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Judgment
Manohar Lall, J.—This is an appeal by the plaintiff who is aggrieved by the concurrent decisions of the Courts below by which they have dismissed his suit which was instituted for recovery of possession of 124 acres of land in village Khandanishan. The facts are now no longer in dispute. The plaintiff is the proprietor of the Biru estate in the district of Ranchi. Village Khandanishan is a part of that estate. On 14th January 1882, the then Raja, the great grandfather of the plaintiff, executed a registered patta in respect of the village in favour of Thuntha Ram Ganjhu and his son Dangu alias Mahendra as jagir hinheyati, that is to say a life grant, on receipt of a nazarana of Rs. 100 and an annual payment of Rs. 25-5-0 besides cess.
It is important to state here that in this document it is recited that ten years before this the village had been let out to the gungles and they made the lands cultivable. On 13th August 1882, Thutha Ram for self and on behalf of his minor son Mahender sold the village to Hira Singh, who was the son of Raja Hari Ram Singh. After the sale deed, Ex. 6, the vendors reserved the lands now in dispute for themselves--it has been found by the Courts below that these were the lands which were reclaimed by the grantees during the ten years before the grant of 1882.
In 1897 the estate was taken charge of by the manager of the encumbered estates. At that time Damar Singh, son of Hira Singh and grandfather of defendant 1, claimed his right to the village on the basis of the sale deed in his favour of August, 1882 just referred to above. This right was recognised by the manager and the village, therefore, remained in possession of Damar Singh and thereafter in the possession of his son Jagatpal Singh. In the survey record of rights prepared in the year 1908 khewat No. 2, was recorded in the name of the Biru estate, but khewat No. 3 was recorded in the name of Jagatpal Singh, whose estate was also then under the manager of the encumbered estates. The remarks column contains these remarks: "The interest was mukarari, not resumable and no patta has been produced." The revisional survey record of rights was finally published in the year 1933 in which again khewat No. 2 was recorded in the name the Biru estate while khewat No. 3 was recorded in the name of defendant 1 with a note to the same effect that the mukarari was not resumable and there was no patta. On these allegations the plaintiff sought to recover possession from defendant 1.
The trial Court came to the conclusion that as the transferor of the predecessor of defendant 1 was holding the village on a grant from the predecessor of the plaintiff as hinheyati grant, the village must be held to be resumable as both the grantees are dead.
In appeal the learned Judicial Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the manager of the encumbered estate-having accepted the claim of Damar Singh, and there being a presumption of accuracy of the entry in the survey record of rights, the plaintiff was debarred from putting forward any claim that the village was now resumable He also pointed to the fact that defendant 1 has been able to produce receipts, Exs. B series and Ex. C(1) in which he or his predecessor-in-interest is described as mukararidar. The receipt Ex. C(1) is of the year 1889 and was actually filed before the manager in 1897.
In that receipt Hira Ram Singh the father of Damar Singh is described as a mukararidar. The appeal of defendant 1 was, therefore, allowed. That part of the claim of the plaintiff has not been pressed and cannot be pressed on his behalf in the present appeal. It will be remembered that the original grantees reserved to themselves 124 acres of land when they transferred the village to the predecessor of defendant 1. Regarding this area khewat No. 4 was prepared in the record of rights of the year 1908 and the land was recorded in the name of Mahendra, Sukhram and Sukhlal sons of Thutha Ram Ganjhu. Sukhlal is defendant i in the present suit. The nature of the rights of khewat No. 4 was recorded as ''Lagan Panewala'' with the remarks that the tenure was not resumable. In the years 1914, 1916 and 1919 Mahendra and Sukhram alienated 110 acres out of this area in favour of defendant 5, Tilakman Sahu. Thereafter, the revisional survey record of rights was finally published in the year 1933. The original grantees are now dead. Thuntha Ram Ganjhu died before 1916 and Mahender died in 1926. The plaintiff on these allegations sought to resume this land. He also claims mesne profits.
The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff against defendants 2 to 5 upon the ground that Thuntha Ganjhu had a jungle-tarasUease from the Eaja from before the patta which was granted in 1882 and that this being a lease for cultivating purposes, Thuntha Ganjhu acquired a permanent right in the lands claimed by him. In appeal the learned Judicial Commissioner has also come to the same conclusion. He points out that the patta itself mentions that the jagirdars had reclaimed the cultivable land of the village prior to the year 1882 and that this state of affairs has been recognised at both surveys. There is no dispute that this 124 acres of land was the land which was reclaimed by Thuntha Ganjhu during the ten years he was in possession of the village before it was granted to him in 1882. The learned Judicial Commissioner has found as a fact that it is reasonable to hold from the circumstances that the grantees remained in possession of 124 acres which may be accepted as representing the land which they themselves had previously cleared and brought under cultivation.
In second appeal Mr. Baldeva Sahay contends that defendants 2 to 4 have no permanent rights and their position is no higher than that of ordinary khuntkatidar tenure-holders. He points out to a number of Sections in the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act to support his argument that no privilege has been conferred on such persons by any provisions of the Act so as to entitle them to retain possession of the lands against the wishes of the landlord.
It is true that there is no provision in the Act giving any permanent rights to khuntkatidar tenure-holders--see the remarks of a Single Judge of this Court in Degan Mahto and Others Vs. Kumar Kamakhya Narayan Singh and Others, . Attention may also be drawn to Reid''s well-known Settlement Report of Chota Nagpur, para. 163, p. 70 where it is stated that "a khuntkatti tenure-holder has no special previleges under the statute law." Our attention was also drawn to Division Bench decision of this Court in Jeo Lal Singh v. Wazir Narain Singh AIR 1921 Pat. 426. In that case it was found:
The entry of Khuntkatti rights in the present case happens to be in the khewat and, therefore, the status of the plaintiffs was recorded as tenure-holders.
It was found as a fact that there was nothing in the record of that case to show that the interests of the plaintiffs were necessarily permanent and not temporary. This case was, therefore, decided on its own facts, and is no authority for holding that in every case when the khuntkattidars are entered in the khewat as tenure-holders, it must be held as a matter of law that they are merely temporary tenure-holders. In my opinion the matter, so far as the present appeal is concerned, is concluded against the appellant by the entry in the survey record of rights which must be presumed to be correct. In that entry it is shown that defendants 2 to 4 are in possession of a tenure which is non-resumable. The onus is on the plaintiff to show that that entry is incorrect, and be has not been able to show to the satisfaction of the Courts of fact below that that entry is incorrect.
On the other hand, every indication upon the record is to the contrary direction. It may be observed as was pointed out in Tengaroo Sukul Vs. Chatthu Bhar, that the civil Court is not a Court of appeal from the decision of the survey authorities when they make a record in the record of rights. As it is impossible to place all the materials before the civil Court of the enquiry or the facts upon which the survey authorities relied in order to record a particular entry, the statute itself directs emphatically that such an entry must be presumed to be correct unless shown by evidence to be incorrect.
The plaintiff in the present case has not shown that the entry is incorrect. There is no onus on the defendants to show as to what were the materials upon which that entry which is in their favour is based or that the entry is correct.
For these reasons the appeal is without any substance and must be dismissed with costs.
Fazl Ali, C.J.
I agree.
Ray, J.
I entirely agree and have nothing to add.