U. Abdul Shukoor and Others vs T.A. Vahab and Others

P.B. Suresh Kumar, J.—1. These appeals are preferred challenging the orders passed by the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram, on two interlocutory applications, in exercise of its power under the scheme formulated in O.S. No. 5 of 1990 for the administration of a public Trust. Among the appeals, F.A.O. No. 94 of 2016 is preferred challenging the order on I.A. No. 1766 of 2015 and F.A.O. Nos. 95 and 100 of 2016 are preferred challenging the order on I.A. No. 3813 of 2015.

The Iqbal College Trust, hereinafter referred to as ''the Trust'' for short, is a public Trust of religious and charitable nature. The Trust runs various educational institutions. O.S. No. 5 of 1990 was a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for framing a scheme for the administration of the Trust and as per the judgment dated 13.4.2007, the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram formulated a comprehensive scheme, hereinafter referred to as ''the scheme'' for short, for the administration of the Trust. Clause IX of the scheme provides that the Board of Trustees shall elect from among them a committee of 15 persons as Executive Committee. The said clause also provides that the Board of Trustees shall also elect a President, Secretary and Treasurer from the Executive Committee. Clause X of the scheme confers on the Executive Committee powers to regulate admission to the colleges and other institutions under the Trust and appoint members of the teaching and other staff necessary for the conduct of the business of the Trust. Clause XII of the scheme deals with the powers and duties of the Secretary. Sub clause (e) of Clause XII of the scheme provides that the Secretary shall convene the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees ordinarily in the month of May or June of each year to consider and pass the annual report, income and expenditure statement, the budget for the current year etc. Sub clause (f) of clause XII of the scheme provides that on the requisition made by not less than 10% of the members of the Board of Trustees, the Secretary shall convene extra-ordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees. The proviso to the said sub clause clarifies that if the Secretary fails to convene a meeting as provided for therein within four weeks of receipt of such request, the persons who made such requisition or a majority of the members of the Executive Committee may convene such meeting and the meeting so held shall be deemed to be duly held under the provisions of the scheme. Clause XVII of the scheme provides that subject to the provisions of the scheme and the rules, if any, made, the final authority of the Trust shall vest in the Board of Trustees. Clause XXII of the scheme provides that all disputes arising in relation to the implementation of the scheme or the management and administration of the Trust shall be entertained and decided only by the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram.

Pursuant to the scheme, a Board of Trustees consisting of 288 members has been constituted. On 6.3.2013, the Board of Trustees have elected a new Executive Committee for the Trust. The Board of Trustees have also elected on the said day three among the members of the Executive Committee as the President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust.

During May, 2015, one among the elected members of the Executive Committee of the Trust filed I.A. No. 1766 of 2015 before the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram invoking clause XXII of the scheme for an order to expel the Secretary of the Trust for facilitating the smooth and proper functioning of the Trust. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, it is alleged that the last meeting of the Executive Committee was held on 10.5.2014; that though various requests have been made thereafter, the Secretary is not convening the Executive Committee of the Trust and that he is administering the affairs of the Trust according to his whims and fancies. It is also alleged in the affidavit that the Secretary is making appointments in the Trust contrary to the provisions contained in sub clauses (b), (c) and (d) of clause X of the scheme. The Secretary of the Trust, who is the second respondent in the above interlocutory application, filed a counter affidavit in I.A. No. 1766 of 2015 controverting the allegations levelled against him in the said interlocutory application.

