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Judgment
M. M. Kumar, C.J.—This order is in continuation of an earlier order passed in AA No. 7/2013. A copy of that order be added as part of
this order. The petitioner had earlier filed AA No. 7/2013 which was decided on 27.07.2013. In those proceedings it was concluded on the basis
of various judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, namely, Datar Switchgears Ltd. Vs. Tata Finance Ltd. and Another, , Punj Lloyd Ltd. v.
Petronet MHB. Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 638, Union of India (UOI) Vs. Bharat Battery Manufacturing Co. (P) Ltd., , S.B.P. and Co. Vs. Patel
Engineering Ltd. and Another, , Denel (Proprietary Limited) Vs. Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence, , Northern Railway Administration, Ministry
of Railway, New Delhi Vs. Patel Engineering Company Ltd., and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others Vs. Raja Transport (P) Ltd., that
following two principles with regard to appointment of arbitrator by the Court have emerged, which are set out below:-
(A) If one party demands the opposite party to appoint an arbitrator as per the agreed arbitration clause and if the opposite party fails to appoint
arbitrator within 30 days of demand made by the other party then the right to appoint arbitrator does not get automatically forfeited after the expiry
of 30 days of the demand. However, the right to appoint an arbitrator by such a party stands forfeited after the aggrieved party has moved the
Court u/s 11 of the Act.
(B) In view of law laid down by a three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Patel Engineering Co. Ltd (supra), the principle which
emerges is that according to the scheme of Section 11 of the Act emphasis has been laid on upholding the terms of the agreement. The sanctity of
contractual terms must be adhered to and given effect as closely as possible. In other words the Court may ask to do what has not been done as
per the terms of agreement. The Court must first ensure that remedies provided for are exhausted. It is not mandatory for the Chief Justice or his
nominee to appoint the named arbitrators. But at the same time due regard has to be given to the qualifications required by the agreement and
other considerations including the one detailed in Section 11(8) of the Act.
In the aforesaid context this Court has set out the facts and has concluded that in pursuance of Clause 18 of the agreement dated 14.02.2011
the petitioner issued a notice on 15.11.2012 calling upon the respondents to appoint an arbitrator within a period of 30 days. However, the
arbitrator could not be appointed as the period of 30 days expired on 15.12.2012. After the expiry of 30 days the respondents were not able to
appoint the arbitrator which resulted in filing of AA No. 7/2013 on 15.05.2013. The arbitrator was appointed only after receipt of notice of that
petition. Consequently the respondents had lost the right to appoint the arbitrator after filing of that petition on 15.05.2013. This Court then posed
a question, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view the principle 'B' extracted in the preceding para, an independent
arbitrator is required to be appointed or a direction should be issued to the authority named in Clause 18 to appoint the arbitrator or to accept the
appointment already made on 10.06.2013. However, in AA No. 7/2013 the order dated 10.06.2013 appointing an arbitrator in accordance with
the arbitration clause was not challenged and this Court has granted liberty to the petitioner to challenge the order dated 10.06.2013 (Annexure-H)
by filing a fresh application. The instant petition has been filed in pursuance of liberty granted to the petitioner to challenge the order dated
10.06.2013.
According to the impugned order dated 10.06.2013, the Chairman, J&K State Forest Corporation-respondent has constituted a Board of
Arbitrators comprising of Shri A. K. Singh, IFS, Chief Wildlife Warden, J&K, as Chairman; and Shri Abdul Gani Hajam, IFS, Conservator of
Forests, IWDP and Shri T. Rabi Kumar, IFS, Special Secretary (Tech.) Forest Department as members. The order dated 10.06.2013 has been
challenged on various grounds by urging that the Board of Arbitrators has been appointed only after receipt of notice issued by this Court with the
object to render the petition infructuous and with a view to deprive the Court to make appointment of an independent arbitrator which is sufficient
proof of bias on the part of the Chairman. There are further allegations of deliberate violation of order dated 27.12.2012 passed by the Principal
District Judge u/s 9 of the Act. There are further allegations of deliberate delay in appointing the arbitrator so as to keep the petitioner-Unit non-
functional. The officers who have been named to constitute the Board of Arbitrators are subordinate of the Chairman and are working under him in
the Forest Department. They are closely associated with the Chairman who is the Forest Minister himself. All the officers appointed by the
Chairman are bound to obey his instructions and directions during the arbitral proceedings. According to the allegations the petitioner do not
expect a fair deal. According to the averments made in para 9, the impugned order was issued on 10.06.2013 and the Board of Arbitrators was
bound to initiate proceedings with prior information to the petitioner. However, it was kept as a guarded secret and no action in the matter had
since been taken. The members of the Board of Arbitrators have acted on the directions of the Chairman. The petitioner has also urged that
respondents have lost the right to appoint the Board of Arbitrators by issuing order dated 10.06.2013 as per the settled law.
