High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 03 DEL CK 0590

Uem India Pvt. Ltd. vs ONGC LTD.

Delhi High Court · Decided on 27 March 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Avneesh Jhingan, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
O.M.P. (COMM) No. 393 Of 2018, I.A.Nos. 12438 Of 2018, 9666 Of 2020 & 2738 Of 2022

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

59 paragraphs · 4,587 words

Avneesh Jhingan, J

1.

This petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act’) for setting aside of the award dated 14.12.2017.

2.

The brief facts are that the petitioner M/s UEM India Private Limited,  a  registered  company  was the  successful  bidder  in  a  tender invited by Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (‘ONGC’) for installation of one Effluent Treatment Plant  (for short ‘ETP’)and three ETP-cum Water Injection Plants at four sites in Assam along with maintenance for seven years. The parties entered into contract on lump sum turnkey basis. The work was awarded on 30.03.2011 for a lump sum amount of  Rs.119,34,58,347/-.  The  project  was  to  be  completed  within  thirty four months from  the date of issuance of the Notification of Award (for short’NOA’)i.e. by 29.01.2014.

2.1 Clause 27 of the General Conditions of Contract (for short’GCC’)provided for dispute resolution through arbitration and the petitioner invoked arbitration. The petitioner claimed prolongation costs aggregating to Rs.10,30,00,000/-; losses to the tune of Rs.7,23,55,402/- due to breach of contract; losses amounting to Rs.105,60,00,000/-  on account of being  placed on a holiday  list and amounts towards resources committed/consumed, damages, interest on  capital cost and  illegal  invocation of the advance  bank  guarantee (for short’ABG’)and performance bank guarantee (for short’PBG’).

2.2 The respondent filed counter claims claiming:

(i) Compensation amount of Rs.86,54,26,860.44/- towards restitution of loss and damages on account of payments made to third party vendors;

(ii) Rs.15,19,72,222.33/- for production and revenue loss due to non-performance of various acts by the petitioner;

(iii) Rs.5,70,84,812/- incurred towards establishment costs for various acts of omission by the petitioner;

(iv) Cost of re-tendering to the tune of Rs.130,65,41,652/-;

(v) Rs.7,35,82,647/- as Liquidated damages (for short’LD’);

(vi) Refund of Rs.2,95,00,483.61/- for provisional progressive payments;

(vii) Rs.11,93,45,835/- towards PBG;

(viii) Rs.53,93,047/- for interest on non-utilization of advances given by the respondent to the petitioner; and

(ix) Lastly Rs.23,86,91,669/- towards compensation of the loss and  damages  suffered  due  to  wilful  non-performance  of  the contract by the petitioner.

2.3 The claim of the petitioner of Rs.13,56,376/- for services rendered for soil investigation was accepted, the invocation of ABG of Rs.2,95,00,484/- was held to be illegal and the respondent was directed to refund it along with interest @ 12%, from the date of encashment  till  filing of  the  statement  of claim.  Interest  pendente lite was awarded @ 9% per annum.

2.4 The counter claim for LD of Rs.7,35,82,647/- was accepted, interest @12% was granted from the date of termination of the contract till filing of the counter claim and pendente lite interest @ 9% per annum. The amount of PBG was determined as the quantum of damages over and above the LD. Both parties filed applications under Section  33  of  the  Act  for  correction  of  the  errors.  The  application  of the respondent was accepted and the typographical error in mentioning  the  LD  in  paragraph  474  of  the  award as  Rs.73,58,264/- instead  of  Rs.7,35,82,647/-  was  corrected.  Consequently, the  interest awarded on the amount was modified. The application filed by the petitioner was rejected by the majority decision, being time-barred but the  minority  held  that  once  the  rectification  application  of  one  of  the party was entertained, the errors pointed out by the other party should also be corrected.

2.5 The only dispute pressed in the present petition is with regard to damages awarded over and above the LD, quantified equivalent to the PBG and the grant of interest thereon.

