High CourtsDivision Bench

Union of India (UOI) vs Ajit Singh and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 30 July 1997 · Citation: (1997) 117 PLR 778 : (1997) 4 RCR(Civil) 609

HON’BLE JUDGES
M.L. Singhal, J · G.S. Singhvi, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 151, 152, 153 · Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 23(1A), 23A
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Letters Patent Appeal No. 48 of 1988
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Judgment

18 paragraphs · 1,529 words

G.S. Singhvi, J.—Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in giving the benefit of Section 23(1-A) of the land Acquisition Act to the respondents on an application filed by them Under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the CPC is the only question which arises for adjudication in this appeal filed by the Union of India and, in our opinion, the issue must be treated as concluded against the respondents by the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Sarwan Hatkar J.T. 1995 (2) S.C. 532; State of Punjab and Another Vs. Babu Singh and Others, and Union of India v. Sube Ram and Ors. J.T. 1996(10) S.C. 529 and also by a judgment of this Court in The Hoshiarpur Improvement Trust Vs. The President Land Acquisition Tribunal and Another,

2.

Admittedly, the proceedings were initiated under the Punjab Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 many years prior to the insertion of Section 23(1-A) in the land Acquisition Act, 1894. Pursuant to the notification dated 10.8.1977 issued by the Government of Punjab, the Senior Sub Judge, Gurdaspur was appointed as Arbitrator. He gave the award on 5.10.1977. F.A.O. No. 44 of 1978 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 6.4.1983. After, four years and three months of the dismissal of the appeal, the respondents filed C.M. No. 3496-CII of 1987 Under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the CPC for awarding solatium and the interest at the enhanced rate in accordance with the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 which came into force w.e.f 24.9.1984. The appellant-Union of India opposed the maintainability of the application on the following grounds :-

(a) that the application Under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the CPC cannot be entertained by the Court for modification and only a review application could have been filed under Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC within thirty days;

(b) that the application was time barred; and

(c) that the benefit of the amending Act cannot be extended to the respondents.

3.

After hearing the counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge allowed the application filed by the respondents in terms of the order dated 14.8.1987 passed in CM. No. 1310-C-1 of 1987 in R.F.A. No. 107 of 1982.

4.

A look at the order dated 14.8.1987 shows that the learned Single Judge granted relief on the basis of the application filed Under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the CPC without examining the issue relating to the maintainability of the application and also without examining whether the benefit of the amending Act could be extended in a case in which the award has become final.

5.

In State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar (supra), the question which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the competent Court could grant the benefit of enhanced solatium etc. on an application filed Under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, the award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 17.12.1981. A reference was made to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jalgaon, on an application filed by the claimants. The reference Court passed a decree on 25.10.1983 and enhanced the compensation. The claimants did not prefer appeal against the decree passed by the reference Court. However, after coming into force of the amending Act, the claimants applied to the reference Court for award of enhanced solatium, additional compensation and interest. The Civil Judge accepted the application and the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State. The apex Court reversed the orders of the Civil Judge and the High Court of Bombay and held :-

"It would thus be seen that the additional amounts envisaged under Sub-section (1-A) Rules and (2) of Section 23 are not part of the component of the compensation awarded under Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act, They are Only in addition to the market value of the land. The payment of interest also is only consequential to the enhancement of the compensation. In a case where the Court ''has not enhanced the compensation on reference, the Court is devoid of merit towards any interest u/s 28 or the spreading of payment of interest for one year from the date of taking possession at 9% and 15% thereafter till date of payment into the Court as envisaged under the proviso.

xx xx xx xx It would be seen that a decree having been made u/s 26(2), the civil Court is left to correct only either clerical or arithmetical mistake as envisaged expressly u/s 13A of the Act or u/s 152 C.P.C. Though Section 151 C.P.C. gives inherent power to the Court, it is intended only to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or meet the ends of justice. The present is not a case of such nature. Further, since Section 23 is an express power under which the Civil Court has been conferred with the jurisdiction to determine compensation, and in addition to the market value certain percentage of the amount is directed to be awarded as envisaged wider Sections 23(1-A) and 23(2) and the interest component u/s 28, the invocation of Section 151 C.P.C. by necessary implication stands excluded.

Thus, we hold that the civil Court had inherent lack of jurisdiction and it was devoid of power to entertain the application to award additional benefits under the Amendment Act. The order thereby is clearly a void order. The High Court has not applied its mind to this crucial consideration but summarily dismissed the appeal."

6.

In State of Punjab v. Babu Singh (supra), the order passed by this Court for payment of enhanced solatium etc. on an application filed by the claimant Under Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC has been set aside by the Supreme Court. In that case, the notification u/s 4(1) was issued on 11.12.1974 and the award was made on 23.2.1978. While reversing the order of this Court, their Lordships observed :-

"Under these circumstances, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 has no application and there is no error in the award or the decree as initially granted. The High Court was clearly without jurisdiction in entertaining the application Under Sections 151 and 152, C.P.C. to award the additional benefits under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 or to amend the decree already disposed of."

7.

In Union of India v. Ajit Singh (supra), their Lordships reiterated the well settled proposition of law that the enhanced solatium and interest can be claimed only if the proceedings were pending and observed :-

"It is now settled legal position that the claimants would be entitled to the enhanced solatium and interest only if the proceedings were pending either before the Land Acquisition Office or Court. The Court defined u/s 2(d) of the Act as on the date of Amendment Bill was introduced and Act made by the Parliament. Therefore, the question that arises is; whether the High Court has , jurisdiction to entertain the application for enhancement under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 came into force. It is true that if it were a case of a superior Court having interpreted the law and the law having become final, by Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C. it could not constitute a ground for review of the judgment. But here is the case of entertaining the application itself; in other words, the question of jurisdiction of the Court. Since the appellate Court has no power to amend the decree and grant the enhanced compensation by way of solatium and interest u/s 23(2) and proviso to Section 23 of the Act, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, it is a question of jurisdiction of the Court. Since courts have no jurisdiction, it is the settled legal position that it is a nullity and it can be raised at any stage."

8.

While dealing with an almost identical issue in the in The Hoshiarpur Improvement Trust v. The President, Land Acquisition Tribunal, Hoshiarpur and another (supra), a Division Bench of which one of us (G.S. Singhvi, J). was a member, noted that the award was passed by the Land Acquisition Collector on 6.1.1979 and the supplementary award was passed by him on 30.7.1979. Reference applications were decided on 17.3.1983. After 11 years, the claimants filed applications Under Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC which were allowed by the Land Acquisition Tribunal. Setting aside the order of the Tribunal, the Court held that the application Under Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC was not maintainable for the purpose of grant of benefit of amending Act.

9.

In view of the above stated legal position, we hold that the direction issued by the learned Single Judge for extending the benefit of the amending Act of 1984 to the respondents cannot be upheld because the award was passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Gurdaspur on 5.10.1977 i.e. more than four years and five months prior to the insertion of Section 23(1-A) etc.

10.

Consequently, we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge.