Tumen Kumar Ranpal vs Union Of India And Ors

This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking the following relief:

(1) Grant an order that the ground of discharge from service by the petitioner is his own request in compulsion by his bodily infirmity;

(2) Direct for issuance of invalid pension in favour of the petitioner by the authority.

(3) Direction for medical examination or medical re-examination regarding the bodily infirmity of the petitioner in case the Hon'ble Court deems it is

necessary.

[2]. The case of the petitioner is that he had served for 13 years in CRPF and at the time of discharge from service with effect from 1.5.1993, the

petitioner was holding the post of Lance Naik and he was in Under Officer category during the period of service. According to the petitioner, he was

discharged in compulsion on medical ground involving bodily infirmity suffered from gout, rheumatoid arthritis, which disease is an non-curable and

uncommunicative illness, whereas the ground for discharge was mentioned as ""his own request"" in the discharge certificate.

[3]. The petitioner, now challenge the discharge from service by saying that the authorities have failed to consider the medical reports and the

petitioner had been discharged from service on the ground of own request is not correct and the real ground for discharge is health condition.

According to the petitioner, he could not serve till his superannuation period on health ground and he is ought to have properly in terms of benefit after

service for his remaining survival and good conduct in the society. Further, disentitlement of invalid pension is amounted to confiscation of properties

and it is in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

[4]. On the other hand, the say of the respondents is that on completion of his basic training, the petitioner was appointed as Constable (GD) in the

CRPF on 30.6.1980 and remained the said post till the date of his discharge from service with effect from 1.5.1993. On 27.4.1993, on his own request,

the petitioner was discharged from service. Thereafter, the petitioner requested the department for re-employment in service and the said request was

considered by the department and found that he did not fulfill the requisite for re-employment in CRPF and the same was communicated to the

petitioner on 28.4.1995 itself. Now after sleeping over nearly 23 years from discharge, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition, which is mainly

hit by delay and laches. Further, the respondents have also raised the issue of maintainability of the writ petition.

[5]. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was enlisted on 30.6.1980 as a Constable in the CRPF and discharged from

service on 1.5.1993. He would submit that the petitioner was in a situation to discharge from service in compulsion due to bodily infirmity suffering

from gout and rheumatoid arthritis and he had not been granted any type of pension for the service he had rendered till date i.e., about 25 years since

his discharge from service.

[6]. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner is entitled to invalid pension under Rule 38 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules,

7972 read with Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. He would submit that the objection of the respondents as to the

disentitlement of invalid pension is against the rule and therefore, prayed for a direction to the respondents to treat the petitioner discharged from

medical grounds and to order invalid pension in favour of him. In support, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions:

(i) Union of India and others v. V.Manjeet Singh, reported in 2015 Legal Eagle (SC) 397.

(ii) State of Manipur, through the Principal Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur and others v. Loitongbam (N) Wahengbam (O) Ibemcha Devi

and another, reported in 2014 Legal Eagle (Manipur) 10.

(iii) Makan Jivan and others v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1971) 3 SCC 297.

(iv) Chairman, Railway Board and others v. C.R.Rangadhamaiah and others, reported in 1997 Legal Eagle (SC) 999.

(v) D.S.Nakara v. Union of India, reported in 1982 Legal Eagle (SC) 235.

[7]. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the very filing of the writ petition is questionable, as this Court had no territorial

jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issues involved as the cause of action either in part or as a whole arose outside the territorial jurisdiction of this

Court. Learned counsel further submitted that the writ petition is hit by delay and laches inasmuch the petitioner was discharged from service on

27.4.1993 and after sleeping over for 23 years, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition and on this count alone the writ petition is liable to be

dismissed.

[8]. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the petitioner was never challenged the office order dated 27.4.1993 in any

appropriate Forum having competent jurisdiction and as such the petitioner cannot question the consequences effect of the said order, which was

issued on his own request.

[9]. Learned counsel then contended that there is no provision for extension of pensionary benefits in the case of a Government servant who had

proceeded on discharge at his own request before completion of 20 years regular service and therefore, the petitioner has no legal right to claim invalid

pension. To fortify his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions:

(i) Union of India v. Adani Exports Limited, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 567.

(ii) Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711.

(iii) Securities & Exchange Board of India v. Mangalore Stock Exchange, reported in (2005) 10 SCC 274.

(iv) Karnataka Power Corporation Limited v. K.Thangappan & another, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322.

