Umed Singh vs DHBVNL

M. Jeyapaul, J.

CM No. 11120-C of 2013:

For the reasons set out in the application, the application is allowed.

RSA No. 4115 of 2013:

The unsuccessful plaintiff before both the Courts below has preferred the present appeal.

A suit was filed by the plaintiff for declaration to the effect that his date of birth was 7.2.1955 and consequently, he be reinstated in service along with consequential benefits of arrears of pay.

Plaintiff has contended that he was appointed on 1.10.1968 in H.S.E.B. as work-charged T-Mate. He was retired from service by Nigam on 29.2.2008 on attaining superannuation. His date of birth was 7.2.1955 but based upon wrong entry in service book/records that he was born on 7.2.1950, he was retired from service.

Defendants contended in their written statement that as per service records, plaintiff was born on 7.2.1950. Never had the plaintiff raised any objection to his date of birth. Defendants sought for dismissal of the suit.

Both the Courts below found that Exhibits PW-2/1 and PW-2/2, school leaving certificate and other certificate issued by the Head Teacher of Govt. Primary School, Shikahpur, cannot be entertained to change his date of birth. The Courts below also held that the plaintiff would not have joined service at the age of 13, having been born on 7.2.1955, as per his case. Ultimately, both the courts below rejected the relief sought for by the plaintiff.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff would vehemently submit, relying upon a decision of this Court in Bhagat Singh v. Union of India and another 1992 (1) RSJ 384, that the Courts will have to change the date of birth relying upon the school certificate. It is his further submission that the plaintiff came to know of his date of birth only after his retirement. Therefore, it is submitted that the second appeal has to be admitted to decide the substantial question of law as to whether the Courts below erred in discarding the school certificates produced to establish the correct date of birth produced by the appellant-plaintiff.

I find that there is no merit in the appeal. The service record is prepared only based upon the information furnished by an employee. For all practical purposes, it is presumed that the entries found in the service record are absolutely correct. The employer cannot enter the date of birth of an employee on his own surmise. Therefore, it is only the plaintiff who had furnished the information as to his date of birth at the time of entering into service.

It is a settled position of law that the plea of an employee to change his date of birth at the fag-end of his service cannot at all be entertained as there is an agenda for the employee to get his employment extended for a further period. As per service records, appellant joined service on 1.10.1968. If his date of birth is taken as 7.2.1955, he would have just completed 13 years at the time he entered into service. No service would have been offered to the appellant at the age of 13. Even otherwise, if a person who had availed benefit projecting himself as major at the time of entering into service, cannot be permitted to canvass at the fag-end of his career or after his retirement that his date of birth was different and thereby, his service requires extension.

Appellant had an ample opportunity to challenge the date of birth entered in his service records during his tenure but very conveniently, he had approached the Court after his retirement contending that he should have been permitted to continue in service as per his real date of birth.

Of course, in Bhagat Singh''s case (supra), it has been held that the school certificates could be given primary importance for determining the date of birth of an employee but in the instant case, the appellant was in long slumber. He had not awaken before his retirement; rather he had come out with the suit well after his retirement. The school certificates produced cannot at all be considered at this distance of time, more especially when those school certificates relate to 5th class.

For all these reasons, I find that there is no merit in the appeal. Therefore, the appeal stands dismissed.