T.T.G. Industries Ltd. and Others vs State By CBI, E.O.W.

P.R. Shivakumar, J.—The Petitioners 1 to 5 herein have been arraigned as Accused Nos. 1 to 5 in C.C. No. 559 of 2007 on the file of the

learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai. Consequent to the dismissal of their petition filed u/s 239 Code of Criminal

Procedure, namely Crl. M.P. No. 1519 of 2009 seeking an order of discharge from the said criminal case, the Petitioners have approached this

Court challenging the correctness and legality of the said order by invoking the revisional powers of this Court u/s 397 r/w. 401 Code of Criminal

Procedure.

Without there being any specific complaint made by a de facto complainant, the SPE/CBI/EOW/Chennai, registered a case on ""source

information"" in R.C. 6/E/2005-CBI/Chennai and submitted a final report on the file of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

Egmore, Chennai alleging that the Petitioners herein committed offences punishable under Sections 120-B r/w. Section 409, 420, 467, 467 r/w.

471 I.P.C and substantive offences thereof, probably meaning the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 467, 467 r/w. 471 I.P.C. The

said charge sheet was dated 31.01.2007. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai took it on file as C.C. No. 559

of 2007 for the above said offences alleged in the final report. On appearance of the Petitioners herein/accused, they not only denied the

allegations against them found in the final report, but also filed a petition u/s 239 Code of Criminal Procedure which was taken on file by the

learned Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai as Crl. M.P. No. 1519 of 2009 in C.C. No. 559 of 2007. After enquiry, the

learned Additional Metropolitan Magistrate passed the impugned order dated 12.03.2010, partly allowing the petition and discharging the

Petitioners herein for the offence u/s 409 I.P.C alone and dismissing the said petition in respect of the offences u/s 120-B r/w. Section 420, 467,

467 r/w. 471 I.P.C. The said order is impugned so far as the dismissal of the petition seeking discharge regarding the offence u/s 120-B r/w.

Section 420, 467, 467 r/w. 471 I.P.C and the substantive offences thereof.

The arguments advanced by Mr. R. Rajarathinam, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and by Mr. N. Chandrasekaran, learned Special Public

Prosecutor of CBI Cases, representing the Respondent were heard. The grounds of revision and other documents filed in this case and also the

records summoned from the trial Court were perused by this Court.

The gist of the allegation made against the Petitioners leading to the institution of the criminal case by the CBI is as follows:

(i) The first Petitioner herein was initially promoted in the name of M/s. T.T.G Machinery Manufacturing Company in the year 1987 and it

underwent a change of name in 1992 as M/s. T.T.G. Industries Limited. It was engaged in manufacturing of Wind Electric Generators in

collaboration with a German company. During the year 1994-1995, the first Petitioner approached the Chennai office of the Industrial Finance

Corporation of India, shortly called as IFCI, for the sanction of a term loan of Rs. 11.65 crores for setting up of a ""Wind Farm"" with 2.5 MW

capacity near Kethanoor, Palladam Taluk and for expanding its capacity of manufacturing Wind Electric Generators at its plant at Ayanambakkam,

Chennai. IFCI agreed to lend financial assistance on condition that the loan amount should be secured by way of first charge on all the movable

and immovable assets of M/s. T.T.G Industries Ltd., both present and future. It was also agreed that the possession of such movable and

immovable assets of the first Petitioner would be treated as properties entrusted to it by IFCI. Out of the agreed amount of loan, at various points

of time, a total amount of Rs. 11 crores was released to the first Petitioner herein by way of cheques. However, the loan in respect of the balance

amount of Rs. 65 lakhs was cancelled. The first Petitioner executed a deed of hypothecation dated 06.06.1995 hypothecating Wind Electric

Generators with their parts and accessories. Pursuant to the execution of the deed of hypothecation and with the help of the financial assistance

rendered by IFCI, the first Petitioner company installed 10 wind electric generators at Kethanur, Palladam Taluk on condition that the possession

of the said wind mills and enjoyment of the same by the first Petitioner was for doing business of electricity generation and out of the profit earned,

the principal and interest should be repaid to IFCI.

