Union of India (UOI) vs State of Gujarat

K.A. Puj, J.—Special Civil Application No. 5523 of 2003 is filed by the petitioners challenging the decision of the respondent No. 1. i.e. Union of India, as contained in the Office Memorandum dtd. 11.02.2003 changing the system of admission to the respondent No. 3 i.e. Sardar Vallabhbhai National Institute of Technology, with effect from 2003. The petitioners have also prayed for interim relief against the respondents restraining them from implementing the decision contained in the Office Memorandum dtd. 11.02.2003 and thereby continuing the prevailing system of admission as contained in the Information Booklet produced at Annexure "B" to the petition, in so far as filling up of 225 seats in the respondent No. 3 and for 129 seats allotted to Gujarat State for admission to Engineering Colleges of other States, is concerned.

The brief facts giving rise to the present petition as well as this Civil Application are that the respondent No. 3 institute was established as a Regional Engineering College (REC) pursuant to the Policy of the Government of India, in the name of Sardar Vallabhbhai Regional College of Engineering and Technology, Surat. The total intake capacity of the said institute is 450 students and further 129 seats of Regional Engineering Colleges of other States are allotted to Gujarat State. Out of the intake capacity of the College for basic degree course interalia of engineering, 50% for the students of the State, 30% for students of other States in the Region and 20% for students of all parts of the country other than the Region were to be allotted.

In the respondent No. 3 institute, right from its inception upto academic year 2002 - 03, the admissions were given on the basis of the merit list prepared by the Central Degree Admission Committee. The total seats in the respondent No. 3 allotted to students of the State (225) were apportioned between the students who had passed standard 12th examination of the Gujarat Secondary Education Board and the students of recognised Central Schools in Gujarat who had passed the standard 12th examination of the Central Board of Secondary Education and / or Council of Indian Schools Certificate Examination, in the same ratio as borne by the total number of such students to the total number of students clearing the standard 12th examination. On and average, such ratio was roughly 95:5 as between the students of the Gujarat Secondary Education Board and the Central Boards. The prevailing admission policy also envisaged special weightage marks being assigned for admission to Engineering courses to students who have passed standard 10th examination with two technical subjects. It is further stated that the respondent No. 3 institute was converted from an REC into an NIT (National Institute of Technology) and was granted status of Deemed University under the University Grants Commission Act (UGC Act). As a condition thereof, the Government of India stipulated interalia that the system of admission would not change as a result of the conversion.

It is further stated that some of the petitioners learnt that Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) had issued an admission notice in TIMES OF INDIA, Mumbai Edition dtd. 20.12.2002 stating interalia that as per the directives of the respondent No. 1, it would be conducting an All India Engineering Entrance Examination (AIEEE) for admission to degree level courses in Engineering in Central Universities, Deemed Universities, National Institute of Technology etc. and that the date of examination was 11.05.2003. It is further stated that such notice was not published in any other newspapers. It is further stated that the petitioners made representations to the respondents and other persons stating that the change in the system of admission, and that too with effect from the ensuing academic year was wholly unreasonable and high handed. It is further stated that the Gujarat Higher Secondary Board''s Examination of 12th standard (Theory) were to end on 08.04.2003 and of Practicals were to end on 30.04.2003, which left the students no time for preparations. It is further stated that the syllabus for the AIEEE was based on that of the Central Boards and the language of the question papers was either in English or Hindi. It was, therefore, contended that a large number of students in Gujarat would obviously be adversely prejudiced by such change. It is further stated that the respondent No. 1 has for the first time informed the respondent No. 2 State Government and the respondent No. 3 about the decision to change the system of admission with immediate effect, much after implementation thereof had already commenced. Since then, number of representations were addressed by the petitioners to the respondents and the concerned Minister to intervene in the matter since irretrievable prejudice would be caused to a large number of students in Gujarat by the sudden change in the system of admission. Despite this fact, the impugned decision has not been withdrawn or suspended. Hence, the petitioners have no other alternative but to challenge the said decision before this Court by invoking prerogative writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

It is stated that the impugned decision is contrary to the condition attached to the declaration of the respondent No. 3 as a Deemed University, and it is in breach of principles of natural justice and / or legitimate expectation of consultation and it also creates hostile and invidious discrimination between students of the Gujarat Board and the Central Boards in respect of admission to the respondent No. 3 institute. It is further stated that the said decision is absolutely improper, unjust and unreasonable in as much as such decision has been taken at the end of the academic term and it was not duly published and even otherwise, left virtually no time for preparation particularly in the context of the change in syllabus and the language of the question papers. This Court has issued Notice to the respondents on 28.04.2003 making it returnable on 07.05.2003 and an ex-parte ad-interim relief was granted in terms of para 23 (B) of the petition.

