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THOMAS, S/O.KURIAKOSE Vs STATE OF KERALA (REPRESENTED BY S.I.OF POLICE,

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 11 July 2017 · Citation: (2017) 07 KL CK 0007

HON’BLE JUDGES
P.Ubaid
RESULT
Disposed
CASE NUMBER
133 of 2011

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

180 paragraphs · 1,726 words
1.

The appellant herein is a driver of the Kerala State

Road Transport Corporation (K.S.R.T.C). He challenges the

conviction and sentence against him under Section 304A

I.P.C in S.C No.1151/2008 of the Court of Session, Thrissur.

He faced prosecution on the allegation that at about 9.30

a.m on 29.1.2008, he drove the K.S.R.T.C Bus No.KL-

15/3860 along the National Highway at Chandapura on the

Kodungallur-Guruvayoor route in high speed, and also in a

rash and negligent manner, hit down a motorcycle, which

was overtaking a tourist bus proceeding from south to

north, and the said motorcycle got sandwiched in between

the two buses. When the riders on the motor cycle fell

down, they happened to be run over by the K.S.R.T.C bus,

resulting in their death. The Police registered the crime on

the basis of the first information statement given by one of

the passengers in the said K.S.R.T.C bus, under Section 304

I.P.C. After investigation, the Police submitted final report

before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kodungallur

under Section 304 I.P.C. On committal, the case came up

before the Court of Session, from where it was made over to

the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc) I, Thrissur for

trial and disposal.

2.

The accused appeared before the trial court, and

pleaded not guilty to the charge framed against him under

Section 304 I.P.C. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses

in the trial court, and proved Exts.P1 to P13 documents.

When examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C, the accused

denied the incriminating circumstances, and projected a

defence that the unfortunate accident occurred due to the

carelessness on the part of the rider of the motor cycle. The

accused did not adduce any evidence in defence.

3.

On an appreciation of the evidence, the trial court

found that this is not a case of culpable homicide not

amounting to murder, but only a case of road traffic

accident that occurred due to the extreme rashness and

negligence on the part of the driver of the K.S.R.T.C bus.

Accordingly, the trial court found the accused not guilty

under Section 304 I.P.C, but he was found guilty under Section 304(A) I.P.C. On conviction thereunder, he was

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years

by judgment dated 10.1.2011. The said judgment of

conviction is under challenge in this appeal.

4.

When this appeal came up for hearing, the

learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is no

clear and satisfactory evidence to prove the prosecution

case that the alleged accident occurred due to the rashness

and negligence on the part of the accused in this case. On

legal aspects, the learned counsel submitted that when the

allegation is under Section 304 I.P.C, and the prosecution

could not prove the essentials of the offence, there cannot

be a conviction under Section 304A I.P.C, because the

offence under Section 304A I.P.C is not a lesser offence. The

learned counsel cited Vijayan v. State of Kerala [1991

(1) KLT 325] and Benny Francis and others v. State of

Kerala [1991 Crl.L.J 2411]. The learned Public Prosecutor

submitted that such an alteration is possible, in view of the

position settled by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. On factual

aspects, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the

witnesses examined as PW1, PW5 and PW6 have given

definite evidence proving the guilt of the accused, that he

caused the unfortunate accident by driving the vehicle

rashly and negligently.

5.

The main witnesses in this case are PW1, PW5

and PW6. The evidence given by the other witnesses is only

formal in nature. The accused has not disputed the question

of identity of the bus driver. He being a K.S.R.T.C driver,

and the vehicle involved being a K.S.R.T.C bus, he probably

thought that it would be futile to project such a defence.

Anyway, it stands proved by evidence that the K.S.R.T.C bus

which caused the accident in this case was in fact driven by

the accused. Of course, it is true that PW1, PW5 and PW6

have not stated anything definite about the identity of the

bus driver. Anyway, Exts.P11 and P12 documents will prove

that the K.S.R.T.C bus was in fact driven by the accused.

On this aspect much discussion is not required.

6.

Now let me see whether the offence under

Section 304 A I.P.C stands proved in this case against the

accused. PW1 was a passenger in the K.S.R.T.C. Bus. PW5

is an autorickshaw driver and PW6 is a workshop owner

The automobile workshop of PW6 is near the spot of

accident, and PW5 was driving autorickshaw from behind.

7.

