Tirath Singh Narain Singh vs Bachitar Singh Mit Singh and Others

Chopra, J.—This is a petition by S. Tirath Singh under Article 227, Constitution of India for quashing an order of the Election Tribunal, Barnala (Pepsu) published in the Government of India Gazette, dated 8-8-1953, whereby the Tribunal besides declaring the election of the Dhuri Constituency of Pepsu Legislative Assembly to be wholly void, recorded a finding that corrupt practice of bribery falling under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123, Representation of the People Act, 1951, was proved to have been committed by S. Tirath Singh Petitioner, and on the ground disqualified him, as proved by Section 140 of the said Act, for membership of Parliament and of Legislature of every State for a period of 6 years.

The facts giving rise to the petition are these; S. Tirath Singh who was a Minister in the interim Government and was in charge of the Local Self-Government Department when last elections of Dhuri Constituency for the Legislative Assembly of the Pepsu were held, was duly elected from that constituency. S. Bachittar Singh, Respondent No. 1, questioned the election by means of a petition duly presented to the Election Commission of India. The election petition was forwarded to the Election Tribunal, Barnala (Pepsu) for trial and decision. In the petition, S. Bachittar Singh took a number of grounds in support of his prayer that the election be declared to be wholly void and in the alternative that the election of S. Tirath Singh be declared to be void and S. Sarwan Singh, Anr. candidate from the said constituency, be declared to have been duly elected. ''Inter alia it was urged that S. Tirath Singh had been guilty of certain corrupt and illegal practices.

List "A" attached to the petition contained 8 instances of corrupt practices under the subhead ''''Bribery", list "B" referred to three instances of "Undue Influence" and the last list (C) described "Other corrupt practices of obtaining assistance of Government servants". With respect to each of the grounds urged in the petition, the Tribunal framed a separate issue. Amongst them issues Nos. 4 to 15 related to the corrupt and illegal practices enumerated in the lists, and No. 3 was with respect to improper rejection of nomination papers filed by Anr. candidate, S. Mali Singh, and its effect on the result of the election, Issue No. 3 was decided by the Tribunal in favour of the Petitioner (S. Bachittar Singh) and, therefore, the election was. declared to be wholly void. Out of the issues relating to corrupt and illegal practices all except issue No. 5 were decided against Bachittar Singh. The rest of the material issues were similarly held not to have been proved.,

In the present case we are only concerned with the facts relating to issue No. 5 and the decision thereon, and it reads as follows:

Whether the Sweepers of Small Town Committee, Dhuri, were granted good-work allowance at Rs. 5/- per mensem for three months only during the election days in order to induce them to vote for the Respondent No. 1.

The decision of the Tribunal on this issue given in para 66 of its judgment is like this:

The direct. as well as the circumstantial evidence thus proves to the hilt the allegation against the Respondent No. 1 that he made an oiler of increasing their pay to the sweepers of the Small Town Committee, in order to induce them to vote for him. That increment was actually granted though due to departmental intervention it had ultimately to take the shape of good work allowance for three months. The period for which this allowance was given is also indicative of the corrupt intention of the Respondent No. 1. We, therefore, decide the issue in favour of the Petitioner.

Further it was found that the corrupt practice of bribery for which S. Tirath Singh" was personally responsible, entailed his disqualification u/s 140, Representation of the People Act, 1951. He was consequently disqualified for membership of the Parliament and of the Legislature of every State for a period of six years to be counted from the date on which the order of the Tribunal was published in the Gazette of India. It is to quash this decision and order that the present petition is presented.

S. Karam Singh, learned Counsel for the Respondent, has raised. certain objections to the maintainability of the petition and it would be better to dispose of them before dealing with the case on merits. His first objection is that Article 329(b) of the Constitution and Section 105, Representation of the People Act, 1951 preclude this Court from interfering in matters relating to an election as those matters can only be agitated before and decided by an authority constituted under the Act, whose decision on those points is to be final and conclusive. The question has been considered and decided by a Division Bench of this Court in - ''Hukam Singh v. Sar-dul Singh'' AIR 1953 Pepsu 133 (A). After discussing the various provisions of law on the point, Kesho Ram Passey J. (now C. J.) observed that the only exception to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 created by Clause (4) of the Article is in favour of Courts and Tribunals constituted by or under any law relating to "Armed Forces", and if a similar exception .were intended by the Constitution to be made in favour of the Election Tribunal as well, the fact, would have been expressly specified in the Article.