(ii) Apart from the hypothecation, the first Petitioner company also mortgaged its immovable properties with all structures and fixtures situated at

Varapatti and Poorandampalayam villages, Kethanoor, Palladam Taluk. Though the installation of 10 electric generators at the above said villages

was completed in March 1996, after purchasing the generators for the Wind Mill from M/s. Siemen Ltd., and they were used for generating

electricity to be sold to Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, and the first Petitioner company sold about Rs. 170 lakhs worth of electricity to Tamil Nadu

Electricity Board and received payments, it failed to repay the loan advanced by IFCI between 1999 and 2002. The first Petitioner company

fraudulently and dishonestly removed 8 of the wind electric generators hypothecated to IFCI from the Wind Farm site at Varapatti and

Poorandampalayam villages, Kethanoor, Palladam Taluk, Coimbatore District and sold 7 wind electric generators to Sriram Investments Limited

and 1 to Sriram City Union Finance Limited, pursuant to which they were erected at their Wind Farm site at Levenjipuram, Tirunelveli District. The

value of the said wind electric generators thus sold and removed from the Wind Farm site of the first Petitioner was about Rs. 8 Crores.

(iii) When the officials of IFCI visited the Wind Farm of the first Petitioner in December 2002 for verification of the hypothecated properties, the

first Petitioner company handed over false and fabricated documents as if those wind electric generators were sent for repair works and thus the

sale of the 8 wind electric generators and removal of the same were concealed. The first Petitioner company''s representatives also falsely

submitted before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (shortly called BIFR) on 21.03.2002 that the subject wind electric

generators had been sent for repairs. During the course of investigation, the second and the third Petitioners (A2 and A3), who were the

representatives of the first Petitioner company also furnished false information to the Registrar of companies by producing false balance sheets for

the year 2003 and 2004, as if the wind electric generators had been sent for repairs. The 4th and 5th Petitioners, who are also the officials of the

first Petitioner company, during investigation gave confessional statements before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai bringing the

malpractice to light that they also entered into a criminal conspiracy with other Petitioners to commit the said malpractice. Pursuant to the

conspiracy, Petitioners 1 to 3 herein, who were entrusted with and were given dominion over the wind electric generators by the IFCI, fraudulently

and dishonestly misappropriated the same with the help of the 4th and 5th Petitioners and thus all the Petitioners had committed the alleged

offences.

The Petitioners had prayed for an order discharging them from the criminal case concerned in this revision on the following submissions made by

them:

(i) In the petition filed u/s 329 Code of Criminal Procedure, there was no allegation in the final report that the term loan was obtained by submitting

any forged document. Admittedly, 10 wind electric generators for the Wind Farm were purchased from M/s. Siemens Limited, through proper

invoices containing the serial numbers of the generators. It is also not in dispute that all the ten generators, thus purchased from M/s. Siemens Ltd.,

were installed at the wind mill farm of the first Petitioner in Palladam Taluk. Though it is true that the wind electric generators were hypothecated to

IFCI by a deed of hypothecation dated 06.06.1995, the first Petitioner never parted with the possession of the same and the possession and

enjoyment of the same was with the first Petitioner company, whereas IFCI had been given only a lien/charge over those generators. Neither the

ownership nor possession of the movable property passed on to the creditor, namely IFCI. Hence, the contention that the said wind electric

generators were entrusted to IFCI and dominion over them was given to IFCI by the first Petitioner, is without any legal basis. Therefore, there is

no prima facie material to show that there was any criminal breach of trust, as there must be an entrustment of the property or entrustment of

dominion over the property. Since the first Petitioner company was the owner of the 10 generators allegedly removed from its Wind Farm, the

preparation of the invoices and delivery challans for the removal of the same from the Wind Farm, even if not true, will not come under the

definition of forgery as defined in Section 463 I.P.C. Creating some false delivery challans and invoices, if any, with regard to one''s own movable

property hypothecated to another will not attract the definition of forgery, even though it may amount to breach of conditions of the hypothecation

deed. Therefore, the Petitioners should not be asked to face trial for the alleged offences u/s 409, 467 and 471.

