Uma Shankar Rai vs The State of Bihar and Others

Aftab Alam, J.—The Petitioner seeks to challenge the order of his removal from service as contained in Annexure 7. This order issued by the Supdt. of Police, Muzaffarpur, the 1st respondent, states that the Petitioner�s appointment as Constable was subject to verification regarding his satisfactory antecedent On enquiry, however, it was found that the Petitioner was accused in Sahar P.S. Case No. 11(2) 80 for various offences including one under, Section 380 of the Indian (sic) Code and in Sahar P.S. Case No. 168/83 for a number of offences including those under Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian (sic) Code. He was accordingly removed from se vice. The other impugned orders are (sic) passed by the Superior officers on appeal (sic) representations filed by the Petitioner again the order of his removal from service. The culminated in the order dated 29.7.(sic) (contained in Annexure 4) passed by the Director General of Police, Respondent No. 5 (sic) finally confirmed the Petitioner�s remove from service.

The facts are few and without contrivers. By communication dated 5.5.1985 copy whereof is contained in Annexure 5, (sic) Petitioner was informed that he had be selected for appointment on the (sic) post of Constable and advising him to (sic) sent himself for a medical check up at the New Police Line, Muzaffarpur. It was (sic) stated in this communication that on (sic) medically found fit, he will be appointed purely temporary basis and in. case of a adverse report relating to his antecedents (sic) appointment letter dated 23.5.1985, a (sic) whereof is contained in Annexure-6 where the Petitioner was appointed as Constable (sic) purely temporary basis (sic). The appointment letter also reiterated that the appointment was subject to the condition that the (sic) would be cancelled without assigning a reason in case any adverse report was (sic) ved on verification of his antecedents.

By notice dated 20.1.1986, the Petitioner was informed that on enquiry, it (sic) to light that in Sahar P.S. Case Nos. 11(2) 80 and 168/83 the police had submitted charge sheets naming the Petitioner as one of the accused. His appointment being subject to the condition of having satisfactory antecedents, the Petitioner was required to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service. It is stated that the Petitioner filed a show cause but a copy of it has not been enclosed with the writ petition. This was followed by the order of removal from service a copy whereof is contained in Annexure-7. As indicated above, the removal order states that the Petitioner�s appointment was subject to a satisfactory verification of his antecedents. An enquiry, however, revealed that he was chargesheeted in Sahar P.S. Case Nos. 11(2)80 and 168/83, He was-accordingly being removed from service. On appeal and representations this order was confirmed by the hierarchy of the superior officers, namely, Dy. Inspector General of Police, Respondent No. 3 vide order dated 14.11.1987 (Annexure-2); Regional Inspector1 General of Police, Respondent No. 4 vide order dated 26.8.1988 (Annexure-3); and finally by the, Director General of Police, Respondent No. 5 vide his order dated 29.7.1989 (Annexure-4.)

It is to be noted that by the time, the '''' Petitioner�s appeal came for consideration before Respondent No. 5 he had been acquitted in the two criminal cases. In Sahar P.S. Case No. 168/83 in which he was charged u/s 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, he was acquitted by the trial court and in Sahar P.S. Case No. 11(2)/80 in which he was charged in several sections including Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code, he was convicted by the trial court but acquitted by the appellate court.

Considering this aspect of the matter Respondent no, 5 observed that both the criminal cases had their genesis in family feuds and in both the cases the Petitioner has been acquitted. He further stated that although the prosecution failed to bring home the charge against the Petitioner but from the judgment in the murder case it is apparent that at the time of the murder, the petition was also present at the place of occurred and this to his mind makes the Petitioner antecedents suspect and not worthy of being a member of the police force. He accordingly found no reason to interfere with the order of his, removal from service.

I may note at this stage that the judgments of acquittal in the two cases were not, enclosed with the writ petition. In course of hearing of the case, however, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted the copies of tat two judgments for the perusal of the court. I have looked into the two judgments'' and direct that these be kept on the records of this case. From the (Appellate) judgment dated 31.7.1987 passed, in Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 1985 (arising put of Sahar P.S. Case No. 11(2)/80) it appears that all the prosecution witnesses had the common title ''Rai''. Coupled with this the non-examination of the I.O. and the doctor led the appellate courts to the opinion that the conviction of the accused persons was not justified and they deserved acquittal. From the judgment and order dated 12.4.1989 passed in Sessions Trial No. 165/1984 (arising out of Sahar P.S. Case No. 168/19(53) it appears that in this case 20 accused persons including the present Petitioner were (sic) up on trial. The factum of murder and causing injuries to some other persons was established but conviction was brought home only against four accused and the rest including She Petitioner were acquitted. As regards the Petitioner, although the prosecution in that Case established his armed presence along pith others at the place of occurrence, it piled to connect them with any unlawful fact committed by them not could it prove that they were members of any unlawful assembly and hence the acquittal of the (Petitioner along with some others.

Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh, Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioner did not question the right of the Respondent authorities to remove the Petitioner from service in case his antecedents could be validly paid to be unsatisfactory, that being a condition of the appointment. He, however, assai led as arbitrary and unsustainable the action of the Respondents in dubbing the Petitioner�s antecedents as unsatisfactory merely on the basis of his having been named as accused in two criminal cases several years earlier than his selection and appointment. Mr. Singh submitted that the words ''past character'' should be the English equivalent of the expression Purv Charitra'' used in the selection and appointment letters as contained in Annexures 5 and 6. Then, on the basis of the dictionary meanings of the word ''character'' he sought 16 argue that the word implied some kind of continuance behaviour, incorrigibility or a trait. Following this line of argument he further submitted that having been named as accused in two cases would mean nothing in judging the past character of the Petitioner and this fact alone was wholly insufficient to reflect his character. He further argued that |be authorities acted quite unreasonably and arbitrarily in holding his past antecedents to be unsatisfactory merely on the basis of two criminal cases in which he was made an accused. In support of this contention, Mr. Singh has relied upon a decision in the case of D. Rama Subba Reddy Vs. P.V.S. Rama Das and Another, and the definition of the word ''character'' as given in Law Lexicon, Volumn I. The aforesaid decision of a learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court describes ''character'' as follows:

Character" is an expression of very wide import which takes in all the traits, special and particular qualities impressed by nature or habit which serve as an index to the essential intrinsic nature of a person. "Character" also includes reputation but "character" and "reputation" are not synonymous.

This is in the context of Exception 9 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code in a prosecution for defamation. I do not see how the afore-quoted observation helps Mr. Singh.

Mr. Singh went on to take the extreme position that even his conviction in the aforesaid two criminal cases would not have been of much consequence inasmuch as even though convicted of the offences, the two isolated incidents five years and two years prior to his appointment would not have been an index of his character and on the basis of those convictions alone his character could not have been assessed.

I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh which tends, to confine the meaning and content of the word "character" into a '' strait jacket incomplete disregard of the different contexts in which the word may be used. An employer while employing a person would be perfectly justified in being thoroughly satisfied about his character and moral strength and for assessing the same, he would be entitled to look into and investigate the events in the past life of the prospective employee. It is only the events in the past life of a person that can form the material for the employer to form an opinion about his character and moral strength. For a Sociologist or a Psychologist one or two events in the past life of a person may or may not be of much significance in assessing that person''s character but to an employer even a single event in the past life of a prospective employee may render him unsuitable for the job. An employer''s point of view is totally different from a Sociologist or Psychologist. It is also elementary and does not require much elaboration that the degree of moral strength required of a prospective candidate for any employment cannot "be judged in a rigid and unflexible manner and its extent would vary according to the nature of employment. The cleanliness and the degree of uprightness required would not be the same for the post of Orderly, Cashier of a bank or the Personal Secretary of the Chief Justice of a High Court who by the nature of employment may be required to handle highly confidential, sensitive and delicate matters. It is also, true that it is for the employer who is the best judge of the nature of the employment Should be left free to determine the extent of moral strength required from a candidate for the job and unless such a determination travels into a realm of arbitrariness the High Court would refrain from interfering and would surely not substitute its own views for that of the employer concerned if the views of the latter are within reasonable limits.

In the instant case, I do not find hat the Respondent No. 5 acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in taking into consideration the Petitioner�s implication in two criminal cases and arriving at his decision that he was iio| fit for a job in the police.

This matter can be looked from another angle also. Had this matter come to light at the time of selection and the issuance of the appointment letter and had the authorities on that basis refused to offer this appointment to the Petitioner, I think they could not have been called unjustified. This being the position, for the same reasons, I think the impugned orders do not warrant any interference by this Court.

I, thus, find ho merit in this application and the same is accordingly dismissed; There shall be, however, no order as to costs in the facts and the circumstances of this case.