Umrao vs Emperor

Lord Dunedin

This is a petition for special leave to appeal against a sentence of death pronounced on the petitioner by the Sessions Judge of Shahpur and con firmed by the High Court at Lahore.

The petitioner, with others, organized a robbery in the house of a money-lender. They broke into the house at night and took ornaments, money and other things from the wife who was in the house (the money-lender himself being absent). Other persons arriving on the scene, two of the gang stationed on the roof fired shots and killed two persons. The conviction pro nounced against the petitioner and four others was for the murder of these persons.

One Misri, one of the party, made a statement to the police, in which he de tailed the incidents of the robbery and in criminated the various accused, including the petitioner. The admission of this state ment was objected to by the vakil for the petitioner, but it was admitted by the Sessions Judge, and this admission was confirmed by the High Court. The ground for the present application is that the ad mission of the statement was clearly wrong and that the improper admission of this evidence amounted to a grave injustice and a violation of the principles of natural justice, and especial reference was made to the case of Vaithinatha Pillai v. The King-Emperor (1913) 36 Mad 501 : 40 IA 193 : 17 CWN 110 : 14 MLT : 26325 MLJ 518 : 11 ALJ 881 : 18 CLJ 365 : (19l3) MWN 806 : 14 CLJ 577 : 21 IC 369 : 15 Bom LR 910 (PC).

Their Lordships find that in the judg ment of the High Court one of the learn ed Judges, while dealing with the point as to the admission of the evidence, express ed himself thus :

I do not suggest that in the present case, the statement of Misri is essential to the conviction as I am satisfied that the rest of the evidence on the record establishes the guilt beyond any rea sonable doubt.

And the other learned Judge agreed with these remarks. In view of this it seems to their Lordships out of the question that leave to appeal should be granted, as to do so would be to turn this Board into a Court of criminal appeal, a position which it has been again and again explained the Board will not assume. But, in view of the judgments given and the argument raised thereon, their Lordships feel constrained to add something more. The question of the admissibility of the evidence turned entirely on the interpretation of certain sections of the Code of Criminal Proce dure and the Evidence Act. According to the view taken of these sections the evi dence was or was not admissible. Now, although if there has been any departure from the ordinary rules of procedure such as to amount to a denial of ordinary jus tice, of which an illustration is given in Pillai''s case (1913) 36 Mad 501 : 40 IA 193 : 17 CWN 110 : 14 MLT : 26325 MLJ 518 : 11 ALJ 881 : 18 CLJ 365 : (19l3) MWN 806 : 14 CLJ 577 : 21 IC 369 : 15 Bom LR 910 (PC) their Lordships will in terfere yet where the matter depends upon the particular view taken of sections of an Indian Act their Lordships could not say that to assert that upon those sections the Judge had come to a wrong conclusion is tantamount to saying that there has been substantial and grave injustice done. Even, therefore, if there had not been the expression of opinion above quoted that the other evidence was sufficient, their Lordships would not have held that the so-called miscarriage of justice in respect of a wrong interpretation of the sections as to the proper interpretation, their Lordships have not formed and express no opinion - is such as to bring the case within the rules laid down in In re Dillet 12 App Cas 459 : 56 LT 615 : 36 WR 81 : 16 Cox CC 241 and insisted upon in subsequent cases.

Their Lordships are, therefore, unable to advise the Sovereign to grant special leave to appeal.