While I.A. No. 1766 of 2015 was pending, on 4.9.2015, 67 members of the Board of Trustees issued Ext. A1 notice to the Secretary of the Trust calling upon him to convene an extra-ordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees. It is stated in Ext. A1 that after the election of the present Executive Committee, the meeting of the Board of Trustees was convened only once and that in view of the difference of opinion among the members of the Executive Committee, even the Executive Committee of the Trust is not being convened. It is also stated in Ext. A1 notice that since the Executive Committee of the Trust is not being convened, the administration of the Trust is being carried on exclusively by the Secretary. It is further stated in Ext. A1 notice that since the ultimate authority of the Trust vests in the Board of Trustees, a meeting of the Board of Trustees is to be convened. The Secretary of the Trust, however, did not convene the extra-ordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees requested for in Ext. A1 notice. Ten among the signatories to Ext. A1 notice who are among the 15 members of the Executive Committee of the Trust, in the circumstances, convened a meeting of the Board of Trustees on 22.10.2015 as provided for in the proviso to clause XII(f) of the scheme, after issuing notice by registered post to all the members of the Board of Trustees, including the Secretary and other office bearers of the Trust. Ext. A3 is the notice issued by the said members of the Board of Trustees for convening the extra-ordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees on 22.10.2015. The agenda of the meeting mentioned in Ext. A3 reads thus:

It is seen that pursuant to Ext. A3 notice, an extraordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees was held on 22.10.2015 as proposed in Ext. A3 notice and various decisions have been taken by the Board of Trustees in the said meeting in relation to the administration of the Trust. Ext. A4 is the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015. Among others, the Board of Trustees have resolved in the said meeting to remove the Secretary and the Treasurer of the Trust from their respective offices and appointed new personnel in their places.

Thereupon, the members of the Executive Committee of the Trust who convened the extraordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees on 22.10.2015 filed I.A. No. 3813 of 2015 before the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram, seeking an order of temporary injunction restraining the Secretary of the Trust who was removed from office as per the decision of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015 from representing the Trust as its Secretary and making any appointments in the Trust or in the institutions under it. In the affidavit filed in support of the said application, the petitioners in the said interlocutory application have stated, among others, that the Secretary of the Trust who was removed from office had not handed over the charge of the Secretary to the newly appointed Secretary and that he is still doing mischievous acts as if he is the Secretary of the Trust. The Secretary of the Trust who was removed in the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015 and who is the sole respondent in the said application, filed a counter affidavit in the above interlocutory application disputing his removal from the office of the Secretary.

The court below considered I.A. No. 1766 of 2015 and I.A. No. 3813 of 2015 along with a few other interlocutory applications pending in relation to the affairs of the Trust and held that the meeting held on 22.10.2015 pursuant to Ext. A3 notice was a valid meeting of the Board of Trustees. The court below also held that the decision taken by the Board of Trustees in the meeting held on 22.10.2015, by which the Secretary of the Trust was removed, cannot also be held to be illegal or against the provisions of the scheme. Consequently, the court below, as per the common order impugned in these appeals, restrained the Secretary of the Trust who was removed from office from representing the Trust as its Secretary or discharging any of the functions relating to the affairs of the Trust. The Secretary of the Trust, who was removed from office on 22.10.2015, is aggrieved by the common order passed on I.A. Nos. 1766 of 2015 and 3813 of 2015 and F.A.O. Nos. 94 and 95 of 2016 are preferred by him challenging the said orders. F.A.O. No. 100 of 2016 is preferred by the Treasurer of the Trust who was also removed from office in the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015.

Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri. N.N. Sugunapalan for the appellant in F.A.O. Nos. 94 and 95 of 2016, Advocate Sri. P. Viswanathan for the appellant in F.A.O. No. 100 of 2016 and the learned Senior Counsel Sri. R.D. Shenoy, Advocates Sri. G.S. Reghunath, Sri. M. Sreekumar and Sri. G. Rajiv for the respondents.

Ext. A4 is the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015. As many as 20 decisions are seen taken in the said meeting of the Board of Trustees. The correctness of all the said decisions are not the subject matter of these appeals. As noted above, among others, in the meeting held on 22.10.2015, the Board of Trustees have removed the Secretary as also the Treasurer of the Trust from their respective offices. I.A. No. 1766 of 2016 was an application filed by one of the members of the Executive Committee prior to the meeting held on 22.10.2015. The prayer in the said application was to disqualify the Secretary of the Trust. It was thereafter, the Secretary of the Trust was removed in the meeting held on 22.10.2015. In I.A. No. 3813 of 2015 filed by the members of the Executive Committee who have convened the meeting held on 22.10.2015, the prayer was for an order of temporary injunction restraining the Secretary who was removed from office on 22.10.2015 from functioning as the Secretary of the Trust. As such, the only issue relevant for the disposal of the above interlocutory applications was whether the removal of the Secretary of the Trust from his office was in accordance with the scheme, and as per the impugned order, the court below held that the removal of the Secretary from office was in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. The Treasurer of the Trust was not a party to the above two interlocutory applications. Since the Treasurer was also removed from the office in the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015 and since it was found in the impugned order that the removal of the Secretary of the Trust in the meeting was in accordance with the provisions of the scheme, the Treasurer of the Trust has preferred F.A.O. No. 100 of 2016. As such, the issue arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the removal of the Secretary and the Treasurer of the Trust by the Board of Trustees in their meeting held on 22.10.2015 was in accordance with the provisions of the scheme.