2.6 During the pendency of the petition vide order dated 30.04.2019,  this  court  while  exercising  power  under  Section  34(4)  of the Act considered the argument of the petitioner that the tribunal had not awarded damages to the tune of Rs.11,93,45,835/- as was evident from paragraph 474 of the award. The submission on behalf of the petitioner was that there was no grievance with regard to the other findings in the award. The respondent relied upon paragraphs 460 and 461 of the award to contend that the damages were awarded. This Court vide order dated 08.02.2019 exercised the power under Section 34(4)  of  the  Act  and  the  operative  portion  of  the  order  is  reproduced below:

“8.The  above  quoted  findings  of  the  Arbitral  Tribunal leave a doubt as to whether the Arbitral Tribunal has allowed the amount of Performance Bank Guarantee in favour of the  respondent over  and  above the liquidated damages allowed under Counter Claim No.5. This is more so because in the Award the Arbitral Tribunal has observed that no damages over and above as prescribed in Clause 6.6 of the Agreement can be allowed in favour of  the  respondent,  however,  at the same  time  in paragraph 460 the Arbitral Tribunal has held that amount of the Performance Bank Guarantee furnished by the claimant cannot be said to be wholly unreasonable  and  in  paragraph  461  it  has  held  that  the amount of the Performance Bank Guarantee furnished by the claimant is also treated as quantum of reasonable damages. In paragraph 457 the Tribunal has further held that the respondent is entitled to damages in addition to the liquidated damages.

9.

In view of the above, the present proceedings deserve to be adjourned, enabling the Arbitral Tribunal to consider  the  observations  made  hereinabove  and  act  in terms of Section 34(4) of the Act, if so advised.”

2.7 During the pendency of the proceedings pursuant to Section 34(4) of the Act, one of  the members of the tribunal  Justice (Retd.) S.B.  Sinha  expired  and  with  the  consent of  the  parties  Justice  (Retd.) Rameshwar Singh Malik was appointed as an arbitrator. The majority of the tribunal decided that damages to the extent of the PBG were awarded over and above the LD. The minority view was that the counter claim no. 7 claiming the amount of PBG was rejected and the direction for the refund of the PBG amount was inadvertently not given by the tribunal.

3.

Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that from a reading of the  award  dated  14.12.2017  it  is  evident  that  no  amount  in  excess  of LD was awarded. Albeit, the PBG was held to be validly invoked but there was no quantification of damages. It was contended that the tribunal rejected the counter claim nos. 1 to 3 for failure of the respondent to prove damages and yet illegally awarded damages under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for short’CA’).Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kailash Nath Associates v. DDA, (2015) 4 SCC 136 and Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 49.

3.1 It is emphasised that  the award is contradictory  as on the  one hand counter claim no. 7 claiming the amount towards PBG was rejected and on the other hand by the order passed pursuant to Section 34(4) the majority held that damages equivalent to the PBG were awarded. It is argued that while rejecting counter claim nos. 6 and 9, it was  stated  that  the  respondent  was  entitled  only  to  LD.  The  decision in Union of India & Anr. v. Sanghu Chakra Hotels (P) Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine Del 912 is relied upon to fortify the contention that a contradictary award  deserves  to  be  set  aside.  The  decision  in  Vishnu Aggarwal v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9300 is relied upon to submit that a vague award is liable to be set aside being violative of Section 31(3) of the Act.

4.

Per contra, the PBG was furnished as per clause 3.3 of the GCC and could be invoked upon failure of the petitioner to honour the contractual obligations. The LD under clause 6.3.2 pertains to delay in completion of work. Both the clauses operate in distinct fields. It is argued that the upholding of invocation of the PBG by the tribunal is not under challenge and there were no pleadings for refund of the PBG amount. The impugned award and the order passed under Section 34(4) is defended by stating that a reasoned decision was rendered holding respondent to be entitled to damages of Rs.11,93,45,835/- over and above the LD. Reliance is on the decision of  the  Supreme  Court  in  SAIL  v.  Gupta  Brother  Steel  Tubes  Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 63 and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in MBL Infrastructures Ltd.  v.  Ircon  International Ltd.,  2017 SCC OnLine Cal 21457 to buttress the argument that damages under heads not covered by the LD can be awarded.