In the objections filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 the principal stand taken is that the Chairman, State Forest Corporation-cum-Minister suffers
from no bias and he is not closely associated with the members of the Board of Arbitrators. It has been alleged that there is no material on record
to draw any adverse inference against the Chairman, State Forest Corporation-cum-Minister or the members of the Board of arbitrators. Reliance
has been placed on Section 11 and 16 of the Arbitration Act.
Mr. M. Y. Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that once there is a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court with regard to the
independence of the Board of Arbitrators then there is no impediment for the Chief Justice to appoint an independent arbitrator instead of the
named arbitrator stipulated by the arbitration clause. In support of his submissions learned counsel has placed reliance on the observations made
by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in paras 19, 20 and 21 of the judgment rendered in the case of Deep Trading Company Vs. Indian Oil Corporation
and Others, . Mr. Bhat then and argued that there are no qualifications laid down in the arbitration Clause 18 of the agreement to appoint only a
particular type of person as an arbitrator. According to the learned counsel all that Clause 18 emphasizes is that the Chairman may himself conduct
the arbitration proceedings or may nominate any officer of the Government to conduct proceedings. Mr. Bhat has also placed reliance on the
observations made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Bipromasz Bipron Trading SA Vs. Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), .
Mr. Chashoo, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that once an arbitrator has been named with the consent of the parties
then there is no scope left for leveling allegations of bias or doubt of their independence. In support of his submissions learned counsel has placed
reliance on Secretary to Government, Transport Deptt., Madras Vs. Munuswamy Mudaliar and Another, and Ranjul Baruah Vs. Numaligarh
Refinery Ltd., .
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, I have reached the conclusion that
the prayer made by the petitioner to appoint an independent arbitrator other than the one named in Clause 18 of the agreement, deserves to be
granted.
It has come on record that there is a live dispute between the parties and a legal notice for appointment of arbitrator in terms of Clause 18 was
issued by the petitioner on 10.09.2012/15.11.2012. The period of one month came to an end and the petitioner landed in this Court by filing AA
No. 7/2013 on 15.05.2013. The matter was delayed for the reasons best known to the respondents and the order appointing the Board of
Arbitrators was passed only on 10.06.2013. The petitioner has leveled numerous allegations doubting the independent working of the Board of
Arbitrators because all of them are under the direct control of the Chairman State Forest Corporation-cum- Minister. Moreover the judgment of
Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Deep Trading Company (supra) in unmistakable terms lays down that once the party like the
respondents has forfeited its right to appoint an arbitrator then the Court would be competent to appoint an independent arbitrator. In that regard
reliance may be placed on the observations made in para 19, 20 and 21 of the judgment which are set out below in extenso:-
Section 11(8) provides that Chief Justice or the designated person or institution, in appointing an arbitrator, shall have due regard to two
aspects, (a) qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties; and (b) other considerations as are likely to secure the
appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator. In Northern Railway Administration3, a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the
scheme of Section 11. Insofar as Section 11(8) is concerned, this Court stated that appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators named in the
arbitration agreement is not a must, but while making the appointment the twin requirements mentioned therein have to be kept in view.
