frequent shut down of the palletising plant. The petitioner''s representatives also met the Chairman in this regard and the minutes of meetings were prepared and assurances were given but the instructions were not adhered to. The repeated assurance regarding installation of 132/133 KVA sub-Station and Installation of transformer so as to ensure uninterrupted power supply at contract demand to the petitioner was never given effect to by the officers of the Board and interruption/load restrictions and trapping in power supply continued at the palletising plant which led to large scale production loss and frequent closure. The meeting and the representation continued and followed thereafter between 1978 to 1980. The petitioner received a letter bearing memo No. 566 dated 15.5.1980 from the Assistant Electrical Engineer allocating only 2 MVA power to the petitioner against the contract demand of 14.2 MVA and was also asked to follow strictly the load restriction. Finally the petitioner decided to close down the plant and accordingly communicated the same to the Executive Engineer vide its letter dated 23.3.1981. No reply was received thereafter from the respondent Board.

According to the learned Sr. Counsel in spite of failure on the part of Board they continued charging maximum demand charge at the rate of 75% of the contract demand for the actual maximum demand as indicated, the maximum demand indicator whichever was higher for the entire bill period without giving any remission under Clause 13 on account of the interruption and or on account of inability on the part of the Board to supply energy at contract demand and the petitioner has paid such bill under protest. The petitioner accordingly filed its claim for proportionate remission under Clause 13 of the agreement before the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, respondent No. 4 herein, for the particular year in question. The further claim of the subsequent years for the year 1972-73 to 1975-76 and 1977-78 to 1981-82 were kept pending for the respondent No. 4 from year to year and was finally disposed of vide a common order dated 15.5.1987 rejecting the entire claim of the petitioner for remission of maximum demand charges and or A.M.G. charges.

The petitioner, being constrained filed a writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 877 of 1987 (R) inter alia for quashing of the aforesaid common order dated 15.5.1987 relating to financial years 1972-73 to 1975-76 and 1977-78 to 1981-82 passed by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, respondent No. 4. The writ petition was admitted for final hearing and vide order dated 8.7.1987 the petitioner was directed to pay Rs. 30 lakhs on account of annual minimum guarantee charges against the aforesaid years and the respondent Board was directed not to take any coercive steps during the pendency of the writ petition. The petitioner accordingly deposited the aforesaid amount. The writ petition was finally disposed of on 6.9.1995 whereby and whereunder the Hon''ble Court was pleased to quash the aforesaid order dated 15.5.1987 passed by respondent No. 4 on the ground that the points raised by the petitioner was not considered and the matter was remitted back to respondent No. 4 to pass a fresh order dealing with the various contentions raised by the petitioner and also after considering the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court as well as other judgments.

The petitioner immediately filed a representation before the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, respondent No. 4 herein, in compliance with the direction issued by the High Court vide its order dated 6.9.1995 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 877 of 1987(R) and also prayed to fix it for hearing. A written submission was also given. The petitioner did not receive any communication from respondent No. 4 which led to filing of another writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 1625 of 1997 (R) for early disposal of the claim of the petitioner under Clause 13 of the agreement for all the aforesaid years. It also filed a contempt petition M.J.C. No. 725 of 1997 (R). This Court ultimately disposed of the petition vide order dated 22.4.1998 directing the respondent No. 4 to decide the claim expeditiously, preferably within two months. It appears that again a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 1903 of 1998 (R) was filed by the petitioner to dispose of its pending claim under Clause 13 of the agreement and this Court vide its order dated 26.10.1999 directed the respondent Board to dispose of the claim within 10 weeks. It also observed that if the claim is not decided within the aforesaid period, the respondent Board will not raise claim with regard to annual minimum guarantee charges. More time was sought by the Board which was granted till 20th April, 2000. Finally respondent No. 4 was pleased to dispose of the claim of the petitioner under Clause 13 of the High Tension agreement relating to the aforesaid years in question by rejecting the claim of the petitioner in totality and the same was communicated to the petitioner vide letter No. 584 dated 19.4.2000. The aforesaid common order passed by the G.M, respondent No. 4 is sought to be challenged in the present batch of writ petition before this Court.