The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in F.A.O. Nos. 94 and 95 of 2016 pointed out that Ext. A3 notice for the meeting proposed on 22.10.2015 was issued only on 13.10.2015. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the length of notice is too short a period for a meeting of the nature of the instant one and that therefore the meeting dated 22.10.2015 shall be held to be not properly convened. He relied on a passage in Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings in support of the said contention. The learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that at any rate the decision taken in the meeting held on 22.10.2015 to remove the Secretary of the Trust from office is illegal as there was no agenda for the said purpose in Ext. A3 notice. According to the learned Senior Counsel, out of 288 members of the Board of Trustees, only 118 members of the Board of Trustees have participated in the meeting held on 22.10.2015 and had there been a proper notice with proper agenda, majority of the members of the Board of Trustees would have attended and opposed the removal of the Secretary from office. The learned Senior Counsel relied on paragraphs 62 and 63 of the decision of the Apex Court in M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu and others (, AIR 1999 SC 2468) in support of the said contention.

Advocate Sri. P. Viswanathan, the learned counsel for the appellant in F.A.O. No. 100 of 2016 contended that the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015 being a meeting convened by the members of the Board of Trustees on account of the failure on the part of the Secretary to convene an extra-ordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees, the said meeting can only be held to be a meeting convened for the purpose for which the requisition was made to the Secretary. According to the learned counsel, the meeting requested to be convened as per Ext. A1 requisition was not a meeting for the removal of the Treasurer from office and that therefore, the Treasurer could not have been removed in the meeting held on 22.10.2015. The learned counsel relied on the proviso to clause XII(f) of the scheme in support of the said contention.

Per contra, Advocate Sri. M. Sreekumar contended that in the light of the sweeping agenda in Ext A3 notice, it cannot be contended that the Board of Trustees was not justified in taking a decision to remove the Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust from their respective offices. Relying on Ext. A4 minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015, the learned counsel contended that all the decisions taken in the said meeting would come within the purview of the said agenda.

Sri.G.Rajeev, the learned counsel appearing for some of the respondents pointed out that along with Ext. A3 notice, a covering letter explaining the manner in which the administration of the Trust is to be carried out as per the provisions of the scheme as also the state of affairs prevailing in the Trust at present so as to enable the members of the Board of Trustees to get a clear picture of the purpose of the meeting was also forwarded to all the members of the Board of Trustees. According to the learned counsel, in the light of the said covering letter, there is absolutely no scope for contending that the members of the Board of Trustees were not informed of the purpose of the meeting or that the removal of the Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust from their respective offices was never in contemplation in the meeting proposed on 22.10.2005.