On service of Notice, the respondents appeared through their advocates and present Civil Application was filed by invoking the provisions contained in Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India for vacating the ad-interim relief granted by this Court on 28.04.2003. On behalf of the respondent No. 3, detailed Affidavit-in-Reply was filed by one Mr. N. Mohan Das, Assistant Educational Advisor (Technical) in the Ministry of Human Resource Development. On behalf of respondent No. 2 State of Gujarat Affidavit-in-Reply was filed by one B. J. Brahmbhatt, Under Secretary, Education Department, Government of Gujarat more or less, virtually adopting the Affidavit-in-Reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 1. Similarly, one Mr. Kashyapkumar Udayshanker Joshi, Director of the respondent No. 3 has also filed Affidavit-in-Reply and adopted the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1. The petitioner has filed Affidavit-in-Rejoinder on 16.06.2003 to the Affidavit-in-Reply filed by the respondent No. 1 and also filed Affidavit-in-Reply to the Civil Application filed by the respondent No. 1.

As far as present Civil Application is concerned, this Court has passed an order on 16.06.2003 stating that because of vacation and other reasons, the Court could not hear this application and hence, interim relief is not required to be automatically vacated by virtue of the provisions contained in Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India and hence, prayer (A) of the said application was disposed of. However, for the purpose of hearing of prayer (B) of this Civil Application, the matter was adjourned to 28.06.2003. However, at the joint request of the parties, matter was taken up for hearing on 23.06.2003.