(v) State of Maharashtra v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, reported in (2003) 9 SCC 731.

[10]. As far as the maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that for enlisting the petitioner as a

Constable in the Force was done at the CRPF Centre stationed and situated at Lamphelpat, Imphal West, Manipur. He was trained at Madhya

Pradesh after waiting for training at Gujarat. Thereafter, he was posted at different State of Indian Union Territory viz., Nagaland, Punjab, Delhi and

Jammu & Kashmir. Therefore, the petitioner's role in CRPF was somewhat related with territorial jurisdiction of Manipur. In addition to this, the

petitioner is a permanent resident of Manipur. Truly, the cause of action regarding the service of the petitioner in CRPF was arisen in the State of

Manipur in part even if it is little.

[11]. Learned counsel further submitted that under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, the power conferred to every High Court to issue

directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the

territories within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government

or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Hence, the present writ petition is maintainable for adjudication in the

Manipur High Court.

[12]. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Manipur High Court has no territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issues

raised in the present writ petition, as the cause of action either in part or as a whole arose outside the jurisdiction of the Manipur High Court. In

support, he relied upon the decision in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Commission (supra).

[13]. In Oil & Natural Gas Commission (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:

clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause - notwithstanding anything in Article 32 â€" and provides that every High Court shall

have power ""throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction"", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases,

any Government, “within those territories"" directions, Orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any

other purpose. Under clause(2)of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part,

had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of

such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a

High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of

the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises

jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is

issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the

cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the writ Petition.

....

The submission of the learned counsel for NICCO was that clause (2) was introduced in Article 226 of the Constitution to enlarge the scope of the

writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The Supreme Court in Saka Venkata Subba Rao case [1953 SCR 1144 : AIR 1953 SC 210] while interpreting

Article 226 as it then stood observed as under:

The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226 which

makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority 'within the territories' in relation to

which the High Court exercises jurisdiction.

Thus, this Court ruled that in the absence of a specific provision in Article 226 on the lines of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot

exercise jurisdiction on the plea that the whole or part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction. This view was followed in subsequent

cases. The consequence was that only the High Court of Punjab could exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Union of

India and other bodies located in Delhi. To remedy this situation, clause (1-A) was inserted by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963, to confer on the High

Courts jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 against the Union of India or any other body or authority located in Delhi if the cause of

action has arisen, wholly or in part, within its jurisdiction. Clause (1-A) was later renumbered as clause (2) of Article 226. Therefore, the learned

counsel for NICCO is right that this amendment was introduced to supersede the view taken by this Court in the aforesaid case. But as stated earlier,

on a plain reading of clause (2) of Article 226, it is clear that the power conferred by clause (1) can be exercised by the High court provided the cause

of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within its territorial limits.

...

Pointing out that after the issuance of the notification by the state Government under Section 52(1) of the Act, the notified land became vested in

the State Government free from all encumbrances and hence it was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice under Section

52(2) for the grant of an appropriate direction or order under Article 226 for quashing the notification acquiring the land. This Court, therefore, held

that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court deeply regretted and deprecated the practice

prevalent in the High Court of exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in matters where it lacked territorial jurisdiction. Notwithstanding

the strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed that the High

Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed

a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the country should appear to have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground

that the petitioner before it resides in or carries on business from a registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that

notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently while

disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. [(1994) 4 SCC

710], this Court observed:

We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction.

In that case, the contract in question was executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, the contracts provided that in

the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction, the arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to function at Aligarh and yet

merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High Court and the High Court exercised

jurisdiction where it had none whatsoever. It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on how the members of that

institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain

members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action

had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise

to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do

not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice.

We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation.

[14]. In Adani Exports Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:

It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case,

the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to

empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every

fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the

court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts

which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the

court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of

bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at

Ahmedabad.

[15]. In Securities & Exchange Board of India (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:

The primary question which has been raised in this appeal is whether the appeal is maintainable before the Securities Appellate Tribunal under the

Securities and Exchange board of India Act, 1992 against the order passed by the Board under Section 4(4) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation)

Act, 1956. It appears that the Tribunal had already passed an interim order on 20-9-2004. The issue as to the maintainability of the appeal was raised

by the appellant before the Tribunal and noted on 22-11-2004. Despite this, the Tribunal has passed an order on 20-1-2005 directing the appellant to

consider the application made by the respondent for corporatisation and demutualisation dehors the order passed by the Board under Section 4(4) of

the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. Being aggrieved by the order dated 20-1-2005 this appeal has been preferred. We are of the view

that once the Tribunal has noted that the appeal had been challenged as not being maintainable, it should dispose of the issue of maintainability first

before passing any further order. In that view of the matter, the impugned order dated 20-1-2005 is stayed until the Tribunal disposes of the issue of

maintainability. The Tribunal is requested to dispose of the issue as early as is conveniently possible, preferably within a period of 8 weeks from date.

