Udai Bhan Singh vs Sub-Divisional Officer

G.C. Mathur and K.C. Agrawal, JJ.—This is an appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition filed by the Appellant and refusing to quash an order of his suspension.

The Appellant was a Pradhan and the Sub-Divisional Officer by order dated January 22, 1975, passed u/s 95(1)(gg) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, placed the Appellant under suspension pending proceedings under Clause (g) of Section 95(1). Learned Counsel for the Appellant has argued that the power of suspension under Sub-section (gg) is a quasi judicial power and that unless there was a specific provision in the Act itself, permitting delegation of the specific quasi-judicial power, there could be no delegation of such a power. He has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Municipal Corporation Vs. Dhondu Narayan Chowdhary, . This case merely says that judicial power cannot be delegated unless the law expressly or by clear implication permits it. Without accepting the Appellant�s contention that the power to suspend under Sub-section (gg) is a quasi judicial power, we think that even if it is so, the Supreme Court decision does not help the Appellant. Section 96-A of the Act expressly empowers the State Government to delegate all or any of the powers conferred by the Act upon it. The power to, suspend under Sub-section (gg) is one of the powers under the Act and it is clearly covered by the provisions of Section 96-A. The contention of learned Counsel is that there must be specific provision in the Act, permitting delegation of quasi-judicial power. The decision of the Supreme Court does not support this contention. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 96-A empowered the Government to delegate all or any of the powers, including the powers under Sub-section (gg) of the Act. By a notification dated 4-8-1974, the State Government delegated the power exercisable by it under Sub-section (gg) to the Sub-Divisional Officers. The Sub-Divisional Officer was, therefore, empowered to pass the order of suspension.

The Appellant was suspended in January, 1975, and his learned Counsel states that the inquiry under Sub-section (g) of Section 95(1) has not yet been completed. We direct that the inquiry be completed expeditiously. With these observations the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.