High CourtsSingle Bench

Union of India and Others vs M/s. Kamal Enterprises

Rajasthan High Court · Decided on 21 August 2013 · Citation: (2013) 08 RAJ CK 0056

HON’BLE JUDGES
Bela M. Trivedi, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34 · Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
SB Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2145/07
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Judgment

2 paragraphs · 319 words

Bela M. Trivedi, J.—The present appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 5.4.07 passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Kota, Rajasthan (hereinafter referred to as ''the court below'') in Civil Misc. Case No. 83/05, whereby the court below has dismissed the application of the appellants-applicants filed u/s 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act alongwith the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. It appears that the award dated 29.10.04 passed by the Arbitrator was sought to be challenged by the appellants before the court below u/s 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ''the said Act'') alongwith the application after the prescribed period of limitation u/s 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. The said application was dismissed by the court below vide the impugned order, holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to Section 34 of the said Act.

2.

The learned counsel Mr. Neeraj Batra for the appellants has failed to point out as to how the provisions of Limitation Act would be application to Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent, the case is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in case of Union of India Vs. M/s Popular Construction Co., in which it has been held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to an application challenging an award u/s 34 of the said Act and as such there is no scope of assessing sufficiency of the cause for the delay beyond the period prescribed in the proviso to Section 34 of the said Act. In view of the above, the court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the court below. The appeal being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.