Tinkari Pramanick vs State of West Bengal

T.P. Mukherji, J.—This is an application u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order of detention made u/s 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act by the District Magistrate with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is not in dispute that a copy of the order of detention made u/s 3 and the grounds were duly served on the detenu.

Mr. Chatterjee, for the Petitioner, has raised three objections against the validity of the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate and against the validity of the detention of the Petitioner in pursuance thereof. His first argument is that the facts constituting the grounds for detention served on the detenu u/s 7 of the Preventive Detention Act not having mentioned the purpose of the detention, the grounds as drawn up and served are bad in law. His second contention is that the grounds (ga), (gha) and (cha) of the grounds as mentioned by the District Magistrate are vague, inasmuch as they do not contain sufficient particulars to enable a proper representation being made against the same. His third contention is that, so far as the incident mentioned in ground (ka) is concerned, it is not proximate in time to the date of the order for detention.

In support of his first contention, Mr. Chatterjee has referred us to the Supreme Court decision in Naresh Chandra Ganguli Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, and to the following observation in that judgment:

Thus on a consideration of the provisions of Sections 3 and 7 of the Act, it may be observed that the detenu has to be served with a copy of the order passed by the Authority contemplated by Sub-section (2) of Section 3 containing, firstly, recitals in terms of one or more of the sub-clauses of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 3(1), which we may call the ''preamble'' and secondly, ground contemplated by Section 7, namely, conclusions of fact which have led to the passing of the order of detention, informing the detenu as to why he was being detained. On the basis of this observation it was contended that the grounds furnished to the detenu in this case prepared u/s 7 of the Preventive Detention Act are not proper grounds in law inasmuch as they do not contain the ''preamble'' mentioned in the observation quoted above and that the failure to mention in a preamble the purpose of the detention would make the grounds bad in law. It is true that the purpose of detention was not mentioned in connection with the grounds that were served.

We have considered this aspect of the matter as it arises in the Supreme Court judgment referred by Mr. Chatterjee. In discussing this question the Supreme Court is found to have referred to Section 3 which requires the authority making an order of detention, to state the fact of its satisfaction that it is necessary to make the order of detention of a particular person, with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to one or more of the objects contained in clauses and sub-clauses of Section 3(l)(a) and (b) of the Act. Thereafter the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 7 which requires that the person detained should be communicated with the grounds on which the order of detention has been made. It was further observed in this connection that statement of facts contemplated by Section 7 would thus constitute the grounds and not the matters contained in one or more of the clauses or sub-clauses u/s 3(l)(a) and (b) of the Act. It would appear thus that the Supreme Court was of the view that the detenu was required to be furnished with the grounds or statement of facts as required by Section 7 and not the particulars as contemplated in Section 3(l)(a) & (b) of the Act.

It is no doubt true that on a consideration of Sections 3 and 7 together the Supreme Court made the observation quoted above. It would also appear that in making that observation the Supreme Court was thinking of a composite order made under Sections 3 and 7. The test of the matter is whether the detenu has been given his right to be informed of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and whether the right to be informed at the earliest opportunity of a right to make a representation against that order has also been given to him. That right would be fully given to him if the purpose of the detention u/s 3 and the grounds or the statement of facts as contemplated in Section 7 are duly furnished. It matters little whether the necessary particulars are furnished in one single document or in two separate documents. In our view, if the order of detention, with the purpose behind that order mentioned therein, be served on the detenu and if the grounds or the statement of facts on the basis whereof the detaining authority is satisfied about the necessity for the detention are also served on the detenu separately, the purpose would be served. The same purpose would be served if a composite order containing a preamble containing the particulars required by Section 3 and the statement of facts contemplated in Section 7 of the Act is served. In the present case admittedly the order u/s 3(2) containing the purpose of the detention was duly served on the detenu and the grounds as required by Section 7 were also separately served. We hold that the requirements of law in this regard were duly satisfied.

Coming now to the second contention of Mr. Chatterjee, he has referred to grounds (ga), (gha) and (cha). So far as ground (cha) is concerned, it relates to an incident on a particular date and at a particular time in course whereof the detenu along with his associates had committed rioting and caused bleeding injuries to one Netai Mitra. The incident, it further stated, led to a criminal case which was under investigation. It was argued that how rioting was caused has not been mentioned. The argument is difficult to appreciate. If it is stated that rioting was caused and as a result thereof -certain consequences followed and if the time and place of the rioting are mentioned all the necessary particulars, in our view, have been mentioned.

Regarding ground (gha) the allegation contained therein is that on a particular date the Officer-in-charge of the local Police Station came to arrest an accused in connection with a specific case at a particular place and that at the time the detenu blew a conch and collected people both male and female and obstructed the Police Officer in effecting the arrest. The contention is that the manner in which the Police Officer was obstructed has not been mentioned. The failure to mention the manner of the obstruction does not, in our view, make the ground vague.

So far as ground (ga) is concerned, the particulars furnished, in our view, may not necessarily relate to any act prejudicial to public order and sufficient particulars regarding the act alleged have, in our view, also not been mentioned. In the context of the other allegations, this allegation we find, is inconsequential and inessential and may very well be ignored. The other grounds mentioned in the order of the District Magistrate are quite specific and fully related to the purpose of the detention.

The third objection is that the incident in ground (ka) is not proximate in time to the date of the order. The incident mentioned therein is on March 29, 1967. The order in the case was made no doubt in January 13, 1968, but the other allegedly prejudicial acts mentioned in the grounds are dated from July to September 1967. All these acts taken together do, in our view, form links in a continuous chain of grounds, which might very well have satisfied the detaining authority about the necessity for the detention. The incident in ground (ka), in our view, is not too far remote from the date of the order to serve as a ground therefore.

Considering all that we have stated above, we find no reason to interfere with the order of the District Magistrate made in this case.

The Rule is, accordingly, discharged.

R.N. Dutt, J.

I agree.