The following observations of the learned Judge at p. 136 may be reproduced with advantage:

The Election Tribunals do not stand as a class by themselves over which the High Court''s power to see whether they are discharging their duty within the four corners of the law, which they are required to administer, does not exist. It is a different matter that the High Court would not interfere unless it finds that the proceedings before the Tribunal are void for total want of jurisdiction or the defect of jurisdiction is apparent on the record; but there appears to me no force in the contention that it has no jurisdiction to take note of and pass necessary orders even when the order of the Election Tribunal is patently ''ultra vires'' or where the initial jurisdiction to entertain an election petition is lacking.

It was consequently held that an Election Tribunal created to determine any election petition, after the result of election has been declared, is not immune from the superintending control of the High Court.

The scope of Article 329(b) of the Constitution when read in the light of Article 227 was discussed in - Shankar Nanasaheb Karpe Vs. Returning Officer, Kolaba District and Another, and it was observed:

the power of superintendence given to the High Court over Tribunals is to be found in Article 227 and the only exemption is in favour of a Court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. So presumably an Election Tribunal set up if necessary after election, would be subject to the superintendence of the High Court under Article 227. Mr. Purshotam Dass said that on our view of the interpretation of Article 329(b) even if the Tribunal was to act without jurisdiction or were to assume jurisdiction which it did not possess, we would have no right to interfere. That is not our interpretation of Article 329(b). All that we lay down is that to the extent that the merits of an election matter are concerned our powers have been taken away, but our powers have not been taken away to compel a Tribunal which is set up to decide those matters acting with jurisdiction and not in excess of the powers conferred upon it by statute.

S. Karam Singh stresses that the words "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" which occur in Article 329(b) override all other provisions of the Constitution including Article 227. Counsel however ignores the words election" and "by an election petition which also occur in Article 329(b). To me, it seems that what the Article read as a whole means, is that so far as calling in question any election is concerned it can be done only by an election petition presented to "such authority" and "in the manner" as prescribed by law of the appropriate legislature. That has been done in the present case and now the Petitioner challenges something done by the "authority", viz., the Election Tribunal. There is nothing in Article 329(b) which takes away the constitutional remedy granted by Article 226 to a person who is aggrieved by any decision of the Election Tribunal or power of superintendence of the High Court over the proceedings of the Tribunal under Article 227.

Section 105, Representation of the People Act no doubt enacts that "every order of the Tribunal under this Act shall be final and conclusive." Finality given to orders of the statutory Tribunal cannot be deemed to interfere with the constitutional powers of superintendence of this Court, as no Parliamentary or State legislature can abrogate supervisory powers granted by the Constitution. .

Even in its wider sense the word "election" used in Chap. 15 of the Constitution connotes the- entire procedure to be gone through to return a. candidate to the legislature. The term "election" may be taken to embrace the whole procedure which consists of several stages and embraces many steps, whereby an elected member is returned. Article 329- (b) ousts the jurisdiction of Courts in regard to electoral matters and is enacted to lay down the- only mode in which an election can be challenged. Any matter which has the effect of vitiating an, election should, be brought up only at the appropriate stage and in an appropriate manner before the Tribunal and not before any Court. This is. the interpretation placed on the word "election" in Article 329 by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in - N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others, It means that the Article excludes the jurisdiction of Courts with regard to matters forming part of the entire procedure whereby a candidate is returned to the legislature.

The words "Notwithstanding anything in the Constitution" exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with any matter which may arise while the elections are in progress. . The process of election begins with the filing of nomination papers and ends with the declaration of the result. For the intermediary stages only one remedy is provided and that remedy is by way of an election petition. Even after elections are over and the result is declared the election can be called to question only by means of an election petition. In my view the proceedings before the Election Tribunal or its orders cannot be regarded as included in the term "election". Calling in question orders or proceedings of the Tribunal is not the same thing as "calling in question an election".

An Election Tribunal is undoubtedly a "Tribunal" over the proceedings of which the High Court has the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. The powers of the Court over any Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces are expressly excluded by Clause. (4) of the Article. A similar exemption with respect to Election Tribunal could also have been expressly created if the same was intended. Different and explicit language could also have been used by the Constituent Assembly if the word "election" in Article 329'' (b) had been intended to include proceedings- and orders of an Election Tribunal as well.