Heard Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned advocate with Miss Amrita M Thakore, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, learned Senior advocate and Additional Advocate General with Mr. S.N. Thakkar for the respondent No. 1, Mr. A.D. Oza, learned GP for respondent No. 2 and Mr. S.N. Shelat, learned Senior advocate and Advocate General appearing for respondent No. 3. Mr. Mihir Joshi has submitted that Office Memorandum dtd. 11.02.2003 which is under challenge is contrary to the conditions attached to the declaration of the respondent No. 3 as a Deemed University and is illegal. It is specifically mentioned in the declaration dtd. 11.02.2003 that in respect of subjects other than those mentioned in the said declaration, the existing system of admission followed by respective NIT / REC will continue. The respondent No. 3 has been following the system of admission since decades on the basis of the results declared in standard 12 examination of the Gujarat Secondary Education Board. He has further submitted that the impugned decision puts a large number of permanently domiciled gujarati students constituting a substantial majority of the total number of students appearing in standard 12 examination, in an unfairly disadvantageous position vis-a-vis students of the Central Board. He has further submitted that the impugned decision takes away the right of the proportionate of seats between the students of the Central Board and the State Board prevailing for a long time and required to ensure adequate fair opportunity to both classes of students. He has further submitted that the impugned decision also puts an end to the established practice of granting substantial weightage marks to students who adopted for two technical subjects for standard 10 itself so far as their request for seeking admission in the respondent No. 3 institute is concerned. The said decision is, therefore, contrary to the principles of promissory estoppel. There is no justification on the part of the respondent No. 1 to make the said decision applicable with immediate effect and that too from the ensuing academic year, particularly in view of the fact that such decision was taken at the end of academic term and it was not communicated to the concerned persons at all. It was not adequately published in any newspapers publishing from the State of Gujarat. He has further submitted that the impugned decision purports to treat two separate classes of students i.e. one studying under the Gujarat Board and the other studying under the Central Boards, alike thereby treating unequal, equally which is unfair, discriminatory and illegal. Mr. Mihir Joshi has further submitted that the letter dtd. 10.10.2002 whereby the conversion of Sardar Vallabhbhai Regional College of Engineering and Technology, Surat into Sardar Vallabhbhai National Institute of Technology, Surat and its declaration as Deemed University u/s 3 of the UGC Act, 1956 was made subject to the conditions mentioned therein. It is specifically stated that system of admission including reservation policy / domicile requirements and eligibility criteria etc. shall not change as a result of the said conversion. However, this condition has been given total go-bye and a change was introduced so far as the system of admission is concerned. He has further submitted that though the decision was taken for such conversion in 10th October, 2002 for the first time, the official communication was made by Office Memorandum dtd. 11.02.2003. However, the students were not informed at all about the said conversion. He has further submitted that the Information Booklet for the year 2002 - 03 was published by the Technical Education Department, Gujarat State, Gandhinagar in which it is specifically mentioned in clause 7.2 that any student who has passed standard 10 examination conducted by Gujarat Secondary Education Board or Central Board or any other equivalent examination by the State of Gujarat from any recognised school with atleast two technical subjects, will be entitled to weightage marks for the purpose of Engineering study. By virtue of the change in the system of admission, the students are deprived of this advantage and hence, it would amount to breach of the principles of legitimate expectation. He has further submitted that those students who have planned their future career on the basis of this assurance would be deprived of the benefit which was given to them under the existing system. He has further submitted that no attempt at all was made for the purpose of having consultation with students who are directly affected by virtue of this change of system. It is further stated that the impugned action taken by the respondent No. 1 is in violation of the provisions contained in Section 12 of the UGC Act. Clause (D) of Section 12 states that the Commissioner has to recommend to any University the measures necessary for the improvement of University education and advise the University upon the action to be taken for the purpose of implementing such recommendation. It is stated that such recommendation directory in nature and not binding. He has further submitted that though it is repeatedly stated that it is for the purpose of uniform policy such a change was introduced, in reality, there was no such uniform policy as three Regional Engineering Colleges were excluded in this regard. He has further submitted that before introducing the said change, the respondent No. 1 has totally ignored the recommendation made by the State of Gujarat, the respondent No. 2 herein which has expressed the feelings of the large section of the students from Gujarat. Mr. Mihir Joshi has submitted that atleast for the current academic year, the change in the system of admission should not be introduced and it should be deferred atleast for one year so as to enable the students to have the adequate notice and an opportunity to prepare them for such a change. Considering all these submissions, Mr. Mihir Joshi has submitted that Ad-interim relief granted by this Court on 28.04.2003 should be continued and the petition be admitted and allowed.

In support of his submission that adequate publicity and proper notice was not given for the change in the system of admission, Mr. Mihir Joshi has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of KUMARI JAYSHREE CHANDRACHUD DIXIT V/s. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS (20 G.L.R. 614) wherein it is held that in a Society governed by the rule of law, certain basic principles must be observed. One of such principles is that enactments or orders governing public rights and duties must be open and adequately published and that they should be relatively stable.

Mr. Mihir Joshi has further relied on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Central Excise Vs. New Tobacco Co. Etc. Etc., for the proposition that it would be a proper publication if it is published in such a manner that persons can, if they are so interested, acquaint themselves with its contents. If the publication is through a Gazette then mere printing of it in the Gazette would not be enough. Unless the Gazette containing the notification is made available to the public, the notification cannot be said to have been duly published.

Mr. Mihir Joshi has further relied on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS V/s. RAVINDRA KUMAR RAI for the proposition that the change in the system of admission brought by virtue of Deemed University status granted to the respondent No. 3 institute can be made effective atleast from 2004 - 05 and in this context he has drawn the attention of the Court to para 9 of the said judgment wherein it is held that it would be appropriate to permit the State of Maharashtra to proceed with admission to medical / dental colleges in the State for the 1998 academic session in accordance with the system which was being followed by the Government of Maharashtra till now, namely, on the basis of marks secured in the qualifying examination subject to the condition that for the purpose of making a comparative assessment of the merit of the students who have passed the qualifying examination by different Boards, the State Government shall follow the normalisation process as adopted by the Birla Institute of Science and Technical Education, Pilani for such comparative assessment. The Court has modified the direction contained in its judgment dtd. 27.02.1998 and directed that the common entrance examination for admission to the medical colleges instead of being conducted for admission to medical colleges for the 1998 academic session shall be conducted for admission from the 1999 academic session onwards. Similar directions can be given by this Court in the present case directing the respondents to follow the new system of admission from academic year 2004 - 05 instead of current academic year.

