Union of India (UOI) vs Pritam Singh

Mehar Singh, C.J.—The Respondent was in railway service when he made his claim in the Court below on July 15, 1965. He claimed Rs. 242.53 Paise plus interest due to him for over-time work. He valued the suit for purposes of Court-fee at Rs. 242.53 Paise. He did not calculate interest due to him on the amount he was claiming to the date of his plaint and did not pay Court-fee on that.

The Applicant raised a preliminary objection to the claim of the Respondent that civil Court had no jurisdiction in the claim in view of Section 22 of the Payment of Wages'' Act, 1936 (Act 4 of 1936), as the claim of the Respondent comes within the scope of Section 15 of that Act. This did not prevail with the learned trial Judge who by his order of February 14, 1966, came to the conclusion that he had jurisdiction in the claim of the Respondent. He said that he had carefully considered the provisions of Sections 15 and 22 of Act 4 of 1936 and had found that nothing in those provisions barred his jurisdiction. It is against the order of the learned trial Judge that the Applicant has filed this revision application.

The claim of the side of the Applicant is that the Respondent is claiming something which is due to him for over-time work and in Section 2(vi)(b) of Act 4 of 1936, any remuneration in respect of over-time work is within the definition of the term ''wages'', and hence claim to it is within the jurisdiction of the authority under that Act u/s 15, which means that u/s 22 the jurisdiction of a civil Court in regard to any such claim is barred.

In reply the Respondent has urged two arguments. One is that where a claim is composite, partly coming within the jurisdiction of the authority under Act 4 of 1936 and partly within the jurisdiction of a civil Court, then the claim is triable by a civil Court, as held by the learned Judges in C.V. Narayanaswamy Iyer v. K.A. Vasudeva Iyer AIR 1958 Mad. 360. The Respondent says that his claim to interest is not within the jurisdiction of the authority under Act 4 of 1936, but can only be within the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil Court. So even if remuneration claimed by him for over-time work is ''wages'' u/s 2(vi) of Act 4 of 1936, the claim as regards interest is not ''wages'' and, therefore, his suit being for a composite claim, the civil Court has jurisdiction to try it. In the first place, although the Respondent has, while claiming the exact amount as remuneration for over-time work, added to it ''plus interest'', but he has not calculated interest up to the date of his plaint and has not paid any Court-fee on that. In substance, therefore, he had made no claim for interest before the civil Court. His claim in his plaint cannot be described as a composite claim. Apart from this, secondly, assuming that he can make a claim for interest that I consider is also within the scope of Section 15 of Act 4 of 1936, because under Sub-section (3) of Section 15 he can claim compensation for deducted or delayed wages and interest is in the nature of a claim of compensation. So this argument on the side of the Respondent cannot be accepted.

The only other argument that has been advanced by the Respondent is that if there is a dispute about the amount claimed, whether it is due or not, then that is a claim which is for the civil court and not for the authority under Act 4 of 1936. In this respect he relies upon the judgment of Beckett, J., in AIR 1945 195 (Lahore) , in which the learned Judge after referring to proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 15 of Act 4 of 1936 was of the view that any bona fide dispute as to the amount payable as wages are to be tried by the civil courts because the authority under the Act can only try claim for wages which are admittedly due. Proviso (a) to Sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act reads--"Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to--(a) a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person. "In clear terms, this part of the proviso merely concerns direction for the payment of compensation and not direction by the authority under the provisions of the Act for payment of deducted or delayed wages. In Sarangdhar Singh and Another Vs. Lakshmi Narayan Wahi, , the learned Judges held that Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 15 prohibits only the making of a direction for the payment of compensation in the case of delayed wages and does not prohibit the making of a direction regarding the refund of the amount deducted or the payment of delayed wages as laid down in Sub-section (3) of Section 15; therefore, the proviso does not suggest that all bona fide disputes as to the amount payable are to be tried by the Civil Courts. The Lahore case ( AIR 1945 195 (Lahore) obviously proceeds on not quite a correct approach to Clause (a) of proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 15 and I agree with the learned Judges in Sarangdhar Singh and Another Vs. Lakshmi Narayan Wahi, . So this argument cannot be accepted from the side of the Respondent either.

Apparently his claim is for over-time work, which is within the definition of the term ''wages'' as in Section 2(vi) of Act 4 of 1936 and he has not really claimed interest, but if he had that was also claimable before the authority under that Act under Sub-section (3) of Section 15. So whether his claim is merely for over-time work or for over-time work and interest on the amount due; in either case the claim is within the jurisdiction if the authority under Act 4 of 1936. In regard to such a claim; the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred u/s 22 of that Act.

In the circumstances, the order of the trial Court is reversed and the Respondent, if so advised, may take back his plaint and present it to the authority under Act 4 of 1936. There is, however, no order in regard to costs in this revision application.