(ii) In addition to that, the entire amount due to IFCI was paid to it and IFCI accepted it in full satisfaction of the claim against the first Petitioner.

On such acceptance, IFCI also released the immovable properties mortgaged to them. It also agreed to withdraw all cases instituted against the

first Petitioner. As such, cases instituted by IFCI against the first Petitioner in other forum were withdrawn, after recording full satisfaction. When

IFCI officials were asked to withdraw the criminal case also, the officials of IFCI revealed the fact that they were not the defacto complainants and

the case was registered by CBI on ""source information"". In view of the fact that the aggrieved party has already withdrawn the cases and has not

chosen to lodge any complaint and in view of the fact that the amount due to the aggrieved party was settled and full satisfaction was obtained, the

Petitioners cannot be prosecuted for the alleged offences and hence, the Petitioners should be discharged in respect of all the offences alleged in

the charge sheet.

Let us now consider the sustainability of the contentions raised by the Petitioners. The Petitioners, as per the final report, are alleged to have

committed the offences of: criminal conspiracy punishable u/s 120-B of I.P.C; criminal breach of trust punishable u/s 409 of I.P.C; forgery for the

purpose of cheating punishable u/s 468 of I.P.C and using a forged document as original punishable u/s 468 r/w. 471 I.P.C. The offence of

criminal conspiracy is said to have been committed for committing the other offences, namely offences punishable u/s 409, 468 and 468 r/w. 471

I.P.C. Therefore, before dealing with the alleged offence of criminal conspiracy, let us deal with the other offences. u/s 409 I.P.C, criminal breach

of trust by a public servant or by a banker, merchant or agent is made a punishable offence. It says, whoever, being in any manner entrusted with

property, or with any dominion over property in any one of the above said capacities, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of such property,

shall be punished. Therefore, besides proving that the accused is a public servant or a banker, merchant or agent and was entrusted with the

property or dominion over property in his capacity as public servant or in the course of business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or

agent, it shall also be proved that he has committed criminal breach of trust. What is criminal breach of trust is defined in Section 405 I.P.C, which

reads as follows:

Dishonest misappropriation or conversion of the property which was entrusted or dominion over which was entrusted to one to his own use or

dishonest use of or disposal of such property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or of

any legal contract, express or implied which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or the act of willfully suffering any other person so to

do. Therefore, to constitute a criminal breach of trust, there must be an entrustment of property or entrustment of dominion over the property to the

person who is said to have committed breach of trust.

Neither any one of the two explanations provided to Section 405 nor any one of the six illustrations provided thereunder makes the owner of the

property who enters into a deed of hypothecation with a financier, as a person entrusted with the property (hypotheca) or entrusted with the

dominion over the property. In a case of hypothecation, the hypothecator being the owner, his possession, enjoyment and dominion over the

property is traceable to his title and not to any concession that may be purported to be extended by the hypothecatee. It is quite clear that in case

of hypothecation, there is no entrustment of either the property or dominion over the property to the hypothecator, who is the owner of the

property. The person, in whose favour the hypothecation is created, does not get possession or dominion over the property. He has got only a lien

or charge over the property, which can be enforced by having recourse to the procedure prescribed by law.

In this regard, a comparison of hypothecation and hire purchase shall be of much use in understanding the problem. In case of hire purchase, the

financier who finances the amount for the purchase of the property shall be the owner and the hirer shall be the pledgee with a condition that in

case of completion of payment of the installments, he shall be entitled to the transfer of ownership without any further payment. Unless and until the

payment of final installment is made, the financier shall be the owner and the possession of the hirer under the hire purchase of agreement will be an

entrustment of the property and any misappropriation or conversion of the same may amount to criminal breach of trust. On the other hand, a

hypothecation of a movable is equivalent to mortgage of an immovable property without possession. The hypothecator does not part with either

the title or possession under the deed of hypothecation. On the other hand, a lien/charge is created in favour of hypothecatee for the repayment of

the loan secured by the hypothecation.