5.

Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Even though written submissions have been filed, learned counsel for the parties while  arguing  the  matter  at  length  have  pressed  only  the  contentions noted above.

6.

The  bone  of  controversy  is  limited  to  awarding  of  damages  of Rs.11,93,45,835/-. The issue arises in two parts: first, as to whether damages were awarded in the original award despite not being reflected in the concluding paragraph and second, whether the damages if awarded are legally sustainable?

7.

In paragraph 454 of award, the tribunal considered that the petitioner had performed only 5.86% of the contract  and held that the respondent  was  entitled  to  encash  the  PBG.  Referring  to  the  decision of the Supreme Court in Kailash Nath Associates (supra) the tribunal in paragraph 461 held that in view of the miniscule fraction of the total work done by the petitioner, the economic viability of the project and  the  abandonment  of  the  contract  by the  petitioner,  the  amount  of PBG furnished is to be treated as the quantum of reasonable damages. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in MBL Infrastructures Ltd. (supra) was relied upon for upholding the invocation of the PBG and awarding damages. In paragraph 466 it was observed that 10% of the contract value cannot be said to be unreasonable as damages. Paragraphs 454, 460, 461,465 and 466 of the award are reproduced below:

“454.  The  materials  brought  on  record  by  the  parties  so far as breaches of contract on the part of the Claimant is concerned show that the Claimant has performed only 5.86% of the total Contract, in that view of the matter the Claimant was entitled to encash the Performance Bank Guarantee to the extent of Rs.11,93,45,835/-.

460.

Even if the Respondent has not been able to quantify the actual direct losses suffered by  it, in the opinion of the Tribunal the amount of Performance Bank Guarantee furnished by the Claimant cannot be said to be wholly unreasonable.

461.

The  Tribunal  is  therefore  of  the  opinion  that  taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, interest of justice will be served if the amount of Performance  Bank  Guarantee  furnished  by  the  Claimant is also treated to be the quantum of reasonable damages.

465.

In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncement the Tribunal is of the opinion that the counter Claimant cannot be said to have acted illegally in invoking the Performance Bank Guarantee.

466.

In the aforementioned fact situation the Tribunal is of  the  opinion  that  10%  of  the  contract  value  cannot  be said to be unreasonable and in that view of the matter the Counter Claimant is entitled thereto.”

8.

While the matter was being considered pursuant to Section 34(4) of the Act, one of the members of the tribunal expired and a new member was substituted. The proceedings were decided by majority and one of the original members dissented and recorded that  damages over  and  above the  LD  were  not  awarded but  the  majority  held  that the  damages  were  awarded.  Without entering  into  the  validity  of  the decision pursuant to Section 34(4) of the Act and in view of the settled position that an award has to be read as a whole, it is evident that 10% of  the  contract  value  was  awarded  as  damages albeit,  the  figure  was not mentioned in the concluding portion of the award. From the extracted paragraphs of the award, it is clear that the tribunal not only upheld the invocation of the PBG but also recorded a finding that the respondent was entitled to reasonable damages over and above the LD, quantified damages equivalent to the PBG amount.

9.

Before dealing with the second limb that as to whether the damages awarded over and above the LD are legally sustainable, it would be relevant to quote the following decisions:

9.1 The Supreme Court in Unibros vs. All India Radio, 2023 SCC OnLine SC  1366 while  dealing with a claim  for redressal of  loss of profit  made  under  Section  73 of  the  CA  arising  from prolongation  of the contract held:

“19.  The law,  as it  should  stand thus,  is that for claims related to loss of profit, profitability or opportunities to succeed, one would be required to establish the following conditions : first, there was a delay in the completion of the contract; second, such delay is not attributable to the claimant; third, the claimant's status as an established contractor, handling substantial projects; and fourth, credible evidence to substantiate the claim of loss of profitability. On perusal of the records,  we are satisfied that the fourth condition, namely, the evidence to substantiate the claim of loss of profitability remains unfulfilled in the present case.”

