Union of India (UOI) and Another vs V. Sekar and Another

F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.—The Union Territory of Pondichery is the petitioner before us. The challenge is to the common order of the

Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai dated 11.10.2001 in O.A.Nos. 591 of 2000 and 851 of 2000.

In O.A.No. 591 of 2001, the first respondent challenged the order of the Revising Authority dated 21.3.2000. The Revising Authority set aside

the order of the Disciplinary Authority, dated 2.9.1999 exonerating the first respondent of the charges levelled against him in the charge sheet

dated 17.5.1993.

In O.A.No. 851 of 2000, the first respondent sought for a direction for being promoted to the post of Revenue Inspector from 26.12.1994, that

was the date on which, his juniors were promoted.

By the impugned order, the Tribunal, while setting aside the order of the Revising Authority dated 21.3.2000, directed the petitioner to consider

the case of the first respondent for promotion to the post of Revenue Inspector in accordance with law from the date when his juniors were

promoted.

The brief facts which required to be stated are, that while the first was working as a Village Administrative Officer in the Union Territory of

Pondichery, he was issued with a charge sheet dated 17.5.1993 under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)

Rules (in short, ''the CCS (CCA) Rules''). Five different charges were framed against him. Thereafter, the enquiry proceedings commenced. As

there was some delay in the conduct of enquiry, the first respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Central Administrative

Tribunal, by its orders in O.A.No. 639 of 1998, directed the petitioner to conclude the proceedings within a time frame. Subsequently, the Enquiry

Officer submitted his report dated 9.7.1999 holding that none of the charges leveled against the first respondent were proved. The Disciplinary

Authority also concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and exonerated the first respondent from all the charges by its order dated

2.9.1999.

This order was revised by the Revising Authority in its order dated 21.3.2000 which was the subject matter of challenge in O.A.No. 591 of

2000 before the second respondent.

While assailing the said order, two contentions were raised by the first respondent before the second respondent. In the first place, it was

contended that the Revising Authority''s order was time barred as the same was not passed within the prescribed time limit contemplated under

Rule 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. It was then contended that there was no power vested in the Revising Authority to quash the charge memo and

direct initiation of fresh proceedings on the same set of facts by issuing a fresh charge sheet. Both the contentions found favour with the second

respondent and by the impugned order, the relief as prayed for by the first respondent came to be granted.

Mr. Syed Mustafa, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the Revising Authority, having initiated the proceedings by

calling for the records of the Disciplinary Authority in its communication dated 23.2.2000, it was well within the period of six months and therefore,

the conclusion of the second respondent-Tribunal to set aside the order on that ground cannot be sustained. The learned counsel also contended

that the Revision Authority was well within its jurisdiction to pass the impugned order dated 21.3.2000 and therefore, the same should not be

interfered with.

As far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner the Revision Authority initiated the proceedings on 21.3.2000 or revising

the order dated 2.9.1999. On a reading of the Rule 29 along with its proviso, we are of the view that initiation is the point of time which is to be

reckoned for finding out the compliance of the said rule for the purpose of limitation. In the case on hand, when the Disciplinary Authority passed

orders on 2.9.1999, six months period within which, the Revising Authority is empowered to review the order of the Disciplinary Authority would

expire by 2.3.2000. The Rule does not state that final orders should have been passed within six months time in order to come within the

prescribed time limit of Rule 29 of the CCS(CCA) Rules. The Rule only prescribes that the proceedings should be initiated within six months time.

Therefore, when the Revising Authority passed orders on 23.2.2000, it will have to be held that the same was initiated well within the prescribed

time limit and therefore, the order of the second respondent Tribunal on that score cannot be sustained.

As far as the merits are concerned, when we perused the order of the Revising Authority dated 21.3.2000, we are not convinced of the

consideration which weighed with the said Revising Authority for ordering de novo enquiry from the stage of framing of charge sheet: In the said

order, the Revising Authority after referring to the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings against the first respondent right from the stage of the

charge sheet dated 17.5.1993 and after extracting the five specific charges as well as the annexures attached to it, has merely referred to the

documents called for by the first respondent in the enquiry and by making certain adverse comments on the procedure adopted by the Enquiry

Officer with reference to the said aspect had abruptly reached the conclusion that the Disciplinary Authority''s order dated 2.9.1999 was liable to

be set aside and that a de novo enquiry was called for.

According to the Revising Authority, when the first respondent requested for certain documents in the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer was not

supposed to direct the Presenting Officer to produce those documents and that the Enquiry Officer himself should have straight away called upon

the Disciplinary Authority who initiated the proceedings against the first respondent, to have produced the documents. The Revising Authority took

the view that by calling up on the Presenting Officer to produce the documents sought for by the first respondent, the Enquiry Officer had given

scope for the first respondent to allege that the documents were tampered with. We are unable to either appreciate or see any acceptable

reasoning in the said conclusion. The very purpose of appointing a Presenting Officer on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority is to ensure that all the

materials are placed before the Enquiry Officer in order to reach a just conclusion.

In the case on hand, when the first respondent wanted certain documents and when the Presenting Officer was called upon to produce those

documents, it was stated before the Enquiry Officer that attempts were made to trace out the documents, but the same could not be secured.

Therefore, whatever stated by the Presenting Officer on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority was apparently based on the instructions of the

Disciplinary Authority and there would have been no scope for even the Disciplinary Authority to come forward with any other stand as regards

the production of the documents. Therefore, the said conclusion of the Revising Authority for the purpose of revising the order of the Disciplinary

Authority cannot be accepted.

Barring that the Revising Authority had not given any other reasoning in the order dated 21.3.2000 for interfering with the order of the

Disciplinary Authority. If that be so, the irresistible conclusion would only be that the order of the Revising Authority should be held to be non-est

in law.

Under Rule 29, when a power is vested with the authorities concerned to revise the order of the original authority, it is imperative that such

Authorities should give valid reasons as to why the order of the Disciplinary Authority required any reconsideration. If the conclusion of the

Revising Authority, namely, that the charges were all not clear is to be accepted, then again it would only result in approving of the order of the

Disciplinary Authority in having exonerated the first respondent of all the charges for such added reasons. Certainly that cannot be a ground for

directing the Disciplinary Authority to commence the proceedings once over again by issuing a fresh charge sheet on the same set of facts. In our

view, such an approach is totally alien to service jurisprudence and therefore, that cannot be allowed to take place.

An employer who desires to initiate the disciplinary action, should bestow all his attention while framing the charges and once the charges were

framed against the delinquent employee, the employer should stand or fall by the charges framed against the delinquent and can never be permitted

to revive the charges after the conclusion of the whole proceedings and allowed to contend that the proceedings can be revived by framing a new

set of charges. That apart on a perusal of the charges, we are unable to subscribe to the view of the Revising Authority that the above said charges

are not clear as held by it.

The other discrepancies such as non-reference to certain documents in the Articles of Charges or in the statement of imputation cannot be a

ground for setting aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority in the absence of any defect having been pointed out with reference conclusion of

the Disciplinary Authority, while passing the final order of exoneration. Therefore, even on this ground, we are unable to see any justification in the

conclusion of the Revising Authority for passing the order dated 21.3.2000 which was impugned by the first respondent before second respondent

Tribunal. In such circumstances, we do not find anything wrong with the conclusion of the second respondent Tribunal while passing the order

impugned in these Writ Petitions.

In the result the Writ Petitions fail and the same are dismissed. No costs.