On the other hand, Mr. K.B. Trivedi, learned Senior advocate and Additional Advocate General strongly urged that granting of interim relief by this Court at this stage has created a chaotic situation and the respondent is not in a position to finalise its counselling schedule and it would affect large number of students all over the country. He has further submitted that the change in the system was introduced only with a view to have an uniform policy and for the benefit and advantage of the community of students at large. He has further submitted that by virtue of this change, the quota of the students in the State of Gujarat has not at all been affected and no disadvantage is caused as contended by the petitioners. He has further submitted that there is no substance in the contention of the petitioners that they were not aware about the change as the petitioners have, right from 22.01.2003 made the representations to the authorities to consider their case. Not only that, but the petitioners have annexed the Office Memorandum dtd. 10.10.2002 alongwith the petition, which in turn talks of the recording of discussions and decisions taken in the meeting held on 27.07.2002. However, the said minutes are not attached with the Office Memorandum dtd. 10.10.2002.The respondent No. 1 has attached the said minutes at Page 146 of the petition alongwith its Affidavit-in-Reply which in turn states that from next year onwards, the students shall be admitted through all India entrance examination (CBSE Examination). However, the State share of quota shall continue to be the same. Thus, the decision was taken way back on 27.07.2002 and the petitioners were fully aware about the said decision as the said minutes was part and parcel of the Office Memorandum dtd. 10.10.2002.

Mr. Trivedi has further submitted that the avowed object behind the change in the system of admission was explained in the Affidavit-in-Reply and it is stated that in consonance with the overall responsibilities of framing uniform policies and with a view to bring an improvement in quality of Technical Education, various changes were initiated from time to time as per the requirements of Technical Education System. It is further stated that the existing system of empowering the Regional Engineering Colleges all over the country many times created discrepancies in allotment of seats, and hence, it was decided to have an uniform pattern of examination for regulating the admissions to the Regional Engineering Colleges by prescribing an All India Engineering Entrance Examination (AIEEE). It is further stated that guidelines issued by the UGC in respect of institutions declared to be Deemed University under the UGC Act were properly followed and it is in consonance with the order containing Clause 3 of the UGC Act. It is further stated that proper advertisements were issued by the respondent No. 1 in National Dailies dtd. 19/20.12.2002, 23.12.2002, 30.12.2002, 03.01.2003, 06.02.2003, 07.02.2003, 08.02.2003, 09.02.2003, 10.02.2003 and 11.02.2003 for conducting of AIEEE 2003 Examination. However, it is fairly conceded that advertisement was not published in any of the dailies circulated within the State of Gujarat. But, the students were aware about the same which can be seen from the representations made by them since January, 2003 onwards. It is further stated that about 3,27,353 students had registered from all over the country for the proposed AIEEE 2003 examination which indicates the adequacy of the notice for the changed pattern examination. It is further stated that more than 5,000 students in the State of Gujarat have registered for the said examination. It is further reiterated that more than 5000 students from Gujarat (as opposed to 570 students who have chosen to file the aforesaid petition) have appeared in the AIEEE which was held on 11.05.2003 at various places, all over the country pursuant to the Office Memorandum dtd. 11.02.2003.

As far as alleged discrimination with regard to other REC colleges are concerned, it is submitted that the respondent No. 1, by letter dtd. 17.04.2003 written to Birla Institute of Technology and Sciences, Pilani specifically directed that the students should be admitted in the institute only on the basis of AIEEE. Similar letter was also written to Dharmsinh Desai Institute of Technology, Nadiad on 14.05.2003 wherein it is stated that request for exclusion of deemed universities from AIEEE 2003 was rejected and institute cannot be exempted from joining AIEEE 2003. On the basis of the above submissions it is emphatically stated that there was no discrimination at all. Proper and adequate notice was given to all concerned and the decision was taken in the larger interest of the students at large. Lastly, it is submitted that similar issue arose before the Bombay High Court wherein a writ petition No. 676/2003 was filed seeking direction to the respondents to grant admission to the First Year Engineering and Technology courses at the second respondent VNIT on the basis of marks obtained at the 12th standard conducted by the State Higher Secondary Board for the year 2003 - 04. The Court has observed that the change from selection on the basis of 12th standard examination marks by selection by AIEEE was made on 26.01.2003 and Court thinks it to be sufficient notice of the change in the policy and hence, it was not considered by the Court to interfere in the policy decision taken in the matter. It is, therefore, submitted that this being the policy decision taken by the Government in the larger interest of the students, the Court should not interfere and Ad-interim relief granted by this Court should be vacated and petition be dismissed.

