High CourtsSingle Bench

T.L. Vedachalam vs The State

Madras High Court · Decided on 28 November 2007 · Citation: (2007) 11 MAD CK 0158

HON’BLE JUDGES
K. Mohan Ram, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 173, 197, 311 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 120B, 420, 468, 471 · Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(1), 13(2), 19(1)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Original Petition No''s. 30338 and 30366 of 2007 and M.P. No''s. 1 to 3 of 2007
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Judgment

72 paragraphs · 1,504 words

K. Mohan Ram, J.—The petitioner in the above criminal original petitions is the first accused in C.C. Nos. 23 and 22 of 2004 on the file of

the Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai.

2.

Both the above said cases, the petitioner is facing trail for charges under Sections 120B r/w 420, 468, 468 r/w 471 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w

13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The above petitions have been filed seeking to quash all further proceedings in the said cases

on identical grounds.

3.

Heard Mr. V. Ramana Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Chandrasekaran, learned Special Public Prosecutor for

CBI Cases appearing for the respondent.

4.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the averments in the First Information Report on the face of it would not constitute any

offences as against the petitioner herein; the charge sheets and the statements relied on for the same are also inherently defective in particulars and

there are no nexus between the actual procedures of process of settlement of claim and the charges framed against the petitioner and as such the

criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed; there were no bogus motor claims; when the claims were submitted through reputed Finance

Company, there is no men rea or material to show prima facie that there was a criminal conspiracy between the petitioner herein and the vehicle

owners; none of the ingredients of the offences under Sections 120B, 420, 468 or 471 IPC or the offence u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988 are made out either in the materials available on record or from the statements purportedly recorded by the Police, or

even from the evidence given by P.Ws.1 to 7 in the trial; u/s 197 of Cr.P.C. and u/s 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, it is

mandatory that previous sanction to prosecute should have been obtained from the competent authority and in this case, no such sanction order

was filed along with the charge sheet but the same was filed after taking cognizance and hence the very cognizance taken by the Court below is

liable to be quashed.

5.

In support of his above contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon certain decisions. The learned Counsel by drawing the

attention of this Court to The conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1975 and particularly to schedule B thereto, which is available at page No. 2

of the typed set submitted that the petitioner was working as Assistant General Manager and as such in respect of Assistant Managers, the

Appointing Authority and the Disciplinary Authority is the Assistant General Manager and Shri S. Sundaresan, Assistant General Manager, who is

said to have issued the sanction order and was examined as P.W. 1 was the Assistant General Manager, Miscellaneous, Motor Underwriting &

Claims, Loss Control, Grievances, R & D and Technical Services Cell & Solatium Fund. The said Sundaresan, who was looking after the said

portfolio is not competent to issue the sanction order.

6.

I have carefully considered the above said submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

7.

At the outset, it has to be pointed out that admittedly the trial in both the cases has commenced and P.Ws. 1 to 7 have also been examined and

the trial is almost coming to a close and the cases are pending right from the year 2004 and at this belated stage, the above two criminal original

petitions have been filed seeking to quash the proceedings. All the contentions that have been urged in the above said petitions before this Court

could very well be urged before the trial Court at the time of arguments, but instead, the petitioner has chosen to seek quashing of the proceedings

at the belated stage.

8.

It is seen from the petition in Crl.O.P. No. 30338 of 2007 that earlier the petitioner had filed a discharge petition in Crl.M.P. No. 1276/2007

before the trial Court in C.C. No. 22 of 2004 and the same came to be dismissed by order dated 30.7.2007 and challenging the correctness of the

said order, the petitioner had filed a criminal revision before this Court and the criminal revision petition also came to be dismissed by this Court.

But yet the petitioner has filed the above criminal original petition urging the same grounds.

9.

It is seen from the order dated 13.9.2005 passed in Crl.M.P. Nos. 319 and 320 of 2005 in C.C. Nos. 22 and 23 of 2004 respectively that the

prosecution had filed the petitions u/s 311 read with 173 of Cr.P.C. seeking permission of the Court to examine S. Sundaresan, Assistant General

Manager as an additional witness in the two cases and those applications were allowed. In the said order, the learned Special Judge observed as

follows:

Therefore, it is very clear that the prosecution had already obtained the sanction order from the competent authority and has also enclosed the

same along with the final report enabling this Court to take cognizance of the cases against the accused. In the said circumstances, the contention of

the accused that the prosecution has not obtained the sanction order from the competent authority before laying the final report and therefore the

same would affect the very basis of the prosecution case cannot be accepted.

It is further observed in paragraph -7 of the said order as follows:

7.

It is contended by the 1st accused that the copy of the sanction order has not been furnished to him. But, there is an endorsement made by the

accused as having received the copies of documents D1 to D112 in R.C. 19/02, C.C. 23/04 and also the documents D1 to D189 (in bounded

books) in R.C. 19/A/02, C.C.22/04.

10.

Therefore, from the above said observations contained in the above said order, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the

prosecution had not filed the sanction order along with the charge sheet is liable to be rejected and it is accordingly rejected.

11.

It is also seen from the evidence of P.W. 1 � S. Sundaresan, Assistant General Manager that P.W. 1 has been questioned regarding his

competency to give sanction to prosecute the petitioner. The sanction orders have also been marked through him. Therefore, it is for the trial Court

to consider from the evidence of P.W. 1 and other connected materials available on record as to whether the sanction order is valid or not. At this

stage, this Court cannot go into the contested issue.

12.

The other contentions put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have to be considered only by appreciating the evidence on record

and other documentary evidence produced by the prosecution and that can be done only by the trial Court and not by this Court at this stage.

13.

In Amolak Singh Chhabra v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2007 (2) Cri 222 (M.P.), paragraph-18, reads as follows:

18.

As the question of obtaining prior sanction for prosecution of a public servant is a mixed question of facts and law, and material collected by

the investigating agency during investigation against the present petitioner are yet to be examined by the Trial Court, therefore, this Court refrain

from making any observations on the quality of evidence collected by the prosecution regarding alleged offence or its nature, so far as present

petitioner is concerned, and leave this aspect of the matter with the Trial Court.

14.

Further, as pointed out above, the petitioner has filed the above quash petitions after the examination of seven witnesses and at the stage when

the trial is almost coming to a close and at this belated stage, the criminal original petitions should not be entertained by this Court.

15.

In Amar Chand Agarwalla Vs. Shanti Bose and Another, etc., , it has been laid down as follows:

(A) Where the accused moved the High Court at the time when the trial was almost coming to a close and what remained to be done was the

examination of two prosecution and one Court witnesses and the High Court quashed the charge and the entire proceedings on the grounds that

the complainant suppressed material facts and that the evidence on record did not establish the alleged offence, the order was liable to be set

aside. The proper course at that stage to be adopted by the High Court was to allow the proceedings to go on and to come to its logical

conclusion, one way or the other, and decline to interfere with those proceedings. The questions whether there was suppression and whether the

evidence established the alleged offence were matters to be considered by the trial Court after an appraisal of the entire evidence.

16.

The above said decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case.

17.

Therefore, for the forgoing reasons, the above criminal original petitions fail and accordingly, they are dismissed. Consequently, connected

miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.