The main contention raised by the learned Sr. counsel Sri Binod Poddar appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, respondent No. 4 has passed the impugned order dated 19.4.2000 in utter disregard to the direction issued by this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 877 of 1987 (R). It is stated that the issue was to be decided afresh after considering the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court as well as of the High Court, but nothing was considered nor the specific direction issued by the High Court was followed while disposing of the representation vide its impugned order. The second contention raised by learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that respondent No. 4 has illegally and arbitrarily denied the proportionate remission in maximum demand charges on account of the load restrictions and/or load shifting/tripping and interruptions of power supply etc. which was due to the inability on the part of the Board to supply energy continuously at the contract demand of the petitioner. It has also been submitted that due to the aforesaid reason and irregular supply and less generation of power or less power available with the respondent Board, the petitioner was forced to close down its palletising plant on 21.10.1990. It has also been submitted that inability to consume the power/energy on the part of the consumer was of no consequence and it was only the inability of the Board to supply energy continuously at the contract demand which entitled the petitioner to claim proportionate reduction/remission in maximum demand charges and annual maximum demand charges.

It has been further contended that the General Manager completely erred and passed the order in violation of the settled law. In the aforesaid background the learned Sr. counsel submits that the petitioner was entitled to remission for the period during which the petitioner was supplied full load but the duration was so short that it was impossible for the petitioner to operate the plant and machinery to a level sufficient for the production and accordingly the petitioner was prevented from using the same for the reasons beyond his control. To support the contention the petitioner has referred to and relied upon several judgments which will be discussed hereinafter for the aforesaid proposition.

Sri Rajesh Shankar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Board submits that the impugned order dated 19.4.2000 was perfectly legal, valid and justified and it has specifically recorded that the consumer had valid and regular power supply. He further submits that the chart annexed in the impugned order at page 154 of the Paper Book clearly shows the maximum demand and the units consumed monthwise, which is identical and the chart has not been disputed. He further submits that even the percentage reflected will clearly show that the consumer/petitioner has consumed more than 100% and at least on all occasion over 75% of the contract demand. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent there cannot be any remission when there is no short fall of supply, since admittedly 75% and more of the contract demand has been supplied even as per their own chart and thus the claim of the proportionate remission was not maintainable under Clause 13. He further submits that in any case the consumer has consumed more than the requirement and the Board was ready to supply and in such a situation the claim of proportionate remission is unsustainable and illegal. It is further submitted that in absence of any annual minimum guarantee bill having been raised Clause 13 for proportionate remission cannot be invoked. To support his contention he refers to and relies upon 2002 (2) JLJR 558. He further submits that load restriction and or trapping etc. is of no consequence in view of consistent supply of energy over 75% of the contract demand. He has further submitted that remission under Clause 13 is permissible only in case of Act of God and the definition was exhaustive. He further submits that it will be evident that the Board made available the power to the consumer which is more fully and particularly described in internal page 3 & 4 of the impugned order passed by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area, Jamshedpur. From the figures, which has been shown in the impugned order as aforesaid, it will be evident that for the month of 4/72, 5/72, 7/72, 8/72, 9/72, 10/72, 11/72, 12/72, 4/73, 8/73, 11/73, 1/74, 2/74, 3/74, 4/74, 8/74, 9/74, 11/74, 1/75, 2/75, 3/75, 4/75, 5/75, 6/75, the consumer has covered the Maximum Demand Charges by way of availing 75% or more than 75% of the Contract Demand. The Respondent Board has accordingly raised bills on the basis of Actual Monthly Maximum Demand availed by the Consumer in these months in accordance with the tariff in force at that relevant time. As regards 6/72, 1/73, 2/73, 3/73, 5/73, 6/73, 7/73, 9/73, 10/73, 12/73, 5/74, 71/74, 12/74 the actual monthly maximum demand is less than 75% of the Contract demand, although monthly availability of power and full load supply period to the consumer in percentage are more than 95% and are also similar to those period for the months in which maximum demand has been achieved. It is also submitted that the consumer covered the Maximum Demand charge even at 33% of full load supply period by availing 8800 KVA. So from the above, it is clear that the Consumer had been drawing power according to his requirement without caring for load restriction and thus load restriction has been made ineffective.

