Umesh Sidar vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J

This appeal arise out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.08.2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Court Under (POCSO Act), Sarangarh, in Special Criminal (POCSO) Case No.20/2019, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376 (2)(n) and 376(3) of IPC and Section 4(2), 5(l)/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short, the POCSO Act) and sentenced him to undergo RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, RI for 5 years and fine of Rs.1000/-with default stipulations. Since RI for 20 years and fine of Rs.5000/- has been awarded for the offence under Sections 4(2) and 5(l)/6 of the POCSO Act, no separate sentence has been awarded for the offence under Sections 376(2)(n) and 376(3) of IPC.

Brief facts of the case is that, on 17.08.2019 the prosecutrix, PW-5, lodged a written complaint to the police of Police Station Baramklela to the effect that she is resident of Pitambar colony Chandrapur-Baramkela Road, District Raigarh. She tied Rakhi to the appellant on 15.08.2019 on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan. On 16.08.2019 at about 7 p.m. the appellant came to her house where the prosecutrix, her younger sister and brother were present in the house. The appellant said that he could not provide any gift on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan therefore and asked her to accompany with him so that he could give her a suit (wearing cloths). When she refused to go stating that her parents are not there in the house, then the appellant forcefully taken her by his Scooty to Baramkela market, but had not proceeded to Baramkela market and went towards Chandrapur side. Upon request made by the prosecutrix to leave her to her house, the appellant taken her towards Sariya road. When she tried to jump from the Scooty, the vehicle got unbalanced and both of them were fell down near Katangpali village and she received injuries on her right cheek. Thereafter, the appellant has again taken her by his Scooty towards pump house which is situated at an isolation place and committed forceful sexual intercourse with her. He detained her throughout night and committed forceful sexual intercourse thrice. In the next morning i.e. on 17.08.2019 at about 6 a.m. the appellant boarded her to Bus to go to Baramkela and then she returned back to her house; informed the incident to her parents and came to the police station along with her mother.

The police registered an FIR, Ex.P-2 on 17.08.2019 under Sections 363, 366, 506(B) and 376 I.P.C. and under Sections 4 & 6 of the POCSO Act and started investigation. Dastyabi Panchnama, Ex. P/3, was prepared on 17.08.2019 in front of the witnesses. The prosecutrix was sent for medical examination to Community Health Centre, Baramkela where Dr. Neelkumari Patel, PW-4 examined her and gave her report vide Ex. P/9 stating that no sign of forceful sexual intercourse has been found as she is habitual in nature. Two slides of vaginal swab were prepared by the Doctor and after sealing it handed over the same to the police for forensic examination. Spot map Ex.P-12 & P/19 were prepared by the investigating officer. Black coloured Scooty bearing registration No.CG-13-N-6615 was also seized from the possession of the appellant on 20.08.2019 vide Ex.P/20. The appellant was arrested on 20.08.2019. He was also sent for medical examination to Community Health Centre, Baramkela where Dr. Sanjay Patel, PW-3, examined him and gave his report vide Ex. P/24 opining the appellant to be capable for having sexual intercourse.

During the course of investigation, the police seized school admission and discharge register from Govt. Primary School Paker Tikra vide Ex. P/28. True copy of the school admission and discharge register is Article-1C in which the date of birth of the prosecutrix is recorded as 22.07.2005. The certificate prepared on the basis of school admission and discharge register, Article-1C, regarding date of birth of the prosecutrix was also seized by the police and the said certificate is Ex. P/27.

The statement of prosecutrix was recorded under sections 161 and 164 of CrPC. The statement under section 161 CrPC of the mother, father and other witnesses were also recorded.

After completion of investigation, charge sheet under Sections 363, 366A, 376 I.P.C. and Section 4 & 6 of the POCSO Act was filed before the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act), Sarangarh, District Raigarh. On 04.12.2019, the trial Court has framed charges under Sections 363, 366, 506-Part-II, 376 IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. The accused abjured his guilt and plead innocence.

In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the prosecution examined 17 witnesses. The statement of appellant was also recorded under section 313 of CrPC in which he denied the material appearing against him and stated that he is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in the case.

After appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. Hence this appeal.

Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubts. There is no legally admissible evidence with regard to the age of the prosecutrix that on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age. In absence of examination of the author of the school admission and discharge register, the same can not be taken into consideration for determination of the age of the prosecutrix. School admission and discharge register is of some other person because the name of the father and mother of the prosecutrix is different than the actual name of the father and mother of the prosecutrix in the present case. No any kotwari register or ossification report are produced by the prosecution to determine the actual age of the prosecutrix that on the date of incident she was below 18 years of age. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecutrix, her mother and father have not stated any date of birth of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix was examined before the court on 10.10.2022 in which she admits that two years back she got married, therefore she was fully matured on the date of incident which is supported by her father’s statement recorded on 02.11.2022, in which he too admits that the prosecutrix is aged about 22-23 years.

Learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that the prosecutrix herself went along with the appellant and no alarm has been raised while traveling from place to place. In her 164 statement she has not disclosed that the appellant has forcefully committed sexual intercourse with her. When she was returning by Bus to Baramkela, she has not made complaint to any of the passengers or any persons. Therefore, the alleged offence of IPC and POCSO Act are not made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal.

On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State opposes and contended that the prosecutrix was minor and below 18 years of age at the time of incident which is proved by the school admission and discharge register, Article 1-C, which contains the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 22.07.2005. The School register is the admissible piece of evidence to determine the age of the prosecutrix. Therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court. The prosecutrix was abducted by the appellant and kept away from the lawful guardianship. The appellant kept her in illegal confinement for whole night and forcefully committed sexual intercourse with her. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence needs no interference.

We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records with utmost circumspection.

In order to consider the age of the prosecutrix, we have examined the evidence available on record produced by the prosecution. The prosecution relied upon the school admission and discharge register, Article 1-C, which is sought to be proved by PW-9, Aashesh Bahadur Singh, who is Assistant Teacher at Govt. Primary School Patthalgaon. He has stated that while he was posted in Govt. Primary School Baramkela, the police has seized school admission and discharge register of the prosecutrix from him. He further states that he has issued birth certificate of the prosecutrix on the basis of entries made in the school admission and discharge register. In cross examination, this witness has stated that the prosecutrix was not admitted by him in the school and he has not written the school admission and discharge register, Article 1-C. He admits that in the school admission and discharge register the name of the father and mother of the prosecutrix is different than the actual name of the mother and father of the prosecutrix of the present case. He further admits that the certificate, Ex. P/27, which is in respect of the date of birth of the prosecutrix, is in the handwriting of police and he has not prepared the same. He admits that in Ex. P/27 the name of the father and mother is different than the actual parents of prosecutrix. He also admits that there is no endorsement of any birth certificate of the prosecutrix in her school admission and discharge register, Article-1, and no birth certificate is enclosed there too.

The prosecution has failed to discharge their burden to explain as to why in the school admission and discharge register, the names of the mother and father of the prosecutrix is different and what benefit they want to get from the said school register, Ex. P/27, by producing the same in support of date of birth of the prosecutrix.

When leading questions were asked to the prosecutrix, PW-5, she has stated that her date of birth is 22.07.2005. In cross examination, she has stated that her birth was taken place at her maternal uncle’s village, but the same was not registered in the Kotwari register and there is no birth certificate obtained from any of the concerned department. She states that at the time of admission in the school, her father has disclosed her date of birth based on conjecture. She admits that she doesn’t know the fact whether her date of birth is true or false.

PW-6, mother of the prosecutrix, have stated in her statement that on the date of incident her daughter was minor and was aged about 12 years. When leading questions were asked from her, she stated that she doesn’t know the actual date of birth of her daughter i.e. the prosecutrix. Similarly, in cross examination she has stated that she could not tell about the date of birth of her daughter and there is no registration of her date of birth in the kotwari register. Further, no birth certificate got prepared from the concerned department. She admits that her date of birth was recorded in the school register based on conjecture.

PW-7, the father of the prosecutrix, have stated that he doesn’t know what was the age of the prosecutrix on the date of incident. In cross examination also he admits that he could not tell the actual date of birth of his daughter. She was borne in her maternal uncle’s village, but there is no registration in the kotwari register and there is no birth certificate of her daughter issued from the competent authority. He further states that her mother went to the school along with his daughter for the purpose of getting admission in the school and he has not gone there. In para 11 of his statement he admits that his daughter is presently aged about 22-23 years. The statement of father was recorded on 02.11.2022 and thus the age of the prosecutrix appears to be about 19 years on the date of incident.