In support of his submissions, Mr. Trivedi has relied on the decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of RAVINDRA KUMAR RAI V/s. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS for the proposition that the Supreme Court has accepted the need for a common entrance examination and in this context referred to its earlier decision in the case of Chander Chinar Bada Akhara Udasin Society and Others and Yasar Shaff and Others etc. Vs. State of J. and K. and Others etc., wherein it is observed that "It need not be pointed out that the percentage of marks secured by different applicants at different types of examination at the higher secondary stage cannot be treated as uniform. Some of such examinations are conducted at the State level, others at the national level including the Indian School Certificate Examination. The percentage secured at different examinations are bound to vary according to standard applied by such examination bodies, which is well known. As such a common entrance examination has to be held."

Mr. Trivedi has further relied on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Hindustan Development Corpn. and others, for the proposition that a decision denying a legitimate expectation based on such grounds does not qualify for interference unless in a given case, the decision or action taken amounts to an abuse of power. Therefore the limitation is extremely confined and if the according of natural justice does not condition the exercise of the power, the concept of legitimate expectation can have no role to play and the court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected.

Mr. Trivedi has further relied on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Communications Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, for the proposition that "The change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on Wednesbury reasonableness. The decision maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy. The choice of the policy is for the decision maker and not for the Court. The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change in policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made."

Mr. Trivedi has further relied on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of English Medium Students Parents Association Vs. State of Karnataka and others, for the proposition that where the States desires to bring about academic discipline as a regulatory measure it is a matter of policy. The State knows how to implement the language policy. It is not for the Court to interfere. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has referred to its earlier judgment in the case of Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti and others Vs. Union of India and others, wherein it is observed that "it is a matter of formulation of policy by the State or educational authorities in charge of any particular situation.Where the existence of a fundamental right has to be established by acceptance of a particular policy or a course of action for which there is no legal compulsion or statutory imperative, and on which there are divergent views, the same cannot be sought to be enforced by Article 32 of the Constitution. Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be a means to indicate policy preference."

Mr. Trivedi has further relied on the decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Thapar Institute of Engineering and Technology and Another Vs. Gagandeep Sharma and Another, for the proposition that Prescribing the academic standards falls exclusively in the domain of special bodies like the Senate, Board of Governors and Syndicate etc. The court would normally not interfere with such prescribed standards and especially when they are intended to improve the academic standards in their respective institutes. The scope of judicial review in such matters would be very limited.

Mr. Trivedi has further relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of RHITU AGGARWAL V/s. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS 1993 (2) GCD 420 (Guj.) for the proposition that If the University has laid down its policy, it is not the function of this Court to declare it ultra vires on certain alleged drawbacks in the policy by holding that it is not a wise or prudent policy. The Court cannot declare that the provision made in the Ordinance is unreasonable because other subjects are also Science group subjects which would have been included in the Ordinance. Nor is it the function of this court to direct the University to provide for other alternative subjects in the Science group of subjects so that candidates from the other states can be admitted to the Engineering courses.

Mr. Trivedi has further relied on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Council for Indian School Certificate Examination Vs. Isha Mittal and Another, for the proposition that it is the obligation of the High Court to decide the matters before it in accordance with law. If the law is in favour of the appellant, High Court was obliged to issue an order in its favour. Considerations of equity cannot prevail and do not permit a High Court to pass an order contrary to the law.

Mr. Trivedi has further relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of VARVABHAI NATHABHAI RABARI V/s. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS (2001 (3) G.L.H. 681) for the proposition that the Court while entertaining the writ petition should not pass an interim order, the nature of which is to grant a relief which can be granted only at the final disposal of such a writ petition.