Sri. G.S. Reghunath, the learned counsel appearing for some other respondents contended that ever since the last election, the administration of the affairs of the Trust was not at all in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that though the scheme enables the Secretary to incur expenses on behalf of the Trust only with the concurrence of the Executive Committee, large amounts had been spent by the Secretary for construction, purchases, vehicle maintenance, fuel purchase, repair and maintenance etc., without the concurrence of the Executive Committee. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel that despite the specific provision in the scheme that admission of students to the various institutions under the Trust are to be regulated by the Executive Committee, thousands of students have been admitted for various courses in the management quota in the institutions under the Trust without the knowledge and concurrence of the Executive Committee. Likewise, it was also pointed out that 20 teachers have been appointed in the college, violating the provisions contained the scheme. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel that large amounts are received by the Secretary of the Trust by way of donations to the Trust and only a portion of the same have been accounted. It was further pointed out by the learned counsel that though specific requests have been made to the Secretary to convene the meetings of the Executive Committee of the Trust as also the meetings of the Board of Trustees, none of those requests have been considered. According to the learned counsel, the aforesaid allegations against the Secretary as contained in the affidavits filed in support be applications which would amount to breach of trust have not been specifically refuted by the Secretary. In the said circumstances, it was argued by the learned counsel that the court has the power to restrain the Secretary who is a Trustee from using his powers under the Trust. The said jurisdiction of the court, according to the learned counsel, is not found upon the irremediable consequence which would result from the act complained of, but upon the breach of Trust itself. In other words, according to the learned counsel, even dehors the decision taken by the Board of Trustees to remove the Secretary from office, the court is justified in restraining the Secretary from functioning as Secretary of the Trust. The learned counsel also pointed out that even if it is found that there is any irregularity in holding the meeting of the Board of Trustees on 22.10.2015, the same has to be ignored in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case as it is clear from the materials on record that the administration of the Trust by the Secretary who was removed from office was against the interests of the Trust and its beneficiaries. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel relied on the proposition that when substantial Justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial Justice deserves to be heard and the courts may in the larger interests of the administration of Justice excuse or overlook a mere irregularity or a trivial breach of law for doing the real and substantial Justice to the parties and pass orders which will serve interest of Justice Best, as reiterated by the apex court in Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva [, (2013) 4 SCC 97].

I have gone through the pleadings of the parties in the interlocutory applications on which the impugned order is passed as also the documents produced by them in support of their respective contentions. A copy of the scheme settled by the court for the administration of the Trust was also made available to me by the learned counsel for the parties for my perusal.

There are altogether 288 members in the Board of Trustees of the Trust and they have elected 15 among them as the members of the Executive Committee of the Trust in the last election held in the year 2013 in accordance with the scheme. The office bearers of the Trust namely, the President, Secretary and the Treasurer are among the said 15 members of the Executive Committee and it is conceded that one among them is no more. Petitioners in the above interlocutory applications are the members of the Executive Committee other than the office bearers. In other words, it is seen that all the members of the Executive Committee other than the office bearers are questioning the administration of the affairs of the Trust by the Secretary and other office bearers. The correctness of the impugned decision, according to me, is to be examined in the said background.

As noted above, the impugned order is challenged by the Secretary and Treasurer who were removed from office on the ground that the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015 was not a validly convened meeting and that even if it is assumed that the said meeting is a validly convened meeting, the decision to remove the Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust from office taken in the said meeting is without authority as the said decision was beyond the scope of the meeting convened. The learned counsel for the Secretary as also the Treasurer who are removed from office have not addressed any arguments on the correctness of the various allegations of breach of Trust raised by the contesting respondents against them. The following are, therefore, the issues to be resolved;

"(1) Is the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015 a valid one?; and

(2) If so, is the decision taken in the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015 to remove the Secretary and the Treasurer of the Trust from office valid?"

The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants as regards the validity of the meeting is that the length of notice issued for the meeting is too short for a meeting of this nature. It is seen that Ext. A3 notice for the meeting proposed on 22.10.2015 was despatched only on 15.10.2015. As such, there was only a week''s notice for the said meeting. The scheme framed for the administration the Trust does not provide for notice to be given in a particular manner nor does the scheme specify the length of notice to be given for an extraordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees. As such, the issue concerning the sufficiency of the notice given for the meeting has to be examined in accordance with the general principles. The passage in Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings, relied on by the learned senior counsel for the appellants reads thus:

"It frequently occurs that those responsible for convening a general meeting of an organisation find that no mention is made in the rules of the period of notice required to be given. Here, the organisers should err on the safe side and give as much notice as is practicable. A rough rule of thumb might be 21 clear days'' notice for an annual general meeting and 14 clear days'' notice for any other general meeting, but much will depend on how important and exceptional is the business to be discussed. In such a situation, the officers of the organisation should take an early opportunity to take steps to amend the rules so that the notice requirements are clearly covered."

