Union Territory vs Presiding Officer

Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.—This order shall dispose of two identical writ petitions bearing CWP No. 25131 of 2013 (Union Territory Chandigarh and another v Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court, U.T. Chandigarh and another) and CWP No. 25132 of 2013 (Union Territory Chandigarh and another v Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court, U.T. Chandigarh and another), filed by the management against the similar awards passed by the learned Labour Court thereby allowing the reference in favour of the respondents-workmen directing reinstatement with continuity of service and 50% back wages. However, for the facility of reference, the facts are being culled out from CWP No. 25131 of 2013. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned Labour Court proceeded on erroneous approach while passing the impugned award. She further submits that respondent-workman failed to discharge the initial onus which was admittedly on him to establish on record that he had completed 240 days of service during preceding twelve calendar months on the date of his alleged termination of service. She further submits that since the learned Labour Court did not record any finding about the alleged violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (''the I.D. Act for short) at the hands of the petitioner-management, the reference was bound to be dismissed. Finally, she prays for allowing the present writ petition by setting aside the impugned award.

Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, after careful perusal of the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present one is not a fit case warranting any interference at the hands of this Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter.

The present case was based on two orders. The first order was passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (''CAT'' for short) and the second order was passed by this Court in CWP No. 4685 of 2012. It is an admitted position on record that while passing the order, it was directed by the CAT that the workman shall be allowed to continue to work and they will be replaced only by the persons who would be recruited on regular basis. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners has fairly stated that owing to the orders passed by the CAT as well as by this Court, the respondent-workman had completed more than 9 years of service but only because of the orders passed by the CAT. She submits that in such a situation, the statutory protection u/s 25-F of the I.D. Act will not be available to the respondent-workman.

This contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is only to be noted to be rejected. The reason is that the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is neither supported by any provisions of law contained in the ID Act. nor any judge made law. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the learned Labour Court committed no error of law while passing the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld.

When the orders were being passed by the CAT as well as this Court, the petitioner-management never raised any issue which might have been adjudicated upon that if under the orders passed by the CAT, the workman would be completing service of more than 240 days in any one calendar year before termination of his service, he will not be entitled for the statutory protection u/s 25-F of the I.D. Act. The reason not to raise such a contention was obvious because no such plea could have possibly been raised by the petitioner either before the CAT or before this Court.

It is also not disputed on record that at the time of terminating the services of respondent-workman, petitioner management neither issued any notice for one month to the respondent-workman nor any salary in lieu thereof was paid. Similarly, no retrenchment compensation was paid to the respondent-workman at the time of terminating of his service. Thus, the mandatory provisions of law contained in Section 25-F of the I.D. Act stand glaringly violated in the present case. In this view of the matter, it is unhesitatingly held that the respondent-workman was, as a matter of fact, entitled for the statutory protection u/s 25-F of the I.D. Act and no fault can be found with the impugned award.

Once the respondent-workman had completed more than 9 years of service out of which he served for some time on the strength of the orders passed by the court of competent jurisdiction, i.e. CAT or this Court, a valuable right had accrued in favour of the respondent-workman under the I.D. Act providing him the protection u/s 25-F of the I.D. Act. In such a situation, the petitioner-management was certainly entitled to replace the respondent-workman by regularly selected persons. However, it was the statutory obligation of the petitioner-management to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. Since the petitioner management has failed in its duty to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act at the time of terminating the service of respondent workman, the learned Labour Court rightly came to the rescue of the respondent-workman while passing the impugned award(s).

During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners could not press into service any substantive arguments so as to convince this Court to take a different view than the one taken by the learned Labour Court. Further, no prejudice has been shown to have been caused to the petitioner-management by passing the impugned awards. No jurisdictional error or patent illegality apparent on the record of the case has been pointed out in the impugned awards and the same deserve to be upheld for this reason as well.

No other argument was raised.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that both the writ petitions are misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance. Thus, these must fail. No case for interference has been made out. Resultantly, both the writ petitions stand dismissed, however with no order as to costs.