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Judgment
K.A. Swami, C.J.—The only point that arises for consideration in these appeals is as to when Act 41 of 1992 came into force and the
applications for grant of permits were pending, whether such applications were saved by reason of Section 10 of the Act or they stood abated by
reason of Section 7 thereof?
Facts necessary for the purpose of deciding this point are as follows: A stage carriage permit was granted by the Regional Transport Authority,
Periyar, on 25.8.1986. It was set aside by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 14.12.1990 and the applications were remitted to the
Regional Transport Authority for fresh consideration as per the provisions of the new Act. The Writ Petition was filed on 30th April, 1991.
However, it come to be posted for admission on 10.11.1993. After notice to the Respondents, it was heard and decided on 23.2.1994. Learned
single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition. Act 41 of 1992 came into force on 31.7.1992.
Sections 7 and 10 of Act 41 of 1992 are as follows:
Pending applications, and appeals for grant of new permits to abate: Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force,
every application for grant of new permit on a notified route and all appeals arising therefrom or relating thereto, made or preferred before the date
of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette and pending before any court with any officer, authority or tribunal constituted
under the Motor Vehicles Act, on the said date, shall abate.
Validation: Notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter V or VI including Section 98 of the Motor Vehicles Act, all proceedings taken for
the grant of and all orders passed granting permits or renewal or transfer of such permits or any variation, modification, extension or curtailment of
the route or routes specified in a stage carriage permit during the period commencing on the 4th day of June 1976 and ending with the date of the
publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be and to have always been taken or passed in
accordance with the provisions of this Act as if this Act had been in force at all material times.
It may be pointed out that Act 41 of 1992 was enacted to make certain special provisions in respect of permits for stage carriage under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and in relation to the schemes and routes notified under Chapter VI of that Act and to provide for matters connected
therewith. Section 3 provided for grant of permits under certain circumstances notwithstanding the draft scheme or an approved scheme in force
covering the route or area in respect of which the applications for grant of stage carriage permit are made. Section 4 made the existing permits
valid. Section 5 gave overriding effect to the provisions contained in Sections 3, 4 and 6 over those contained in Chapters V and VI of the Motor
Vehicles Act and also Section 98 thereof. Section 6 dealt with renewal or variation of the permits. Section 7, as already extracted, dealt with
pending applications and appeals for grant of new permits to abate. Section 8 provided for making of the Rules and Section 9 provided for
construction of reference to Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 10 validated the permit granted between the period 4th June, 1976 and
31.7.1992.
The contention of the Appellants is that as Section 10 of Act 41 of 1992 makes the proceedings initiated for grant of permit and also the permit
granted or renewed between the period 4th June, 1976 and 31.7.1992 valid and as the present proceedings for grant of stage carriage permit fall
within the aforesaid period as there was a grant made by the Regional Transport Authority, the fact that the Tribunal set aside and remitted the
matter to the Regional Transport Authority for grant of permit did not make any difference, as the grant was made or at any rate the proceedings
was pending on the date the Act came into force.
A reading of Section 7 of the Act clearly points out that the applications for grant of new permit on a ratified route and the appeals arising
therefrom relating thereto, would abate on the coming into force of Act 41 of 1992. As a result of the order of the State Transport Appellate
Tribunal, the permit granted in favour of the Appellant was set aside on 25.8.1986 and the application was remitted for fresh consideration under
the new Act Therefore, on 31.7.1992 what was pending, was only the application filed by the Appellant for grant of a stage carriage permit on a
route, which overlapped the notified route. Such as application, having regard to the clear wordings contained in Section 7 of Act 41 of 1992,
stood abated.
We shall now consider, whether Section 10 of the Act can be of any help to the Appellants. A close reading of the provisions contained in
Section 10 of the Act would disclose that what is validated by Section 10 of the Act is the grant of permits or the renewal of permits or the transfer
of such permits or any variation, modification, extension or curtailment of the route granted on the date, Act 41 of 1992 came into force, when on
the date and Act came into force, if the permit was not subsisting and was set aside by the process known to law, it is not possible to hold that
there was a grant of permit. If the interpretation, which learned senior counsel, Shri V.T. Gopalan wants to place on Section 10 of the Act, is
accepted, Section 7 of the Act would be rendered otiose, because the Section deals with pending proceedings. In the event the interpretation is
accepted, Section 10 also will take into its fold, without there being a subsisting grant, the proceedings pending. Therefore, we are of the view that
as the grant was not subsisting on the date the Act 41 of 1992 came into force, Section 10 was not available to the Petitioner/Appellant as it did
not apply to cases where the grant of permit or renewal or transfer of permit or variation, modification, extension, curtailment did not subsist.
Learned senior counsel has also placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in T.P.K. Thilagavathy v. The Regional Transport
Authority, Periyar District, Erode and Ors. Civil Appeals Nos. 540-542 of 1994 dated 29th November 1994. The relevant portion of the
judgment is found in page 16 which is as follows:
One Loganathan along with nine others, had applied for permit which overlapped notified route. He died on 7th December, 1987. His wife
Samiyathal was brought on record. On 11th January, 1988 permit was granted in her favour. Against this order various persons filed appeal and
on 28th January, 1992 a consent Memo was filed before the appellate authority who granted the permit in accordance with the Consent Memo not
only in favour of Samiyathal but others as well. Validity of this order was challenged by the State Undertaking in the High Court. It was held that
since the effect of accepting the Consent Memo was to permit grant of fresh permits in favour of persons other than Samiyathal in 1992 it was
violative of the provisions of the Act. Consequently, the petition filed by the undertaking was allowed and the permit granted in favour of others on
basis of Consent Memo was set aside. But the order granting permit to Samiyathal being of 1988, the Writ filed by the undertaking against this
order was dismissed. In S.V. Sivaswami Servai Vs. Hafez Motor Transport (Firm) and others,, it has been held that addition of permit on
agreement was not permissible. Therefore, the High Court did not commit any error of law in allowing the Writ Petition of the Undertaking and
quashing the permits granted on Consent Memo. Since we have agreed with the decision of the High Court that no permit could have been granted
after 30th June, 1990 the order passed by the High Court allowing the Writ Petition of the undertaking against persons other than Samiyathal dies
not suffer from any error of law.
From the aforesaid extract of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the grant made in favour of one Loganathan which name to be
transferred in favour of Samiyathal, was subsisting. The challenge to it by the State Transport Undertaking was unsuccessful. Therefore, the permit
had the benefit of Section 10 of the Act. That being so, it is not possible to apply the aforesaid ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court to the
cases on hand.
Learned Counsel has also brought to our notice the orders passed by learned single Judges of this Court in M. Ramasamy v. The State
Transport Appellate Tribunal and Ors. W.P. Nos. 3509 and 3510 of 1991 dated 24.11.1992, K. Joseph Packiaraj v. The Regional Transport
Authority and Ors. W.P. Nos. 1175 and 4300 of 1993 dated 9.9.1993, V. Sengottuvel v. Anna Transport Corporation Ltd. C.R.P. No. 2684 of
1987 dated 1.2.1994, C. Ganesan v. The Managing Director, TVL. Annai Sathya Transport Corporation C.R.P. 2757 of 1987 dated 2.2.1994
and Tmt. S. Palaniammal v. R. Premavathy C.R.P. 2518 of 1988 dated 15.2.1994. In the light of the interpretation on Section Nos. 7 and 10 of
the Act, we do not consider it necessary to go into the correctness of these decisions.
For the reasons stated above, the Writ Appeals are not admitted and the same are dismissed. The C.M.Ps. are also dismissed. However, we
make no order as to costs.