This position shall be clear in the light of the observations by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and

Ors. reported in (2006) 3 SCC 188. In the said case, NEPC India Ltd. had hypothecated its two aircrafts to the Indian Oil Corporation for

securing payment for the fuel supplied under a contract. In the said contract itself a clause was incorporated to the effect that NEPC India would

not assign, sell, pledge, charge, underlet or otherwise encumber or part with the possession, custody or beneficial interest in respect of the two

aircrafts without the previous consent of IOC in writing. NEPC also undertook not to do any act which might diminish the value of the

hypothecated property without clearing the outstanding due to IOC. Thus NEPC had been bound by the contractual clause. NEPC India Limited

was alleged to have clandestinely removed the engines and certain parts of the aircrafts hypothecated to IOC and also committed default in

payments to be made to IOC. A private complaint was filed against the directors of NEPC for offences punishable u/s 378 (theft), 403 (dishonest

misappropriation), 405 (criminal breach of trust) 415 (cheating) and 425 (mischief) of Indian Penal Code. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in that

case held that the complaint itself could be quashed. Dealing with the allegation of commission of criminal breach of trust, the Hon''ble Supreme

Court made the following observations:

A criminal breach of trust involves the following ingredients:

a) a person should have been entrusted with property or entrusted with any dominion over property;

b) that person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that property or willfully

suffer any other person to do so;

c) that such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is

to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.

It has also referred to observation made in an earlier judgment Chelloor Mankkal Narayan Ittiravi Nambudiri Vs. State of Travancore-Cochin, ,

wherein it was observed as follows:

the ownership or beneficial interest in the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust is alleged to have been committed, must be in some

person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court has also answered the question whether there is any entrustment in a Hypothecation in the following observation:

Hypothecation is a mode of creating a security without delivery of title or possession. Both, ownership of the movable property and possession

thereof, remain with the debtor. The creditor has an equitable charge over the property and is given a right to take possession and sell the

hypothecated movables to recover his dues. The creditor may also have the right to claim payment from the sale proceeds (if such proceeds are

identifiable and available).

In Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU (X), New Delhi Vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta, , the following observations were

also made:

When some goods are hypothecated by a person to another person, the ownership of the goods still remains with the person who has

hypothecated such goods. The property in respect of which criminal breach of trust can be committed must necessarily be the property of some

person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be in the other person and the offender must hold such property

in trust for such other person or for his benefit. In a case of pledge, the pledged article belongs to some other person but the same is kept in trust

by the pledgee. In the instant case, a floating charge was made on the goods by way of security to cover up credit facility. In our view, in such case

for disposing of the good covering the security against credit facility the offence of criminal breach of trust is not committed.

Applying the ratio decided in the said cases, the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has rightly held that criminal breach of trust

as defined in Section 405 I.P.C has not been made out and the Petitioners cannot be prosecuted for the offence of aggravated form of criminal

breach of trust made punishable u/s 409 I.P.C. The said finding of the Court below is not challenged by the prosecution. Therefore, this Court

hereby holds that no prima facie case has been made out for prosecuting any one of the Petitioners for the offence u/s 409 I.P.C and the finding of

the Court below in this regard is on sound reasoning, which deserves confirmation by this Court.

So far as forgery is concerned, it is defined u/s 463 I.P.C. As per the definition found in Section 463 I.P.C, making a false document or part of

a document shall be forgery if it is done with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to

cause any person to part with property or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be

committed. Making a false document is defined u/s 464 I.P.C. Dishonest or fraudulent making, signing, sealing or executing a document or part of

a document or making any mark denoting the execution of a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of

the document was made, signed, sealed, executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority the person doing it knows

that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed, is defined as making a false document. Dishonest or fraudulent cancellation, alteration of a

document or material part without lawful authority is also construed to be making a false document. Dishonestly or fraudulently inducing any person

to sign, seal, execute or alter a document with the knowledge that such person, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication, cannot or that by

reason of deception practiced upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or nature of alteration, will also amount to making a false

document. Making a false document shall be with dishonest or fraudulent intention of causing any damage or injury to the public or to any other

person or to support any claim or title or to make any person to enter into a contract, which he otherwise would not chose to do so.

