High CourtsDivision Bench

Union Of India @APPELLANT@Hash Ravi Singh And Ors.

Rajasthan High Court · Decided on 2 April 2018 · Citation: (2018) 04 RAJ CK 0055

HON’BLE JUDGES
K.S.JHAVERI, J · VIJAY KUMAR VYAS, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writs No. 5596 of 2018
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Judgment

59 paragraphs · 1,298 words

By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order of the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal has allowed the Original

Application.

Now, the issue is covered by the decision of this Court in case of Union of India & Ors. vs. N.L. Khandelwal & Anr. (DBCWP No. 4897/2017) and

other connected matters decided on 24th November, 2017 wherein it has been held as under:-

“By way of these petitions, the petitioners have assailed the judgment and order of the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal has set aside the penalty

imposed for recovery of amount which was reduced from Rs. 54,833/- to 49,310/-.

While considering the case, the Central Administrative Tribunal observed as under:-

“27. I am inclined to agree with the averments made by the learned counsel for the applicant that the Disciplinary Authority could not have

confirmed the order dated 27.06.2005, which was already quashed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 25.02.2009 (Annexure A/21). Once the order is

quashed by the Tribunal then that order seizes to be in operation. The Disciplinary Authority was required to pass a fresh order after supplying the

necessary documents to the applicant for making his effective representation. However, the Disciplinary Authority while passing the fresh order has

confirmed his earlier order dated 27.06.2005. There was no bar to impose the same penalty of Rs. 54,833/- on the applicant by the Disciplinary

Authority but that could have been done by a fresh order rather than confirming that order which was already been quashed by the Tribunal. The

Disciplinary Authority while passing the fresh order did not even care to the order passed by the Appellate Authority, who had reduced the penalty

awarded to the applicant from Rs. 54,833/- to Rs. 49,310/-. He should have take care that Superior Authority had reduced the penalty amount then

there would certainly be some genuine grounds for reducing the amount of penalty. It appears that he was bent upon confirming his earlier decision.

Therefore, on this ground, the order dated 28.06.2011 (Annexure A/1) is liable to be quashed and set aside.

28.

I am also inclined with the averments of thelearned counsel for the applicant that the order of the Disciplinary Authority has been passed after the

expiry of six months period, which was given by the Hon’ble High Court to the respondents to complete the disciplinary proceedings. The order of

the Hon’ble High Court is very clear on this point.

29.

The Hon’ble High Court had directed the Disciplinary Authority to initiate expeditious disposal of the departmental proceedings in relation to

the case of the respondent strictly in accordance with the Service Regulations applicable to the case within a period of six months from today i.e.

09.08.2010. Six months were over on 08.02.2011. However, from the perusal of reply of the respondents, it is clear that photostate copies of the

documents, required by the applicant vide his application dated 21.10.2004, were supplied to him on 25.04.2011 i.e. after more then eight months of the

date of the order of the Hon’ble High Court. The respondents neither during the course of arguments nor in their reply have indicated as to why

that these documents could not be supplied to the applicant within time prescribed by the Hon’ble High Court and also that the Disciplinary

proceedings could not be completed within time prescribed by the Hon’ble High Court. If there was any difficulty in completing the disciplinary

proceedings within the prescribed time limit, then the respondents should have requested the Hon’ble High Court for the extention of time. From

the perusal of record, it appears that respondents have not requested the Hon’ble High Court for the extension of time. After a specific and clear

direction from the Hon’ble High Court to the Disciplinary Authority to complete the disciplinary proceedings within the specified time, it was the

duty of the Disciplinary Authority to comply with the direction of the Hon’ble High Court or else seek further extension. In this case, the

Disciplinary Authority has neither completed the disciplinary inquiry within the time frame nor sought any extension from the Hon’ble High Court.

In this particular case, only photocopies of certain documents were to be supplied to the applicant. These documents could have easily been made

available to the applicant within a reasonable period. In this case, no oral evidence was to be taken after the supply of the photostate copies of the

documents required by the applicant. The applicant was to be given an opportunity to file his representation. The Disciplinary Authority took more than

eight month to supply the photostate copies of the documents. No reason has been given for this inordinate delay.

30.

I have carefully perused the case law preferred toby the learned counsel for the applicant on the point that when a direction is given to complete

the departmental proceedings within fixed time frame and if that time frame is not honoured by Disciplinary Authority then disciplinary proceedings

would abate. This Bench of the Tribunal in the case of H.S. Shekhawat vs. The Union of India & Ors., ATJ 2004 (1) 458, has held that the entire

action taken after the prescribed time limit shall have to be treated as nullity and this order of the Tribunal was upheld by the Hon’ble Rajasthan

High Court, Jaipur Bench in DB Civil Writ Petition No. 2737/2004 (Union of India & Ors. vs. H.S. Shekhawat & Another) decided on 19.10.2010.

31.

While passing the order in the case of H.S.Shekhawat vs. The Union of India & Ors, ATJ 2004 (1) 458, this Tribunal has also considered the

order of this Tribunal passed in OA No. 443/2001 (S.K. Sharma vs. Union of India &O rs.) and Praban Kumar Dutta vs. Union of India & Ors, 2001

(1) ATJ 404. This Tribunal also considered the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal at Lucknow in the case of K.B. Bhardwaj vs.

Union of India & Ors., 2002 (2) ATJ 477. the Lucknow Bench of the Tribunal in the case of K.B. Bhardwaj (supra) has placed reliance on the

decision of the Apex Court in the case of M.L. Sachdeva vs. Union of India, 1991 (1) SCC 606 and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of

State of Bihar vs. Subhash Singh, 1997 (4) SCC 430 in which the Apex Court came to the conclusion that where directions could not be complied with

within the period allowed by the court an application for extension of time for with the directions was necessary.

32.

The OA filed by H.S. Shekhawat (supra) wasallowed and penalty order beyond the time was quashed. The ratio as laid down in these cases is

squarely applicable in the facts & circumstances of the present OA.

33.

As stated earlier in the present OA, theDisciplinary Authority had failed to complete the disciplinary proceedings within a period of six months as

directed by the Hon’ble High Court. The Disciplinary Authority has also not sought any extension of time from the Hon’ble High Court. Thus

I am of the considered view that the penalty order passed beyond the time prescribed by the Hon’ble High Court is a nullity and, therefore, it is

quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed that any recovery made from the applicant be refunded to him within a period of three months

from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.â€​

Identical case (DBCWP No. 15199/2013 Union of India &O rs. vs. P.P. Swami & Anr.) decided on 9th November, 2017 came up for hearing before

this Court where this Court dismissed the petition of the Central Government.

In that view of the matter, we also confirmed the order of Central Administrative Tribunal.

In view of the above, the petition stands dismissed.