These are some of the points which do not appear to have been taken into consideration in - ''Ramkrishna v. Daoosing Sheoprasad Singh'' AIR 1953 Nag 357 (D), the only authority cited by the Respondent as holding the contrary view. The learned Judges in that case expressed the view that election could not be said to be over after the declaration of the result was published in the Gazette as required by Section 74, Representation of the People Act, 1951. In arriving at this.. conclusion the learned Judges were influenced by the fact that u/s 98 of the Act the Tribunal could not only declare the election to be wholly void but could also declare the election of the returned candidate to be void and the Petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected, and this made them think that the proceedings before the Election Tribunal would be included in the process of election and that the result of the poll or the election was only de ciared finally by the Tribunal.

With due respect, if I may say so, I have not been able to convince myself to accept the proposition that the result of the poll must not be treated as final or that the election continues till decision is reached by the Election Tribunal in an election petition. The fact that the tribunal has authority to annul, wholly or partly, the result of the poll or to modify it, if a petition is presented and objections are raised, would not make its proceedings part of "the procedure to be gone through to return a candidate to the legislature", and hence bring them within the word "election" under Article 329(b).

I am, therefore, in respectful agreement with the view expressed by this Court in AIR 1953 Pepsu 133 (A). Reference in this connection may also be made to a Division Bench decision of Madhya Bharat High Court in - ''Jamna Prasad v. Lachhmiram Ratanmal'' AIR 1953 MP 197 (E) and the decision of the Judicial Commissioner in -- ''Jagdish Chandra v. Prakash Narain'' AIR 1953 VP 51 (F). Since I am of the view that powers of superintendence of the High Court are not taken away by the provisions of Article 329(b) of the Constitution, I would disallow the preliminary objection of the Respondent that the petition should be rejected on that score alone.

Next objection of S. Karam Singh is that an order of the Election Tribunal, after it is adopted by Election Commission and notified, becomes an order of the Election. Commission, and since the Tribunal has ceased to exist and the Election Commission is not situate within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court no writ or order can be issued or made on this petition. It is argued that under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, an election petition is to be presented to the Election Commission, the Election Tribunal is (hen appointed to enquire into the petition, the Election Tribunal has to send a copy of its order to the Commission, the Election Commission thereafter publishes the order of the Election Tribunal in the Gazette and the order of the Tribunal does not take effect until it is so published. This no doubt is the procedure that has to be adopted when and if results of the poll are sought to be challenged by election petition. But the order on the petition is to be that of the Tribunal and Section 105 of the Act enjoins that the order of the Tribunal shall be final and conclusive. It is only a copy of the order that is sent to the Election Commission.

The Election Commission has no authority tinder the Act to modify or interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. All that the Election Commission is required to do is to forward copies of the order to the appropriate authorities and cause the order to be published. The Election Commission only acts as a ministerial authority after the final order on the petition is passed by the Tribunal. The fact that the order takes effect only when it is so published or that the petition in the first instance is to be presented to the Election Commission and the Tribunal is appointed by the Election Commission does not alter the position that the order is to be that of the Tribunal and not of the Election Commission. The Representation of the People Act nowhere provides that the order of the Tribunal is to be regarded as an order of the Election Commission. I have not been able to appreciate the contention that the Election Tribunal is nothing more than an amanuensis of the Election Commission and that the order of the Tribunal for all intents and purposes should be regarded as an order passed by the Election Commission. The argument is based on the same Nagpur decision reference to which has already been made: AIR 1953 Nag 357 (D).

Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 deals with the trial of election petitions and provides for the appointment of and the procedure to be followed by the Election Tribunal. Section 98 of the Act authorises the Tribunal to make, at the conclusion of the trial, a final order on the election petition. After it is announced by the Tribunal, as provided by Section 103, a copy of the order is .sent to the Election Commission, and the records of the case are sent to the District Judge of the District within which the place of trial is situate. Section 105 makes every order of the Tribunal as final and conclusive. Section 106 provides for the transmission of the order to the appropriate authorities and its publication in the Gazette of India. The last Section (107) of the Chapter enjoins that the order of the Tribunal shall not take effect until it is so published. The Tribunal thus, under the law, is the final authority to make any order it deems fit, and by no stretch of reasoning can it be said to be acting merely as a copyist or Secretary of the Election Commission or to be writing the order at the dictation of the Election Commission. The Tribunal has its own independent functions and unhampered authority to deal with the case before it and to decide it finally. The law also does not leave any discretion with the Election Commission to adopt, reject or amend an order passed by the Tribunal, and, therefore, the order remains as one made by the Tribunal and at no stage does it become an order of the Election Commission.

