High CourtsSingle Bench

T.V. Alwar vs Bank of Tamil Nadu

Madras High Court · Decided on 22 August 1997 · Citation: (1997) 3 CTC 28

HON’BLE JUDGES
A. Raman, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
S.A. No. 2307 of 1983

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

186 paragraphs · 4,261 words

A. Raman, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli in A.S.No. 126

on 1982 on 16.7.1983.

2.

The plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 19,842.15 on the following allegations. The defendant obtained a loan of Rs. 15,000 from

the plaintiffs Bank on 10.6.1977 agreeing to pay interest at 16% with quarterly rests. The defendant also executed promissory note as security for

the same on 10.6.1977. He also executed a letter of undertaking agreeing to pay the said sum in 30 monthly equal instalments. It was further

agreed that the defendants should pay the interest as fixed by the Bank from time to time and pay penal interest at 3% over the scheduled rate in

default. On 10.6.1977 the defendant deposited with the plaintiff at Thachanallur the title deeds with intent to create an equitable mortgage over the

properties set out in the plaint. On 11.6.1977 confirming the deposit of the title deeds the defendant also wrote a letter to the plaintiff. Thus the

equitable mortgage has been created over the scheduled property. As the defendant was irregular in payment, the plaintiff sent a notice on

17.1.1978. The defendant sent his reply requesting for time. Therefore the suit.

3.

The defendant filed a written statement putting forth the following contentions:- The suit is not maintainable. The allegation that the defendant

agreed to pay interest at 16% and he further agreed to pay interest as fixed by the bank and penal interest at 3% over the scheduled rate of interest

is not true. The defendant did not create nor intended to create an equitable mortgage. He did not deposit the title deeds. He did not writ any letter

confirming the deposit of title deeds. There is no equitable mortgage created at all nor subsisting. The defendant no doubt borrowed Rs. 15,000

from the plaintiff promising to repay the sum in instalments. There is no other transaction. The signature of the defendant were obtained. The

defendant does not know English. He did not sign the papers on the date mentioned in the plaint, or in the document. If at all the plaintiff has got

any right, it is only to collect the amount due and not more than that. The claim is premature. There is no valid agreement for payment of interest of

16%. The amount claimed is not correct. The plaintiff is entitled to only 6% of simple interest. The plaintiff''s claim for compound interest is not

tenable in law. The interest claimed is exhorbitant and prohibited by law. The plaintiff has no locus standi to issue the defendant. The allegation that

the defendant gave a letter on 10.6.1977 stating the details of the documents deposited is not correct. It is only a memorandum whereby the

equitable mortgage is created. The said mortgage has been hit by provisions of the Registration Act.

4.

The plaintiff in his reply statement pleaded as follows:-

The defendant applied to the plaintiff bank for loan on 28.1.1977 and 12.5.1977. But the applications were approved on 26.5.1977. One of the

conditions of the loan is that if one instalment is not paid, the entire amount with interest would become due. The terms of the loan were all

considered and settled and approved by the parties. The undertaking letter of deposit of title deeds was made by the defendant in pursuance of the

terms and conditions. The suit transaction is not hit by the Registration Act.

5.

Before the Ist Additional Sub Judge, Tirunelveli, who conducted the trial on behalf of the plaintiff Swaminatha Mudaliar was examined as P.W.-

l. On the defendants side, no witness was examined. ExsA-1 to A-19 were marked. The first Additional Sub Judge, who conducted the trial of the

suit by his judgment dated 30.9.1981 decreed the suit with costs. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant preferred an appeal in A.S.No. 126 of

1982 to the District Court, Tirunelveli and the Second Additional District Judge by his judgment dated 16.7.1983 dismissed the appeal and

confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Hence the second appeal by the defendant.

6.

At the time when the second appeal was admitted the following substantial question of law was framed for consideration:-

Whether the courts below are right in holding that Ex.A-8 is not hit by Section 17 of the Registration Act?

7.

The point:- Though several contentions were raised in the trial court and in the lower appellate court rightly the defendant confined his

submissions with regard to Ex.A-8 and did not choose to raise any other contention. Ex.A-8 according to the counsel for the appellant is a

document that is compulsorily registerable and therefore as it is not registered it is hit by the provisions of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act.

