Tripasura Venkata Narasinga Rao vs Vysyaraju Surayyaraju and Others

Patanjali Sastri, J.—We are asked to certify u/s 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, that this case involves a substantial question of

law as to the interpretation of that Act. Although one of the questions raised and argued; before us was a substantial question as to the

interpretation of Sections 99 and 100 of that Act it was considered unnecessary to decide it and the appeal was disposed of on another point. Can

it then be said that the case ""involves"" that question? We think not. Sub-section 2 of Section 205 clearly contemplates that such question should

not only have been raised but also decided by the High Court, for otherwise it would not be possible for any party in the case to appeal to the

Federal Court "" on the ground that any such question as aforesaid has been wrongly decided."" Reading Sub-sections (1) and (2) together, it would

seem that a case cannot be said to "" involve "" a question unless its decision is necessary for the purpose of the case.

In Gaddam Padmanabham Vs. Pasupuleti Kamaraju and Others, , one of us sitting alone had to consider whether a certificate u/s 205 could be

given in respect of a question which was not raised in this Court at all, although it was raised and decided against the appellant in the Courts below.

The question haying been decided adversely to the appellant by a Full Bench of this Court, Counsel for appellant did not argue the point at the

hearing of the appeal and the Court made no reference to it in the judgment. Subsequently however an application was made for the issue of a

certificate u/s 205 as the question was one of interpretation of the Constitution Act. The Court refused to grant a certificate observing:

Section 205 allows an appeal to the Federal Court on ''defined grounds'' where a certificate under Sub-section (i) is given. One of such grounds

which is material here is that a question of the kind specified in the section has been ""wrongly decided"" which, I take it, means wrongly decided by

the Court from whose judgment, decree or final order the appeal is sought to be preferred.

That decision was followed later by a Division Bench. Here, no doubt, the point was raised and argued. But, as already stated, we did not find it

necessary to decide it in the view we took on another point arising in the case. The reasoning of the decision therefore applies here and no

certificate can be given.

A similar view has been expressed by the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts. In Muhammad Saidkhan v. Shiam Lall and Ors. ILR (1944)

All. 773, the learned Judges observed thus:

The principle underlying all the cases which I have mentioned above is that there must be a pressing necessity for the decision of the point. The

point may be important or its attractiveness may invite an adjudication, but can it be said that its importance to the case compels decision? This is

the principal test and this test the present application does not answer.

In Emperor v. Savar Manuel Dantes ILR (1941) Bom. 421 , the Court said, referring to Sub-section (2),

The wording of the Sub-section seems to indicate that the Legislature did not contemplate an appeal against a decision not based on a point of law

arising under the Government of India Act.

The learned Judges were of opinion that the expression �involves"" could not mean the mere possibility of some question of law arising in a

remote contingency.

Reference was made by Mr. Rajagopala Aiyangar for the appellant to Mohamed Mohy-ud-din v. The King-Emperor (1946) 2 M.L.J. 23 :

(1946) F L.J. 64 where the Lahore High Court appears to have given a certificate u/s 205 although the decision of the case was not based upon

the question of law relating to the interpretation of the Government of India Act. One of the learned Judges dealt with the question in his judgment,

but the case was decided in the High Court on a different point. Apparently no objection was raised to the issue of a certificate, and the present

question does not appear to have been argued with reference to the terms of Section 205. We cannot, therefore, regard the order of the High

Court in that case as an authority on the point now arising for our decision.

For the reasons we have indicated we must decline to certify that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the

Government of India Act, 1935.