Counsel further contends that the abolition of the Tribunal precludes proceedings being taken under Article 227 of the Constitution. The argument is that the power of superintendence is merely to keep the inferior Courts or Tribunals within their bounds, and, therefore, it can only be exercised as long as the Court or Tribunal is functioning and dealing with the case in which interference is sought. Counsel has not been able to cite any authority in support of his '' argument. The existence or non-existence of the inferior Court or Tribunal is not a matter of any consequence for the exercise of the powers of superintendence, and they are not taken away as soon as the Court or Tribunal ceases to function or is abolished. It cannot be said with any justification that a wrong order, despite the fact '' that it is without jurisdiction and has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice, cannot be interfered with or that the mischief done cannot be remedied simply because the Court or Tribunal is no longer functioning.

However, I have no hesitation to agree wilh S. Karam Singh that the power of superin tendence under Article 227 of the Constitution does not make this Court a Court of appeal or revi sion over the proceedings of the Tribunal. It is only where there is any grave miscarriage of justice and flagrant violation of law, or where the Tribunal has failed to act within the bounds of its authority, or acts contrary to the provi sions of law prescribing the mode of its acting which has materially affected its decision, that the High Court may interfere to remedy the obvious error or the grave injustice. In appeal or revision the superior Court has the right and jurisdiction to make orders which the inferior Court should have made, and substitute its own decision. The High Court under its powers of superintendence is not competent to interfere with and set right every error of law or fact committed by the Tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction. The powers are to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases. The power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate Courts or Tribunals within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty enjoins and that they do it in a legal manner. These are principles which appear to have been well established by now.

Keeping in view the limited scope of the powers that this Court has under Article 227 of the Constitution, I have now to examine the facts of the present case. On behalf of the Petitioner it is urged that the election petition and the list attached to it did not strictly comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 83, Representation of the People Act, inasmuch as the petition did not contain the material facts on which the Petitioner (S. Bachittar Singh) relied and the list did not set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice which Respondent No. 1 to the petition (S. Tirath Singh) was alleged to have committed, nor did it disclose names of the persons who were bribed or the date and place when and where they were bribed. It is further contended that the corrupt practice regarding which evidence was led and of which the Petitioner (S. Tirath Singh) was around guilty by the Tribunal was different from and had no connection with the one which he was alleged to have committed. In order to appreciate the objection it becomes necessary to refer in some detail, to the contents of the election petition and its list "A" and other facts of the ease. Clause (8) of the election petition says:

That the election as a result whereof the Respondent No. 1 has been returned and declared to have been elected (i) is wholly void because the result of the election has been materially affected by the improper rejection of the nomination of Mali Singh and S. Bhopinder Singh Mann and (ii) is also void for the reasons that it has been procured and induced by the corrupt and illegal practices (full particulars of which have been set out in the list annexed to the petition) committed by Respondent No. 1, his agents and other persons with the knowledge and connivance of Respondent No, 1 and his agents.

List "A" contained instances of corrupt practice of "Bribery" and its item No. 2 which relates to the point in question reads as follows:

The sweepers of the Small Town Committee, Dhuri, were each granted good work allowance at Rs. 5/- p.m. for three months only during the election days, simply because they happened to be voters in the said constituency, vide letter No. ST/l/(4)/52/20702 dated 7-12-1951. All this was done to induce the sweepers to vote for Respondent No. 1. The allowance was given against the Rules.

S. Tirath Singh denied the allegations in to and his reply to item No. 2 of the list is reproduced below:

The sweepers of Small Town Committee represented to me in writing that their pays should be increased and they also quoted the pays that the employees of other Small Town Committees and Municipal Committees were getting. The representation was forwarded to . the Secretariat. The Secretariat examined it on merits, passed legal orders. Such concessions were also shown to other employees of the various Small Town Committees and Municipal Committees in Pepsu before and after this case. This was an official act done in the routine and not to induce the sweepers to vote for Respondent No. 1 The allegation is, therefore, denied.

