Udai Chand Agrawal vs Hanuman Mandir Trust, Bijuri And Others

The petitioner seeks exception to order dated 27.02.2017 (Annexure P-15), whereby the respondent No.2Collector, Anooppur has directed the

respondent No.3, Municipal Council, Bijuri to pay the rent to respondent No.1 Hanuman Mandir Trust, Bijuri.

The facts necessary for disposal of present petition are that the petitioner claiming to be the owner and in possession of the disputed land, rented out

the premises mentioned in the agreement (Ex.P-11) dated 08.11.2011 to the Municipal Council, Bijuri for a monthly rent of Rs.18,300/- as determined

by the Collector. The respondent No.1/Trust filed an application before the SubDivisional Officer Kotma, stating that the Municipal Council is using

the Community Hall and the adjoining open area of plot No.83, owned by the Trust, without paying any rent to it and prayed that the Municipal Council

be directed to determine and pay the rent to the Trust.

According to the petitioner, without giving any opportunity of hearing to him, the Sub-Divisional Officer directed the Municipal Council to pay the

rent to the Trust. However, the rent was not paid to the Trust as some objections were filed before the Municipal Council, who thereafter sought

instructions/directions from the Collector, Anooppur in regard to payment of the rent. The Collector, in turn invited all the parties including the

petitioner to put forth their cases. The petitioner got his statements recorded before the Collector and also filed his written statement stating that he is

the owner of Community hall and the adjoining area and which he had given on rent to the Municipal Council on rent vide agreement dated 08.11.2011

and prayed that the rent from May, 2012 to February, 2017 be paid to him. It was also stated that since there is no agreement between the respondent

No.1/Trust and the Municipal Council, no amount could be tendered to the Trust. However, the Collector vide impugned order, directed the Municipal

Council to tender the rent to the respondent/Trust.

Shri Ashok Lalwni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has argued that the Collector has no jurisdiction to pass any order in the matter,

which are governed by the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act'), taking this Court through Section

2(b) of the Act. It is submitted that the petitioner fall in the category landlord as he had entered into an agreement with the Municipal Council to

receive the rent. It is further argued that if respondent/Trust is claiming right on the property, it ought to have filed a suit for recovery against him, but

in violation of the agreement dated 08.11.2011, the Municipal Council cannot be directed to pay the rent amount to the Trust. He has placed reliance

on the case of Vasudha Shrivastava and others Vs. Sm. Kamla Chouhan and another (1992) AIR (SC) 1454, in support of his contentions.

Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1/Trust, on the other hand, has argued that the petitioner has not

come before this Court with clean hands. It is contended that suppressing the fact that the petitioner is not the owner of the rented premises, he

entered into an agreement with the Municipal Council. It is submitted that the whole case of the petitioner is based on false hood, he is neither the

owner nor the land lord, as he was never permitted by the trust to collect rent on its behalf. It is submitted that earlier the grandmother of petitioner

had instituted a suit claiming right and title over the said land. After her death, petitioner and his mother Belabai were substituted as her legal heirs.

Petitioner thereafter entered into a compromise with the defendant therein and filed an application under order 23 Rule 3 of the C.P.C. for

compromise and the trial Court on 11.07.1996 after hearing both the parties and recording the statement, passed a compromise decree whereby the

respondent No.1/Trust was declared owner and in possession of the area mentioned in the map annexed to the application and the basis of that

decree, name of trust was thereafter updated in the Municipal records vide Annexure R-1/1. He further contents that pursuant to the decree, a

community hall was constructed on the land with the financial aid of SECL, as reflected from Annexure R-1/3. It is urged that the petitioner has

surreptitiously entered into an agreement with Municipal Council for use of the land despite being aware of the fact that owner of the land is the Trust

and not the petitioner and considering this aspect and the judgment of the Courts below, wherein the suit and the first appeal filed by Damyanti, sister

of the petitioner, challenging the compromise decree was dismissed, the Collector, thereafter passed the impugned order to pay the rent to the Trust,

which is just and proper. The learned counsel has placed reliance on (2010) 10 SCC 677 Ritesh Tewari and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and

others, (2010) 2 SCC 114 Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others and (2008) 14 SCC 58 Ramesh Chandra Sankla others Vs. Vikram