9.2 The Supreme Court in Kailash Nath Associates (supra) held:

“43.6.  The  expression  “whether  or  not  actual  damage  or loss  is  proved  to  have been  caused  thereby” means that where it is possible to prove actual damage or loss, such proof is not dispensed with. It is only in cases where damage or loss is difficult or impossible to prove that the liquidated amount named in the contract, if a genuine pre-estimate of damage or loss, can be awarded.”

9.3 The  Supreme  Court  in  State  of  Rajasthan  v.  Ferro  Concrete Construction (P) Ltd., (2009) 12 SCC 1 held:

“55.While  the  quantum  of  evidence  required  to  accept  a claim may be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide, if there was no evidence at all and if the arbitrator makes an award of the amount claimed in the claim statement, merely on the basis of the claim statement  without  anything  more,  it has to  be  held that  the  award  on  that  account  would  be  invalid.  Suffice it  to  say  that  the  entire  award  under  this  head  is  wholly illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of  the  arbitrator,  and wholly unsustainable.”

9.4 The Division Bench of this court in Tower Vision India (P) Ltd. v. Procall (P) Ltd.,2012 SCC OnLine Del 4396 held:

“16. Consequence for breach of the contract are provided in Chapter VI of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which contains three sections, namely, section 73 to section 75. As per section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, the party who suffers by the breach of contract is entitled to receive  from  the  defaulting  party,  compensation  for  any loss or damage caused to him by such breach, which naturally arose in usual course of things from such breach,  or which  the  two  parties  knew  when they  make the contract to be likely the result of the breach of contract. This provision makes it clear that such compensation is not to be given for any remote or indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. The underlying principle enshrined in this section is that a mere breach of contract by a defaulting party would not entitle the other side to claim damages unless the said party has in fact suffered damages because of such breach. Loss or damage which is actually suffered as a result of breach has to be proved and the plaintiff is to be compensated to the extent of actual loss or damage suffered. When there is a breach of contract, the party who  commits  the  breach  does  not  eo  instanti,  i.e.,  at  the instant incur any pecuniary obligation, nor does the party complaining of the breach becomes entitled to a debt due from the other party. The only right which the party aggrieved by the breach of the contract has is the right to sue for damages. No pecuniary liability thus arises till the court has determined that the party complaining of the breach is entitled to damages. The court in the first place must decide that the defendant is liable and then it should proceed to assess what the liability is. But, till that determination, there is no liability at all upon the defendant. The courts will give damages for breach of contract only by way of compensation for loss suffered and not by way of punishment. The rule applicable for determining the amount of damages for the breach of contract  to  perform a specified  work  is  that  the  damages are  to  be  assessed  at  the  pecuniary  amount  of  difference between  the  state  of  the  plaintiff  upon  the  breach  of  the contract and  what it would have been if the  contract had been  performed  and  not  the  sum  which  it  would  cost  to perform the contract, though in particular cases the result of either mode of calculation may be the same. The measure of compensation depends upon the circumstances of the case. The complained loss or claimed damage must be fairly attributed to the breach as a natural result or consequence of the same. The loss must be a real loss or actual damage and not merely a probable or a possible one. When it is not possible to calculate accurately or in a reasonable manner, the actual amount of loss incurred or when the plaintiff has not been able to prove the actual loss suffered, he will be, all the same, entitled to recover nominal damages for breach of contract. Where nominal damages only are to be awarded, the extent of the same should be estimated with reference to the facts and circumstances involved. The general  principle  to  be  borne  in  mind  is  that  the  injured party  may  be put  in  the  same position  as  that  he  would have been if he had not sustained the wrong.”