In this case, the Petitioners are said to have committed forgery for the purpose of cheating as defined u/s 468 I.P.C. Forgery per se is made

punishable u/s 465 I.P.C. The Petitioners 1 to 3 are said to have committed the offence of forgery by preparing invoices showing repair charges

and transport delivery challans to project as if 8 out of 10 wind electric generators were removed from the Wind Farm of the first Petitioner to the

factory for repairs. According to the prosecution, 7 out of 8 wind electric generators removed from the Wind Farm of the first Petitioner were sold

to Sriram Investments Limited and the remaining one was sold to Sriram City Union Finance Ltd., and all the 8 wind electric generators were

erected by them at Levenjipuram, Tirunelveli District. According to the prosecution, suppressing the fact of the sale of those 8 wind electric

generators to Sriram Investments Limited and Sriram City Union Finance and the transportation of the same to Levenjipuram, Petitioners 1 to 3

had created false transport delivery challans and false invoices for repair charges and thereby committed the offence of forgery for the purpose of

cheating IFCI, in whose favour those wind electric generators had been hypothecated.

On the other hand, it is the contention of the Petitioners/accused that those wind electric generators, due to some technical fault, were to be

removed to the factory for effecting repairs and the transport delivery challans and the invoices for repair charges were prepared for the said

purpose; that during the said period there was a recession in the market, which was a cause for the inability on the part of the first Petitioner to

make repayment of the loan advanced by IFCI; that pursuant to the same, IFCI initiated proceedings against the first Petitioner; that pursuant to

the said initiation of proceedings, the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction took over the business as the business of the first Petitioner

became sick and IFCI itself was appointed as operating agency; that the same was done after the Debt Recovery Tribunal was approached by

IFCI in 2000 itself and that subsequently the cases initiated by IFCI were withdrawn pursuant to a settlement under which entire debt was

discharged as the amount paid by the first Petitioner was accepted by IFCI in full settlement of the claim and IFCI agreed to withdraw the cases it

had initiated against the first Petitioner; that during the course of proceedings before DRT and BIFR, the wind electric generators that were in the

factory for repair works were sold to third parties and the amount realized was paid to IFCI and IFCI accepted in full satisfaction of its claim

against the first Petitioner and that therefore, there shall be no question of the documents, namely transport delivery challans and repair invoices

relating to the transport of the wind electric generators and accessories for effecting repairs in the factory, being construed as documents prepared

dishonestly or fraudulently with intent to cause damage or loss to IFCI. The above said contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners does

have substance in it and the same cannot be rejected as untenable.

In Mohammed Ibrahim and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in (2003) 3 SCC 929, the Hon''ble Supreme Court, while dealing with

the question of forgery of a valuable security and using it as a genuine one punishable u/s 467 and 471, has made the following observations:

The condition precedent for an offence u/s 467 and 471 is forgery. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document or false

electronic record or part thereof. This case does not relate to any false electronic record. Therefore, the question whether the first accused, in

executing and registering the two sale deeds purporting to sell a property (even if it is assumed that it did not belong to him), can be said to have

made and executed false documents. In short, a person is said to have made a ""false document"", if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to

be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document or (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception,

or from a person not in control of his senses.

The following observations have also been made:

There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property and a person

executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorized or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on behalf

of the owner. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he

claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document purporting to convey some property of which he is not the

owner, is not execution of a false document as defined u/s 464 of the code.

Similar view was also expressed by the Apex Court in Devendra and Ors. v. State of Utter Pradesh and Anr. reported in (2009) 3 SCC 461.

