Union of India vs NITABEN J.PUROHIT

THIS appeal arises from order dated 17.4.2004 rendered by learned Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Jamnagar in Complaint Application No. 62 of 2002 directing the opponent Telecom Department to accept the deposit from the complainant and reconnect the telephone in question (Telephone No. 771100) and pay compensation in the sum of Rs. 1,000 on account of deficiency in service and cost in the sum of Rs. 1,000. It would appear from the facts of the case that the complainant, a doctor, had telephone in question at her residence. Her husband also had telephone bearing No. 553439 in respect of which there was outstanding bill of Rs. 17,273. On account of non-payment thereof, opponent Telecom Department issued notice dated 21.1.2002. As the complainant''s husband did not pay the bill, complainant''s telephone was disconnected on 2.4.2002. The complainant gave reply to the opponent''s notice. It was contended by the opponent Telecom Department before the learned Forum that as per the relevant rule of the Telegraph Rules, opponent Telecom Department was entitled to disconnect the telephone of the complainant, wife of the defaulter subscriber. The learned Forum considered the rule that was submitted from the side of the opponent department and came to the conclusion that the rule did not provide for disconnection of her telephone on account of default by her husband. The learned Forum, therefore, upheld deficiency in service alleged by the complainant and passed the impugned order. THIS appeal against the same has been taken up for admission.

WE have heard the learned Advocate appearing for the opponent Telecom District. WE have gone through the impugned order. WE have gone through the decisions which have been submitted for our consideration. Briefly stated Rule 443 reads as under: "443. Default of payment-If, on or before the due date, the rent or other charges in respect of the telephone service provided are not paid by the subscriber in accordance with these rules, or bills for charges in respect of calls (local and trunk) or phonograms or other dues from the subscriber are not duly paid by him, any telephone or telephones or any telex service rented by him may be disconnected without notice. The telephone or telephones or the telex so disconnected may, if the Telegraph Authority thinks fit, be restored, if the defaulting subscriber pays the outstanding dues and the reconnection fee together with the rental for such portion of the intervening period (during which the telephone or telex remains disconnected) as may be prescribed by the Telegraph Authority from time to time. The subscriber shall pay all the above charges within such period as may be prescribed by the Telegraph Authority from time to time".

On the question as to who this subscriber is intended by the rule drafting authority, reference has been made to Rule 2(bb) of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. It defines ''subscriber'' to be a person to whom the telephone service has been provided by means of installation under the rule or under an agreement. Reference has, however, been made to a decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Bhagwanji Devraj v. Union of India, reported in 1975 (16) GLR 357. In that case, the subscriber had two telephones, one in his personal name and the other in the name of his partnership firm. On default in payment of telephone charges by the partnership firm, it was held that the Telephone Department was entitled under Rule 443 to disconnect other telephone line of the defaulting subscriber also. It is important to note from this decision that the liability of the partners has been noted to be joint and several under Section 25 of the Partnership Act while construing the word ''subscriber'' given in the aforesaid rules. This decision came to be relied upon by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Indravadan Pranlal Shah v. General Manager, Ahmedabad Telephones District, AIR 1990 Guj. 85. There also, the petitioner was partner of Sukan Chemicals who was subscriber of other telephones in respect of which there were outstanding dues. Both the said telephones of the firm were disconnected and notice was issued to the petitioner, partner by name and it was stated that the telephone held by the petitioner was also liable to be disconnected if the dues of the partnership firm were not paid. Similar proposition noted in the case of Bhagwanji Devraj (supra) is to be noted from this decision also. Reference has also been made to a recent decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of New Ressian Automobiles v. Union of India and Another, 2000 (2) GLR 1427, where it has been observed that pursuant to Rule 443 Telecom Department would be entitled to disconnect the telephone of the subscriber in respect of the outstanding rent bill. The plaintiff subscriber in that case did not pay the dues in respect of three telephones and, therefore, the Telecom Department could not have been restrained from disconnecting 2 of the three telephones for which there was a lis before the Court. Finally, reference has been made to a decision of National Commission in the case of General Manager, Telecom v. Narsingh Das, II (2002) CPJ 53 (NC), where also the subscriber had two telephones and on account of default in payment of bills of one of the two telephones, other telephone was also required to be disconnected and it was held that the Telephone Department was entitled to do so under Rule 443.

In all the aforesaid decisions, it might be noticed that the telephone which was sought to be disconnected was that of subscriber, matters not whether such telephone is additional telephone of the subscriber or telephone of the partnership firm wherein he is a partner. In the present case, subscriber is a different person. Merely because she happens to be wife of the defaulting subscriber, Rule 443 could hardly be invoked in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Plain meaning of Rule 443 would also not call for disconnection of telephone held by wife in her own capacity.

IT has finally been submitted that since husband and wife have been residing in the same premises under the same roof, husband could be said to be beneficiary of wife''s telephone and, therefore, if the definition of word ''consumer'' as contained in Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is considered, wife''s telephone could also be disconnected on account of default of the beneficiary. This argument cannot be accepted as the enabling definition is for the benefit of the consumer. Said definition cannot be correlated with the meaning of ''subscriber'' as contained in Rule 443. Both the provisions are quite different provisions. In view of what is stated above, this appeal is rejected. Appeal dismissed.