Cement and others.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in my opinion, the petitioner has not made out any ground, on the basis of which the order passed

by the Collector be set aside. From the record, it is clearly established that the suit was instituted by one Shyamabai, grandmother of the petitioner

claiming right and title over the land in question. After her death, the petitioner and his mother were substituted as her legal heirs. Petitioner and his

mother entered into a compromise with the defendants therein and accordingly filed an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the C.P.C. The trial

Court on the basis of the application and the map annexed thereto, which also formed part of the decree, passed a decree for compromise in terms of

the settlement arrived at between the parties thereto. The petitioner though aware that the land/area in question came into the share of

respondent/Trust as per the compromise decree, surreptitiously entered into an agreement with the Municipal Council for use of the said land, on

08.11.2011, representing himself as the owner of the land.

I am not impressed by the arguments of Shri Lalwani that since Municipal Council has entered into an agreement with the petitioner, he is entitled to

receive the rent as landlord and the Trust may take appropriate proceedings to recover it from him. The case law relied upon by him is also not

applicable to the facts of the present case, as in the present case, the petitioner entered into an agreement with Municipal Council falsely claiming to

be the owner of the property. Petitioner neither being the owner, nor authorized/entitled to collect rent on behalf of the Trust cannot be termed as

landlord only because he singed the agreement with Municipal Council.

The agreement dated 08.11.2011 clearly shows that the petitioner suppressing the fact that he has no right or tittle over the land has fraudulently

entered into an agreement with the Municipal Council. Clause 9 of the agreement clearly mentioned that in case of any dispute the agreement shall

render null and void and the possession of the land/building shall be delivered to the owner. It is evident from Annexure P-11 that the Municipal

Council also informed him vide letter No. 284 dated 25.05.2012 that in case of dispute, the agreement shall stand cancelled. It is apparent from the

record that after the Trust made an application to the Municipal Council and SDO for fixation and payment of rent, the SDO also directed the

Municipal Counsel to pay the rent to the owner as declared by the decree dated 11.07.1996. However, the Municipal Council in confusion over the

identity of the rightful claimant, did not pay the rent to anybody.

The Collector after giving opportunity of hearing to all the parties, considered the statements and documents produced before him and directed the

Municipal Council to execute an agreement with the Trust who is the owner of the property being used by the Municipal Council and to pay the rent to

the owner of the property, i.e., the Trust. Relevant portion of the impugned order is extracted herein as under :-

^^3- iz'uk/khu Hkwfe ds HkwfeLokeh mn;pUnz vxzoky dks vkgwr fd;k x;k rFkk mlds 'kiFkiwoZd dFku vafdr fd;s x;sA mn;pan vxzoky us vius dFku

esa crk;k gS fd fctqjh dk IykV uacj 83 ds va'kHkkx 133 ,dM esa ckmUMªh cuk gS bl ckmUMªh ds Hkhrj 2265 oxZfQV esa ,d gky cuk gSA rFkk

,d pijklh DokVZj cuk gSA mn;pUnz us uxjikfydk ls mDr iz'uk/khu Hkwfe ds fdjk;k gsrq vuqca/k fnukad 8@11@2011 dks fd;k Fkk ftl ij mlds gLrk{kj

gSA mn;pUnz vxzoky dh ogu n;earh }kjk ,d O;ogkj okn dzekad 12&,@2015 izLrqr fd;k Fkk ftlesa mn;pUnz vkSj vU; 06 O;fDr;ksa dks i{kdkj ckrk;k

x;k gSA mDr izdj.k esa dzekad 07 ij guqeku eafnj VªLV lfpo }kjk lqjsUnz dqekj xqIrk dks Hkh i{kdkj cuk;k x;k gSA bl izdj.k esa i{kdkjksa ds e/;

jkthuke ds vk/kkj ij fnukad 11@7@96 dks ikfjr fMdzh vuqlkj 127 x250 QhV izfroknhx.k guqeku eafnj VªLV dh gksxhA rFkk blh Hkwfe ls yxk gqvk

