Union of India and Others vs Smt. Ramanti Devi

Dipak Misra, J.

The central and essentially fundamental issue that emanates for adjudication in this intra-court appeal preferred u/s 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalay (Khand Nyaypeeth to Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 [for brevity ''the Act''] wherein the assail is to the order dated 26.04.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby he has come to hold that the Respondent is entitled to the special family pension, is whether the view expressed is warrantable and presentable on the bedrock of principles of statutory interpretation or is it to be regarded pregnable and unacceptable because of special features attached to conception of special family pension if understood in a purposive context and appreciated in proper perspective inasmuch as the stand and stance in the appeal is that the dictionary facets of the eligibility criteria are totally different putting it on a singularly raised pedestal than other categories of pensions, namely, normal pension, disability pension and family pension, for Mr. Satish Chandra Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants would contend and emphatically propone that any event which eventually leads to death of the service holder, while in service for all purposes, would not be entitled to special family pension as something else, something plus or something special is imperative.

The husband of the Respondent-wife was recruited in the Army Corps of Signal as a Recruit and after undergoing requisite training in various courses he was appointed as a Soldier. He was granted casual leave from 15.04.1993 to 30.04.1993. While on leave on 25.04.1993 he was brutally assaulted by some miscreants in the village because of which he sustained head injuries to which he eventually succumbed. Because of his death Respondent submitted an application for grant of special family pension to the authorities but the same was rejected by the Appellants on the bedrock that the husband of the Respondent at the material time of his death was not on duty and the incident of beatings and assault cannot have any nexus with the military service. Challenge to the said orders in appeal and further appeal did not meet with success. Being dissatisfied with and aggrieved by the aforesaid rejection the Petitioner preferred a writ petition asseverating that she is entitled to get special family pension as per Paragraph 203 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 [for short ''the Regulations''].

A counter affidavit was filed by the Respondent contending, inter alia, that her husband was enrolled in the Army on 11th May, 1984 and while serving with 36 Infantry Division, Signal Regiment he has gone to his village on casual leaves where he was injured and eventually breathed his last in the Military Hospital, Gaya due to multiple head injuries sustained by him. The husband had rendered 8 years and 351 days service in the Army. The Respondent was paying the family pension and a sum of Rs. 12,000/- was also granted on account of death-cum-retirement gratuity and the said aspect was communicated to the Respondent. It was also put forth that initially rejection was called in question in an appeal which was adjudicated by the competent authority but the same was rejected. A second appeal being preferred was considered by the Defence Minister/Appellate Committee on Pension but the Committee did not find any ground to alter the decision of the first appellate committee communicated to the Respondent by letter dated 12.08.1996. It was further contended that his death having no connection with the Military Service and she was not fit to get the benefit of Regulation 213 and hence, the claim has been rightly rejected.

The learned Single Judge interpreting the Regulation 213 and Rule 9 and the concept of casual leave came to hold that as the husband of the Respondent was in causal leave and the said casual leave is countable towards the duty except as provided in Rule 10(a) the Petitioner is entitled to special family pension.

Assailing the correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge it is submitted by Mr. Satish Sharma, learned Senior Counsel along with Mr. J.K. Pillai that the learned Single Judge has fallen into grave error in his interpretation of Regulation 213 inasmuch as it has a different connotation and the purpose and intention of the regulation is quite different than that has been understood by the learned Single Judge. It is submitted by Mr. Sharma that intendment of the regulation has to be kept in view, for the same has been provided keeping in view certain special circumstances. It is urged by him that language of Regulation 213 is quite clear as far as its sweep is concerned but the learned Single Judge has completely erred by expanding its ambit an sweep which makes the order sensitively susceptible. It is his further submission that the Respondent is entitled to family pension and gratuity but she is not entitled to the special family pension as engrafted under Regulation 213 as the same operates in a different arena the concept of purposive appreciation of rule makes it warrantable to attach special circumstances inasmuch as the same is evincible and inhered in the said provision. To buttress his submissions he has commended us to the Division Bench decision rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Smt. Krishna Devi v. Union of India, Mil LJ 2004 Del 38.

Mr. R.B. Yadav, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent submitted that the order passed by the Learned Single Judge is absolutely supportable and there is no justification not to extend the benefit of special family pension as envisioned under Regulation 213 inasmuch as the husband of the Respondent was in military service at the time of his death. The learned Counsel contended that the analysis made by the learned Single Judge is beyond reproach and absolutely impeccable inasmuch as while he was continuing in his service casual leave has to be computed towards service, therefore, Regulation 213 and Rule 10 have been rightly interpreted by the learned Single Judge and hence, no interference is required. To bolster his submission he has commended us to the decisions rendered in the cases of Shashi Kumar Mishra v. Union of India and Ors. 1995 (2) MPJR 334 : 1996 (2) SLR 590; Chatroo Ram v. Secretary, Deference and others, 1991 (1) SLR 678; Harbans Singh Vs. Union of India, ; and Smt. Charanjit Kaur Vs. Union of India and others, .

At the very outset it is seemly to state that there is no cavil over the facts. It is beyond dispute that the husband of the Respondent had gone on casual leave to his village where he was assaulted by certain miscreants and eventually after availing treatment he breathed his last. There is no controversy that the Respondent is being given the family pension and gratuity. The only issue is whether in the obtaining factual scenario she would be entitled to special family pension as envisaged under Regulation 213.

