Tiriplex Agencies, (H.P. Gas Dealer) vs The District Collector and Another

P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.—Heard the learned Govt. Pleader for Civil Supplies at the stage of admission.

The petitioner - a dealer in L.P. Gas has filed this writ petition questioning the seizure of 150 filled cylinders and 240 empty cylinders by the 2nd respondent on 30-11-1993 and also the order passed by the 1st respondent on 9-12-1993 suspending the ''B'' Form licence issued under the A.P. Petroleum Products (Licensing and Regulation of Supplies) Order, 1980. The seizure was effected on the ground that there was an excess of 94 filled cylinders and 57 empty cylinders over and above the stock recorded in the registers. Certain other irregularities such as improper maintenance of records, failure to deliver the refills upto 30-11-1993, etc. were also allyed. A show cause notice dated 7-12-93 proposing confiscation of the seized stock was issued by the Joint Collector. Inasmuch as the enquiry u/s 6-A read with Section 6-B of the Essential Commodities Act is pending and the petitioner has been given a notice of hearing already, I am not inclined to express any view on the merits of the charges. I would only direct that the final orders u/s 6-A shall be passed expeditiously without avoidable delay.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Joint Collector has already come to a final conclusion in para 7 of the notice and therefore the petitioner may not be able to get a fair adjudication from him. In other words, the petitioner submits that there is likelihood of bias against the petitioner. No doubt, the wording used viz., ''clearly contravened'' may be suggestive of the fact that the competent authority came to a conclusion without hearing the petitioner. But I do not think that bias shall be necessarily inferred by reason of employing such expression. The overall tenor of the notice indicates that it is only in the nature of a show cause notice calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation and the conclusions recorded in the said notice are only prima facie conclusions based upon the report of the 2nd respondent. In any case, the Joint Collector will independently adjudicate the issues involved after taking into account the representation of the petitioner without being merely carried away by the report of the 2nd respondent. This observation is sufficient to dispel any apprehension on the part of the petitioner that there may not be fair and independent adjudication by the competent authority exercising powers u/s 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act. The ratio of the decision of Calcutta High Court in Munilal Bhagwat Sharan and Others Vs. The Chief Commercial Superintendent, Eastern Railway and Others, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has no application to the facts of the case. It is well settled that unless there is real likelihood of bias, the proceedings initiated before the quasi-judicial authorities cannot be quashed on the basis of vague apprehensions. An inappropriate wording in the show-cause notice cannot by itself be sufficient to infer bias on the part of the Joint Collector. Hence I am not inclined to interdict the Joint Collector from proceeding further in the matter u/s 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act.

Coming next to the order issued by the Collector (Civil Supplies) Chittoor suspending the ''B'' Form licence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner seems to be well-founded. The mere fact that a case has been booked u/s 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act for certain irregularities committed by the dealer is no ground to suspend the licence pending finalisation of enquiry u/s 6-A. No doubt, the power of interim suspension of the licence is vested with the 1st respondent, but such suspension is only a step in aid for passing final order under the provisions of the Control Order viz., A.P. Petroleum Products (Licensing and Regulation of Supplies) Order. The competent authority vested with power under the said Control Order has to independently apply its mind to the relevant facts viz., prima facie material against the petitioner and the circumstances warranting immediate suspension of the licence, before passing an order of interim suspension. As far as this aspect is concerned, a recent judgment of mine in P. Hanumantha Rao v. Chief Rationing Officer, Twin Cities, Hyderabad 1993 (2) L.S. 105 is quite relevant. This is what I observed in the aforementioned case:

"The mere fact that the Vigilence Cell Officials registered a case against the petitioner and arrested him, was perhaps found sufficient to direct immediate suspension of the licence and there is no other indication in the impugned order. It is axiomatic that an authority in whom statutory power is vested has to apply his mind independently and to reach a conclusion prima facie or otherwise whether any order is to be passed in exercise of that power. The prima facie satisfaction must be that of the 2nd respondent but not that of the Vigilence Officials. It may be that while exercising the power of suspension pending further enquiry, the adverse material which has come to light in the course of investigation by the Vigilence Officials can be taken into account. But there should not be mechanical exercise of power based merely on a report that a vigilence case has been filed against the petitioner. Secondly, interim suspension of the authorisation cannot be made on the ground of mere pendency of the enquiry. There is no such provision in the Control Order. In the very nature of things, interim suspension is meant only to facilitate further enquiry under the provisions of the Control Order and it would only be a prelude to take final action under Clause 3 (4) by way of suspension for a specific period or cancellation of the authorisation. The 2nd respondent obviously fell into error in assuming that so long as proceedings u/s 6-A were pending against the petitioner, the suspension of the dealer''s licence should be an automatic consequence....... Suspension of the authorisation cannot go on for an indefinite length of time linking it up with the outcome of the proceedings u/s 6-A......"

The same principle governs the present case and in the light of the said judgment, the impugned order of suspension pending ''finalisation'' of Section 6-A enquiry cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly I quash the order of the 1st respondent dated 9-12-1993 leaving it open to the District Collector to pass fresh order keeping in view the observations made above. The 1st respondent may also consider whether, having regard to the fact that the enquiry u/s 6-A is already in progress and it is likely to be finalised soon, it is necessary to direct interim suspension of the licence. 1 would like to make it clear that it is open to the 1st respondent to make an enquiry under the provisions of the A.P. Petroleum Products (Licensing and Regulation of Supplies) Order by framing specific charges irrespective of pendency of the enquiry u/s 6-A and to take such action as may be deemed fit and contemplated by the relevant Control Order.

The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above and the matter is disposed of with the above observations. There will be no order as to costs.