'ks""k cdk;k Hkwfe oknh dh gksxhA jkthukek esa utjh uD'kk Hkh cuk gqvk gSA mn;pUnz vxzoky us 'kiFkiwoZd dFku esa ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k gS fd

jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij tks fMdzh ikfjr dh xbZ Fkh mlds fo:) mlus dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha dh gSA

4- vkosnd }kjk izLrqr vkosnu ds laca/k esa izdj.k esa layXu vfHkys[k o uxjikfydk fctqjh ls izkIr ewy uLrh dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA izdj.k esa layXu

vuqca/k i= fnukad 8@11@2011 }kjk mn;pUnz vxzoky firk Lo-Jh QwypUnz vxzoky ,oa eq[; uxjikfydk vf/kdkjh fctqjh ds e/; fctqjh ds IykV uacj 83 jdok

2-40 ds va'kHkkx mn;pUnz vxzoky ds uke vafdr Hkwfe@Hkou dks uxjikfydk ds lkFk] fdjk;snkjh gsrq vuqca/k fd;k x;k gSA ekuuh; f}rh; O;ogkj

U;k;k/kh'k oxZ&2 dksrek ds O;ogkjokn izdj.k dzekad 14,@94 esa ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 11@7@96 }kjk i{kdkjksa ds e/; jkthukek Lohd`r dj ;g vkns'k ikfjr

fd;k x;k gS jkthukek vkosnu dh dafMdk&4 esa nf'kZr utjh uD'kk ds vuqlkj mHk;i{k dks oknHkwfe ds [k.M Hkkx dk Lokeh ?kksf""kr fd;k x;k gSA

jkthukek ds mDr utjh uD'kk vuqlkj iz'uk/khu Hkwfe 127 x250 fQV dk Lokeh izfroknh guqeku eafnj VªLV fctqjh dks ekuk x;k gSA O;ogkj U;k;ky;

}kjk jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij fd;s x;s bl fu.kZ; fnukad 11@7@96 ds fo:) Jherh n;earh vxzoky iRuh jathr vxzoky us ekuuh; f}rh; O;ogkj oxZ&2 dksrek ds

U;k;ky; esa okn izLrqr fd;k Fkk tks izdj.k dzekad 12&,@2015 vkns'k fnukad 9@10@2015 }kjk [kkfjt fd;k x;k gSA bl izdkj ekuuh; O;ogkj U;k;ky; }kjk

jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 11@7@96 ds vuqlkj iz'uk/khu Hkw&[kaM dk HkwfeLokeh guqeku eafnj VªLV fctqjh dks ?kksf""kr fd;k x;k

gSA mn;pUnz vxzoky us vius dFku esa O;ogkj okn izdj.k dzekad 12&,@2015 vkns'k fnukad 9@10@2015 ds fo:) dksbZ dk;Zokgh Hkh ugha dh xbZ

gSA mn;pUnz vxzoky dh vksj ls fnukad 25@2@2017 dks ,d fyf[kr vkosnu izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ftlesa ys[k fd;k x;k gS fd guqeku eafnj VªLV desVh

rFkk uxjikfydk ds chp fdjk;kukek fu""ikfnr ugha gqvk gS vr% mUgsa fdjk;k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkj ugha gSA vr% iz'uk/khu Hkwfe dk fdjk;k Hkqxrku

mn;pUnz vxzoky dks fd;k tkuk pkfg;sA vukosnd }kjk ,slk dksbZ U;k;ky;hu vkns'k izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gS fd ftlds vk/kkj ij ;g Kkr gks lds fd fdjk;k

