Union of India vs Inder Singh

D.S. Tewatia, J.—The question of some significance that falls for consideration for this Bench on a reference order dt. July 1;, 1986. passed by I. S. Tiwana, J. is as to whether claimant-respondents, whose land stands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, can or cannot take advantage of the provisions of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act. 1984(Act No. 68 of 1984)(hereinafter called ''the Amending Act'') even though no appeal against the award at their instance was pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court at the relevant time. only appeal pending against the award being that of the State Government.

When the matter came up for hearing before the learned single Judge, counsel for the claimant-respondents canvassed that even the pendency of an appeal of the State Government would give the respondents right to claim benefit of the provisions of the said Amending Act and in support of that stand. the learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions :--

(i) Civil Misc. No. 3127 of 1985 in C.W.P. No. 3962 of 1973(Amritsar Improvement Trust v. Gurdial Singh) decided on 9th May, 1986(reported in.

(ii) Civil Misc. No. 105-CI of 1986 in R. F. A. No. 1352 of 1981(State of Haryana c. Ishwar Singh), decided on 16th May, 1986;

(iii) Civil Misc. No. 371-CI of l985 R.F.A. No. 714 of 1975(P.S.E.B. v. Saranjit Singh etc.) decided on 18th Dec., 1985;

(iv) Civil Misc. No. 203-CI of 1986 in R.F.A. No. 129 of 1983(State of Haryana v. Hukam Singh etc.), decided on 10th Mar., 1986.

Tiwana, J. in view of the fact that in Civil Misc. No. 1515-CI of 1985 in R.F.A. No. 815 of 1979(Lila Wati v. State of Haryana), decided on 30th Nov., 1985, he had held that only when the claimants'' appeal is pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court at the relevant period that the provisions of the Amending Act can he taken advantage of by the claimants, which view is contrary to the judgments cited on behalf of the claimant-respondents, referred the matter for decision to the larger Bench and that is how the case is before us.

The judgments cited on behalf of the claimants have not examined the provision of S. 30(2). sub-section (2) of the Amending Act. As a matter of fact no reason has been given. as if appears, the question had not been posed to the learned Judges, who decided those cases and, therefore, no occasion arose to examine the controversy that arises for consideration before us.

Tiwana, J. no doubt examined the proposition of law that he has referred for decision to this Bench. He while construing the provision of S. 30(2) of the Amending Act, took the view that the benefit of the Amending Act could be available to the claimants only if at the relevant time envisaged by S. 30(2) of the Amending Act. the Court was seized of the matter at the instance of the claimants and not otherwise.

The provision of S. 30. sub-section (2) of the Amending Act is in the following terms:--

"30. Transitional provisions.-(1)......

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of S. 23 and S. 28 of the principal Act, as amended by Clause (b) of S. 15 and S. 18 of this Act respectively. shall apply. and shall be deemed to have applied. also to. and in relation to. any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court. in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th April. 1982(the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act."

A perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that the Legislature intended to extend the benefit of the provision of the Amending Act to the claimants up to a certain date in the past if by then the compensation matter had not been finally disposed of by the Courts. If at the relevant time, the Court happens to be seized of the compensation matter, the Court would take into view the provisions of the Amending Act while determining the correct quantum of compensation. whether the Court was seized of the matter at the instance of the State, which had intended to reduce the quantum of compensation or it was seized of the matter at the instance of the claimants for having the quantum of compensation enhanced.

That. it has been so intended by the Legislature, appears to have weighed with their Lordships (though the legal proposition had not been examined by their Lordships) when dismissing the appeal of State of Punjab Vs. Mohinder Singh and Another, their Lordships awarded solatium and interest at the increased rates. as is evident from the following relevant portion of the judgment :--

"..... ...... ..... .... We find no merit in this appeal so far as quantum of compensation is concerned, because SLP has been dismissed against the impugned judgment. However, the respondents are entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Act 68 of 1984 by which 30% solatium is to be given from the date of publication to the date of notification under S. 4, sub-s. (1) of the Act, and interest at the rate of 9%, instead of 6%, as originally contained in the unamended Act, from the date of taking possession of the land acquired. Since the decision in this case has been given after one year. it is manifest that under the said Act. respondents would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% towards which they have already got 6%."

In view of the aforesaid decision of the apex Court. there is no escape from holding that the claimant to the compensation for the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act shall be entitled to claim enhanced solatium and interest in terms of sub-s. (2) of S. 30 of the Amending Act, notwithstanding the fact that at the time envisaged by the said provisions, there is pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court only an appeal on behalf of the State Government or the Union of India, as the case may be, in the present case on behalf of the Union of India.

In the light of above view. we hold t hat the judgment in Civil Misc. No. 1515-CII of 1985 in R.F.A. No. 815 of 1979(Li1a Wati v. State of Haryana). decided on 30th Nov., 1985, does not lay the correct law.

Accordingly, me direct that the claimant-respondents, shall be paid 30 solatium on the entire amount of compensation instead of 15% and interest at the rate of 9% instead of 6% for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15% per annum thereafter till the payment of the amount of compensation.

The Civil Misc. Application No. 1671-CII of 1986 in F.A.O. No. 48 of 1978 is allowed. No costs.

Petition dismissed.