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Union of India (UOI) vs Rajesh Kumar Pradeep Kumar

Delhi High Court · Decided on 25 September 2002 · Citation: (2002) 101 DLT 141 : (2003) 2 RCR(Civil) 175

HON’BLE JUDGES
Kripa Shankar Gupta, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Arbitration Act, 1940 — Section 30, 33 · Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 119
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
I.A. No. 1273/98 and S. No. 1519/97
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Judgment

3 paragraphs · 572 words

K.S. Gupta, J.—Respondent-Objector filed objections (I.A. 1273/98) under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short ''the Act'') against the award dated 7th August 1995 which are being contested by filing reply by the petitioner-claimant.

2.

Although award dated 7th August 1995 has been challenged on diverse grounds but during the course of arguments Sh. M. Dutta for respondent pressed only the ground about award being filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. It was pointed out that as is evident from covering letter dated 19th May 1997 forwarding therewith the award dated 7th August 1995 by the arbitrator to the Registrar of this court, the award was sent to court at the request dated 2nd April 1997 made by Union of India (ITB Police). Relying on the decision in Govt. of Kerala and Anr. v. V.J. Chacko 1995(2) A. L.R. 50; Seth and Associates v. Steel Authority of India 1998(2) RAJ 528 (Cal) and Patel Motibhai Naranbhai and another Vs. Dinubhai Motibhai Patel and others, it was urged by Sh. M. Dutta that were award is filed before the court at the instance of a party to the agreement, it has to be considered as an application by that party and in such a case Article 119(a) of Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. While refuting the submission, it was contended by Sh. Dalip Singh for petitioner that as the said award was filed before the court by the arbitrator himself the said Article would not apply. Reliance was placed on the decision in Champalal Vs. Mst. Samrath Bai, ; Chowdhury and Gulzar Singh Vs. Frick India Limited, ; Moti Ram v. Mangal Singh and Ors. (1971) 2 Del 451 and The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd v. Marpro Ltd. U.K. 2000(2) A. L.R. 605. Notice (at page 5 of the file containing arbitration proceedings) would reveal that both the parties to petition were intimated through registered AD posts of the making and publishing of award on 7th August 1995 by the arbitrator. Aforesaid covering letter dated 19th May 1997 would show that award was filed therewith at the request dated 2nd April 1997 made by the petitioner (ITBP). To be noted that Seth & Associates''s case (supra) was rendered taking note of the ratio of Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court in Government of Kerala and Anr. (supra). In former decision, distinction has been made in between filing of award by the arbitrator suo moto and filing of award by him at the instance of a party to the agreement. Both these decisions fully support the contention referred to above advanced on behalf of respondent that where award is filed in court by the arbitrator not suo moto but at the instance of a party to arbitration agreement said Article 119(a) would apply and the award if filed beyond 30 days period will be barred by limitation. In none of aforementioned decisions relied on behalf of petitioner the question of filing of award by the arbitrator at the instance of one of the parties to arbitration agreement was either in issue or considered. In the said backdrop and the ratio in aforesaid two decisions, the filing of award dated 7th August 1995 was, obviously, barred by limitation.

3.

Therefore, while allowing objections (I.A. 1273/98), the filing of said award is held to be barred by limitation and the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.