Union of India vs Bachan Singh

I.S. Tiwana, J. (Oral)

This set of four Regular First Appeals (RFA Nos. 1918 to 1921 of 1984) filed by the Union of India and three crossobjections (Xobjections No. 96CI, 98CI and 107CI of 1985) preferred by the land owners/claimants, is being disposed of through this common judgment. Though these are directed against four different awards, the contentions raised therein are similar.

As a result of a notification published under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short, the Act) on 10th May, 1979, the Union of India acquired a huge chunk of land along with houses of these claimants for setting up a Cantonment at Bathinda. For these constructions, the Collector awarded certain sums to there owners in the light of the valuation statements prepared by Inder Mohan, Sub Divisional Engineer (R.W. 1). The Court, as a result of the reference under/Section 18 of the Act, has enhanced these valuations in the light of the evidence of Shri H.S. Virdee, retired Sub Divisional Engineer (A.W. 1). Whereas the acquiring authorities challenge the enhancement ordered by the lower court, the claimants make a house of the fact that the lower court has unnecessarily imposed a cut on account of "depreciation" on the valuations prepared by Sh. H.S. Virdee AW 1. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties in the light of the material on record. I am of the opinion that whereas the appeals must fail, the crossobjections must succeed.

For ruling out the evidence of Sh. Inder Mohan RW 1, the court has observed as follows :

"No evidence has been brought out on the record as to how the plinth area rate was calculated by the department and what if was in relation to similar buildings in the locality and whether any enquiries to that effect has been made when the value was calculated. In absence of such evidence we have to fall back on the detailed estimate worked out by Shri H.S. Virdee Ex. A. 1."

I am in full agreement with this conclusion of the lower court. As far as the question of not accepting the valuations made by Sh. H.S. Virdee in toto in all these four cases is concerned, I find that the court while not doubting the calculations made by Sh. Virdee for fixing the value of each of these acquired properties, has chosen to impose a cut on account of "depreciation" for which no rationale is available on the records of these cases. The following table reflects the details of these valuations and the extent of the cuts imposed on account of the age of the buildings :

RFA No.

Year of construction of the property in question.

Valuation as per the evidence of AW 1 Sh. H.S. Virde.

Extent of cut.

Amount awarded Rs.

i) 1919/84

1975

Rs. 36,14906

5%

32,800/

ii) 1921/84

1976

Rs. 15,67856

20%

9,530/

iii) 1918/84

1977

Rs. 18,48188

9%

12,900/

Besides the imposition of cut on account of `depreciation'', the court even chose to reduce the compensation as worked out by Sh. H.S Virdee PW 1 for the reason that certain material i.e., Sirki/kana, etc., used by the owner was going to be of no use to the acquiring authorities, and therefore, no compensation was payable to them on that account. To me, both these cuts, as imposed by the lower court, appear to be wholly unjustified, and, therefore, unsustainable. Merely on account of the fact that the buildings in question were two to four years old by the time these were acquired, there was no justification for the cut on account of depreciation because no such depreciation can safely be assumed in case of newlyconstructed buildings. It is mentioned in Shri B.N. Dutta''s book "Estimating and Costing" 17th Edn., that "generally there is little deprecation of the buildings for the first five year." Besides this, this is what has been opined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in an unreported judgement in State of Kerala v. Chawala Lonoppan Palu, etc. U.J. (S.C.) 1979 page 170, in a similar situation :

"Depreciation, in such circumstances, is a necessary consequence, but then this is not an inflexible rule regardless of the realism of things. Speaking generally, and with a practical sense, builders of homes move in when they are barely ready for occupation, and spend the first months and years to beautify, touch up, tune up, make the edifice liveable and lovable. These years enhance the home worthiness of the house rather than depreciate its value. There may be exceptions where engineering blunders, defects showing up gross neglect damaging the structure or its finishing may reduce the value. Such deterioration being the exception, the depreciation must be made out and not presumed. In these circumstances, the mere fact that after the house was completed about 5 years had elapsed, could not justify the claim that, mechanically, depreciation must be awarded."

Similarly, I find that there was no justification with the court to disallow the cost of the material, i.e., sirki/kanas, on account of the fact that it was not going to be of any use to the department. I have earlier opined in RFA No. 1931/84 (Union of India v. Chagar Singh) decided on 21st July, 1988, that "the payment of compensation to a person whose property has compulsorily been acquired under the Act does not depend upon the fact as to how the acquiring authorities are going to utilise the acquired property and is rather dependent on the fact as to of what the person concerned has been deprived of." In the instant cases, the claimants have concededly been deprived of the materials, the value of which has been deducted by the lower court from the estimated cost of the buildings. This is totally without any justification. In the light of the abovenoted discussion I dismiss the Union of India appeals and while allowing the crossobjections hold that each of the claimants has to be paid the compensation on the basis of the market value of his acquired property as estimated by Sh. H.S. Virdee AW 1, and as noticed in the above table. Besides this, all of them would also the granted the benefits envisaged by sections 231A, 23(2) and 28 of the Act, as these stand after the enforcement of Act No. 68 of 1984.

At this stage, it is brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the claimants that they have not been able to pay the requisite court fee on the claims decreed on account of paucity of funds. Keeping in view the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory Chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 1576 : 1987 R.R.R. 473 : 1986 R.R.R. 606, they are allowed two months'' time to make up the deficiency. In case of default, their claims would be taken to have been decided only to the extent to which they have already paid the court fee.