Union of India vs Mansi Sanjay Bhave & Anr.

This first appeal has been filed by the Union of India, appellant against the order dated 19.9.2014 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra, (in short ''the State Commission''). 2. Brief facts of the case are that the mother of the complainant Nos. 1 and 2 fell down from platform No. 5 at Thane Railway Station while awaiting the arrival of a train as she was leaning at the edge of the platform on 14.2.1996 she was admitted for treatment but later succumbed to death The complainants first filed death claim with the Railway Claims Tribunal, Mumbai and later on, the same was withdrawn on 29.6.1997. The present consumer complaint was filed on 12.2.1998. The complainants alleged deficiency on the part of the Indian Railways and prayed a compensation of Rs. 19,95,000. The complaint was resisted by the opposite party/Appellant Indian Railways on the ground that the complaint was not maintainable before the Consumer Forum. The State Commission vide its order dated 19.9.2014 allowed the complaint as under: "1. Complaint is partly allowed. 2. Opponents/Railway Authorities are directed to pay Rs. 18,23,000 together with interest @ 9% pa. from the date of filing of complaint i.e. 6.2.1998 within a period of ninety days, failing which rate of interest will be increased by 3% p. a. till realization of claim. 3. Opponents are also directed to pay an amount of Rs. 25,000 to the complainants as costs of this litigation and bear their own costs." 3. Hence the present appeal 4. Heard the learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the records 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that first of all, the complaint was not maintainable before a Consumer Forum as Section 15 of Railway Tribunal Act, 1987 clearly bars jurisdiction of all other Courts to entertain such claim petitions. The State Commission has relied on Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and has decided the complaint as an availment of alternative remedy. When the Railway Tribunal Act, 1987 expressly bars the jurisdiction of other Courts, the view regarding additional remedy does not seem to be sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned Counsel cited the following judgments in this regard: "(i) Chief Commercial Manager (Claims) v. Sanjiv Sharma, IV (2015) CPJ 655 (NC). It has been held that: "Consumer Protection Act, 1986- Section 21 (b)-Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987-Jurisdiction-Loss or non-delivery of goods entrusted to Indian Railways-Consumer Forums have no jurisdiction to enter tarn complaint on account of deficiency in service arising from loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or nondelivery of goods, etc. entrusted to Railway Administration for carriage and that such jurisdiction exclusively vests in Railway Claims Tribunal." (ii) Rakesh Patralekh v. Union of India & Ors., II (2010) CPJ 234 (NC). It has been observed that: 6. On a conjoint reading of the provisions contained in aforesaid Sections 123(c), 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 and '' 13 and 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 would show that on establishing of Railway Claims Tribunal, any claim for ''untoward incident'' payable under Section 124A by the Railway Administration shall be entertained only by the Tribunal and no Court or other authority including the Consumer Forums shall have, or be entitled to exercise jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such claim. Obviously, present complaint is not legally maintainable before this Commission. In view of the bar of jurisdiction created by said Section 15, the decisions in F.A. No. 2209 of 2004, Smt. Vinaya Vilas Sawant v. Union of India, of this Commission and in Kishore Lal v. Chairman, Employee'' State Insurance Corporation, (2007) 4 SCC 579, on which reliance has been placed will not be of any help to the complainant Impleadment of the Railway Medical Officer and SHO, Mokama Rail Police as opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 will not make any difference as in substance the claim made is in respect of untoward incident which is entertain able only by the Railway Claims Tribunal. Complaint is, therefore, dismissed being not maintainable under the Act." (iii) Southern Railways v. M. Chidambaram, (2002) CPJ 34 (NC) It has been held that: It is not disputed that the accident in question occurred due to untoward incident as mentioned in Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989. That being so jurisdiction of Forum under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 would be barred under Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, (iv) Chairman, Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation v. Consumer Protection Council, I (1995) CPJ 3 (SC)=1995 (SLT Soft) 780=AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1384. It has been observed that: 6. The question which then arises for consideration is whether the National Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the claim application and award compensation in respect of an accident involving the death of Shri K. Kumar caused by the use of a motor vehicle. Clearly the Claims Tribunal constituted for the area in question, had jurisdiction to entertain any claim for compensation arising out of the fatal accident since such a claim application would clearly fall within the ambit of Section 165 of the 1988 Act, The 1988 Act can be said to be a special Act in relation to the claims of compensation arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. The 1986 Act being a law dealing with the question of extending protection to consumers in general, could, therefore, be said to be a general law in relation to the specific