High CourtsSingle Bench(2021) 05 J&K CK 0016

Union Of India vs Villagers Of Hamray And Others

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 6 May 2021

HON’BLE JUDGES
Vinod Chatterji Koul, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CM No. 2978, 2979 Of 2021, RP No. 50 Of 2021

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

129 paragraphs · 2,953 words
1.

Application, taking into account averments made therein, is allowed and time for affixing of court fee etcetera is extended till the Court resumes

functioning in physical mode/hearing. CM disposed of

2.

Review of judgement dated 23rd April 2021, passed by this Court in dismissing Appeal, being CFA no.19/2018, titled Union of India v. Villagers of

Hamray and others, is sought for in instant petition on the grounds tailored therein.

3.

Mr S. A. Naik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of review petitioners, has stated that this Court while dismissing Appeal of review petitioners

has at paragraph 15 in judgement under review made mention of and relied upon a judgement of the Supreme Court passed in Trishala Jain v. State of

Uttaranchal (2011) 6 SCC 47, and quoted paragraph 42 thereof, which divulges that it is permissible to take into account large tract of land acquired if

the latter is also fully developed with requiring little or no further development. According to learned counsel, the case of review petitioners is exactly

same inasmuch as the land in question has been acquired in the year 2001 when there was no activity in and around the village while as other portion

of land which has been marketed @ 2,40,000/- has been acquired in the year 2004, that is, at least, after two to three years of earlier acquisition and

therefore equation of rates with the area adjacent to said village cannot be equated with land acquired for railway station as the rates have

subsequently increased. Thus, as said by learned counsel for review petitioner, the above judgement of the Supreme Court has been wrongly applied

and judgement needs to be reviewed, as such. Learned counsel also avers that paragraph 43 of the above judgement of the Supreme Court, also

fortifies the case of review petitioners as it reveals that by comparing the price shown in the transactions all variables have to be taken into

consideration as transactions in regard to smaller property cannot be taken as a real basis for fixing compensation for larger tracts of property. While

saying this, learned counsel asserts that case of review petitioners is that only one sale deed of village Hamray has been considered by Collector, but

same could not be corroborated with the value of the land in the year 2000-2001, as such, after meticulous deliberations by Collector concerned rate of

the land was fixed with complete reasoning, comparing the judgement passed by the Supreme Court with grounds of appeal, it will look that the

Supreme Court is in favour of review petitioners and ought to have paved way for allowing the appeal. It is also submission of learned counsel that all

that is mentioned in paragraph 17 of the judgement under review, is what review petitioners prayed in the Appeal as court below has not followed

principles laid down by the Supreme Court qua assessment of compensation on the basis of various factors laid down by the Supreme Court.

However, this Court is said to have wrongly applied judgment in Manomegalali [Manimegalai] v. The Special Tehsildar (Land Acquisition Officer) Adi

Dravidar Welfare, (2018) 13 SCC 491.

4.

It is pertinent to mention here that while considering abovementioned contentions, the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rue 1

of the Code of Civil Procedure is to be taken into consideration.

5.

The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, which reads as under:

“1. Application for review of judgment. - (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the

exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on

account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree

passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment of the court which passed the decree or made the order.â€​

6.

An application for review would lie, among others, when an order suffers from an error apparent on the face of record and permitting the same to

continue would lead to failure of justice. Limitations on exercise of power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of

entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the

order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.

7.

The power of review can also be exercised by the court in the event discovery of new and important matter or evidence takes place which despite

exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. An

application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake.

8.

It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It

constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. It is also trite that exercise of

inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order.

9.

Given contentions of learned counsel for review petitioners, it would be apt to mention here that in Trishala Jain (supra), it was held by the Supreme

Court, as has also been said in judgment under review, that more often than not, it is not possible to fix compensation with exactitude or arithmetic

accuracy and that depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, the court may have to take recourse to some guesswork while determining

the fair market value of the land and the consequential amount of compensation that is required to be paid to persons interested in acquired land. This

Court after reproducing relevant excerpt of judgement in Trishala Jain has unequivocally said that parties have produced documentary evidence as

also oral evidence and it is on the basis thereof that Trial Court came to conclusion that compensation, awarded by Collector, Land, Acquisition, was

not adequate and therefore, compensation in the amount of Rs.2.50 Lacs per kanal was reasonable amount of compensation.