Long back in 1963 in Dr. Vimla v. The Delhi Administration reported in AIR 1963 SCC 1572, while deciding the question whether the accused

therein committed the offence of forgery in signing the name of her minor daughter for the purchase of her car and the transfer of the insurance

policy in her name (minor''s name) and receiving compensation for the claims made by her with regard to the accident caused to the car, the

Hon''ble Supreme Court, after referring to various decisions, ultimately held that Dr. Vimla, the accused therein was not guilty of deceit. Though

her name was Vimla, she signed all the relevant papers as Nalini and made the insurance company believe that her name was Nalini, but the said

act did not either secure any advantage to her or cause any non-economic loss or injury to the insurance company and that the charge did not

disclose any such advantage or injury. It was further observed that Dr. Vimla, who was alleged to have defrauded the insurance company and the

only evidence given was that if it was disclosed that Nalini was a minor, the insurance company might not have paid the money. But it held that

since the entire transaction was that of Dr. Vimla and it was only put through in the name of her minor daughter for the reasons best known to her,

there was no case of forgery or cheating. If the above said views of the Hon''ble Apex Court is applied to the facts of the case, we have to come

to the necessary conclusion, the only one conclusion that can be arrived that no prima facie case for the offence of forgery as defined u/s 463 has

been made out.

Further more, Section 467 Code of Criminal Procedure deals with forgery of valuable security, the transport delivery challan and the invoices

for repairs cannot be said to be valuable securities. Section 468 deals with forgery for the purpose of cheating. There are also clear materials to

show that the person allegedly cheated does not have any grievance and the amount due to such person was paid and full satisfaction was

obtained. Admittedly, the first Petitioner paid the loan after waiver of interest and IFCI received it in full settlement of its claim against the first

Petitioner. It has also expressed its willingness to withdraw all cases instituted against the first Petitioner and its officials. The same will amount to

compounding of the offence u/s 420 I.P.C, if at all it had been committed. When an offence u/s 420 I.P.C stands compounded, then the accused

on the very same facts cannot be directed to face trial for the offence u/s 468 I.P.C. For the same reason also, prosecution for the offence

punishable u/s 468 r/w. 471 also becomes impermissible. In the this regard, the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Kulwinder Singh and

Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. reported in by a Full Bench judgment of High Court of Punjab and Haryana is worth mentioning. The said

judgment is to the effect that even when an offence is not shown to be compoundable u/s 320 I.P.C, in appropriate cases the High Court using its

inherent powers u/s 482 can quash the proceedings pursuant to the settlement of parties, in order to prevent abuse of process of Court or to

render complete justice.

In this case, as pointed out supra, there is no material to make out a prima facie case that the Petitioners have committed forgery in getting the

transport delivery challans and invoices for repair charges. As pointed out supra, the charge of cheating u/s 420 I.P.C will not survive as the person

allegedly cheated had accepted payment in full satisfaction of the claim and also agreed to withdraw all cases instituted against the debtor. The

offence u/s 420 I.P.C is shown to be an offence compoundable with the permission of the Court and its is shown in Sub-clause 2 of Section 320

Code of Criminal Procedure Apart from the fact that the person allegedly cheated has accepted the amount in full settlement of the claim and

agreed to withdraw all cases and thereby agreed for compounding the case, it is also an admitted case that none of the officials of IFCI gave the

complaint for the registration of the case and that they have also informed the CBI of their having no interest in pursuing the criminal case. Under

such circumstances, if the case against the Petitioners is allowed to proceed further, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the

Petitioners, the same will result in not only waste of exercise of judicial time, but also an abuse of process of Court.

For all the reasons stated above, this Court comes to the conclusion that the Petitioners have made out a case for discharge in respect of the

offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 468 r/w. 471. The case of the prosecution is that there was an agreement among all the accused to

commit the said offences and hence they have committed an offence punishable under Sections 120-B r/w Sections 409, 420, 467, 467 r/w. 471

I.P.C. There can be no direct evidence regarding the alleged conspiracy. It has been held supra that the Petitioners are entitled to an order of

discharge in respect of the offence alleged to have been committed in pursuance of the alleged conspiracy. Under such circumstances, this Court

comes to the conclusion that the Petitioners are entitled to discharge for the offence u/s 120-B I.P.C also.

In the result, this petition is allowed and the Petitioners are discharged in respect of all the offences alleged in the final report. Consequently, the

connected miscellaneous petition is closed.