The issue that the Tribunal framed with respect to this corrupt practice is No. 5 and that has been given above. It may be mentioned here that votes of Dhuri Constituency were polled between 7th and 12th January, 1952, S. Tirath Singh was then a Minister of the Interim Government and as Minister of Health was I/C of the Local Self-Government Department. In the month of November, 1951 the sweepers, part time employees of the Small Town Committee, Dhuri, made a representation in writing to the Minister concerned that their pays be increased. This representation which did not bear any date was sent to the President of the Committee for report, vide order dated 16-11-1951. In the for warding endorsement the Under Secretary point ed out that the policy of the Government was to reduce the number of sweepers by one half if they were to be made whole time servants. For information of the Committee, it was further added that even at Patiala the pay that the sweepers were drawing was Rs. 25/- p.m.

Before any report was received, the Minister passed an order dated 28-11-1951 that the pay of the sweepers of Dhuri was increased from Rs. 27/- to Rs. 32/- p.m. The order stated that the President and Members of the Committee agreed to the increment in pay of the sweepers. On certain objections having been raised by the department, the Minister modified his previous order and instead of increasing their pay allowed each of the sweepers of Dhuri good-work allowance at the rate of Rs. 5/- p. m. for a period of three months, viz., December, 1951, January and February, 52. This order was passed on 7-12-1951.

The Petitioner before the Tribunal (S. Bachittar Singh) led evidence to prove that the Committee did not formally or informally make any move or recommendation for increase in pay of the sweepers or for grant of good-work allowance to them. The Secretary and ex-officious President of the Committee were examined in this connection. Other facts on which evidence was led were that S.. Tirath Singh paid a visit to Dhuri In the month of November 1951, called Darogha of the Small Town Committee at his residence and asked him to sound the sweepers if they would be. prepared to vote in his favour in case an increment in their pay was allowed. The sweepers, on a suggestion made by the Darogha, held a meeting and decided to vote in favour of S. Tirath Singh if their pay was increased. Four or five of them, accompanied by the Darogha, conveyed their decision to S. Tirath Singh on the following day and the latter agreed to order an increment of Rs. 5/- p.m. in their pay. M. Joginder Singh Darogha and five of the sweepers deposed to these facts.

The position taken by S. Tirath Singh in his statement before the Tribunal was that on an occasional visit of his to Dhuri, some months before the polling started, the sweepers made a representation that their pay should be increased and that he, after verbally getting approval of the Members of the Small Town Committee and also its President, passed an order allowing an increment of Rs. 5/- p.m. in their pay. He denied that this was done because of any settlement arrived at with the sweepers or to induce them to vote in his favour. S. Tirath Singh examined Ch. Sadhu Ram, a member of the Committee, in rebuttal, who deposed that S. Tirath Singh had enquired from him if he had any objection to the pay of the sweepers being increased and that he had replied in the negative. The deposition of this witness was not believed by the Tribunal because he was a seconder of S. Tirath Singh''s nomination papers and otherwise also was found to be interested in him. The Tribunal on the other hand giving detailed reasons for the same, relied upon the evidence produced by the Petitioner before them and arrived at the conclusion and made the orders, which are now in question.

Section 83, Representation of the People Act requires an election petition to contain a concise statement of the material facts en which the Petitioner relies, and further to be accompanied by list setting forth duly particulars of any corrupt or illegal practice which the Petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible as to the names of parties alleged to have committed such corrupt and illegal practice, and the date and place of the commission of such practice. The election petition together with the list is to be presented to the Election Commission. Section 85 provides that the Election Commission shall dismiss the petition if it does not satisfy the requirements of Section 83 with respect to its contents. If the petition is not so dismissed the Election Commission appoints an Election Tribunal and sends the petition to it for trial and disposal. Section 90 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal and Sub-section (4) of the Section provides that the Tribunal may dismiss the petition if it does not comply with the provisions amongst Ors. , of Section 83.

The grievance of the Petitioner is that the Tribunal should have dismissed the petition u/s 90(4) since it did not fully comply with the requirements of Section 83 as regards the contents of the petition and the list attached to it. The contention is that since the Tribunal ignored a mandatory provision of law it was ousted of the jurisdiction to proceed with the defective petition. Even if it is assumed that the election petition was defective, it was for the Tribunal to decree whether it should dismiss the petition on that fore, or direct it to be amended, or proceed with its trial even without amendment. The law does not enjoin upon the Tribunal necessarily to dismiss it for defects of the kind. The question whether the election petition fulfilled the legal requirements under the Act is one that is for the Tribunal to decide. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal does not depend upon the fact whether the election petition is properly framed or not, but is independent of it.