10.

This Court, while reproducing pertinent excerpt of judgement passed in Manogelali (supra), has said that in making assessment of compensation to

be paid for land acquired, certain factors must be taken into account which include nature of land, its present use, and its capacity of higher potential,

its precise location in relation to adjoining land, use to which neighbouring land was acquired and so on. The facts and circumstances vis-Ã -vis

subject-matter of dispute before the Trial Court was rightly and correctly discoursed and decided by Trial Court and as such, this Court dismissed the

Appeal of review petitioners.

11.

Insofar as submissions made by learned counsel for review petitioners and averments made in review petition are concerned, those are not the

grounds that would portray or depict or show error apparent on the face of record but motion in hand is an Appeal under the attire of review petition.

12.

The Supreme Court in Haridas Das vs. Usha Rani Banik (Smt.) and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 78 while considering the scope and ambit of Section

114 CPC read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC observed and held as under:

“14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 it was held that:

“8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47

Rule 1 CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the

High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court, in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak

Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations:

'It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every

court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to

the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after

the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the

order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any

analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of

appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed

by the subordinate court.'

15.

A perusal of Order 47 Rule 1 shows that review of a judgment or an order could be sought: (a) from the discovery of new and important matters

or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not

be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the

face of the record or any other sufficient reason.â€​

13.

An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be

said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be

established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of

the superior court to issue such a writ. An error that is not axiomatic and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an

error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of jurisdiction under

Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petition, it must be remembered

has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’. [Vide: Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, AIR

1979 SC 1047; Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137, and Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997)

8 SCC 715].

14.

Again, the Supreme Court in Lily Thomas vs. Union of India, (2000) 6 SC 224, held that power of review could be exercised to correct a mistake

but not to substitute a view. Such powers could be exercised within limits of statute dealing with exercise of power. It was further observed that the

words “any other sufficient reason†appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those

specified in the rule†as was held in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose

Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526.

15.

Section 114, CPC, provides for a substantive power of review by a civil court and consequently by appellate courts. Section 114 envisions:

“114. Review.â€"Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved,â€

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code,

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small cause, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the

order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.â€​

16.

The words “subject as aforesaid†occurring in Section 114 of the Code mean subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed

as appearing in Section 113 thereof and for the said purpose, the procedural conditions contained in Order 47 of the Code must be taken into

consideration. Section 114 of the Code although does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court but such limitations have been provided for

in Order 47 Rule 1, CPC

17.

Power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of

statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation

of a statute. In the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844, the Supreme Court has held that power of

review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in

disguise. It is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real

difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case.

When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned counsel on either side were unable to

suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. The term “mistake or error apparentâ€

by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and

elucidation either of facts or legal position. If an error is not obvious and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be

treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment

cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court on a point of fact

or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision. [See: Inderchand Jain

vs. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663; T.C. Basappa vs. T.Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440; Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233;

Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372; Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170; State of West

Bengal and Others vs. Kamal Sengupta and Anr., (2008) 8 SCC 612; Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Rajah Vellanki Venkatrama Rao

(18991900) 27 IA 197; Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, 1949 FCR 36; K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473; Ajit Kumar Rath v.

State of Orissa, (1999) 9 SCC 596 and Gopal Singh v. State Cadre Forest Officers' Assn., (2007) 9 SCC 369].

18.

The Supreme Court in Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs and others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 896, after discussing

slew of judgement on the subject of review, has held that an application for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and the Court of review

has limited jurisdiction as to the definite limit mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC itself. The powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent

power nor can an appellate power can be exercised in the guise of power of review. After holding this, the Supreme court found that High Court

overstepped the jurisdiction vested in the Court under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

19.

In the backdrop of above well-settled legal position, all that has been argued by learned counsel for review petitioners is that this Court should re-

open the findings recorded in the judgement under review. It is made clear here that review jurisdiction cannot possible be used for that purpose. This

is not the scope of Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. After having an overall view of the grounds taken in the application and submissions

made by learned counsel for review petitioners, there is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of judgement dated 23rd April

2021. The review petition is wholly misplaced and the same is liable to be dismissed.

20.

For the reasons discussed above, review petition is dismissed.