TTK Pharma Ltd., Jeedimetla vs Authority under the Munimun Wages Act under Section 20 (2) and Deputy Commissioner of Labour and another

The petitioner is a reputed company belonging to reputed group of companies manufacturing drugs. It employs about 400 workmen. The Government issued a notification vide G.O. Ms. No.183, dated 26-12-1992 fixing minimum wages to be paid to various categories of employees in drugs and Pharmaceutical Industries. The petitioner, apparently, has violated this law of paying minimum wages contained in Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (''the Act'' for brevity) and statutory notification issued thereunder. On 17-7-1997, the Assistant Labour Officer inspected the office of the petitioner and found that in respect of 82 workmen, the petitioner is not paying the minimum wages as fixed by the Government. Therefore, the inspecting officer estimated the value of the balance of wages to be paid to those workmen at Rs.2,90,111.50 ps. as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act. The Labour Officer-cum-Inspector under the Act filed an application before the Minimum Wages Authority, the first respondent herein. The petitioner appeared before the first respondent and filed counter on 8-9-1998. It may be passingly mentioned that the claim relates to four period namely, from October, 1995 to March, 1996, from April, 1996 to September, 1996, from October, 1996 to March, 1997 and from April, 1997 to June, 1997. Having regard to this fact, the Authority under the Act condoned the delay in filing the Minimum Wages Case No.4 of 1997. Be that as it may, the matter was adjourned on a number of occasions, to wit, 18-9-1998, 22-10-1999, 5-11-1998, 13-11-1998 and 27-1-1998. On these occasions, both the opposite parties did not appear. Therefore, the first respondent set the opposite parties ex parte on 27-1-1999 and recorded ex parte evidence on 23-2-1999. After considering the ex parte evidence, the Authority passed an elaborate and reasoned order on 19-7-1999.

The order passed on 19-7-1999 inter alia directs the petitioner and another to pay the claim amount of Rs.2,90,111.50 ps. and compensation of two times totalling, Rs.8,70,334.50 ps. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner herein filed an interlocutory application on 18-8-1999, Rule 34 of the Andhra Pradesh Minimum Wages Rules (''the Rules'' for short) provides for an application to be filed within a period of 30 days. The first respondent issued notices on the application filed by the petitioner seeking to set aside the ex parte order dated 19-7-1999. Having regard to the conduct of the parties and orders passed earlier and after hearing all the concerned, the first respondent disposed of the interlocutory application in Minimum Wages Case No.4 of 1997 on 7-10-1999. By the said order, the first respondent allowed the application seeking to set aside the ex parte order subject to the condition that the petitioner should deposit the original claim amount of Rs.2,90,111.50 ps. within 15 days. This order is assailed in this writ petition.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri. M. Radhakrishna Murthy submits that the impugned order is without power or jurisdiction. He further elaborates this by inviting the attention of the Court to various sub-sections in Section 20 and Section 21 of the Act and the Rules made thereunder and submits that the power vested in the first respondent is only to set aside the ex parte order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act and it does not empower the Authority to impose conditions or to impose costs.

After careful and anxious consideration and after going through various provisions of the Act and the Rules, I am of the opinion that the Authority constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 20 shall have all the powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and shall be deemed to be a civil Court. Subsection (7) of Section 20 provides for the same. Even otherwise, in discharging functions, a quasi Judicial Authority is deemed to be vested with all the powers to do justice within the four comers of law save the exercise of the same does not result in abuse of power. The Act being a regulatory and welfare measure, the Authority under the Act shall be deemed to be conferred with the necessary ancillary powers to enforce the Minimum Wages Act and the Rules by a process of quasi judicial proceedings.

The view that the Minimum Wages Authority while exercising powers either u/s 20(3) of the Act or under sub-rule (4) of Rule 34 of the Rules has incidental and/or ancillary powers and such authority should be endowed with such power is supported by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, . In the said case, the question whether the Industrial Tribunal has any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award or whether the the same has become functus officio on the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parts award u/s 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act (ID Act for brevity), fell for consideration. The Hon''ble Supreme Court observed that the ID Act is a piece of legislation to ensure social justice to both the employers and the employees and therefore while interpreting the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, we should keep in mind the just and fair procedure. After referring to various provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, the Supreme Court held as follows:

"It is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal to do so. But it is a well known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary and incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in a statute to the contrary. We do not find any such statutory prohibition. On the other hand, there are indications to the contrary."

The dicta laid down in this case was subsequently followed by the Supreme Court in Satnam Verma Vs. Union of India (UOI), . In Union of India and another Vs. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd., , the question whether a Tribunal constituted under a statute has powers to regulate its own procedure apart from the explicit provisions, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the context of the powers exercised by a Bench of Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. After referring to the provisions of Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962, the Supreme Court, held as follows:

"There is no doubt that the Tribunal functions as a Court within the limits of its jurisdiction. It has all the powers conferred expressly by the statute. Furthermore, being a judicial body, it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers. Certain powers are recognised as incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers. Certain powers are recognised as incidental and ancillary, not because they are inherent in the Tribunal, nor because its jurisdiction is plenary, but because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and meaningfully exercised. The powers of the Tribunal are no doubt limited. Its area of jurisdiction is clearly defined, but within the bounds of its jurisdiction, it has all the powers expressly and impliedly granted. The implied grant is, of course, limited by the express grant and, therefore, it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all such acts or employing all such means as are reasonably necessary to make the grant effective. As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edn.) ''where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution''."

There is no indication in the Act or in the rules specifically and particularly prohibiting the minimum wage authority for imposing any conditions while exercising its jurisdiction in setting aside the ex parte order.

In my considered opinion, sub-rule (4) of Rule 34 does not vest the Authority with unconditional power to set aside an ex parts order. The party seeking to set aside the ex parte order has to show sufficient cause. Every application filed under sub-rule (4) of Rule 34 cannot be automatically ordered. As per the Rules, "it may be set aside on sufficient cause being shown by the defaulting party". The discretion is vested in the Authority. When the discretion is exercised by the Authority as in this case, imposing the condition to deposit the original claim amount as a precondition for restoring Minimum Wages Case No.4 of 1997 to the file, he is within the power conferred under Rule 34(4). The order has to be. understood as the petitioner having shown sufficient cause only if he deposits the original claim amount within 15 days as a pre-condition for setting aside the ex parte order. This interpretation of sub-rule (4) of Rule 34 is in accordance with the object of the Act as well as purpose for which the first respondent is vested with the adjudicator powers u/s 20 of the Act.

For these reasons, it cannot be said that the first respondent has exercised the discretion under sub-rule (4) of Rule 34 in abusive manner. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view the regulatory and social welfare nature of the Act and the Rules, it should be held that the Authority has ample powers to impose conditions while exercising his discretion under sub-rule (4) of Rule 34. Therefore, the writ petition is devoid of any merits and the same is dismissed at the admission stage. No costs.