The objection regarding any defect in the election petition ought to have been raised before the Tribunal and it was for the Tribunal finally to decide it. It has to be remembered that no such objection was taken by S. Tirath Singh before the Tribunal either in his written statement or at any stage of the trial. It can be safely presumed that the Tribunal did not find any defect in the contents of the petition or the annexture, and decided to proceed with it. Jurisdiction to decide a question includes the jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly, and, therefore, even if the Tribunal decided this question wrongly it cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction. It may further be observed that the law does not make it imperative for the Tribunal to dismiss the petition as soon as it finds that it does not conform to the requirements of Section 83.

An almost identical question came up before the Division Bench of this Court in AIR 1953 Pepsu 133 (A). The Election Tribunal In that case had ordered fresh parties to be impleaded as Respondents io the election petition. On a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing that order of the Tribunal Kesho Ram Passey J. (now C. J.) made the following observations:

The question of the result of such a conjoiner will have to be considered and decided by the Tribunal. It will be for the Tribunal to accept the omission as fatal to the continuance of the petition or to hold that the nonjoinder of a duly nominated candidate who has withdrawn does not affect its maintainability. The Tribunal is the only authority competent to determine whether all the necessary parties have been brought before it in an election petition, and if it finds that some have been omitted it has the power to throw out the petition or make an order bringing them before it.

Teja Singh C. J. who agreed with the judgment pronounced by his learned colleague, again dealt with the point and after referring to Section 105, Representation of the People Act and Article 329(b). of the Constitution concluded as follows:

All objections relating to the proper presentation of an election petition and the power of the Tribunal to remove defects in the petition should be raised before the Tribunal itself and the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide them. Following the well known maxim that . ''jurisdiction to decide a question included the jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly'' I further hold that the order in question made by the Election Tribunal in the present case is not vitiated by total want of jurisdiction.

Moreover, the Petitioner has not been able to convince us that he was in any way prejudiced by an incomplete narration of facts in. the petition or its schedule. The provisions of Section 83 are for the benefit of the Respondent to the election petition, viz., to enable him effectively to reply to the allegations against him. If the Respondent may have fully under stood the allegations and does not object to the form or contents of the petition before the Tribunal, he cannot be heard to say for the first time in a writ petition to this Court that the petition was defective or that he was prejudiced by it. The objection is consequently overruled.

On behalf of the Petitioner, it is next urged that an allegation as regards corrupt practice is in the nature of a criminal charge and therefore the Tribunal could not go beyond the allegations made in the petition and its annexture and find the Respondent before it guilty of some other practice which he had no occasion to meet. To be more explicit, the argument is that while in list "B" it was only the order dated 7-12-1951 that was challenged and alleged to have been made with a view to induce the sweepers of Dhuri to vote in favour of the Petitioner (S. Tirath Singh) the Tribunal found him guilty of an agreement that had been arrived at between him and the sweepers sometimes earlier. The facts regarding which evidence was led during trial of the election petition, by themselves formed a completed corrupt practice of bribery as defined in Section 123, Representation of the People Act, 1951. It was held to be proved that the opponent in the petition (S. Tirath Singh) made an offer and also a promise to the sweepers of Dhuri to increase their pay with the object of inducing them to vote in his favour. No mention of this act of bribery was made in the annexture. It is, there lore, contended that the finding of the Tribunal with respect to things that had happened at Dhuri sometimes earlier than the order, was illegal and without jurisdiction.

We have given careful thought to the contention and think that there is no force in this either. To say that the talks at Dhuri completed the transaction or that the subsequent order was something independent of or had nothing to do with them, would not be correct. At Dhuri a proposal was made that the pay of the sweepers could be raised if they agreed to vote in favour of the Petitioner. The sweepers expressed their willingness to do it, if and when . that condition was fulfilled. The agreement arrived at was incomplete as long as the order allowing increment in pay was not passed. This was done on 28-11-1951 and was subsequently amended on 7-12-1951 by allowing them good-work allowance for three months. The Petitioner performed his part of the agreement by issuing the necessary order. It was after and because of this order that the sweepers were expected to stick to their part of the agreement and vote for the Petitioner. The Petitioner before the Tribunal was required by issue No. 5 to prove that the order of good-work allowance to the sweepers was passed with a view to induce them to vote in favour of the Respondent. This he did by leading evidence of what happened at Dhuri. The intention of the Petitioner in making the order and the purpose behind it were proved by the previous events and the understanding arrived at between him and the sweepers. The Tribunal has found that the order itself, giving good-work allowance only for those particular three months, indicated that it was made to induce the sweepers to vote for the Petitioner, this indication was strengthened and stood definitely proved by the evidence regarding the talks at Dhuri.