Therefore according to the counsel for the appellant; the plaintiff is at best entitled to only a simple money decree as no equitable mortgage was

created and hence the findings of the courts below that the document Ex.A-8 whereby the deposit of title deed was made and which created an

equitable mortgage is not a document that requires to be registered is not correct and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree as prayed for. It

is therefore necessary to recapitulate the facts of this case in the order of things so that the moot point raised in the second appeal can be better

elucidated and decided. The defendant herein applied to the plaintiffs Bank for a loan of Rs, 15,000. The evidence of P.W.-l is to the effect that

the defendant applied on 28.1.1977 and 12.5.1977. The request of the defendant for grant of loan was considered by the Bank and the order of

sanction was passed on 26.5.1977 permitting the plaintiff to grant the loan. In pursuance of the order of sanction, the defendant executed an

undertaking to pay the amounts sanctioned and received as loan in 30 monthly instalments and also to pay the interest at quarterly rests. The

defendant also executed a promissory note for the sum of Rs. 15,000 granted as the loan. Ex.A-6 and Ex.A-7 are these two documents dated

10.6.1977. It is on the same day on 10.6.1977 the defendant is said to have executed the memorandum whereby the deposit of title deeds were

made by the defendant. Ex.A-9 is the registration copy of the Will dated 29.5.1925. Ex.A-10 is the registered sale deed dated 19.8.1964. Exs.A-

11 to A-13 are the encumbrance certificates submitted along with the memorandum of deposit of title deeds to the plaintiffs bank by the defendant.

On 11.6.1977, the defendant has written a letter under Ex.A-16 confirming the transactions and also the deposit of title deeds under Ex.A-8. In

the context of these facts it has to be decided whether the document relied upon by the appellant is one compulsorily registerable.

8.

The Privy Counsel had an occasion to deal with such a case as we see from the ruling reported in Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar 33 LW

501.

The principle has been enunciated by the Privy Counsel in the following terms :-

(1) that an agreement embodied in a written document requiring registration u/s 17, Registration Act and not so registered could not be proved by

the written document or by oral evidence, yet where there was no written agreement there was no reason why the intent to create a security by

deposit of title deeds under the exception provided for in Section 59, Transfer of Property Act, should not be evidenced by written as well as by

oral evidence;

(2) that the memorandum did not embody the terms of the agreement between in parties but was merely the list of the documents deposited and

nothing more and hence it could not be held that the memorandum purported or operated to create or declare any right, title or interest in the

property and required to be registered u/s 17 of the Registration Act; and

(3) that while it should not be thought that the language of Lord Carson in Subramonian v. Lutchan 18 LW 446 that no memorandum relating to a

deposit of title deeds could be within Section 17, Registration Act, unless it embodied all the particulars of the transactions of which the deposit

formed part, it should be held that no such memorandum could be within the section unless on its face it embodied such terms and was signed and

delivered at such time and place and in such circumstances as to lead legitimately to the conclusion that so far as the deposit was concerned it

constituted the agreement between the parties.

Their Lordships have further observed as follows:-

Now this transaction took place in Madras and did not therefore require a registered instrument under Sections 59 of Transfer of Property Act, the

question which falls to be determined is whether the memorandum having regard to its true construction the circumstances in which it came into

existence and passed into the hands of the plaintiff is an instrument which purports or operates to create, declare assign, limit or extinguish, whether

in present or in future, any right, title or interest whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards to or in immovable property; If

the memorandum is considered in vacuo its meaning is plain. It records particulars of documents which, it states, have been delivered as security in

pursuance of an agreement reached in person. It does not state what were the terms of the agreement or indicate the nature of the matter for which

the deeds were deposited as security. So far as anything disclosed by the memorandum is concerned the security may have been for money lent or

to be lent or for the performance of some obligation the breach of which would sound in damages. Even if it was a condition of the advance that

the memorandum was to be given, the fact that the memorandum was prepared, signed and handed over to the mortgagee before the advance of

the balance of the money to be secured by the deposit could not alter the nature and meaning of the document. It was and remained a list of the

documents deposited and nothing more. It did not embody the terms of the agreement between the parties. Upon this vies of the matter, apart from

authority, it would in their Lordships'' opinion be impossible to hold that the document purported or operated to create or declare any right, title or

interest in the property and required to be registered u/s 17 of the Registration Act.

The Supreme Court also considered the question whether the memorandum given along with title deeds is a document compulsorily registerable. In

the decision reported in Rachpal Mahraj Vs. Bhagwandas Daruka and Others, their Lordships observed as follows:-

When the debtor deposits with the creditor the title deeds of his property with intent to create a security, the law implies a contract between the

parties to create a mortgage, and no registered instrument is required u/s 59 as in other forms of mortgage. But if the parties choose to reduce the

contract to writing, the implication is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the

deposit and the document both form integral part of the transaction and are essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage. As the deposit

alone is not intended to create the change and the document, which constitutes the bargain regarding the security, is also necessary and operates to

create the charge in conjunction with the deposit, it requires registration u/s 17, Registration Act, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an

interest in immovable property, where the value of such property is one hundred rupees and upwards. The time factor is not decisive. The

document may be handed over to the creditor along with the title deeds and yet not be registerable, or it may be delivered at a later date and

nevertheless be registerable.

In the above decision the Supreme Court also referred to the decision in Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar 33 LW 501 Privy council.

9.