(emphasis supplied)

10.

Clause 3.3 of the GCC deals with the PBG. Under clause 3.3.1 the contractor within two weeks from  the date of issue of the NOA had to furnish an unconditional and irrecoverable bank guarantee equivalent to 10% of the contract price for due performance of the contract. As per clause 3.3.3 the respondent was entitled to invoke the PBG on failure of the petitioner to honour the contractual obligations. Clause 3.3.5 provides that in case of a delay in completion of the project beyond the scheduled date of completion, the respondent without prejudice to other rights and remedies  could operate the PBG for recovery of LD. Clause 6.3.2 deals with LD for non-completion of work within scheduled time and provides that the respondent may recover LD at the rate of 0.5% per week subject to maximum of 10% of the total contract price. The clause provides that upon partial completion and acceptance of part of the work the LD shall apply only to the balance work. A conjoint reading of clause 3.3 and clause 6.3.2 indicates that they operate in different fields. Clause 3.3 pertains to securing  due  performance  of  the  contract  and  enabling  invocation  of the  PBG  in  case  of  breach  whereas  clause  6.3.2  governs  the  levy  of LD for delay in completion of the work.

11.

There is no challenge to the LD awarded for delay in completion of the project. It is undisputed that only 5.86% of the project was completed by the petitioner and consequently the PBG was invoked. The challenge is to the quantification of damages inspite of the failure of the respondent to prove actual loss. Clause 3.3 provides for furnishing and invocation of the PBG but does not stipulate  the  quantification  of  damages.  In  counter  claim  nos.  1  to  3, the respondent claimed damages under various heads including payments to third-party vendor, production and revenue losses on account of non-performance, compensation towards establishment costs and for re-tendering of the project however, the claims were rejected  for  lack  of proof.  For  claiming  damages  under  Section 73  of the CA the claimant has to prove the loss suffered and in case it is not possible to prove the actual damages, a reasonable amount of damages is to be assessed. It was neither the case set up before the tribunal nor it was held that in the facts of present case the actual damages cannot be proved. Rather the respondent failed to prove the counter claims nos. 1 to 3 claiming damages under various heads. In absence of a proof of actual damages and without recording a finding that actual damages  could  not  be  proved  the  tribunal  proceeded  to  conclude  that 10% of the contract value shall be a reasonable damages to be awarded over and above the LD. The basis for quantification is missing and the awarding of damages is vitiated for violating  Section 31(3) of the Act whereby a reasoned award is to be passed.

12.

The Supreme Court in  Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited, (2019) 20 SCC 1:

“34. The mandate under Section 31(3) of the Arbitration Act is to have reasoning which is intelligible and adequate and, which can in appropriate cases be even implied by the courts from a fair reading of the award and documents referred to thereunder, if the need be.  The  aforesaid  provision  does  not require an elaborate judgment to be passed by the arbitrators having  regard  to  the  speedy  resolution  of  dispute.  35.  When we consider the requirement of a reasoned order, three characteristics of a reasoned order can be fathomed. They are: proper, intelligible and adequate. If the reasonings in the order are improper, they reveal a flaw in the decision-making process. If the challenge to an award is based on impropriety or perversity in the reasoning, then it can be challenged strictly on the grounds provided under Section 34 of the Arbitration  Act. If the  challenge to  an  award is based on  the ground that the same is unintelligible, the same would be equivalent  of  providing no  reasons  at  all.  Coming  to  the last aspect concerning the challenge on adequacy  ofreasons,  the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 has to adjudicate the validity of such an award based on the degree of particularity of reasoning required having regard to the nature of issues falling for consideration. The degree of particularity cannot be stated in a precise manner as the same would depend on the complexity of the issue. Even if the Court comes to a conclusion that there were gaps in the reasoning for the conclusions reached by the Tribunal, the Court needs to have regard to the documents submitted by the  parties  and  the  contentions  raised  before  the  Tribunal  so that awards with inadequate reasons are not set aside in casual and cavalier manner. On the other hand, ordinarily unintelligible awards are to be set aside, subject to party autonomy to do away with the reasoned award. Therefore, the courts are required to be careful while distinguishing between inadequacy of reasons in an award and unintelligible awards.”