Hkqxrku fd;s tkus ij fdlh izdkj dh jksd yxkbZ xbZ gSA blds vfrfjDr ekuuh; O;ogkj U;k;ky; }kjk jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij ikfjr fMdzh fnukad 11@7@96 ds

vuqlkj iz'uk/khu Hkwfe 127 x250 oxZfQV dk Lokeh guqeku eafnj VªLV fctqjh dks ?kksf""kr fd;k x;k gS ftldk mYys[k dzekad 12&,@2015 vkns'k

fnukad 9@10@2015 dh dafMdk 6 esa djrs gq;s n;earh vxzoky }kjk izLrqr LoRo ?kks""k.kk ,oa LFkk;h fu""ks/kkKk ckcr O;ogkj okn fujLr fd;k x;k gSA

bl izdkj vafdr :i ls mDr Hkw[kaM dk Lokeh guqeku eafnj VªLV fctqjh gh gSA ftls Hkw[kaM dk fdjk;k uxjikfydk ls izkIr djus dk iw.kZ vf/kdkj gSA

vr% eq[; uxjikfydk vf/kdkjh fctqjh dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd ekuuh; O;ogkj U;k;ky; ds mDr fMdzh vuqlkj Hkw[kaM ds LoRokf/kdkjh guqeku eafnj

VªLV fctqjh ds lkFk iz'uk/khu Hkwfe ds laca/k esa la'kksf/kr vuqca/k fu""ikfnr djk;sa rFkk mDr Hkwfe@lEifRr dk fdjk;k guqeku eafnj VªLV fctqjh

dks Hkqxrku djkus dh dk;Zokgh djsA^^

In the present case, it is evident that the petitioner willfully and deliberately suppressed the fact that he is not the owner of the land/premises, while

entering into an agreement for the use of said premises with Municipal Council/respondent No.3. Hence the document founded on the falsehood from

the very beginning was null and void. Furthermore, as objections/disputes were raised by the Trust as well as by the sister of the petitioner, the rent

was never paid to the petitioner. Resultantly, the document/agreement was never acted upon.

Even before this Court, the petitioner has not come with clean hands. There is no reference in the petition that petitioner and his mother Belabai

had entered into a compromise with defendant (as reflected from decree dated 11.07.1996), wherein they had admitted that the area/premises in

question shall remain in ownership of the respondent/Trust. Thus non-disclosure of correct facts by the petitioner amounts to suppression of facts,

disentitling the petitioner from any relief. By artistic and clever drafting, the petitioner has suppressed the correct facts from this Court and neither

pleads that decree had become redundant and petitioner continued in the possession of the leased land, as is also evident from para 5.4 of his

pleadings, which reproduced as under:-

“That it shall be important to mention that a civil suit pertaining to leased plot was litigated between the successor of the petitioner and

Radheshyam, Ramlal, Harinarayan, Nityanand, Surendra Kumar and Ramlakhan as defendants. The petitioner and his wife were substituted as legal

heirs of said Smt. Shyama Bai. Though Smt. Damyantibai was also the legal heirs of late Smt. Shyamabai, but she was not impleaded as her legal heir

in the suit. The said suit was compromised on certain conditions between the petitioner and the defendants by ignoring Smt. Damyanti Bai, who also

had equal say in the suit. The copy of compromise application order and decree are filed as Annexure P-4 to P-6. The said judgment and decree are

under challenge before the Additional District Judge at the behest of Smt. Damyanti Bai. The copy of judgment memo of appeal and order-sheet

exhibiting pendency of appeal are filed as Annexure P-7 to P-9. It is worth mentioned that decree passed in the civil suit preferred by late Smt.

Shyamabai, having been unlawful and therefore name of the parties to the application under Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. obeyed its term. Thereby the

said decree became redundant and the petitioner continued to be in possession of leased land also.â€​

A person who invokes the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution of India, is duty bound to place all the facts before

the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court, then the Court

would be fully justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

In (2010) 10 SCC 677 Ritesh Tewari and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, the Supreme Court has held :

“26. The power under Article 226of the Constitution is discretionary and supervisory in nature. It is not issued merely because it is lawful to do so.

