Supreme CourtDivision Bench(2013) 02 SC CK 0101

Union Territory of Pondicherry and Others - Appellants @HASH Meenakshi Devi Bhavanani and Others

Supreme Court Of India · Decided on 18 February 2013 · Citation: (2014) 2 SCT 611

HON’BLE JUDGES
Dr. B.S. Chauhan and Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, JJ.
RESULT
Disposed Of
CASE NUMBER
Civil Appeal No(s). 5543 to 5550 of 2001.

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

22 paragraphs · 2,041 words
1.

These civil appeals arise out of the common judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated 3.4.2001 in Writ Appeal Nos. 1344-1347/1986 and 2205-2208/1987. The first and second respondent in these civil appeals approached the High Court by filing batch of writ petitions when they were confronted with two Government Orders dated 25.8.1986 in G.O. Ms. No.57 and 58. Pursuant to the above two Government orders, according to first and second respondent, the appellant herein sought to interfere with their right to deal with the institution called Sri Kamblisamy Madam, Pakkamudayanpet, Oulgaret Commune, Pondicherry (now known as Puducherry). While challenging the above referred two Government orders, the writ petitioners also raised a challenge to Section 4(1) and 9(1) of the Pondicherry Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1982 (No.10 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'').

2.

While resisting the challenge made in the writ petitions, the appellants herein among other grounds also raised the question as regards the locus of the petitioners namely, the first and second respondent herein. Such opposition was made inter alia on several grounds including on the ground that they were foreigners and that they did not possess appropriate rights in claiming authority over the management of the Sri Kamblisamy Madam. Though such an issue was raised before the learned Single Judge and the learned Judge also dealt with the said question of locus in his judgment dated 10.12.1986, we find that a conclusion was arrived at to the effect that the writ petitioners-respondents 1 and 2 herein did have the locus standi to question the act of taking over in its purported attempt of the Appellant under Section 4(1) and 9(1) of the Act. The learned Judge ultimately held that Section 4(1) and 9(1) of the Act was ultra vires of the Constitution and the impugned G.Os 57 and 58 were invalid. As regards the question as to the status of the institution and the applicability of the Act, the learned Judge held as under:

"16.....Therefore, so far as the second qualification is concerned, having regard to the conjuctive clause ''and'' occurring in clause (e), I should conclude that it is a ''Math'' falling within the definition of the Act. I should also in this connection, note that at no point of time excepting in the affidavit before me it was ever claimed that it is not a religious institution, perhaps to say that it would almost amount to a blasphemy, and that was the reason why the petitioners did not choose to do so. However I cannot rest my conclusion on that concession but purely on the interpretation of the scope of section 2(e). Therefore, the first of the arguments of Mr. Krishna Shetty that this is not a Mutt and hence the Act is not applicable, has to be rejected."

3.

Aggrieved by the striking down of Section 4(1) and 9(1) of the Act and the setting aside of the G.Os, the appellant preferred writ appeals while the respondents 1 and 2 herein also challenged the order of the learned Single Judge, in so far as the learned Single Judge''s conclusion about the applicability of the Act. The Division Bench by the judgment impugned in these appeals while upholding the striking down of Section 4(1) and 9(1) of the Act of 1972 and the two G.Os dated 25.8.1986 also held that the institution was not a religious institution falling within the definition of Section 2(e) of the Act and consequently the Act in question was not applicable to the institution. This is how the appellants are before us.

4.

Be that as it may, when the issue was pending consideration before the Division Bench, an interim order came to be passed on 18.12.1986 to the following effect:

"The Board of Trustees appointed by the Government in G.O. Ms. No.57.CHRI/T.1 dated 25th August, 1986 shall be in custody of the Mutt and its various properties and it shall also administer the secular aspects of the Mutt. However, the Board shall permit the second respondent Anands Bhavanani alias Swami Gitananda to be in charge of the religious aspects of the Mutt and perform the religious functions vested in him as such Head of the Mutt. The first and the second respondents along with their son will also be permitted to stay in the first floor of the premises known as Ananda Asharam situated in the premises of the Mutt and marked in blue shades in the plan which we are annexing to this order.

It is represented by the learned counsel for the appellants that on 25.8.1986 and 26.8.1986 when the Board of Trustees went to take over the administration, an inventory may be given to the learned counsel for the respondents. We do not want to make any direction regarding the same till the parties want a direction on that.

Except to the extent of occupying the first floor portion of the Ananda Ashram referred to above, in respect of the other properties and assets to the Mutt, there will be an injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the management and administration by the Board of Trustees.

sd/- Kali Muhlla Baig

Asstt. Registrar"

5.