Mr. Trivedi has further relied on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) Vs. Union of India and Others, for the proposition that this being a policy decision, the Court should not interfere in the matter. In this connection, he has also drawn the attention of the Court to para 47 of the judgment wherein it is held that process of disinvestment is a policy decision involving complex economic factors. The Courts have consistently refrained from interfering with economic decisions as it has been recognised that economic expediencies lack adjudicative disposition and unless the economic decision, based on economic expediencies, is demonstrated to be so violative of constitutional or legal limits on power or so abhorrent to reason, that the courts would decline to interfere.

Based on the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, Mr. Trivedi has submitted that since the petitioners were pursuing the matter since January 2003, it cannot be said that it was not within their knowledge nor there was adequate publicity of the change. He has further submitted that there is no substance in the arguments canvassed on behalf of the petitioners that because of different syllabus and because of change of language, the students who have passed their examination in Gujarat Higher Secondary Education Board would be adversely affected. As a matter of fact, syllabus is the same and whenever a person opts for a competitive examination, the medium of instruction is bound to be either Hindi or English and one should not insist for the regional language. Mr. Trivedi has further submitted that exclusion of Durgapur etc. has no relevance as the said institutions are not deemed Universities and hence, they are not comparable. Mr. Trivedi has further submitted that the request of two institutes, namely, Birla Institute of Technology and Sciences, Pilani and Dharmsinh Desai Institute of Technology, Nadiad was not acceeded to by the respondent and they are also directed to adopt the new system of admission. He has further submitted that despite the request made from the State Government to consider the feelings and sentiments of the student community from the State that the change should not be enforced from the current academic year, Mr. Trivedi has submitted that the decision was taken way back in July, 2002 and it was communicated to respondent No. 3 in October, 2002 and students were also made aware about it on or around January, 2003. Since this being the uniform policy through out the country, the respondent No. 1 cannot make any exception and hence, the request of the State was not accepted. He has further submitted that even if the decision is taken by the State Government not to implement the change in the system of admission, it would not fall within the domain of State and the Union Government has to take decision taking into consideration the overall policy prevailing in the entire country and hence, the said decision was not accepted by the respondent No. 1. Considering all these arguments, submissions and legal authorities, Mr. Trivedi has submitted that the Ad-interim relief granted by this Court on 28.04.2003 should be vacated and since the present petition as well as the present Civil Application both were heard at length by this Court after giving ample opportunities of hearing to all concerned, the petition can also be finally disposed of as nothing further is required to be argued so far as the final hearing is concerned.

Mr. S.N. Shelat, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent No. 3 submitted that the respondent No. 3 is bound to follow the decision taken by the respondent No. 1. He has further submitted that the State Government wrote a letter dtd.11.02.2003 conveying the decision of the State Government to continue the admission for the academic year 2003 - 04 to REC / NIT as per the prevailing system of merit based admission in HSC examination, the same was not found favour with the respondent No. 1 and new admission policy was made effective from the year 2003 - 04. Mr. Shelat has produced before the Court the necessary correspondence exchanged between the concerned authorities.

Mr. A.D. Oza, learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondent No. 2 submitted that it is true that the State Government has conveyed the feeling and sentiments of the large number of students to the respondent No. 1. However, the respondent No. 1 being the final decision making authority, the State Government is bound to accept and follow it. He has further submitted that in the booklet containing Rules and Regulations for admission to First year courses in Degree / Diploma Engineering etc. after 12th (H.S.C.) Science Stream, against respondent No. 1''s name, it was made clear that the admissions are subject to approval from MHRD. He has further submitted that the representations made since January, 2001 itself indicates that the students in the State were aware and it was within their knowledge that they would have to appear in AIEEE for the purpose of getting admission in the respondent No. 3 institute. He has further submitted that about 5000 students did appear in AIEEE despite this fact and hence grievance raised by the present petitioners who are very less in number in comparison to those who appeared, does not appear to be justified.