In the decision reported in United Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Lekharam Sonaram and Co. and Others, the Supreme Court had again to tackle the

same proposition. It was then held as follows:-

When the debtor deposits with the creditor title deeds of his property with an intent to create a security the law implies a contract between the

parties to create a mortgage and no registered instrument is required u/s 59 as in other classes of mortgage. It is essential to bear in mind that the

essence of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is the actual handing over by a borrower to the lender of documents of title to immovable property

with the intention that those documents shall constitute a security which will enable the creditor ultimately to recover the money which he has lent.

But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, this implication of law is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be the

sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredients in

the creation of the mortgage. It follows that in such a case the document which constitutes the bargain regarding security requires registration u/s 17

of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an interest in immovable property, where the value of such

property is one hundred rupees and upwards. If a document of this character is not registered it cannot be used in evidence at all and the

transaction itself cannot be proved by oral evidence either., where the letter in question did not mention details of title deeds, which were to be

deposited with the Bank and neither mentioned what was the principal amount borrowed or to be borrowed nor it referred to rate of interest for

the loan, the letter was not intended to be an integral part of the transaction between the parties and did not by itself operate to create an interest in

the immovable property and, therefore, it did not require registration.

The Supreme Court in this case has also referred to the rulings reported in AIR 1931 36 (Privy Council) and Rachpal Mahraj Vs. Bhagwandas

Daruka and Others, to which decisions I have already referred to.

10.

The other decision on this point that is referred to is that reported in Nanjappa v. MF.C. Industries P. Ltd. 1987 (1) MLJ 180. It has been

observed by this court as follows:-

Whether the memorandum by itself constitutes a bargain between the parties or it constitutes evidence of the contract between the parties? It is not

the case of the defendant that there is an agreement between the parties that the mortgage was to take effect only on the execution of the

memorandum. The memorandum clearly and plainly appears to be something in the nature of a forwarding letter or acknowledging the fact that the

defendant has deposited the said deed of title as security which is obvious because according to the plaintiff, there is admittedly a promissory note

which has been executed much earlier and a sum of money was due on the basis of the said promissory note. The mere statement that a deposit is

made by way of security for the repayment of the loan cannot be read as a contract which is arrived at by the document itself. The document

therefore, cannot be read as a recording of an agreement between the parties, the agreement to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It is at

best an evidence of the fact that the title deeds have been deposited with the plaintiff . The facts do not show that the memorandum accompanying

the title deeds are intended to be a contract of mortgage reduced to writing by the parties. It cannot be so read as meaning that the plaintiff and

defendant had agreed to reduce the transaction of mortgage to writing. The memorandum singed by the defendant cannot be construed as an

integral part of the transaction of mortgage or intended to create an interest in the subject matter of the mortgage.

Now with the position of law on this point enunciated by the Supreme Court, it is necessary for us to see whether in the facts and circumstances

Ex.A-8 can be construed a document requiring registration. In other words, we have to see whether the parties intended that the memorandum

should be an integral part of the agreement or whether it is merely a letter intimating the deposit of title deeds. To ascertain the intention of the

parties and also to arrive at a proper conclusion it is first of all necessary to refer to the terms of the document. Therefore a reference to the

Document Ex.A-8 is necessary to find out that the document Ex.A-8 which evidences the memorandum of deposit of title deeds contains the terms

of agreement between the parties. In other words whether the memorandum in question is the bargain between the parties can therefore be

construed. For, if the memorandum is of such nature that it is to be treated as a contract for mortgage and the parties intended it to be the

repository and appropriate evidence of their agreement, then the instrument by which the equitable mortgage was created would squarely fall within

Section 17 of the Registration Act. Therefore when the parties have chosen to reduce into writing, which is implication of law is executed by their

express bargain and therefore the terms alone will be the sole evidence. In such case the deposit and the document both form integral part of the

same transaction. Whether the document was intended to be form part of the same transaction can be also gathered from the terms and conditions

of the agreement.

The document reads as follows:-

List of documents of title deeds relating to the property mentioned hereunder belonging to me deposited by me on the 10th day of June 1977 at

Tirunelveli Town with the Manager, The South India Bank Ltd., (Tirunelveli) Tirunelveli Town as already agreed upon by way of security for the

debt due under pronote dated 10th June 1977 for Rs. 15,000 (Rs. fifteen thousands only) executed by me (Mr. T.V. Alwar S/o, Sri Vellaya

Naidu No. 2, Mangalakudyiruppu St., Thachanallur) to the South India Bank Ltd., (Tirunelvelly) Tirunelveli Town branch.

(1) Original Registered Sale Deed dated 19.8.1964 executed by Karuppayee Ammal in favour of Alwar Naidu.

(2) Copy of the Will dated 29.5.1925 made by Piramuthu Moopanar in favour of his daughter Karuppayee Ammal.