After the passing of the above said interim order dated 18.12.1986, due to certain subsequent development, the said order came to be modified to a limited extent by order dated 21.12.1994 by the Division Bench. The relevant part of the said order is to the following effect:

"...When the person authorised to manage and administer the Mutt expired, the Head of the Mutt, who had authorised the late Gitananda Swami will be entitled to exercise all those powers. Therefore, we see no reason to refuse the interim prayer, which would be only in conformity with the order dated 18.12.1986 passed on C.M.P. No. 18083 of 1986 in W.A. No.1347 of 1986. The only difference being in the place of Ananda Bhavanani alias Swami Gitananda (deceased) Sarkaragiri Swamigal would be in charge of the all religious aspects of the Mutt and perform all religious functions vested in the Head of the Mutt. One cannot fail to notice the fact that Sankaragiri Swamigal was the Head of this very same Mutt before he executed the release deed in favour of Swami Gitananda to administer and manage the Mutt. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this petition is allowed Sankaragiri Swamigal is permitted to be in charge of the religious aspects of Kambli Swamigal Madam, and perform the religious functions vested in the Head of the Kambli Swamigal Madam, with the assistance of Ananda Balayogi Bhavanani.

Post this appeal and the connected cases for hearing on 8.2.1995.

(K.A. SWAMI,CJ) (TSJ)

21st December, 1994"

6.

In the above stated background, the special leave petitions were entertained on 17.8.2001 by this Court while granting leave and noting the appearance made on behalf of the first and second respondents, an interim order was passed to the effect that "the status quo shall be maintained in relation to puja as was in existence during the pendency of the matter before the High Court in terms of its interim order".

7.

The interim order was modified by the subsequent order of this Court dated 3.12.2001 stating that "status quo shall be maintained as it existed earlier during the pendency of this matter". In effect, whatever status quo that was maintained when the matter was pending before the High Court and which prevailed as on the date when the special leave petitions were entertained by this Court on 17.8.2001, was directed to be maintained. It is stated before us by learned counsel for respective parties that the said position continued to be maintained even as on date.

8.

We heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having examined the orders impugned and all other material papers, at the very outset we find that the issue raised as regards the locus of the first and second respondents vis-a-vis the institution namely, Sri Kamblisamy Madam has not been properly examined in the order impugned in these appeals. Though Mr. A. Mariarputham, learned senior counsel appearing for first and second respondents attempted to contend that the said issue was not raised as a focal point in these appeals at the instance of the appellant, inasmuch as, such issue would strike at the root of the claim of the first and second respondents vis-a-vis the institution - Sri Kamblisamy Madam, we are of the view that there ought to have been proper consideration of the said issue in detail.

9.

We are also conscious of the fact that the first and second respondents did approach the civil court once in the year 1984 by filing a original suit No. 353/1983. Mr. M.S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants brought to our notice an order dated 20.12.1984 passed in I.A. NO. 3841/1984 in the said suit which was filed under Order 23 Rule 1 (3)(b) read with Rules 38 and 151 of C.P.C by which the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry dismissed the suit. He also took note of the fact that the said suit was filed for mere injunction and in the application filed for withdrawal of the said suit it was prayed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 to permit them to withdraw the suit reserving their right to seek for appropriate remedy in court in the event of any interference in future and a fresh cause of action arose. The learned Judge also noted that the respondents therein cannot technically object the plaintiffs'' prayer to reserve their right for filing any fresh suit later on, inasmuch as, the trial of the court had not commenced and so on.

10.

Keeping the above factors in mind, when we examined the respective contentions, we are of the view that the issue concerning the locus of respondents 1 and 2 as to their rights in regard to the management as well as the properties of the institution Sri Kamblisamy Madam has to be worked out before the appropriate forum in the manner known to law. We also make it clear that such a substantial issue could not have been examined or decided in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court as that would involve very many disputed questions of fact relating to the rights of the respective parties.

11.

As far as the decision of the learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench relating to the vires of Section 4(1) and 9(1) of the Act, it was brought to our notice that the said issue is pending consideration before another Bench of this Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 476/2012. In such circumstances, we only state that leaving the said question open for consideration to be decided by the appropriate Bench, we are not expressing any opinion on that issue. As far as the writ petitioners'' right, entitlement or any other issue as regards Sri Kamblisamy Madam is concerned, it is open to respondents 1 and 2 to work out their remedy before the appropriate civil court in the manner known to law, if so advised. In the event of respondents 1 and 2 working out their remedy before appropriate civil court, it is always open to them to fall back upon Section 14 of Limitation Act to seek for appropriate orders and it is also open to the appellant to resist such suit on all issues including on the issue relating to the question of limitation by raising appropriate plea in that respect. Leaving all issues left open to be decided by the appropriate civil court in the event of respondents 1 and 2 choose to work out their remedy in the manner known to law, these civil appeals stand disposed of.

12.

Whatever interim order that was existing and was operating as on date shall continue to operate for a period of three months from the date of this order and thereafter, it will be open to respondents 1 and 2 to seek appropriate interim orders before the civil court concerned, if so advised. Our direction to continue to maintain the interim order shall however, cease to operate automatically on the expiry of three months from the date of this order.