Union of India vs Uday Pal

R.C. Mishra, J.—This is a petition, under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for review of the order-dated 5/3/2012 passed in M.A. No. 464/2012, directing the Registry to return the appeal for its presentation before the Bench at Gwalior in view of the fact that cause of action had arisen at a place between Jora Alapur and Sumaoli Railway Stations located in Distt. Morena, that falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bench of this Court at Gwalior. Learned counsel for petitioner, the Union of India, has strenuously contended that the order deserves to be reviewed as the order passed by the Tribunal, situated within the jurisdiction of the Principal Seat of this Court, constituted a part of cause of action and for the purpose, an analogy could have been drawn from Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. To buttress the argument, implicit reliance has been placed on a four-judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in Sri Nasiruddin Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, that has been explained in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, . Particular reference is made to Paragraph 24 and 25 of the Judgment in Ms. Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd.

Relevant extracts of Paragraph 24 and 25 (in extenso) may be reproduced here-in-below

24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . So far as the decision of this Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra) is concerned it is not an authority for the proposition that the situs of legislature of a State or the authority in power to make subordinate legislation or issue a notification would confer power or jurisdiction on the High Court or a bench of the High Court to entertain petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In fact this Court while construing the provisions of United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 stated the law thus:-

The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression "cause of action" in an application under Art. 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression "cause of action" is well-known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in arisen in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action.

The said decision is an authority for the proposition that the place from where an appellate order or a revisional order is passed may give rise to a part of cause of action although the original order was at a place outside the said area. When a part of the cause of action arises within one or the other High Court, it will be for the petitioner to choose his forum.

The statutory provision in the form of sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 reads as under-

Appeals.--(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every order, not being an interlocutory order, of the Claims Tribunal, to the High Court having jurisdiction over the place where the Bench is located.

(Emphasis supplied)

Observing that the language used in the amalgamation order is in pari materia with the language of the Notifications dated 28-11-1968 issued by President constituting permanent Benches at Gwalior and Indore President''s Order read with S. 51(2) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and both have been enacted to meet similar situations and with regard to a similar subject a Full Bench of this Court in Abdul Taiyab Abbasbhai Malik and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, proceeded to follow the ratio in Nasiruddin''s case (supra). G.L. Oza, J. (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the majority, made the following illuminating observations-

"High Court of Madhya Pradesh" only means the Chief Justice and such other Judges as may be appointed by the President to the said High Court. The place of sitting may be one or more, may be principal or otherwise; but it does not mean that the High Court means only the High Court sitting at the principal seat. The place of sitting is provided for the convenience of the litigating public and therefore sitting at different places they may hear cases from the respective districts only. S. 51 of the States Reorganisation Act itself contemplated the sitting of the High Court at more than one place. It is, therefore, clear that in view of the scheme of the States Reorganisation Act and in view of the context it could not be doubted that the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act contemplated the sitting of the High Court at different places with jurisdiction exercised by the Judges while sitting at those places in respect of areas allotted to those places for that purpose. The President''s Notifications dated 28-11-1968 confers exclusive territorial jurisdiction on the respective Benches and it is not in contravention of Art. 214 of the Constitution or Item 3 in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.

The question whether a particular case arises in a particular district or not can properly be examined with due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case itself; and it would not be possible to deal with it hypothetically. References under the income tax Act, the Wealth-tax Act and other tax references do arise out of cases before statutory tribunals. For purposes of such references it would be necessary to find out where the case arose which gave rise to the reference and that would be the determining factor for purpose of the expression ''cases arising'' in the districts specified in the Presidential orders. It cannot therefore, be said that such references do not fall within the expression ''cases arising'' within a particular district and as such the Presidential order is not applicable to them at all and they must necessarily be instituted at the principal seat of the High Court. Such references are not outside the scope of the Presidential orders.

(underlined by me)

Accordingly, in absence of any order, issued by the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the proviso to the aforesaid Presidential orders, directing that the appeals against the orders passed by the Tribunal in cases arising from the Revenue districts falling within the jurisdiction of the Gwalior and Indore Benches shall be heard and decided at Jabalpur, the appeal ought to have been filed before the Bench at Gwalior only.

This apart, in Ms. Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd.''s case (above), the Supreme Court also sounded a note of caution in the following terms-

We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.

(See. Paragraph 30)

There is yet another aspect of the matter. The review jurisdiction cannot be used as the appellate jurisdiction. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review Jurisdiction ( Parsion Devi and Others Vs. Sumitri Devi and Others, To sum up, viewed from any angle, there is no error apparent on the face of record requiring reconsideration of the order-dated 5/3/2012 (supra).

The petition, therefore, stands dismissed.