(3) Encumbrance certificates (1) from 1.1.1963 to 30.11.1975; (2) 1.12.1975 to 19.9.1976 and (3) 20.9.1976 to 27.2.1977.

Schedule of Property

Rice Mill building bearing Door No. 59 (in S.No. 129/1) situate at Mathrai High Road, Thachanallur valued at Rs. 37,000.

The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that from the sanction order it is clear that it was a condition of the advance that the

memorandum has to be given and therefore it must be construed that it was a condition of the bargain and form integral part of the transaction and

hence it is a document falling squarely within Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. But even if it is a condition of the advance that a

memorandum was to be given it does not alter the situation. Here the defendant has not taken the witness stand to speak to the circumstances

whereunder he executed the memorandum. He has not chosen to come forward to state that it was intended and was part of the bargain that the

execution of memorandum and deposit of title deeds and the deposit must be integral part of the transaction. When such a evidence has not been

adduced by the defendants we have to go only by the recitals in the memorandum. P.W.-l has also not stated anything on this aspect. But it is in

evidence that the advance was made already in the morning in pursuance of the promissory note and the undertaking was signed by the defendant,

on the date at about 4.00 p.m., the defendant executed the memorandum of deposit of title deeds and handed over the documents viz., A-8 to A-

14 with the Manager of the Bank. In such circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that merely because there was a

condition of the advance that the memorandum should be given, it does not alter the situation. The fact that the memorandum was prepared and

signed and handed over to the mortgagee even assuming it was before the advance of money which was to be secured by deposit of title deeds, it

cannot alter the nature and meaning of the document. Here, the document is at best a list setting out the title deeds that are handed over by the

mortgagor. The terms of the transaction are not set out. The terms of the agreement between the parties is not embodied. Therefore it is at best a

written record of the particulars of the deed and therefore it neither purport nor operated to create or declare any right, title or interest in the

property included in the deeds with the result that it did not require the registration. The letter neither mention what was the principal amount

borrowed nor the amount to be borrowed. The rate of interest agreed between the parties for the loan is not mentioned. Therefore, it cannot be

contended that it was intended to be an integral part of the transaction between the parties and therefore it did not by itself create an interest in the

immovable properties and there is no need to register the same. In the decision reported in Rachpal Mahraj Vs. Bhagwandas Daruka and Others,

the memorandum runs as follows:-

We write to put on record that to secure the repayment of the money already due to you from us on account of the business transactions between

yourselves and ourselves and the money that may hereafter become due on account of such transactions we have this day deposited with you the

following title deeds in Calcutta at your place of business at No. 7 Sambhu Mallick Lane, relating to our properties at Samastipur with intent to

create an equitable mortgage on the said properties to secure all moneys including interest that may be found due and payable by us to you on

account of the said transactions ...

Here the Supreme Court construed the said memorandum as one which did not create any charge, but purport to record a transaction which has

been concluded and under which the rights and liabilities had been relied and agreed upon and that the transaction far from intending to reduce the

bargain to writing and make the document creating the rights and liabilities of the parties. Here in this case as I pointed out already it is simply

stated that as already agreed upon by way of security for the amount due by the defendant on the promissory note dated 10.6.1977 he has

deposited certain documents, the list of which are thus purport to be set out under this memorandum. In the Privy Council case to which I have

already referred to viz., that reported in Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar, 33 LW 501 while construing a similar memorandum, the Privy Council

has held after referring to the decision reported in 1873 II B.L.R. 405 and that of the Chancery Division reported in 1972 (5) H.L. 321 : 42 Ch.

49 and Subramanian v. Lutchmanan 18 L.W. 446 held that the effect of such a memorandum is only at best a written record of particulars of

deeds and not than that. In the leading case in United Bank of India v. Lekhram Co., Ltd. AIR 1964 SC 1591 while construing the memorandum

of deposit of title deeds which contained more terms than what we find in the document in question their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that

this memorandum did not mention the principal amount borrowed or to be borrowed nor it did refer to the rate of interest and therefore the

document was not intended to be an integral part of the transaction between the parties and did not by itself operate to create an interest in the

immovable property. Therefore, the cumulative effect of these circumstances would go to show that the document in question is at best only a list

of title deeds and that the document can never be said to form an integral part of the transaction nor it can be stated to evidence the bargain

between the parties. On the other hand, it is at best an instrument recording the particulars of document and nothing more. The document was not

intended to and did not operate to create any right in or over any property nor has the effect of creating any charge over the property and therefore

it is not a document which requires to be registered. Therefore it follows that the conclusion of the courts below that the document is admissible in

evidence and that is not hit by Section 17 of the Registration Act is a proper conclusion. Therefore, I find that there is no merit in this appeal.

11.

In the result, this appeal is dismissed with costs confirming the judgments and decrees of the courts below.