The Petitioner next wants us to go into the merits of the case and to hold that the decision of the Tribunal was not justified on the evidence before it. That, however, we cannot do. The fact that the law does not provide for appeal or revision against an order of the Tribunal cannot induce this Court to interfere with the order In exercise of the powers of superintendence. That could only be done if this Court was to act as a Court of appeal or revision. Whether or not an appeal or any other remedy should be provided from decisions of Election Tribunal is a matter of policy which is for the legislature to determine and with which we have no concern.

Some days after presenting the petition, but before it was admitted, the Petitioner took up the additional plea that no evidence had been led before the Tribunal nor had it as a matter of fact given a finding that the sweepers of Dhuri, or at least some of them, were entered as electors in the Dhuri Constituency. Without a clear finding on the point, it is contended, the Petitioner could not be held guilty of the, corrupt practice of bribery. Section 123, Representation of the People Act defines "Bribery" as a gift, offer or promise by a candidate, or his agent, or by any other person with the connivance of a candidate or his agent of any gratification to any person, with the object of inducing an, elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election. It is, therefore, correct that if the matter was disputed, lit was necessary for the Petitioner before the Tribunal to prove and the Tribunal to give a distinct finding that the names of the sweepers to whom inducement was alleged to have been made, were entered in the electoral rolls of the constituency. But as is clear from their pleadings the parties did not join issue on the point at any time during trial of the case before the Tribunal.

The fact was specifically alleged in item No. 2 of list "B". S. Tirath Singh in his reply, which has been already reproduced, justified his action by saying that the order was made in official routine on a representation of the sweepers "and not to induce the sweepers to vote for Respondent No. 1". The mainstay of the Respondent (S. Tirath Singh) was that there was nothing illegal or corrupt behind the order, he denied its having been made with a view to induce the sweepers to vote for him. The reply read as a whole shows that the allegation that the sweepers were voters was not denied expressly or even by necessary implication. The Defendant in a case may either admit or deny the several allegations made in the plaint, but if he decides to deny any such allegation he must do so clearly and explicitly. Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, is taken to be admitted. Acting on this principle the Tribunal was fully justified to take it as admitted that the sweepers of Dhuri were electors in the constituency.

That is probably the reason why a specific issue on the point was not framed and why a separate and clear finding with respect to it was not given. A passing reference to this is, however, found to be made in para 58 of their judgment which reads as follows:

From the side of the Petitioner oral evidence was led to show as to why the sweepers of Small Town Committee, Dhuri, who being adult persons were all voters in Dhuri Constituency, were singled out for the preferential treatment.

One of the sweepers examined by the Petitioner before the Tribunal deposed to his being an elector. The electoral roll of Dhuri Constituency that has been shown to us contains the names of most of them. In view of these facts, the objection seems to be only a technical one and has not found favour with us.

When the case was being argued by him on the first day of hearing, viz., 2-12-1953, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner wanted to raise a fresh objection on the score of Section 99(I) and also presented an application for that purpose. Counsel was told that he, if allowed, could address us on the new point after he had concluded his arguments on the points already raised. The case was argued by the counsel and also by the Petitioner himself for several days. The Petitioner was again heard in reply to the arguments of the Respondent''s counsel. But at no stage the application dated 2-12-1953 was pressed or even referred to. It may be remembered that the present petition was presented on 19-9-1953. On 29-9-1953, the Petitioner took up some additional grounds and submitted an application for being allowed to raise them. He was heard on those points as well, and they too have been decided against him. To allow fresh objections at the time of arguments would have necessitated fresh notice to the Respondents most of whom were neither present nor represented by a counsel. The objection which was raised at such a belated stage of the ease and was not even pressed, need not be gone into or discussed.

For the reasons stated above, the petition stands dismissed with costs, as already directed. Counsel fee shall be Rs. 50/-.

Gurnam Singh, J.

I agree.