It is clear from the quoted passage that as far as an extraordinary meeting of a body in the nature of the Trust is concerned, the question as to the sufficiency of notice is to be decided taking into consideration of the business proposed to be discussed in the meeting. It is seen that in the letter sent to the members of the Board of Trustees along with Ext. A3 notice, it is stated, among others, that the administration of the Trust and the institutions under it are not being carried on at present in accordance with the provisions of the scheme; that the meetings of the Executive Committee are not called for, for the last 18 months; that the members of the Executive Committee are kept in dark as to the affairs of the Trust; that hundreds of students have been admitted to various courses in the institutions under the Trust and several appointments have been made in the Trust and the institutions under it without the concurrence of the Executive Committee as also the Board of Trustees; that crores of rupees have been received by the Trust during this period by way of donations and otherwise; that the accounts of the Trust have not been audited nor placed before the Board of Trustees or the Executive Committee since 2013 as provided for in the scheme and that it is in the said circumstances that 67 members of the Board of Trustees have submitted Ext. A1 requisition to the Secretary for convening the extraordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees. It is also stated in the letter referred to above that since the Secretary failed to convene the meeting as requisitioned by the said members of the Board of Trustees, the extraordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees was convened. Further, as noted above, the meeting was convened by none other than 10 elected members of the Executive Committee of the Trust. According to me, in the absence of any provision in the scheme as to the length of notice to be given for an extra ordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees, in the light of the facts stated in the letter enclosed along with the notice of the meeting, it cannot be said that seven days of notice given for the meeting proposed on 22.10.2015 is insufficient, especially when the meeting was convened by 10 out of the 14 members of the Executive Committee of the Trust themselves.

The validity of the decision taken by the Board of Trustees in its meeting held on 22.10.2015 to remove the Secretary and the Treasurer of the Trust from their respective offices is attacked on two grounds. The first ground is that the agenda of the meeting does not indicate that the removal of the Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust from their respective offices is a matter which will be discussed in the meeting and that therefore, a decision to remove the Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust could not have been taken in the said meeting. The other contention is that the meeting held on 22.10.2015 being a meeting convened invoking the proviso to clause 12 (f) of the scheme, only matters mentioned in the notice of requisition could have been discussed in the meeting. It is settled that for a notice of a meeting to be valid, it must clearly state the business to be transacted at the meeting and all the material information to enable it to be fully understood. The question whether notice issued for a particular meeting is sufficient must be decided on the facts facts of each case. The crucial test is whether it contains enough information to enable the recipient to understand the scope of the meeting to decide for himself whether he should attend the meeting. (See Chapter V in Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings Eleventh Edition). With these principles in mind, I should examine whether the Board of Trustees were justified in removing the Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust from their respective offices in its meeting held on 22.10.2015. Ext. A3 notice issued for the meeting of the Board of Trustees proposed on 22.10.2015 mentions only one agenda, other than the formal agendas of the meeting. The said agenda, if understood in the context of the Trust, would make it clear that what was communicated as per the said agenda is a discussion on the administration of the Trust contrary to the provisions of the scheme and its remedial measures, though the same may not be the verbatim translation of the said agenda. A perusal of the letter addressed to the members of the Board of Trustees of the Trust along with the notice of the meeting indicates that it contains a brief description as to how the administration of the Trust is to be carried out in accordance with the scheme and a brief description as to how the administration is being carried on at present by the Secretary. In other words, the said letter conveys to the recipient a clear indication that the affairs of the Trust are not being carried on at present by the Secretary in accordance with the provisions of the scheme and that the Secretary is guilty of breach of Trust warranting immediate remedial measures. If the agenda of the meeting was to discuss about the alternate arrangement for the management and administration of the Trust in accordance with the provisions of the scheme, it cannot be said that the recipients of the notice will not be in a position to understand the scope of the proposed meeting as one for removal of the office bearers who are guilty of breach of trust also. Viewed in the angle, according to me, it cannot be contended that the decision taken in the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on 22.10.2015 to remove the Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust from their respective offices is illegal or irregular in any manner.