If we apply the legal position exposited by this Court in Datar Switchgears1 to the admitted facts, it will be seen that the Corporation has
forfeited its right to appoint the arbitrator. It is so for the reason that on 09.08.2004, the dealer called upon the Corporation to appoint the
arbitrator in accordance with terms of Clause 29 of the agreement but that was not done till the dealer had made application u/s 11(6) to the Chief
Justice of the Allahabad High Court for appointment of the arbitrator. The appointment was made by the Corporation only during the pendency of
the proceedings u/s 11(6). Such appointment by the Corporation after forfeiture of its right is of no consequence and has not disentitled the dealer
to seek appointment of the arbitrator by the Chief Justice u/s 11(6). We answer the above questions accordingly.
Section 11(8) does not help the Corporation at all in the fact situation. Firstly, there is no qualification for the arbitrator prescribed in the
agreement. Secondly, to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator, it is rather necessary that someone other than an officer
of the Corporation is appointed as arbitrator once the Corporation has forfeited its right to appoint the arbitrator under Clause 29 of the
agreement.
(Emphasis added)
The view of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, supports the principle that the Chief Justice or his designate has the power to appoint a person other
than the named arbitrator upon examination of the relevant facts which would tend to indicate that the named arbitrator would not likely be
impartial. In that regard reliance may be placed on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bipron Trading SA (supra).
In para 49 of the judgment their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also held that once the named arbitrator is the direct subordinate to the
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, then it is not expected that he would act impartially. The aforesaid view is discernible from perusal of paras 48
and 49, which are set out below in extenso:-
In view of the aforesaid observations, it would not be possible to reject the petition merely on the ground that this Court would have no power
to make an appointment of an arbitrator other than the Chairman-cum-Managing Director or his designate. This Court would have the power to
appoint a person other than the named arbitrator, upon examination of the relevant facts, which would tend to indicate that the named arbitrator is
not likely to be impartial.
In this case, the petitioner had clearly pleaded that the named arbitrator is a direct subordinate of the CMD and employee of the respondent.
CMD is the controlling authority of all the employees, who have been dealing with the subject matter in the present dispute and also controlling
authority of the named arbitrator. Apprehending that the CMD, who had been dealing with the entire contract would not act impartially as an
arbitrator, the petitioner had issued a notice on 20th May, 2011. In this notice, it was pointed out that while the entire process of the performance
of the contract was going on, the CMD had issued a letter on 05.06 2009 to the petitioner stating that as per the company's directives, all pending
supplies as on that date were 'put on hold'. After the aforesaid communication, no communication was issued to the petitioner for supply of the
goods as per the Purchase Order dated 3.12.2009. Even subsequently, there were difficulties when a further lot of 24 units were supplied. The
detailed submissions made by the petitioner have been noticed in the earlier part of the judgment.
(Emphasis added)
It is thus evident that the power of the Chief Justice to appoint an independent arbitrator is not confined to those persons who have been
named in the arbitration agreement, particularly when in the facts and circumstances of the case the Court finds that the named persons in the
arbitration agreement are working under the control of the authority who has appointed them as such. Therefore, the principles enunciated in the
aforesaid judgment would be fully applicable to the facts of the present case.
The argument of Mr. Chashoo learned counsel for the respondents has failed to impress me because legal position which emerges from the
various provisions of the new Act and adopted in various judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court has to be followed. It does not lie in the mouth
of the respondents to first violate the provisions of appointing arbitrator within thirty days or before the filing of petition by the petitioner u/s 11 of
the Act and the claim enforcement of stipulation in the arbitration agreement. If allowed to do so, the respondents would be permitted to approbate
and reprobate, which is impossible proposition to accept. Therefore, I find no substance in the submission of Mr. Chashoo and reject the same.
As a sequel to the above discussion this petition succeeds. The order dated 10.06.2013 passed by the Chairman-State Forest Corporation-
cum-Minister is hereby quashed. Accordingly, I proceed to appoint Hon'ble Mr. Justice Muzaffar Jan, a former Judge of this High Court, as the
sole Arbitrator. The arbitrator shall commence the proceedings at the earliest and conclude the same expeditiously. A copy of this order along with
a copy of the order dated 24.07.2013 passed in AA No. 7/2013 be sent to the learned Arbitrator under registered post.
The petition stands disposed of.