(emphasis supplied)

13.

Another aspect is that for want of evidence three different heads in counter claim nos. 1 to 3 were rejected by the tribunal but damages were quantified without discussing the heads under which the damages were being awarded. This renders the award self- contradictory, on one hand the tribunal rejects the counter claims under  specific  heads  for  want  of  proof  and  on  the  other  hand  awards damages over and above the LD without identifying the heads of loss suffered.  Further  while  deciding  the  counter  claims  for  compensation and  damages  arising  from  wilful  abandonment  of  the  contract  it  was held that the respondent was only entitled to the LD and no other claims. The award of damages is contrary to public policy being against the law laid down by the Supreme Court and is in violation of Section 73 of the CA.

14.

The contention that there were no pleadings for refund of the PBG is rejected. Suffice it to say that the petitioner is not aggrieved by the invocation of the PBG but by the appropriation of the PBG amount.  From  a  perusal  of  the  pleadings,  it  is  evident  that  the  reliefs claimed included the amount of the PBG.

15.

There is no quarrel with the proposition that damages for breaches not covered by a clause of LD can be awarded over and above the cap provided for which SAIL (supra) is relied upon.

16.

The decision of the Calcutta High Court in MBL Infrastructures Ltd. (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, the court held that damages for lack of performance  of  the  contract  cannot  be denied  for  the  reason  that  the claim for additional expenses was disallowed and there was no nexus between the two claims.

17.

The Supreme Court in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., (2025) 7 SCC 1 held that  while an arbitral award cannot be modified under Section 34 of the Act, a severable part of the award may be set aside. The relevant paragraphs are quoted below:

“32. In the present controversy, the proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv) is particularly relevant. It states that if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters non- submitted may be set aside. The  proviso,  therefore,  permits courts to sever the non-arbitrable portions of an award from arbitrable ones. This serves a twofold purpose. First, it aligns with Section 16 of the 1996 Act, which affirms the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, that is, the arbitrators' competence to determine their own jurisdiction. Secondly, it enables the Court to sever and preserve the “valid” part(s) of the award while setting aside the “invalid” ones. [ The“validity” and “invalidity”, as used here, does not refer to legal validity or merits examination, but validity in terms of the proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the 1996 Act.] Indeed, before  us,  none  of  the  parties  have  argued  that  the  Court  is not empowered to undertake such a segregation.

33.

We hold that the  power conferred  under the proviso  to Section  34(2)(a)(iv)  is  clarificatory  in  nature.  The  authority to  sever  the  “invalid”  portion  of  an  arbitral  award  from  the “valid” portion, while remaining within the narrow confines of Section 34, is inherent in the Court's jurisdiction when setting aside an award.

34.

To this extent, the doctrine of omne majus continet in se minus—the greater power includes the lesser—applies squarely. The authority to set aside an arbitral award necessarily encompasses the power to set it aside in part, rather than in its entirety. This interpretation is practical and pragmatic. It would be incongruous to hold that power to set aside  would  only  mean  power  to  set  aside  the  award  in  its entirety and not in part. A contrary interpretation would not only  be inconsistent  with the statutory  framework but may also result in valid determinations being unnecessarily nullified.

(emphasis supplied)

18.

In the case in hand, the claims of the petitioner for rendering services, refund of ABG and the counter claim  of LD are separable and  not  inter-connected  and  shall  not  be  affected  by  the  setting  aside of  damages  of  Rs.  Rs.11,93,45,835/-  awarded  to  the  respondent  over and above the LD.

19.

The award to the extent of allowing the counter claim of the respondent awarding damages to the tune of PBG over and above the LD  is  set  aside.  The  petition  is  allowed.  All  pending  applications  are also disposed of.