The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant in F.A.O. No. 100 of 2016 is that since the meeting held on 22.10.2015 was a meeting convened invoking the proviso to Clause XII(f) of the scheme, only matters referred to in the requisition submitted to the Secretary for convening the meeting can be discussed in the meeting. Clause XII(f) of the scheme reads thus:

"XII. Powers and duties of the Secretary:

xxxxxx

xxxxxx

(f) On the requisition made by not less than 10% of the members of the Trustees or on a resolution of the Executive Committee in this behalf, the Secretary shall convene extraordinary meeting of the board of Trustees. Any fraction above 5 or above shall be treated as one calculating the percentage.

Provided that if the Secretary fails to convene a meeting as aforesaid within four weeks of receipt of such request the persons who made such requisition or a majority of the members of the Executive Committee meeting may convene such meeting and the meeting so held shall be deemed to be duly held under the provisions of the scheme."

It is clear from the proviso to Clause XII(f) of the scheme that the meeting contemplated therein is a meeting to discuss the matters referred to in the requisition. Ext. A1 is the requisition submitted by 67 members of the Board of Trustees to the Secretary for convening the extraordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees. Ext. A1 states that though an Executive Committee was elected to power in the year 2013, only one meeting of the Board of Trustees was convened thereafter. It also states that due to difference of opinion among the members of the Executive Committee, the meetings of the Executive Committee are not being convened. It further states that in the circumstances, the administration is being carried on by the Secretary contrary to the provisions of the scheme. It further states that since the Board of Trustees is the ultimate authority in relation to the affairs of the Trust, a meeting of the Board of Trustees will have to be convened to decide the further course of action as regards the management of the Trust. On a close reading of Ext. A1 notice, it is evident that the requisition for convening of an extraordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees was also submitted for the purpose of taking appropriate decisions to ensure that the administration of the Trust is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. In the said circumstances, it cannot also be said that the meeting requested to be convened as per Ext. A1 notice was not a meeting in which a decision for the removal of the office bearers was contemplated.

M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu and others (supra) is a case where a decision was taken by a local body to construct an underground shopping complex engaging a private builder without inviting a tender in a meeting in which the construction of the underground shopping complex was not an agenda. In the said case, the Apex Court held that the law not only mandates that the notice of the date and time of the meeting shall be given, but also mandates that the business to be transacted at such meeting shall be given. It was also held by the Apex Court in the said case that since the agenda of the meeting in which the decision referred to above was taken did not include the subject of construction of the underground shopping complex or any other material to support the discussion on the said subject, it could not have been considered in the said meeting. I have held that sufficient and more materials are available in the letter enclosed along with Ext. A3 notice issued for convening the extraordinary meeting of the Board of Trustees proposed on 22.10.2015 to enable the recipient to understand the scope of the meeting. The decision of the Apex Court referred to above, in the circumstances, has no application to the facts of the present case.

Clause XXII of the Scheme formulated for the administration of the Trust categorically provides that all disputes arising in relation to the implementation of the scheme or the management and administration of the Trust shall be entertained and decided only by the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram. The impugned order restraining the Secretary from functioning as the Secretary of the Trust is passed invoking the said clause in the scheme. As noticed above, serious allegations are levelled against the Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust in the affidavits filed in support of the applications, which are disposed of as per the impugned order. A perusal of the counter affidavits filed by the Secretary in the said applications indicates that most of the vital averments in the affidavit such as non-convening of the meetings of the Board of Trustees and Executive Committee of the Trust, admissions of students and appointment of staff without the concurrence of the Board of Trustees and the Executive Committee of the Trust, non-accounting of the donations received on behalf of the Trust etc. are not specifically denied. As such, according to me, even if there is any irregularity in the meeting convened on 22.10.2015 for removal of the Secretary and Treasurer of the Trust from their respective offices, the court below was justified in passing the impugned order. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred and the courts may in the larger interests of administration of justice excuse or overlook a mere irregularity or a trivial breach of law for doing real and substantial justice to the parties and pass orders which will serve the interest of justice best.

In the said view of the matter, I do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are, accordingly, dismissed. All interlocutory applications in the appeals are closed.