I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties at great length and I have considered their submissions made and contentions raised before me. I have also given my anxious thoughts to the facts stated, submissions made and authorities relied upon by the respective parties. Before I begin to deal with the rival contentions, it is in the fitness of things to mention here that Mr. Trivedi, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondent No. 1 wanted the Court to decide and dispose of the entire petition since the matter is heard at length. Mr. Mihir Joshi, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that issues regarding change in syllabus and change of language as well as challenge to the new admission policy as a whole are not argued in their entirety and hence, the decision should be confined to the civil application containing the prayer for vacation of interim relief only. I, therefore, decide the Civil Application only and not Special Civil Application finally.

From the foregoing discussion, what appears to the Court is that the impugned decision dtd. 11.02.2003 of the respondent No. 1 is mainly challenged on the ground of lack of adequate notice or wide publicity of the decision, insufficiency of time to prepare themselves for the AIEEE examination, change in syllabus and change of medium, contrary to doctrine of reasonable expectation and consultation, violative of principles of natural justice and discriminatory and in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, having been treated equals unequally. If I consider these grounds of challenge to the impugned decision in the facts situation of the present case, I do not think it just and proper for continuation and / or not vacating the exparte ad-interim relief granted by this Court on 28.04.2003, after having given my serious thoughts to the entire issue and after having kept in mind the celebrated principles of granting of injunction, namely, primafacie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss or injury, not compensated in terms of money. I have discussed the entire issue threadbare and gone into it at a great length only because I have thought of finally disposing of the main petition too. It could not, however, be done. But in any case, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, mere admission of petition and issuance of Rule does not entitle the petitioners to be clothed with continuation of an exparte ad-interim relief granted by this Court on 28.04.2003.

The decision was taken in the meeting of Directors NITs held on 27.07.2002 to the effect that next year onwards, the students shall be admitted through all India entrance examination (CBSE Examination). However, the State share of quota shall continue to be the same. The respondent No. 3 was conferred deemed University status with immediate effect by Notification dtd. 04.10.2002. The respondent No. 3 was informed about this conversion, by letter dtd. 10.10.2002, alongwith which the copy of the record of discussions and decisions taken in the meeting held on 27.07.2002 was enclosed. The petitioners have produced this letter dtd. 10.10.2002, alongwith their petition, without its enclosure. In any case, without disclosing the source of obtaining this document, the petitioners presumably came to know about it at least from that date onwards. The petitioners have started making representations from January, 2003. Instead of indulging themselves and protesting the change, had they started preparation for appearing in Entrance examination as it has been done by about 5000 students from the State of Gujarat, there would not have been any grievance. Firstly, the petitioners have passed their time in making representations on 28.01.2003, 03.02.2003, 15.03.2003 and 22.03.2003, though ostensibly under the guise of preparing for standard 12 examination, upto 30.04.2003, no sooner the date of entrance examination i.e. 11.05.2003, came to be nearer and nearer, they have approached to this Court.The petitioners have not prepared themselves for the examination and they have not appeared as such in the entrance examination. It is lapse on their part and they can not claim any advantage or an equitable relief from the Court because of their own lapses. A career oriented student, in this competitive age, must prepare himself to face all challenges and all eventualities. There is, therefore, no justification in granting relief of deferment of implementation of decision till 2004 - 05 academic year.

As far as violation of doctrine of promissory estoppel and / or legitimate expectation is concerned, it is true that weightage of marks is given to the student who takes technical subjects in standard 10, while seeking admission to Engineering college and because of introduction of new system of admission on the basis of AIEEE, such student would loose this advantage. This, however, may be true and the admission in respondent No. 3 institute now is concerned, the students are even otherwise entitled to this advantage while seeking admission to other Engineering colleges. There are large number of such engineering colleges in the State of Gujarat. When merit-cum-performance at all India level is made the sole criteria by adopting an uniform policy and quest to find out the best talented students for professional competitive examinations is the avowed object of introduction of this new system of admission, the doctrine of legitimate expectation has no such role to play. The Courts have taken the view that when a policy decision is taken in the best interest of the public at large and that decision is not otherwise, capricious, perverse or ultravires, the Provisions of law, the Courts should not permit the parties to press this doctrine into service for their own advantage as against others. The petitioners will not therefore succeed on this count too.