provisions concerning accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles found in Chapter XII of the 1988 Act. Ordinarily the general law must yield to the special law. Besides, the complaint in question cannot be said to be in relation to any goods sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or any service provided or agreed to be provided to the deceased. The expression " service" as defined by the 1986 Act means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provision of facilities inter alia in connection with transport. The accident that occurred had nothing to do with service provided to the deceased. This becomes obvious when one reads the provision along with the definition of complaint in Section 2(c) and service in Section 2(o) of the 1986 Act. Complaint according to Section 2(c) means any application in writing in relation to an unfair trade practise or as a restrictive trade practise adopted by any trader or in relation to goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him. Both these clauses have no application whatsoever. The third clause relates to the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by a consumer. Therefore, at best it can be said the complaint in question related to the service hired or availed of by the deceased. The complaint in the instant case cannot be said to be in relation to any service hired or availed of by the consumer because the injury sustained by the consumer had nothing to do with the service provided or availed of by him but the fatal injury was the direct result of the accident on account of which he was thrown out of his seat and dashed against an iron handle of the seat in front of him." 6. It was also stated by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the mother of the complainants herself was responsible for her accident as she was leaning on the edge of the platform and was waiting for arrival of the train. She was concentrating on one side of the track, whereas another train approached from the other side and hit her. Thus, deceased was totally at fault and no deficiency can be attributed to the appellant.. Learned Counsel also cited the following judgment wherein the claim was not sustained under the Consumer Protection Act, due to contributory negligence "Miro Devi v. Union of India, III (1994) CPJ 70 (NC), wherein the following has been held: We find a careful scrutiny of all the materials available on record that the only conclusion possible is that the complainant has totally failed to establish that the deceased had sustained injuries by falling from the running train as a result of any negligence or deficiency on the part of the railway administration. On the other hand, the evidence on record would indicate that the deceased was in a drunken state and in that condition he had stood on the foot board of the compartment of a running train holding on to the door handle with only one of his hands at a time when the train was negotiating a curve and it was as a consequence of this rash and negligent act of his own that he happened to fall down from the running train and sustain fatal injuries. In the light of the conclusion reached by us that no negligence or deficiency in service has been made out against the respondent, the claim of the complainant for recovery of the compensation from the respondent cannot be sustained." 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant also argued that the complainants had filed the death claim with the Railway Claims Tribunal, which was subsequently withdrawn for the reasons best known to the complainants. This claim was for Rs. 2,00,000 as the maximum amount admissible under the death claim was only Rs. 2,00,000. The consumer complaint has been filed with a claim of Rs. 19,95,000 whereas, no justification has been given for 10 times enhancement of the claim. Even if the present case is treated as alternate remedy the claim under the Consumer Protection Act 1986, If admissible, cannot exceed the amount of claim permissible under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. The State Commission has grossly erred in first of all entertaining hie complaint and then allowing a claim of Rs. 18,23,000. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents stated that the deceased was having a valid ticket and therefore, she would be a consumer and for such a person if any untoward incident occurs, he or she will be entitled to a claim as provided under the Railway Tribunal Act, irrespective of the fact whether there was any deficiency on the part of Railway or not as observed by the Delhi High Court in its judgment-Setu Niket v. Union of India & Ors., IV (2015) ACC 850, W.P.(C) 1089/2013 & CM No. 2073/2013, pronounced on 19.11.2015 wherein the following has been observed: "8. A plain reading of Section 124 and Section 124A of the Act shows that when in the course of working a railway an accident or an untoward incident occurs then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the Railway Administration, a passenger who was injured or killed is entitled for compensation. In other words, there is no obligation on the part of the claimants of the deceased/ injured to prove whether there was a wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the Railway Administration. However, the total compensation payable under Section 124 and Section 124-A of the Act shall not exceed Rupees four lacs prescribed under Rule 4 of the compensation Rules." 