Ganga Bai vs State Of Rajasthan

Farjand Ali, J

The jurisdiction of this court has been invoked by way of filing an application under Section 439 CrPC at the instance of accused-petitioner. The requisite details of the matter are tabulated herein below:

S.No.

Particulars of the Case

1.

FIR Number

132/2023

2.

Concerned Police Station

RAC Center,Kharoda

3.

District

Udaipur

4.

Offences alleged in the FIR

Sections 449, 302/34 of

the IPC

5.

Offences added, if any

-

6.

Date of passing of impugned

05.07.2025

order

Briefly stated that facts of the case are that on 06.06.2023, the complainant Kaushal, submitted a written report at the Mortuary, M.B. Hospital, Udaipur, alleging the homicidal assault of his aunt, Chandabai. He stated that around 2:30 PM, he received a phone call from his brother Bharat, informing him that their aunt had been severely assaulted at her residence in Menar by her co-wife, Ganga Bai, and Ganga’s son, Naresh, using a stick, rendering her unconscious.

2.1. Upon receiving this information, Kaushal, along with his younger brother Karan, rushed to the scene and found Chandabai lying unconscious. She was immediately transported to M.B. Hospital, during which she reportedly disclosed that Ganga and Naresh had brutally beaten her with a stick, inflicting internal injuries to her left arm and abdomen. She lost consciousness after expressing concern for the welfare of her children. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending doctor declared her brought dead.

2.2. It is further alleged that Ganga and Naresh had unlawfully trespassed into her premises and fatally assaulted her. The incident is purportedly rooted in a longstanding property dispute between Chandabai and her co-wife Ganga over ancestral land and its partition. On the basis of the above, an FIR aforesaid has been lodged against the petitioner and Naresh. Her first and second bail applications being SBCRLMB Nos.12516/2023 & 11662/2024 were dismissed by this Court vide orders dated 14.12.2023 & 18.09.2024. Hence the instant bail application.

It is contended on behalf of the accused-petitioner that no case for the alleged offences is made out against her and her incarceration is not warranted. There are no factors at play in the case at hand that may work against grant of bail to the accused-petitioner and she has been made an accused based on conjectures and surmises.

Contrary to the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application and submits that the present case is not fit for enlargement of accused on bail.

I have heard and considered the submissions made by both the parties and perused the material available on record.

The prosecution’s case centers on the allegation that that the petitioner is culpable for the homicidal death of her co-wife, arising from a protracted history of familial discord. It is not disputed that the petitioner was legally espoused to the deceased’s husband nearly two decades prior, thereby acquiring the status of the first wife within a legally recognized matrimonial union. In due course, the husband, while still in a subsisting marital relationship with the petitioner, entered into a second marriage with the deceased, thus giving rise to a polygamous domestic setup, which was not uncommon in certain social contexts.

6.1. Following the solemnization of the second marriage, both wives commenced cohabitation within the same residential premises. The accommodation in question was modest in scale and structure, and while jointly owned or occupied, was informally divided between the two women, with each residing in demarcated but interconnected portions of the dwelling. This arrangement, albeit practically functional, was not supported by any legal partition or formal delineation of ownership rights.

6.2. Upon the death of their common husband—who had, until then, presumably acted as a stabilizing influence between the co-wives—the fragile equilibrium of the household was significantly disrupted. In the absence of a patriarchal figure, disputes over the property, which had hitherto remained dormant or unarticulated, began to intensify. The deceased and the petitioner, both asserting possessory and proprietary interests in the shared premises, reportedly engaged in recurring disagreements, primarily revolving around the division and control of the immovable estate.

6.3. Although their shared residence continued post the demise of the husband, their relationship became increasingly acrimonious. Despite occupying physically separate quarters, underlying resentment and emotional estrangement persisted, fuelled by competing claims of inheritance and entitlement. The prosecution submits that this history of simmering tension and antagonism created an environment fraught with hostility, eventually culminating in the tragic incident in question.

