Umesh Singh vs The State of Bihar and Another

S.N. Jha, J.—The dispute in this criminal revision relates to the age of opposite party No. 2, Mukesh Kumar Singh, who figures as an accused in Sahar P.S. Case No. 82/97 u/s 302/34 I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act with respect to an occurrence which took place on 29.5.97.

From the records of the case and the submissions made at the Bar, it appears that the Chief Judicial Magistrate examined witnesses to find out whether Opposite Party No. 2 is a juvenile within the meaning of Juvenile Justice Act, 1936 and came to conclusion that he was not so. It may be mentioned here that in the inquiry the witnesses examined were the mother of the Opposite Party No. 2, a priest and Headmaster of the School. They stated that the date of birth of Opp. Party No. 2 was 2.2.83. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, however, preferred the opinion of the Medical Board which had assessed the age of said opposite party as 17 years on 18.10.97. The Sessions Judge, on appeal by the opposite party, took a different view. He held that the Medical Board can merely make an estimate of the age of a person. He relied on certain judgments of the Supreme Court as also of this Court in this regard.

Mr. Ajit Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that whenever dispute arises regarding age of an accused under Juvenile Justice Act, an inquiry is to be held by the Court. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in 1997(2) PLJR 161(SC). The decision is of no avail to the Petitioner for simple reason as noted above, an inquiry was, in fact, held by the C.J.M. in which witnesses were examined. Mr. Singh then contended that in the inquiry the Petitioner was not given any opportunity to participate. In this regard he placed reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court, 1285. I am afraid, the decision is of little avail to the Petitioner. The decision cannot be read as an authority on the point that in the matter of determination of age under the Juvenlie Justice Act, the informant is a necessary party to participate in the inquiry.

From the narration of the facts, as briefly made above, if appears that even as per the opinion of the Medical Board the opposite party would be about 16-1/2 years old on the date of occurrence. In other words, even as per the Medical Board''s opinion, the difference was of only six months or so. I am inclined to agree with the Sessions Judge that the Medical Board can not assess the age of person with a mathematical precision. Besides, counsel for the Petitioner was not able to point out as to on what basis the Medical Board had assessed the age of opposite party, that is to say, whether before coming to the conclusion that the opposite party was 17 years old any test was carried out or not.

All said and done the dispute regarding the age of opposite party in the present case lies in narrow compass and in revision it is not possible to reverse the finding of fact. Consequently, I dismiss this revision.