9. Learned Counsel for the respondent argued that Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 clearly states that remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is alternate remedy. It simply means that even if some remedy is available under some other Acts, one can avail the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act as well. In this regard, learned Counsel also mentioned that Section 128 of the Railways Act saves the right of the affected person to recover compensation under any other law for the time being in force. The National Commission has gone into this question in the following two judgments: "(i) Union of India & Anr. v. Savitaben Sumanbhai Patel & Ors., III (2011) CPJ 34 (NC) = RP No, 1725 of 2009, decided on 5.5.2011 (NC). It has been observed that- Section 128 reads as under: 128 Saving as to certain rights: (1) The right of any person to claim compensation under Section 124 [or Section 124A] shall not affect the right of any such person to recover compensation payable under the Workmen''s compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) or any other law for the time being in force; but no person shall be entitled to claim compensation more than once in respect of the same accident. (2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall affect the right of any person to claim compensation payable under any contract or scheme providing for payment of compensation for death or personal injury or for damage to property or any sum payable under any policy of insurance. 16. Further, Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, specifically provides that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. 17. Consumer Fora can exercise jurisdiction under the Act in cases when there is no specific bar. In Kishore Lal v. Chairman, Employees'' State Insurance Corporation, the Apex Court has gone to the extent of saying that if two different Fora have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in regard to the same subject, the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum would not be barred and the power of the Consumer Forum to adjudicate upon the dispute could not be negated." It is thus clear from the above that Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 provides additional remedy to the consumer and as such the Consumer Fora are competent to entertain claims covered and filed under the relevant section of the Railways Act, 1989/Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. In the instant case, the points of law are similar to those in Viriaya Vilas Sawanl (supra). Therefore, following the above judgment of this Commission as well as a host of other judgments with similar conclusions, we agree with the Fora below that the present case is not barred by jurisdiction. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, the fora below based on credible evidence produced before it had concluded that the Petitioners were also guilty of negligence and deficiency in service. In fact, Petitioners themselves have conceded that there was no railway over-bridge available at the Atul Railway Station and that passengers wishing to board the train corning from Mumbai and going towards Valsad would have to cross the railway tracks which at all times can be a hazardous and dangerous proposition. Denial by the Petitioners that the goods train did have lights and gave necessary warning signals while it was transiting the Atul Railway Station has not been proved either through an affidavit of the concerned driver or any other credible evidence. In view of all the above facts, we uphold the order of the State Commission in to. The revision petition is dismissed. The Petitioners i.e. Union of India and General Manager (Administration) are directed to jointly and severally pay a sum of Rs. 5,50,640 to the Respondents within 30 days from the date of the order as compensation. On recovery of amount, a sum of Rs. 1 lakh be deposited in Fixed Deposit with a Nationalised Blank for a period 10 years in the name of the three children of the Respondent. (ii) Smt. Vinaya Vilas Sawant v. Union of India, I (2008) CPJ 13 (NC)=RP No. 864 of 2006, decided on 29.11.2007 (NC). It has been held that: IV. Apart from this, Section 128 of the Railways Act saves the right of the affected person to recover compensation under any other law for the time being in force. Section 128 reads as under 128. Saving as to certain rights-(1) The right of any person to claim compensation under Section 124 [or Section 124-A] shall not affect the right of any such person to recover compensation payable under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) or any other law for the time being in force; but no person shall be entitled to claim compensation more than once in respect of the same accident. (2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall affect the right of any person to claim compensation payable under any contract or scheme providing for payment of compensation for death or personal injury or for damage to property or any sum payable under any policy of insurance. Further, Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, specifically provides that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. Consumer Fora can exercise jurisdiction under the Act in cases when there is no specific bar in Kishore Lal v. Chairman, Employees State Insurance Corporation, (2007) 4 SCC 579, the Apex Court has gone to the extent of saying that if two different Fora have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in regard to the same subject, the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum would not be barred and the power of the Consumer Forum to adjudicate upon the dispute could not be negated Dealing with similar contention, in the case of Geeta Jethani & Ors. v. Airport Authority of India & Ors., Original Petition No. 81 of 2001, decided on 5th August, 2004, (relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 651), we have negatived the contention of the Airport Authority of India that as no consideration is received from the passengers