I have considered the pleading, rival submissions and the case law cited and the law applicable. The controversy relating to the interpretation of Clause 13 of the Agreement, which is a remission clause, was firstly considered in Northern India Iron and Steel Co. and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, and the Hon''ble Supreme Court at para-9 has held as under:

We are, therefore, of the view that the inability of the Board to supply electric energy due to power cut or any other circumstance beyond its control as per the demand of the consumer according to the contract will be reflected in and considered as a circumstance beyond the control of the consumer which prevented it from consuming electricity us per the contract and to the extent it wanted to consume. The monthly demand charge for a particular month will have to be assessed in accordance with Sub-clause (b) of Clause 4 of the tariff and therefrom a proportionate reduction will have to be made as per Sub-clause (f). We hope, in the light of the judgment, there will he no difficulty in working out the figures of the proportionate reduction in any of the cases and for any period. In case of any difference or dispute as to the quantum of the demand charge or the proportionate reduction, parties will be at liberty to pursue their remedy as may be available to them in accordance, with law.

The same issue again came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Bihar State Electricity Board and Another Vs. Dhanawat Rice and Oil Mills, and the common question which arose for consideration was as to whether under Agreement arrived at between the Consumer and the B.S.E.B. there is a Clause for payment of minimum guarantee charges which indicates that even if the consumer does not consume electricity above the minimum guarantee still it will be incumbent upon the consumer to pay charges for energy which is the only minimum guarantee provided in the Agreement pertaining to Industrial Units in accordance with Clause 1.

In the aforesaid case the Hon''ble Supreme Court uses the word reduction in the context that the consumer were also held to be liable to pay the annual minimum guarantee charges even if they do not consume to that extent and the amount towards loss of hours for non-supply they were held as entitled to remission which was directed to be computed and adjusted.

A similar issue came up for consideration in 2002 (2) JLJR 558 and a Division Bench of this Court held that as per Clause 4(a) and 4(c) of the Agreement the Board was entitled to recover annual minimum guarantee charges and maximum demand charges. The said provisions are however, subject to the provisions of Clause 13 of the Agreement.

Clause 13 of the agreement in clear terms applies not only in the case of minimum guarantee charges but also maximum demand charges. It is true that in terms of Clause 4(c) of the Agreement, a consumer is to pay 75% of the maximum KVA demand or the contract demand whichever is higher. It is also not disputed at the Bar that the maximum demand indicator is installed in the premises of H.T. consumer and it records the maximum KVA demand if a consumer draws electrical energy more than the contract demand continuously for half an hour in any month. In terms of the Agreement the consumer is liable to pay the maximum demand charges on the basis of the recording in the maximum demand indicator as if the same had been the contract demand for the month in question that does not mean that if for the rest of the period the Board is unable to supply electric energy or the consumer is unable to consume electrical energy for one or other reasons enumerated in Clause 13 of the Agreement, it would not get proportionate reduction in the maximum demand charges. There is no dispute that in terms of the Clause 4(a) and 4(c) of the H.T. Agreement, Board is entitled to recover both annual minimum guarantee charges and maximum demand charges as the case may be but at the same time the consumer is entitled to remission on both A.M.G. charges and maximum demand charges under Clause 13 of the Agreement.

In 1997 (1) PLJR 729 title- Karamchand Thapar & Brothers v. Bihar State Electricity Board and Ors. at para-6 it was held as under:

It is obvious from the aforesaid clause quoted above that the consumers are entitled for remission it they are prevented from receiving or using electric energy in whole or part due to strikes, riots, fire, floods, explosions and act of god or any other cause reasonably beyond control or if the board is prevented from supplying or unable to prevented from supplying or unable to supply such electric energy owing to any of the causes mentioned above. Merely because non mentioning of lock out in Clause 13 of H.T. agreement it cannot be said that the petitioner is not entitled for remission for the period the management of the consumers remained under lock out as Clause 13 of H.T. agreement is illustrative and not exhaustive which is apparent from the language of Clause 13 as it has been stated in the said clause that "any other causes reasonably beyond control. Therefore, it is to be seen that the causes shown by consumers for not using electric energy was reasonably beyond its control or not.