After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case it emerges that the name of the father and mother of the prosecutrix recorded in school admission and discharge register is different than the actual name of the parents of the prosecutrix of the instant case. The prosecution has failed to explain as to how this document can be relied upon to determine the date of birth or age of the prosecutrix when the same relates to some other person. Furthermore, PW-9, Aashesh Bahadur Singh, Assistant Teacher, is not the author of the said school admission and discharge register. He has clearly admitted that there is difference in the name of mother and father of the present prosecutrix in the certificate issued from the School.

If we consider the statement of the prosecutrix herself, we find that she herself admits that she doesn’t know whether her date of birth is right or wrong. She states that it is her father who has given information about her date of birth at the time of admission in the school, however, her father has stated that it is the mother of the prosecutrix who have gone to the school for getting admission of her daughter and not he. Thus, the statement of prosecutrix, her mother and father and also the statement of PW-9, Aasesh Bahadur Singh, Assistant Teacher of School, are contradictory to each other and does not inspire confidence upon this court to hold that date of birth of the prosecutrix was 22.07.2005 and she was under 18 years of age on the date of incident. There is no other evidence like kotwari register, birth certificate or ossification report.

In case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2)SCC-385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under :

“40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-

"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined….Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."

The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:-

"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"."

In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.

We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-

"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."

In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under :

“33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

XXXX XXXX XXX

33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.

33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.”

Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :

“14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

“20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.”

Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:

“Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.

In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.”

Reverting to the facts of the present case, on due consideration of the prosecution evidence, we find that no any clinching and legally admissible evidence has been brought by the prosecution to prove the fact that the victim was minor on the date of incident, despite that, the trial Court in the impugned judgment has held her minor. Hence, we set aside the findings given by the trial Court that on the date of incident the victim was minor, as the same has not been proved by the prosecution.

So far as the issue of forceful sexual intercourse by the appellant with the prosecutrix is concerned, we have carefully perused the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 CrPC, Ex.P/17. In her 164 statement she has stated that while they were going on Scooty, they fell down from the Scooty twice and thereafter the appellant had taken her to an isolation place where he made physical relationship with her. In the next morning she came up to road by walking alongwith the appellant and thereafter came to Baramkela by Bus and informed the incident to her mother. In 164 statement she has not stated that the appellant has used any force or she was allured or threatened while committing sexual intercourse or sexual intercourse against her will or consent.

The prosecutrix has admitted in her deposition that she has not raised any alarm while she was traveling along with appellant in his Scooty. She has also not refused the appellant to go with him. That, while roaming towards Baramkela neither she has made any complaint to any person nor raised any alarm. Even at Chandrapur and Sariya also she has not informed the incident to anyone. She received injuries over her face due to fall from the Scooty. She further admits that she doesn’t know who has written the report, Ex. P/1. PW-6, the mother of the prosecutrix, have stated that the report was written by the police as per her version.

Dr. Neelkumari Patel, PW-4, who has examined the prosecutrix has not found any injury on her private part either external or internal and further no sign of forceful sexual intercourse was found.

Close scrutiny of the evidence makes it clear that the prosecutrix was a consenting party and went along with the appellant towards Baramkela on his Scooty and stayed whole night with him in the Pump House. She has not made any complaint to any person of nearby place or to any of the passengers while returning to Baramkela by Bus. Neither she was taken by force nor she was abducted by the appellant. She herself accompanied the appellant on her own will and consent. Further, it is also not a case that the appellant has committed forceful sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix without her will or consent.

Considering the entire evidence available on record, the evidence with regard to age and the conduct of the prosecutrix, we are of the opinion that the prosecutrix was more than 18 years of age at the time of incident. Further, she was a consenting party with the appellant. Therefore, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376 (2)(n) and 376(3) of IPC and Sections 4(2), 5(l)/6 of the POCSO Act would not be made out against the appellant.

For the forgoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.08.2023 is set aside. The appellant stands acquitted from all the charges. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 20.08.2019. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. If fine amount is deposited, the same shall be refunded back to the appellant.

Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC, the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The lower court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.