Union of India vs A.V. Ramalingam

Jagadeesan, J.—The Union of India represented by the Chief Secretary to Government and Deputy Collector-Cum-Land Acquisition

Officer are the Appellants herein. One Thambusamy reddier filed a suit in O.S. No. 97 of 1991 seeking for a declaration that the declaration under

6 of Land Acquisition Act dated 24.12.1990 in G.O.M.S. No. 90 dated 20/12/1990 in respect of the suit property issued by the appellants is

void ab initio and is liable to be set aside and far permanent injunction restraining the appellants herein from dealing with the property in any

manner. The respondent was subsequently impleaded as the representative of the said Thambusamy Reddiar.

There is no dispute that the respondent is the owner of the property.

The appellants herein, under their power of eminent domain commenced acquisition proceedings, requiring the land of the respondent, since the

same is required for public purpose.

Suitable notice under Sec. 4(1) and under Sec. 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued.

The respondent herein challenged the said notification in the suit. The trial Court has dismissed the suit on the ground that the Civil Court has no

jurisdiction to try the suit.

The respondent herein, preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 64 of 1992 on the file of the Second Additional District Judge, Pondicherry.

The lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal and consequently decreed the suit by the judgment and decree dated 26.07.1995. As against

this, the present appeal has been filed. Mr. R. Natarajan, Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that since the Land

Acquisition Act is an independent Code by itself, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings, challenging the notifications

issued under the said Act. In fact, the attention of this Court was drawn to the Judgments reported in:

(i) Laxmi Chand and others v. Gram Panchayat Kararia and others (AIR 1996 S.C. 218)

(ii) State of Bihar Vs. Dhirendra Kumar and others,

The learned counsel Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan appearing on behalf of the respondent fairly conceded that in view of the Supreme Court Judgment,

though the appeal has to be allowed, the Supreme Court in their Judgment have not referred to Section 52 of Land Acquisition Act. Section 52

provides for a suit against any person if anything is done pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act. In view of that, the Judgment of the Appeal Court

are to be reconsidered.

I carefully considered the contention of both the counsel. In the Judgment reported in State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar (A.I.R.1995 S.C.

1995) the Supreme Court has held as follows:

The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether an interim injunction would be issued where proceedings under the Land

Acquisition Act were taken pursuant to the notice issued u/s 9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed

to acquire the land by the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with statutory

requirements contained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural

steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications

and declaration u/s 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land

Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and make the award. Section 11-A, now prescribes limitation to make the award

within 2 years from the last date of publication envisaged u/s (sic) of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Government needs possession of

the land urgently, it would exercise the power u/s 17(4) of the Act and dispense with enquiry u/s 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice

to the parties u/s 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise,

it would take possession after the award u/s 12. Thus, it could be seen that the Act is a complete Code in itself and is meant to sever public

purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the Civil Court to take cognizance of

the case u/s 9 of CPC stands excluded and a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the question of the validity or legality of the

notification u/s 4, and declaration u/s 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was

not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial Court that there is a prima facie triable issue is unsustainable. Moreover,

possession was already taken and handed over to Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction"".

Equally, in the case reported in Laxmi Chand and Others v. Gram Panchayat, Karari and others (1996 S.C. 218), the learned Judges have held

as follows:

It is seen that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 gives jurisdiction to the Civil Court to try all civil suits, unless barred. The cognizance

of a suit of civil nature may either expressly or impliedly be barred. The procedure contemplated under the Act is a special procedure envisaged to

effectuate public purpose, compulsorily acquiring the land for use of public purpose. The notification u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6 of the Act are

required to be published in the manner contemplated thereunder. The inference gives conclusiveness to the public purpose and the extent of the

land mentioned therein. The award should be made u/s 11 as envisaged thereunder. The dissatisfied claimant is provided with the remedy of

reference u/s 18 and a further appeal u/s 14 of the Act. It would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the

jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognisance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. The Civil Court

thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right an aggrieved

person has is to approach the constitutional courts, viz., the High Court and the Supreme Court under their Plenary over under Articles 226 and

136respectively with self-imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary power. Barring thereof, there is no power to the Civil Court"".

From the above laid principles of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the Civil Court jurisdiction u/s 9 of the CPC cannot be invoked for challenging

the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act.

Even though Section 52 of the Land Acquisition Act has not been referred to in both the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, I

am of the view that may not be a ground to differ from the well laid principles. Section 52 of the Land Acquisition Act may provide for the tortious

acts of the officials. When the Apex Court has clearly held that so far as the acquisition, enquiry with regard to the objections and compensation

has been dealt with by separate provisions of the Act and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the acquisition proceedings,

naturally the purpose of Section 52 of the Act has to be construed that it is meant for something else. In fact, in Sanjiva How''s book on ''Land

Acquisition and Compensation'' 7th Edition, a passage is as follows:

This Section provides for a notice of one month as a condition precedent to the institution of certain suits or proceedings. These presumably

would be actions for damages for wrongful acts committed in the course of the acquisition proceedings which had not been adequately

compensated by the Collector"".

Though it may be the view of the author, I am of the opinion that in view of the decision of the Apex Court referred to earlier, the view expressed

by the author can be taken as correct that Section 52 has been provided only for the actions for damages for wrongful acts committed by the

officials of the acquisition proceedings and not for the lawful acts. On this ground also I do not find any substance in the point raised by the senior

counsel for the respondent. Hence the Second Appeal is allowed. No costs.

However, it is open to the respondent to challenge the acquisition proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as laid down by

the above judgment of the Supreme Court, if he is so advised. In case, the respondent invokes Article 226 of the Constitution of India, equally it is

open to the appellants to raise their objections that are available to them in law.