Tilak Ram Verma vs State Of Chhattisgarh

This appeal arises out of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.07.2001 passed by learned Second Additional Sessions Judge Baloda Bazar, District Raipur in sessions Trial No. 314/2000 whereby and whereunder, learned Second Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellants under Section 304-B of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo R.I. for 10 years and pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, plus default stipulation.

Brief facts of the case are that on 06.05.2000 deceased Geeta Bai @ Pramila Bail got married to one Tilak Ram Verma (Appellant No.1). Appellant No. 2 is mother-in-law of the deceased. The allegation against both the appellants is that they tortured the deceased both physically and mentally due to which on 04.07.2000 she committed suicide by consuming poison. Thereafter, Merg Intimation (Ex. P-11) was registered on the basis of intimation of hospital. Intimation given to the punches through Ex P-9 and inquest on the body of deceased was prepared vide (Ex. P-10) and deady body was sent for postmortem to P.H.C. Kharara where Dr. M. Samuel (PW-4) conducted autopsy vide (EXP-3) The autopsy surgeon opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to suspected pressing. Dowry articles seized from Tulai Ram and seizure memo (Ex. P-2) was prepared. FIR was registered against the appellants under Sections 304(B), 34 of the IPC. After completion of investigation charge-sheet was filed and charge was framed under Section 304-B of the IPC against the appellants.

So as to hold the accused/appellants guilty, the prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses. Statements of the accused/appellants were also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which they denied the charges leveled against them and pleaded innocence and false implication in the case and also examined 3 witnesses in their defence.

After examination of oral and documentary evidence, learned trial Court convicted the appellants under Section 304-B and sentenced them as mentioned above in para 1 of this order. Hence, the present appeal filed by the appellants.

Assailing legality and validity of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, learned counsel for the appellants would argue that the impugned judgment is contrary to law facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Court below has erred in believing the statements of Sumitra Bai (PW-1), Nirmala Bai (PW-11) and Ramadhar (PW-12). He further submitted that there is inordinate delay in lodging the FIR which creates serious doubt in the prosecution case. At the time of funeral of the deceased all her relatives from parent side were present but they did not say anything but, after some time, they concocted a false story and implicated the appellants. As there are number of omissions and contradictions in prosecution witnesses, the impugned judgment is liable to be set-aside. In support of his argument, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of Hon'ble Apex court in the matter of Major Singh & Another vs. State of Punjab reported in (2015) 5 SCC 201, and decision of this High Court in the matter of Ajay Koushik And Another vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2012 CJ (Chh) 92 & Taramuni Prajapati Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2016 CJ (Chh) 669.

On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of State has supported the impugned judgment of the Court below convicting the appellants under Section 304-B of the IPC, being based on the material available on record, are just and proper and do not call for any interference in this appeal.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records including the impugned judgment.

Before the learned trial Court Sumita Bai (PW-1), co-villager of the deceased, was examined and in her examination-in-chief she states in paras 6 & 7 that deceased Pramila Bai/deceased had told her that her mother-in-law and husband used to torture her. They used to take her to the farm and make her do a lot of work. Tilak Ram, husband of the deceased, also complained about the golden ring gifted by father of deceased stating that the ring is too tight and returned it to her to change the same. But in her cross-examination, Sumita Bai stated in para 21 that she does not know about the articles that Pramila's in-laws had demanded in dowry.

Kagin Bai (PW-3), mother of the deceased, was also examined before the trial Court and in her statement she stated that when her daughter came from in-laws' home, she was very sad. Deceased told her mother that her in-laws were complaining about the bed, ring & clothes, gifted by bride family stating that the ring is too tight, bed is short and the quality of clothes is too substandard. But in her cross-examination Kagin Bai again submitted that there was no condition of dowry in the marriage. Whatever they had given, it was at their own will. After marriage, there was no demand of dowry on behalf of the in-laws.

Nirmala Bai (PW-11), sister of the deceased, deposed the same as has been complained by Pramila Bai (deceased) but in her cross examination she has not stated anything adverse against the appellants about the demand of dowry soon before the death.

Hon'ble  Supreme  Court  in  the  matter  of  Major  Singh (Supra) in para 10, held as under:-

"10. To sustain the conviction under Section 304-B IPC, the following essential ingredients are to be established: (i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a 'normal circumstance': (ii) such a death should have occurred with seven years of her marriage; (iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband: (iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry: and (v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.

If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both these sections, Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows:

"113.B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death."

The language of Section 113 A of Evidence Act makes it clear that if a woman has committed suicide within a period of 7 years from the death of her marriage and that her husband subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such suicide has been abated by her husband.

In this case, father of the deceased Ramadhar (PW-12) has admitted in his cross-examination that his son-in-law Tilak Ram has not demanded dowry from him. He stated in para 9 of his statement that:-

He again stated in Para 12 of his cross examination that:-

Close scrutiny of evidence makes it clear that there is no conclusive piece of evidence with regard to demand of dowry soon before the death. In the light of evidence of the witnesses, it is clear that deceased died on 04.07.2000 and at the time of funerals, her father was present on the spot but he did not make any allegation against anyone.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Major(Supra) in para 16 held as under:-

"16.To attract conviction under Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution should adduce evidence to show that "soon before her death", the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment. There must always be proximate and live link between the effects of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. In Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2003) 8 SCC 80, in paragraph (9) it was observed as under:-

"9. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of "death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by the prosecution. "Soon before" is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to the expression "soon before" used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods "soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their possession". The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence."

In the case in hand, in spite of these principles, this Court finds no evidence with regard to demand of dowry or cruelty by the appellants and that deceased Pramila Bai was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry soon before her death. Even father (PW-2) of the deceased, admitted that appellants never demanded any dowry from him. In absence of any evidence showing that the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry soon before her death by the appellants, the conviction of the appellants under Section 304-B IPC cannot be sustained. The trial Court while convicting the appellants has not appreciated the oral and documentary evidence in its true perspective and has erred in law.

Appeal, as a result, is allowed and the impugned judgment of the trial Court is set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The appellants are reported to be on bail, their bail bonds are discharged and they need not to surrender.