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Judgment
The second opposite party in W.C.C.No.494/2003, the insurance company challenges the award of compensation passed in favour of the
dependents of deceased Dharman.
Sri.Dharman was engaged as a driver of an autorickshaw bearing registration No.KL-8/A-6386 on 30.5.2003. The contention is that he died of
heart attack while being engaged by the third opposite party. In this appeal, the substantial question raised for consideration is whether the workman
who died of heart attack and without having any personal injuries is entitled to compensation. Learned counsel for the appellant relying on a decision
reported in Shakuntala v. Prabhakar [2006(4) KLT 1031 (SC)] submitted that the death arising out of heart attack is not an accident and therefore
respondents 1 to 3 in this appeal should not have been favoured with an award of compensation by the Commissioner.
I heard the learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 as well in this matter.
My attention was drawn to the evidence given by the widow AW1 as well as AW2 the co- worker. The evidence given by the widow indicates that
her husband was doing his work restlessly and was most often under stress and strain arising out of his employment. Further the vehicle was often run
through rough surface of the road. This evidence was accepted by the Commissioner and the definite finding is to the effect that though the immediate
cause was heart attack, it was on account of restless and hard driving of the deceased. The term 'accident' is not defined anywhere in the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 and it could be ordinarily understood to be an untoward incident which causes personal injuries to the workman. Though in
the present case no physical injury is proved, heart attack was shown to be the result of restless and hard driving of the deceased. That means, heart
disease had got at least casual connection with the employment of the deceased. That being the position, the decision cited before me cannot apply to
the facts of the case. Therefore, agreeing with the learned Commissioner, I also find that the death was on account of the accident understood in the
larger meaning of personal injury referred to in Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Learned counsel for the appellant raised another point to the effect that there is nothing on record to prove that the deceased was employed by the
3rd opposite party. It was contended that the deceased was a person who used to hire vehicles from many persons and was accordingly self
employed. This contention was not accepted by the Commissioner. On the other hand, the definite finding is that the deceased was employed by the
third opposite party, despite the fact that the first opposite party was the insured in whose name the policy was issued. The insurance company was
found to be liable in as much as the first opposite party continued to be the registered owner, even though the policy was not changed in the name of
the third opposite party.
There is no reason to differ from this finding. Under Section 157 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the policy runs with the vehicle and by virtue of
the deemed transfer stipulated in the provision, the liability under policy devolves on the insurance company, notwithstanding change of policy not
having been effected.
After having heard both sides, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Commissioner.
In the result, appeal fails and it is dismissed.
All pending interlocutory applications are closed.