The extraordinary power in the writ jurisdiction does not exist to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion any substantial injustice. A writ

can be issued only in case of a grave miscarriage of justice or where there has been a flagrant violation of law. The writ court has not only to protect

a person from being subjected to a violation of law but also to advance justice and not to thwart it. The Constitution does not place any fetter on the

power of the extraordinary jurisdiction but leaves, it to the discretion of the court. However, being that the power is discretionary, the court has to

balance competing interests, keeping in mind that the interests of justice and public interest are coalesce generally. A court of equity, when exercising

its equitable jurisdiction must act so as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud and promote good faith and equity. An order in equity is one which is

equitable to all the parties concerned. Petition can be entertained only after being fully satisfied about the factual statements and not in a casual and

cavalier manner. (Vide Champalal Binani Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 645; Chimajirao Kanhojirao

Shrike & Anr. v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 2532; LIC of India v. Smt. Asha Goel & Anr., AIR 2001 SC 549; The

State Financial Corporation & Anr. v. M/s. Jagdamba Oil Mills &Anr., AIR 2002 SC 834; Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., AIR 2003 SC

2889; and Punjab Roadways, Moga through its General Manager v. Punja Sahib Bus and Transport Co. & Ors, (2010) 5 SCC 235).

Where a party's claim is not founded on valid grounds, the party cannot claim equity. A party that claims equity must come before the court with

clean hands as equities have to be properly worked out between parties to ensure that no one is allowed to have their pound of flesh vis-a-vis the

others unjustly. (vide: Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim(2001) 5 SCC 629).â€​

In (1984) 4 SCC 371 M.P. Mittal Vs. State of Haryana and others, the Supreme Court has held :-

“5. Now there is no dispute that the appellant knowingly and deliberately entered into the Guarantee agreement, and is liable as Guarantor to make

payment of the dividend due from Messrs. Depro Foods Limited. Nor is it disputed that the amount due, with interest, stands at Rs.2,02,166/- in

respect of the period ending with the year 1977. It was not contended that the appellant in fact does not possess sufficient funds or cannot avail of

sufficient personal property for the purpose of discharging the liability. The record also shows that before instituting coercive proceedings, the

Assistant Collector provided the appellant an opportunity to pay up the amount due from him, and that the appellant made no attempt to discharge the

liability. When that is so, we are of opinion that he is not entitled to relief in these proceedings. The appeal arises out of a writ petition, and it is well

settled that when a petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226of the Constitution, it is open to the High Court to consider

whether, in the exercise of its undoubted discretionary jurisdiction, it should decline relief to such petitioner if the grant of relief would defeat the

interests of justice. The Court always has power to refuse relief where the petitioner seeks to invoke its writ jurisdiction in order to secure a dishonest

advantage or perpetuate an unjust gain. This is a case where the High Court was fully justified in refusing relief. On that ground alone, the appeal

must fail.â€​

          (emphasis supplied)

In (2011) 7 SCC 639 State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Narmada Bachavo Andolan and others, the Supreme Court had held :- Â

A person seeking relief in public interest shouldapproach the Court of Equity, not only with clean hands but also with a clean mind, clean heart

and clean objective. Thus, he who seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim ""Jure Naturae Aequum Est Neminem cum Alterius Detrimento Et

Injuria Fieri Locupletiorem"", means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another. The judicial process should

never become an instrument of oppression or abuse or means to subvert justice.

""The interest of justice and public interest coalesce.They are very often one and the same"". Therefore, the Courts have to weigh the public

interest vis-a-vis the private interest. A petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement(s), if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose, amounts to

an abuse of the process of the Court and such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly. Thus, a litigant is bound to make ""full and true disclosure

of facts"". The Court is not a forum to achieve an oblique purpose.â€​

It is thus clear that a person, who seeks equity must come with clean hands. The equity jurisdiction is exercised to promote honesty and not to

frustrate the legitimate rights of other parties. Hence, equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the case of the petitioner, who knowingly and

deliberately got the agreement with the Municipal Council, executed by making false statement that he is owner of the land which amounts to fraud.

From what is mentioned above, it is clear that even before this Court, he has twisted the facts and not presented the correct facts.

In view of the aforementioned legal pronouncements, I do not find any justification to interfere with the order under challenge or to entertain the

petitioner's prayer to set it aside. Â

Resultant this petition stands dismissed.