The next submission of Mr. Joshi regarding impugned decision being discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, does not carry the petitioners case any further as the very foundation of making this submission is very erroneous. Mr. Trivedi has produced two letters - one addressed to Birla Institute of Technology and Sciences, dtd. 17.04.2003 and another addressed to Dharmsinh Desai Institute of Technology, dtd. 14.05.2003 rejecting their request to grant exclusion from AIEEE 2003 and directing them to admit students in their institute only on the basis of AIEEE 2003. Mr. Trivedi has further made it clear on instruction from the respondent No. 1 that no institute on which deemed University status is conferred, is excluded from AIEEE 2003 and instances quoted by Mr. Joshi are not comparable.

It has also come on record that a petition filed before the Bombay High Court raising the similar dispute and challenging the similar decision was dismissed by the Division Bench of that High Court holding that the change from selection on the basis of 12th standard examination marks by selection by AIEEE was made on 26.01.2003 and it was considered to be sufficient notice of the change in the policy and the court therefore did not consider it necessary to interfere in the policy decision taken in the matter. The Court, therefore, did not entertain the petition and summarily rejected it. Here in the present case, the first representation of the petitioners is dtd. 22.01.2003 which itself makes it clear that the petitioners were aware about the change in the policy and yet they have not prepared themselves for such change. Apart from the merit of this submission, judicial propriety demands that this Court should not extend an exparte ad-interim relief when these new facts are brought to its notice, after granting of an exparte Ad-interim relief.

Since this Court is of the view that the petitioners have had sufficient notice of change in policy, the decision rendered by this Court in 20 G.L.R. 614 does not render much assistance to the petitioners. Similarly, the petitioners came to know about the impugned decision since October, 2002 and they have started making representations since January, 2003, it cannot be said that there is no wide publicity of this notice or these facts were not within their knowledge. Even in this age of E-Mail and E-Communication, such a contention does not find any favour with the Court. The decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Central Excise Vs. New Tobacco Co. Etc. Etc., does not help much to the petitioners. It is true that the State Government has recommended to the respondent No. 1 not to implement the change in the policy for the Academic term 2003 - 04 and sentiment was strongly conveyed to the State Government by all cross sections of the society including academic fraternity. However, the respondent No. 1 after taking overall view of the matter and after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, did not accede to this request and since this being policy decision, the Court can not and should not direct the respondent No. 1 to postpone its decision simply on the basis of earlier recommendation made by the State Government and especially so when the State has filed its affidavit during these proceedings supporting the stand of the respondent no. 1. This Court is mindful of the fact that the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS V/s. RAVINDRA KUMAR RAI, 1999 (2) SCC 48 did give some what similar direction for postponement of decision by one year, but the entire complexion of the case was different and in the context of the present case, the same could not be pressed into service as it otherwise leads to an anomalous situation and causes injustice to many deserving and meritorious students who have already appeared in the entrance examination and now anxiously awaiting the result of the said examination.

In view of the above discussion and observations, this Court is left with only one conclusion that an exparte ad-interim relief granted by this Court on 28.04.2003 deserves to be vacated and it is accordingly vacated. Rule in Civil Application is made absolute with no order as to costs.

For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the prayer made in this Civil Application in paragraph 5 (B) is hereby granted. Ad-interim relief granted by this Court on 28.04.2003 is hereby vacated. Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners submits that Ad-interim relief is in operation from 28.04.2003 onwards and the present Civil Application is moved on 23.05.2003 which is disposed of by this Court today and hence, the Ad-interim relief would be extended for a further period of one week so as to enable the petitioners to avail appropriate remedy under the law and challenge this order before the Division Bench of this Court. Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, learned Senior counsel and Additional Advocate General appearing for respondent No. 1 and Mr. A.D. Oza, learned GP appearing for respondent No. 2 strongly objected to any extension of Ad-interim relief. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ad-interim relief granted by this Court on 28.04.2003 is continued with modification that from Stage 6 onwards of Counselling schedule given at page 10 of Annexure attached with the present petition shall not be finalised and it is subject to further order that may be passed in the appeal that may be preferred by the petitioner challenging the impugned order , till 02.07.2003. In view of the above observation, present Civil Application is disposed of.