who are coming from other countries, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 would not be applicable. It was held that maintenance of airports is a statutory function of the Airport Authority of India and, that without using the airport premises, passengers coming from other countries cannot enter into Indian territory Similar would be the position in the present case, It is the duty of the Railways to maintain, in good order, platforms, foot paths, over bridges for ingress and egress of the passengers and all other passenger facilities and amenities. For this maintenance, passengers are paying fee, by way of purchase of journey tickets or platform tickets. The next question, which would require consideration, would be: whether the petitioner can be said to be a consumer? In our view, a railway passenger, who purchases a ticket for travelling by the railway, would undoubtedly be a consumer because he pays for availing of the services to be rendered by the railways. That person would have right to ingress to the train as well as egress from the train. For boarding and alighting the train, he is required to pass through the railway premises, i.e., the railway platform, over bridge, etc. In that set of circumstances, the services, which are required to be rendered by the Railways, would include maintenance of railway station, platform, as well as over-bridge, etc. It is not disputed that the FOB in this case is maintained by the Railways." 10. Learned Counsel for the respondent also stated that Hon''ble Supreme Court has been of the view that the scope of the Consumer Protection should not be curtailed rather it should be widened. In this regard, he drew our attention to the para 17 of the judgment passed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Kishore Lal v. Chairman, Employees State Insurance Corporation, I (2008) CPJ 13 (SC)=Appeal (Civil) 4965 of 2000, decided on 8.5.2007: "17. It has been held in numerous cases of this Court that the jurisdiction of a consumer Forum has to be construed liberally so as to bring many cases under it for their speedy disposal. In the case of M/s. Spring Meadows Hospital and Another v. Harjol Ahluwalia and Another, AIR 1998 SC 1801, it was held that the CP Act creates a framework for speedy disposal of consumer disputes and an attempt has been made to remove the existing evils of the ordinary Court system. The Act being a beneficial legislation should receive a liberal construction. In State of Karnataka v. Vishwabarathi House Building Co-op. Society and Others, AIR 2003 SC 1043, the Court speaking on the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora held that the provisions of the said Act are required to be interpreted as broadly as possible and the Fora under the CP Act have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint despite the fact that other Fora/Courts would also have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis. These judgments have been cited with approval in paras 16 and 17 of the judgment in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 305. The trend of the decisions of this Court is that the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum should not and would not be curtailed unless there is an express provision prohibiting the Consumer Forum to take up the matter which falls within the jurisdiction of Civil Court or any other Forum as established under some enactment. The Court had gone to the extent of saying that if two different Fora have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in regard to the same subject, the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum would not be barred and the power of the Consumer Forum to adjudicate upon the dispute could not be negated." 11. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by both the parties and perused record. The first stress of the revision petition is that Sec lion 15 of tire Railways Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 bars the jurisdiction of other Courts/authorities including the Consumer Fora. This section reads as follows: 15. Bar of jurisdiction-On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority:shall have, or be entitled to, exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to matters referred to in [Sub-sections (1) and (1 A)] of Section 13. 12. From the above, it is clear that this bar is in respect of matters referred to in [Subsections (1.) and (1 A)] of Section 13 which reads as follows: 13. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal- (1) The Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that day by any Civil Court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act- (a) relating to the responsibility of the railway administrations as carriers under Chapter VII of the Railways Act in respect of claims for- (i) compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or nondelivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration for carriage by railway: (ii) compensation payable under Section 82A of the Railways Act* [*Ed. For Section 82-A, see The Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890). The Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890) has been repealed by the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989)] or the rules made there under; and (b) in respect of the claims for refund of fares or part thereof or for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway. [1(1 A) The Claims Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date of commencement of the provisions of Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that date by any Civil Court in respect of claims for compensation now payable by the railway administration under Section 124A of the said Act or the rules made thereunder] 13. From the