PW1 has given evidence that he had seen the

K.S.R.T.C Bus overtaking the motorcycle, and he is definite

that it was quite rashly and negligently, the accused in this

case overtook the motorcycle which was overtaking a

tourist bus proceeding in normal speed from south to north

along the eastern side of the road. There is nothing to show

that the driver of the tourist bus was in any manner

responsible for the accident. Of course,PW1 has stated

that the motorcycle had hit on the body of the tourist bus

also. But the witness is definite that the accident occurred

due to the extreme rashness and negligence on the part of

the K.S.R.T.C bus driver. In the process of double overtaking,

the K.S.R.T.C bus happened to hit down the motorcycle

which got sandwiched in between the two buses, and when

the riders fell down, they happened to be run over by the

K.S.R.T.C bus. They are husband and wife.

8.

The evidence of PW5 is that the K.S.R.T.C bus came from behind while he was driving his autorickshaw and

when he gave side, the K.S.R.T.C. bus overtook his vehicle,

and immediately he saw the K.S.R.T.C bus overtaking a

motorcycle which was carefully overtaking a tourist bus

proceeding in normal speed along the eastern side of the

road from south to north. PW5 is definite that the K.S.R.T.C

bus happened to hit down the motorcycle only because the

K.S.R.T.C bus driver overtook the motorcycle quite rashly

and negligently. This is the evidence given by PW6 also. He

has also affirmed in evidence that the unfortunate accident

occurred, resulting in the death of two persons, only

because the K.S.R.T. C driver overtook the motorcycle in

extreme rashness and negligence.

9.

I find that PW1, PW5 and PW6 are definite in

evidence that the unfortunate accident occurred due to the

extreme rashness and negligence on the part of the driver

of the K.S.R.T.C bus. It stands satisfactorily and properly

proved that quite unnecessarily, and with the knowledge of

consequence and in extreme rashness and negligence, the

accused overtook the motorcycle which was at that time

overtaking another vehicle. Due to this double overtaking,

the motorcycle happened to be sandwiched in between the

two buses, and the bus driven by the accused hit down the

motorcycle. When the rider and the pillion rider fell down

with the motorcycle, they happened to be run over by the

K.S.R.T.C bus. This resulted in the death of the two persons,

within no time. Thus, I find that a clear case under Section

304A I.P.C stands well proved in this case.

10.

Now let me see the legal issue raised by the

petitioner. The question is whether the accused can be

convicted under Section 304A I.P.C in a case tried under

Section 304 I.P.C. In Vijayan''s case cited supra, a conviction

under Section 304A I.P.C in a prosecution brought under

Section 304 I.P.C was set aside by this Court on the ground

that the two are different and distinct offences. Vijayan''s

case is not a case of road traffic accident.

11.

This is a case where the final report submitted by

the Police itself contains the necessary elements of the

offence under Section 304A I.P.C, though the charge was

brought under Section 304 I.P.C The very allegation in the

final report, and also in the charge framed by the trial court,

is that the accused caused the accident by rashly and

negligently driving the K.S.R.T.C. Bus. In Prabhakaran v.

State of Kerala [2007 (3) KLT 400 SC], a case where the

accused was convicted under Section 304 I.P.C, the Hon''ble

Supreme Court altered the conviction to one under Section

304A I.P.C, on the finding that the evidence in that case

revealed only the essentials of the offence under Section

304A I.P.C, I find that this is not a case where the

prosecution brought a clear case under Section 304 I.P.C.

The final report would practically show that the allegation

would come only under Section 304A I.P.C. The court charge

also contains the essentials of the offence under Section

304A I.P.C, though the charge was framed under Section

304 I.P.C. If the allegations in the final report and also in the

court charge, constitute the essential elements of Section

304A I.P.C, or if the accused is practically called upon to

answer the necessary elements of the offence under Section

304A I.P.C, the court can very well convict the accused

under Section 304A I.P.C.

12.

Whether it is Section 304A I.P.C, or 304 I.P.C what

is prominently and essentially involved is causing the death

of a person. Causing death by a voluntary act will come

under Section 304 I.P.C, whereas causing the death of a

person by an act of negligence or rashness will come

under Section 304A I.P.C. I find that the court below rightly

convicted the accused under Section 304A I.P.C, on the basis

of clear evidence, though the final report was brought under

Section 304 I.P.C.

13.

The sentence imposed by the court below is

rigorous imprisonment for two years. The licence of the

appellant was also suspended for three months. The

accused had to undergo disciplinary action also by the

Department. Now he has retired from service. He must be

now aged about 65 years. There is nothing to show that

there is any other conviction to his credit. On a

consideration of all the aspects, I find that rigorous

imprisonment for eight months will be the adequate and

reasonable sentence in this case.

In the result, the conviction against the appellant in S.C

1151/2008 of the court below under Section 304A I.P.C is

confirmed and the appeal is disposed of accordingly.

However, the jail sentence imposed by the court below will

stand reduced to rigorous imprisonment for eight months.