6.4. In this context, the alleged offence is said to have occurred. The prosecution attributes the fatal act to a spontaneous escalation of an existing dispute, wherein the petitioner, aggrieved by what she perceived as unauthorized construction or renovation activities undertaken by the deceased within the shared courtyard (angan), resorted to an act of violence. This confrontation, it is alleged, resulted in the petitioner striking the deceased with a washing bat, thereby inflicting grievous injuries that ultimately proved fatal.

6.5. The factual matrix, as projected by the prosecution, must thus be viewed against the backdrop of longstanding property-related animus, the deterioration of interpersonal relations following the husband’s demise, and the absence of any formal partition, which collectively contributed to a volatile domestic environment.

The petitioner has been in judicial custody for over two years. The trial remains pending, with only a portion of the prosecution witnesses examined thus far; many still await examination. Given the pace of proceedings and the volume of evidence yet to be recorded, there appears to be no immediate likelihood of conclusion of the trial in the near future. The petitioner’s prolonged incarceration, without conviction, thus becomes a matter of constitutional and procedural concern.

7.1. A crucial point requiring consideration—though not for final adjudication at this stage—is whether the alleged act amounts to ‘murder’ as defined under Section 302 IPC (or its corresponding provision in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita), or whether it may more appropriately be categorized as ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ under Section 304. The distinction is not merely academic; it has significant bearing on the gravity of the charge and the applicability of statutory bail restrictions.

7.2. The submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner—that the act, at best, reflects a sudden altercation over property and may fall within the definition of culpable homicide— cannot be brushed aside at this preliminary stage. This contention

does have legal merit and introduces a degree of doubt as to the exact nature of culpability attributable to the petitioner.

7.3. Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now encapsulated under Section 480 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, governs the principles for grant of bail in non-bailable offences. The provision lays down that ordinarily, bail shall not be granted where the accused is charged with an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment, and where there are reasonable grounds to believe in their guilt. However, the statutory provision carves out a critical exception through its proviso, which extends a beneficial discretion in favour of vulnerable classes, including women, children, and infirm persons. The underlying legislative intent is to ensure that these categories are not subjected to the rigors of pre-trial incarceration unless warranted by compelling reasons.

7.4. The interpretative contours of such discretion have been judicially clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court through judicial pronouncement holding that the word “may,” when used in empowering provisions, can be interpreted as “shall” where the discretion is coupled with a duty to act in a particular manner. The objective, therefore, is to ensure that the discretion is not exercised arbitrarily, but in consonance with the constitutional mandate of fairness and equity. Moreover, jurisprudentially, the presumption of innocence remains the cornerstone of criminal law. The accused must be treated as innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Detaining a person indefinitely without a finding of guilt offends the very essence of Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to personal liberty.

7.5. An essential consideration in any bail application is the potential threat posed by the release of the accused. This includes the risk of absconding, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses. In the present case, the petitioner is an elderly widow with no prior criminal antecedents. There is no material on record to suggest that she poses any such risk. In fact, several witnesses have already been examined, reducing the likelihood of interference with the trial process.

7.6. Given her age, lack of influence, and the absence of any demonstrated intention to obstruct justice, it would be overly punitive to continue her detention solely on the basis of the gravity of the charge, especially when the trial is expected to continue for a considerable period.

In view of the totality of circumstances—particularly the petitioner’s prolonged pre-trial incarceration, the absence of compelling reasons to suggest a risk to the trial, the debatable classification of the offence, and her status as an elderly woman— this Court is of the considered opinion that continued detention would be unjustified. The purpose of bail is not to punish, but to secure the attendance of the accused during the trial. Where that objective can be reasonably ensured without incarceration, the denial of bail becomes untenable in law.

Accordingly, the instant bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is allowed and it is ordered that the accused-petitioner as named in the cause title shall be enlarged on bail provided he furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with two sureties of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge for his appearance before the court concerned on all the dates of hearing as and when called upon to do so.