above, it boils down to the fact that, in effect, this section relates only to cases under Section 124A of the Indian Railway Act, 1989. At this stage, it would be worthwhile to examine the definition of accident and Section 124A of the Indian Railway Act, 1989. Concerned sections are reproduced below: The Railways Act, 1989 123. Definitions-In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) "accident" means an accident of the nature described in Section 124; (b) "dependant" means any of the following relatives of a deceased passenger, namely: (i) the wife, husband, son and daughter, and in case the deceased passenger is unmarried or a minor, his parents; (ii) the parents, minor brother or unmarried sister, widowed sister, widowed daughter-in-law and a minor child of a pre-deceased son, if dependant wholly or partly on the deceased passenger; (iii) a minor child of a predeceased daughter, if wholly dependant on the deceased passenger; (iv) the paternal grandparent wholly dependant on the deceased passenger. [(c) "untoward incident" means (1) (i) the commission of a terrorist act within the meaning of Subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (28 of 1987); or (ii) the making of a violent attack or the commission of robbery or dacoity; or (iii) the indulging in rioting, shoot-put or arson, by any person in or on any train carrying passengers, or in a waiting hall, cloak room or reservation or booking office or on any platform or in any other place within the precincts of a railway station; or (2) the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers] 124. Extent of liability-When in the course of working a railway, an accident occurs, being either a collision between trains of which one is a tram carrying passengers or the derailment of or other accident to a train or any part of a train carrying passengers, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or has suffered a loss to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of a passenger dying as a result of such accident, and for personal injury and loss, destruction damage or deterioration of goods owned by the passenger and accompanying him in his compartment or on the train, sustained as a result of such accident. Explanation-For the purposes of this Section "passenger" includes a railway servant on duty. [124A. Compensation on account of untoward incident-When in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or the dependant of a passenger who has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such untoward incident: Provided that no compensation shall be payable under this section by the railway administration if the passenger dies or suffers injury due to- (a) suicide or attempted suicide by him; (b) self-inflicted injury; (c) his own criminal act; (d) any act committed by him in a state of intoxication or insanity; (e) any natural cause or disease or medical or surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due to injury caused by the said untoward incident 14. A simple reading of these sections reveals that the accidents and untoward incidents are specified in these sections that would be covered as subject matter of Railway Claims Tribunal where the jurisdiction of other Courts/authorities would be barred and the case of the complainant in the instant case is not covered under these sections. Hence, Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act is not attracted in the present complaint case. Therefore Consumer Fora are competent to decide the present complaint. As the legal position is very clear and the facts in the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant are different, we find no need to examine this issue any further on the basis of cases cited. 15. Now we have to examine whether the complainants are entitled to any compensation under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The complainants have alleged in the complaint that the indicator at the Thane Station was not working and there was no announcement about the arrivals of trains by the Railway Authorities which created confusion and commotion. It has also been stated that there is a cabin at the side of VT (CST1) end of the platform No. 5 which creates a hindrance in viewing trains coming towards platform No. 5. Thus, trains coming towards the platform are not viewable until they enter the platform. In such a situation, ''the concerned Motorman ought to have blown the horn on reaching such spots before entering into the platform to caution the commuters. The complainant has alleged that in the present case, the Motorman of the local train did not blow the horn to caution the commuters and the train entered the platform with abnormal speed (rash driving). The complainants'' mother along with some other ladies were standing at the edge of the platform, they were knocked down by the fast local train entering the platform resulting in serious head injuries. The complainants'' mother succumbed to her injuries. 