In Tata Yadogawa Limited v. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1997 (2) PLJR 522 at para-18 and 20 it was held as under:

Clause-13 of the agreement is divided broadly in two parts and from a reading of the same it appears that the right of the consumer to seek reduction of A.M.G. charges arises:

(i) Where the consumer is prevented from receiving or using the electrical energy to he supplied to him for the reasons beyond its control.

(ii) Where the board is prevented from supplying or is unable to supply such electrical energy owing to any reasons beyond its control.

In either of these two situations for the consumer''s failure to consume the minimum guaranteed units, the benefit of reduction in payment of A.M.G. charges cannot be denied to the consumer.

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In the instant case, the second condition namely, board''s inability to supply the electrical energy is admitted, but the consequence of such admitted failure of the board is sought to be diluted. The fact that the consumer could use energy even when there was a failure of supply by the board and it could not use energy when there was better supply by the board are totally extraneous considerations for the purpose of determination of the controversy at issue.

However, it will be relevant to refer 2004 (3) JLJRR 671 which is a Judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in a batch of three writ petitions preferred by the petitioner Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited itself wherein the Division Bench while considering an identical issue with regard to Clause 13 of the Agreement and the remission while relying upon Bihar State Electricity Board and Another Vs. Dhanawat Rice and Oil Mills, held that under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement the consumers were liable to pay annual minimum guarantee charges even though they were entitled to proportionate reduction. At para-21 it also held that since in the claim for reduction as made by the petitioner under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement there was no specific pleading to suggest that on a particular date of a particular month the Board failed to supply electrical energy continuously at the contract demand. It also held that the chart enclosed was vague and there was no particulars, such as date and hours on which the Board failed to supply electrical energy at contract demand for one or other particular month during the year 1977-78.

The Division Bench at para 27 held as under:

Thus, it will be evident that the restrictions of load even though made in one or other month during the aforesaid years, in no manner it affected the petitioner who consumed energy as per its requirement irrespective of allotted load. This will be evident from the figures year-wise submitted by the Board.

Similar view has also been taken in the case of Rollwell Enterprises v. BSEB and Ors. in 2002 2 JCR 623 (jhr), Jharkhand, which was challenged in Civil Review No. 88/02 (Rollwell Enterpriser v. BSEB and Ors). However, by terms of order dated 1.2.2008, this Hon''ble court was pleased to dismiss the review application and thereby held as under:

From perusal of the documents particularly Annexure-3 a Bill upon which the petitioner relies, the contract demand was 120 KVA and the petitioner exceeded the contract demand which reached 149.35 KVA and, therefore, there is no question of remission in the minimum guarantee charges as against the petitioner exceeding the contract demand.

In that view of the matter, we do not find any error in the impugned judgment.

In the written notes of argument, the learned Sr. Counsel for the Board has placed on record an order dated 10.7.2006 passed in SLP(C) No. 26453 of 2004 and SLP(C) No. 26454 of 2004 preferred by the petitioner Tata Iron Steel Company Ltd. (TISCO) challenging the aforesaid judgment and order reported in 2004 (3) JLJR 671 vide which the Division Bench dismissed the Writ Petitions and the Hon''ble Supreme Court while condoning the delay has granted Leave.

Be that as it may, the issue being identical, the parties being same and leave having been granted and the Hon''ble Supreme Court being ceased of the matter, it will be in the interest of justice to await the outcome more so when there are conflicting views of Division Bench judgments passed by Jharkhand High Court which cannot be distinguished or clarified by a Single Bench.

The law in this regard is well settled that once leave has been granted the order of the Division Bench merges in it and thus, judicial discipline requires that this Court should await the outcome of the pending appeals on the same issue between the same parties pending before the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The petitioner is at liberty to move transfer petition to get the present writ petitions tagged with the pending Civil appeals preferred by the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (TISCO) itself for an authoritative pronouncement which can become a binding precedent for the High Court.

Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the present batch of writ petitions are disposed of with the aforesaid liberty.