Umsalma Bibi vs R. Lakkia Gowder

Anantanarayanan, C.J.—These related revision proceedings involve a question of considerable interest, in the context of a proceeding by the

landlord under S. 14(1)(b) of Madras Act 18 of 1960 for recovery of possession of the building bona fide for demolition and reconstruction. The

facts themselves are not now in controversy, though they were in dispute in the Courts below. We may now take it as established that the landlord

(here respondent) required this structure or entire building, consisting of several door numbers or distinct tenements, for demolition and re-

construction, so that he could therein house his own commercial undertaking, which is a radio business. The Courts have found that the landlord

was serious about his intention in this regard, that there is an approved plan (Ex. A. 1), and that this is a bona fide proposal by the landlord, who is

now conducting the radio business in rented premises, to shift here after reconstruction of his own building. The Courts have specifically found that

this building, which relates to the application under S. 14(1)(b), is situate in an important business locality, and that, judged from the point of view

of finance, preliminary steps, approval of concerned authorities etc. the requirement of the landlord is bona fide.

A ground of maintainability was urged in this form. Though there are separate door numbers or tenements, as I have already indicated, the

landlord filed a single application in respect of the entire structure, under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. It was urged that this was unauthorised and illegal

and that there should have been distinct applications for each distinct door number or tenement, which is the subject-matter of a separate tenancy.

It has further been urged before me that distinct defenses might be put forward by the concerned tenants, and that, conceivably, one such tenancy

may be saved by the operation of S. 14, sub-S. (5), and not otherwise. Further, it is conceivable that other unrelated grounds, such as ground of

''wilful default'' in payment of rent, might be included within the scope of one such tenement, but not another. Per-contra, the learned revisional

authority pointed out the anomaly and absurdity that might ensue ""if eviction was ordered only in respect of one or two door numbers"" which may

happen, if independent petitions had been filed against each tenant on behalf of the landlord.

The point here is that the word ""building"" has two distinct connotations. One is the connotation in the ordinary usage of the English language, to

which I shall presently refer. The other is a connotation derived from S. 2(2) of Madras Act 18 of 1960, which is a definition. By virtue of this

definition, ""building"" will mean or include a part of a building ""let or to be let separately"". In other words, the statute embodies a technical definition,

which makes ''building,'' equivalent to tenement, as ordinarily understood in law.

But this is not the connotation in the usage of English, apart from a technical context. In Stevens v. Courley 1859 7 C. B. N. S. 99 at 112, the

learned Judge said:�

I may venture to suggest, that, by a ''building'' is usually understood a structure of considerable size, and intended to be permanent, or at least to

endure for a considerable time.

In other words, it is the unity of the structure and its permanence, which are normal factors in the connotation, according to English usage. Also see

the commentary in Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. Volume I page 347 under the caption ""Building"". In Moir v. Williams (1892) 1 Q.B. 264

Esher M.R. said that this is always a question of degree and circumstances, but that the ""ordinary and usual meaning is, a block of brick or stone

work, covered in by a roof"". In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the word has been defined as ""a structure, or edifice"".

As observed earlier, the connotation derived from the usage of the language appears to involve the factors of a permanent structure and the unity

of that structure. In that sense, there can be no doubt that this was a single building, though there are separate door numbers and distinct tenements

for distinct tenancies. But, since the Legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit to substitute a technical definition for purposes of the Act, for the

connotation derived from ordinary usage, I am clear that the landlord must file separate applications for each building or tenement as defined in the

Act for purposes of S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. When they relate to the composite structure or edifice, though with distinct tenements, it will be proper

to treat such applications together, and to dispose of them by means of a common judgment.

But the point is not this. The point is whether, in the present case, assuming that separate applications ought to have been filed, the fact that the

landlord filed a comprehensive or composite application, has worked any prejudice to the tenants (revision petitioners) I am unable to see any

prejudice whatever. As laid down by the Supreme Court in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. Municipal Board, Rampur, even the question whether

a word like ""shall"" used in a statute is mandatory or merely directory, has to be determined after taking into account the factor of inconvenience or

prejudice. I therefore hold that there is no justification for interference in revision in these cases, though I must equally make it explicit that, in my

view, where a landlord makes an application under S. 14(b) in respect of a ''building'' as defined in the Act, he must make a separate application in

each such instance, though all these ''buildings'' may be within one structure. The proceedings are dismissed. However, in view of the great

hardship that revision petitioners are bound to sustain, in the matter of finding alternative accommodation for non-residential business purposes, in a

congested urban area, I direct that they shall have time for nine months from this date for vacating the premises. The order will be enforced only if

they do not shift elsewhere by that period. No costs.