16. The State Commission has observed the following: "14. On going through the record, documentary evidence and pleading of the parties, we are of the opinion that initial onus has been discharged unequivocally by the complainants since deceased passenger was a bona fide passenger, who unfortunately met with an accident and later on succumbed to the injuries. There is no credible evidence led by the opponents/Railway Authorities to prove that the Motorman of DA-1 train blown required horn signal and any announcement was made to that effect with display of indicator installed on the Platform for the benefit of public. There is no affidavit evidence of the concerned Motorman or the Guard to that effect 19. The alleged negligence of not blowing the horn and/or any announcement about sudden arrival of the down train on Platform No. 5, there are statements of (i) Sint, Pushpa Jawahar Nagori, (ii) Catherene Sequrea (iii) Allin Misket, who were the co-passengers injured in the said accident. On going-through all these statements recorded by the Police while conducting Panchanama stated that attention of the standing passengers was towards Kalyanside and therefore, incoming train from backside on Platoform No. 5 was not noticed. Statement of Mr. Kirtikumar Panchal relied upon by opponents corroborates statements of these copassengers. None of these deponents could remember whether there was any announcement to the effect about fast moving down train or whether there was horn blown by the Motorman. However, only announcement which was repeatedly carried out was about trains running late''. There was as usual heavy rush on the Platform which resulted into commotion after accident because of sudden incoming down train on Platform No. 5. Later on the Motorman took the train ahead and then only was blowing the horn continuously after people started screaming. There is unanimity in the statement of all the co-passengers standing on Platform No. 5 at the crucial time. Relevance of these statements gathers the factum leading to incidence of accident and chaos." 17. From the above observations, it comes out that on the one hand, the State Commission has reached to the conclusion that opposite party/Indian Railways have failed to prove that the Motorman blew horn before entering into the platform No. 5, but on the other hand, it has been observed that none of the witnesses/co-passengers have remembered whether Motorman had blown the horn before entering the platform or not and whether there was any announcement for arrival of the down train. Both these observations cannot go together to reach to any definite conclusion. However, the possibility of Motorman not blowing the horn before entering the platform No. 5 seems more probable because, had the Motorman blown the horn before entering the platform the crowd just standing on the edge of the platform looking to the other side might have moved away from the edge of the platform as the engine horn is very very loud. Moreover, the mother of the complainants was not only victim, but there were other ladies, who were hit and injured. In this context, it is necessary to examine the nature and extent of the liability of the Indian Railways in this scenario. 18. The State Commission while deciding the compensation has not considered the contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. Every passenger is required to take sufficient precaution and care so as to protect himself or herself from the probable risks. It is the admitted case that the deceased was leaning on the edge of the platform No. 5 and that is why she was hit by the train coming from one side whereas she was concentrating and looking towards the other side. Standing and leaning on the edge of the platform is definitely a dangerous act and there is no case of the complainants that she was pushed aside towards the edge of the platform by somebody or by any disturbance on the platform. Even if there was no announcement in respect of the down train or even if the Motorman did not blow the horn leaning and standing on the edge of the platform by any person is not justified and amounts to taking undue risk. '' 19. Under the provisions of the Indian Railways Tribunal Act, 1987, the maximum liability for accidental deaths was Rs. 2,00,000 at that time and this was so irrespective of the fact whether Indian Railways was at fault or not as provided under Sections 124 and 124A of the Indian Railway Act, 1989 and as opined by the Hon''ble Delhi High Court in the case of Setu Niket v. Union of India & Ors. (supra). This is perhaps due to the nature of the Appellant/Union of India as a Welfare State. So keeping this nature of the appellant in mind, even without conclusively deciding the deficiency on the part of the appellant, we deem it appropriate to allow the same compensation as could have been allowed under the Railways Tribunal Act, 1987, had the same been applicable in the present case subject to further consideration of the contributory negligence evident on the part of the deceased. We do not completely agree with the assertion of the Indian Railways that no compensation could be given to the complainants due to contributory negligence of the deceased as held in the matter of Miro Devi v. Union of India (supra) In the circumstances of the case, when the negligence on the part of the Indian Railways is also not completely ruled out. Obviously the compensation payable deserves reduction due to the contributory negligence of the deceased. 20. Based on the above discussion, First Appeal No. 1226 of 2014 is partly allowed. The appellant is directed to pay compensation of Rs. 1,50,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the complainants instead of Rs. 18,23,000 as award by the State Commission along with the interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing of complaint as ordered by the State Commission. As there was no law under which the appellant/Indian Railways would have paid this compensation to the complainants, the complainants had to file this complaint to get award of compensation, we find no justification for awarding the cost of Rs. 25,000 as litigation cost. Hence this part of the State Commission''s order is set aside. The order of the State Commission dated 19.9.2014 stands modified on the basis of above directions. This order may be complied within a period of 45 days from the date of this order, failing which, an additional interest of 3% p.a. shall be payable by the appellant from the date of this order till actual payment. Parties to bear their own costs. Appeal Partly Allowed.