[16]. Thus, it is clear that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire

facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts constitute a cause of action so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute which has

at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction.

[17]. The petitioner invoked the territorial jurisdiction of the Manipur High Court stating that his role in CRPF was somewhat related with territorial

jurisdiction of Manipur and in addition, he is a permanent resident of Manipur, cannot be countenanced.

[18]. It is to be mentioned that at the time of discharge, the petitioner was posted at 25 Bn CRPF, C/o 56 APO (J&K) and therefore, taking advantage

that he is the resident of Manipur and the recruitment rally for enlisting him as Constable in the Force was done at the CRPF Centre stationed and

situated at Lamphelpat, Imphal West, the petitioner cannot contend that he is entitled to maintain the writ petition before the Manipur High Court.

Since the office order dated 27.4.1993 and the letter dated 26.4.1995 of the respondents were taken place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the

State of Manipur, this Court is of the view that the Manipur High Court has no territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issues raised by the

petitioner.

[19]. As far as the delay and laches are concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has knocked the door of the

concerned authority of the Force since 1996 and illness suffered by the petitioner is not yet recovered. Further, the writ petition for securement of

fundamental rights for the duties of the petitioner had already rendered. The instant writ petition is the first petition seeking justice and therefore, there

is no delay in filing the present writ petition.

[20]. It is to be noted that after the petitioner discharged service on 27.4.1993 and after sleeping over the matter for the about 23 years, the petitioner

has filed the present writ petition.

[21]. In Karnataka Power Corporation Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:

Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article

226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on

the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causes prejudice to the opposite

party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief

Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

[22]. In the instant case, as rightly stated by the learned counsel for the respondents, there is total negligence on the part of the petitioner to make his

grievance within a reasonable time that too before the proper authority. Since the petitioner has failed to do so and after sleeping over for nearly 23

years he has approached this Court which is not the territorial jurisdiction, the present petition is hit by the delay and laches.

[23]. As far as the plea of the petitioner that he ought to have been discharged from service on medical grounds and he should be paid invalid pension

is concerned, on a perusal of the office order date 27.4.1993, it has been clearly stated as under:

No.300250131 L/NK Tumen Kumar of this unit is hereby 'DISCHARGED from Service' wef 1/5/1993(AN) at his own request as per Rule 17

of CRPF Rule 1955 on compassionate Grounds.

[24]. The contention of the petitioner is that at the time of discharge from service, he was suffering from gout, rheumatoid arthritis and therefore, he

ought to have been discharged on medical grounds. In the instant case, what this Court finds from the records that the petitioner himself tendered

resignation from service with effect from 1.5.1993 and despite explaining the consequences and hardship which he may have to face after discharge

from service, the petitioner had insisted the authority for resignation from service. Accordingly, he was discharged from service on his own request

under the provisions of Rule 17 of the CRPF Rules, 1955. Therefore, there is no question of discharging him on medical grounds. Since the petitioner

was serving more than 13 years of service in the CRPF, he was aware of the facts that there is no provision of pensionary benefits in the case of a

Government servant who proceeded on discharge from service.

[25]. Since this Court finds that the petitioner discharged from service on his own request and he was not discharged on medical grounds, the question

of payment of invalid pension does not arise. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument of the petitioner that the petitioner is entitled to get the

invalid pension. Further, there is no provision for extension of pensionary benefits in the case of a Government servant who had proceeded on

discharge at his/her own request before completion of 20 years of regular service. The petitioner was not retired under Rule 38(1) of CCS (Pension)

Rules, 1972. Therefore, he is not entitled to invalid pension under the relevant Rules and he was never subjected to any of the procedure for invalid

pension.

[26]. Since the decisions relied upon by the petitioner are not directly applicable and/or helpful to the case of the petitioner, this Court is not elaborating

upon the same.

[27]. For the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the view that the writ petition is not maintainable and the same is hit by delay and laches.

Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.