Regulation 212 deals with ordinary family pension. It reads as under:

An ordinary family pension may be granted to the family of a Junior Commissioned Officer granted honorary commission as a commissioned officer while on the effective list, who dies during service or after retirement for causes neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service.

Regulation 213 which deals with special family pension reads as under:

A special family pension may be granted to the family of an individual if his death was due to or hastened by-

(a) a wound, injury or disease which was attributable to military

service.

or

(b) the aggravation by military service of a wound, injury or disease which existed before or arose during military service.

The said regulations came to be interpreted in the case of Smt. Krishna Devi (supra) by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court wherein S.B. Sinha, learned Chief Justice (as his Lordship then was) while interpreting the Regulation 213 placed reliance in paragraph 424, which reads as under:

The cause of disability of death resulting from disease attributed to service when it is established that the disease during service. On the conditions are circumstances of the disease. Cases in which it is established that service condition did not determine or contribute to the on set of the disease but influenced the subsequent courses of disease which led to an individual''s discharge or death which ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in service if no note of it was at the time of the individual''s acceptance for service in the Armed Forces. However, if medical opinion holds, for the reasons to be stated, that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to acceptance for service, the disease will not be deemed to have arisen during service.

It is worth-noting after interpreting paragraph 424 Clause which deals with disability or death resulting from disease attributed to service their Lordships proceeded to state as under:

.... The special family pension admittedly is payable only when a person in invalidated out of military service. However, special family pension would also be payable when a death occurs due to or hastened by own injury or disease which was attributable to the military service. The expression attributable to military service must in our opinion be limited to such factors in respect where of the legal fiction was created. We may be hastened to add that whereas in the case of disability pension, the benefit of such legal fiction would be available but the same cannot be extended further in a case of death namely in a case where no disability pension at any point of time was given at all. Law is not mathematics where the problem is to be solved treating it as a theorem and applying the principles of solving such a problem. If a contention is accepted then in all cases of unnatural deaths special family pension would be payable whether military person has suffered it while on duty or otherwise; whether he was performing military duties or was on leave and attending to his personal work as in the instance case. The legal fiction is extended only to the payment of disability pension. It cannot be extended still further to cover the cases of special family pension. For such cases the words "a wound, injury or disease which was attributable to military service" have to be read to mean that death has occurred due to injury which was relatable to military service.

The learned Counsel for the Respondent as has been indicated has relied on certain citations. In Shashi Kumar Mishra (supra) the learned Single Judge has expressed the opinion that when an employee while undergoing recruitment training going on casual leave to his leave station at public expense meets with an accident some injury may be attributed to have been caused while in military service and he cannot be denied the disability pension on the ground that such injury is not attributable to military service.

In Chatroo Ram (supra) a Division Bench of the Haryanas High Court expressed the opinion that the Petitioner while returning his duty after availing leave met with an accident and his right arm got dismembered and such a disability is to be treated as attributable to military service and hence, he is entitled to disability pension.

In Harbans Singh (supra) the Division Bench of Delhi Court interpreting the Pension Regulations for Army Rule 48 opined that the person travelling even partly at the public expense to his leave station is a person on duty and he will be entitled for the disability pension if he is disabled in the course of such training due to his accident.

In Smt. Charanjit Kaur (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with the factual matrix where there was gross negligence and callousness on the part of the authorities and the consequent indescribable mental torment and physical and financial hardship caused to the widow and the two minor children of any Army Officer came to hold in paragraph 8 as under:

In the aforesaid facts, the conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the officer died while in mysterious circumstances and his death is attributable to and aggravated by the military service. The responsibility of his death is prima facie traceable to the act of criminal omissions and commissions on the part part of the concerned authorities. The Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to suitable compensation as well as to the Special Family Pension and the Children Allowance according to the relevant rules w.e.f. 23.06.1978, i.e., the date of the death of her husband.

In our considered opinion the decisions rendered in the cases of Shashi Kumar Mishra (supra), Chatroo Ram (supra) and Harbans Singh (supra) are in the one compartment and they deal with disability pension. Disability pension stands on a different footing than the special family pension.

The decision rendered in Smt. Charanjit Kaur (supra) the Apex Court took note of the fact with regard to death of a military officer while in service in mysterious circumstances and in that obtaining factual matrix expressed the opinion that the same is attributable to and aggravated by the military service. In the factual backdrop decision were given. In our humble opinion the said decision is not a precedent for the purpose of special family pension that if a person dies otherwise is entitled to get special family pension.

In our considered opinion the view laid down by the Delhi High Court in the case of Smt. Krishna Devi (supra) interprets Regulation 213 correctly and we respectfully concur with the same, for the words in Regulation 213 are capable of one interpretation and have to be read in proper context. Such words have to take colour and character from the context itself. If we permit ourselves to say so the concept of pension has been compartmentalised into ordinary pension, disability pension and special family pension. They have been distinguishably made both textually and contextual and the same does not admit any kind of ambiguity. It is clear as crystal clear and clean as noon day that death due to causation of rendering of real military service cannot be equated with death due to quarrel or fight in a village. Thus, by no stretch of imagination it can be conceived that because the husband of the Respondent was on causal leaves and causal leave form a part of duty and during that period if he suffers an injury, a wound or disease by some one the same cannot entrench upon the fundamental conception of a wound, injury or disease which are attributable to military service, nor can it be said that the said wound, injury or disease has been aggravated by military service, for it had neither existed nor did it arise during military service.

In the ultimate analysis, we conclude, inevitably, that the appeal deserves to be allowed and accordingly we so direct and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.