Urmila @APPELLANT@Hash State of Rajasthan & Ors.

This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:

“a. That by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be restrained from deleting

Question No.141 from Social Science Subject Question Paper and Question No.92 from GK & Education Psychology Subject.

b. That by an appropriate writ, order or direction, therespondents may kindly be directed to give numbers for Question No.141 from Social Science

Subject Question Paper and Question No.92 from GK & Education Psychology Subject and to give appointment on the post of Senior Teacher Grade

II.

c. Any other appropriate writ, order or direction, whichthis Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case

may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner.

d. Writ petition filed by the petitioner may kindly beallowed with costs.â€​

Learned counsel for the parties agree that the present controversy is covered by the judgment rendered by this Court in a batch of writ petitions,

leading case being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3083/2018 (Rameshvri Kumari Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. decided on 05.05.2018), relevant

portion of which reads as under:

“36. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case alongwith the precedent laws cited at the Bar.

The questions arises for consideration of this Court is whether this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can sit in appeal over the

report given by the expert committee and substitute its own finding in place of the opinion of the expert committee, pertaining to the evaluation of the

answer scripts of the examination for public employment.

Before entering into the merits of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners in regard to the faulty answer keys, we propose

to first deal with the contention of the respondents regarding the scope of judicial review in such matters.

Leading precedent law, in this series, is Kanpur University & Ors. Vs. Samir Gupta & Ors., reported in (1983) 4 SCC 309, wherein, the question

arose for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court was to the effect that if a paper-setter commits an error while indicating the correct

answer to a question set by him, can the students who answer that question correctly be failed for the reason that though their answer is correct, it

does not accord with the answer supplied by the paper-setter to the University as the correct answer? In the case before the Supreme Court, the

questions were multiple choice objective type and the candidates were required to exercise choice in respect of one correct answer out of the four

alternatives, as in the case at hand.

The relevant portion of the judgment in Kanpur Univesity & Ors. Vs. Samir Gupta & Ors. (supra) reads as under:

“ . . . . . .We agree that the key-answer should be assumed to be correct unless it is proved to be wrong and that it should not be held to be

wrong by an inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation. It must be clearly demonstrated to be wrong, that is to say, it must be

such as no reasonable body of men wellversed in the particular subject would regard as correct. The contention of the University is falsified in this

case by a large number of acknowledged textbooks, which are commonly read by students in U.P. Those text-books leave no room for doubt that the

answer given by the students is correct and the key answer is incorrect.

. . . . . . . Secondly, a system should be devised by the State Government for moderating the key answers furnished by the paper setters. Thirdly, if

English questions have to be translated into Hindi, it is not enough to appoint an expert in the Hindi language as a translator. The translator must know

the meaning of the scientific terminology and the art of translation. Fourthly, in a system of 'Multiple Choice Objective-type test', care must be taken to

see that questions having an ambiguous import are not set in the papers. . . . .  . . . .â€​

The Hon’ble Apex Court, recently, in Ran Vijay Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2018) 2 SCC 357, has laid down the

precedent law regarding the scope of judicial view in the matters pertaining to the recruitment process, while referring the law laid down in Kanpur

University & Ors. Vs. Samir Gupta & Ors. (supra) amongst other precedent laws.

The judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ran Vijay Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) is reproduced, in extenso,

as hereunder:-

“What a mess! This is perhaps the only way to describe the events that have transpired in the examination conducted by the U.P. Secondary

Education Services Selection Board. We have reached the present stage of judgment after eight long years of uncertainty for, and three evaluations of

the answer sheets of, more than 36,000 candidates who took the examination for recruitment as Trained Graduate Teachers way back in January

2009. Hopefully today, their travails, as those of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board, will come to a satisfactory end.

On 15-1-2009 the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board (for short “the Boardâ€) published an advertisement inviting applications

for recruitment to the post of Trained Graduate Teachers in Social Science. The recruitment was to be in accordance with the provisions of the U.P.

Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 and the Rules framed thereunder.

More than 36,000 candidates took the written examination held pursuant to the advertisement and the result of the written examination was

declared by the Board on 18-6-2010. It may be mentioned that the written examination was based on multiple-choice answers which were to be

scanned on OMR sheets.

The candidates who qualified in the written examination were called for an interview held between 16-7-2010 and 26-7-2010. Eventually, the

combined result (written examination and interview) was declared on 14-9-2010. According to the appellants, they were successful in the written

examination as well as in the interview and were amongst those who were in the select list for recruitment.

Some candidates who were not successful in the written examination or in the interview filed writ petitions in the Allahabad High Court between

2010 and 2011. All these writ petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge. The reasons for dismissal of these writ petitions were that there was

no provision for re-evaluation of the answer sheets in the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 or the Rules

framed thereunder. Reliance was also placed by the learned Single Judge for dismissing the writ petitions on the decision of this Court in H.P. Public

Service Commission v. Mukesh Thakur [H.P. Public Service Commission v. Mukesh Thakur, (2010) 6 SCC 759 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 286 : 3 SCEC

713] in which this Court considered a large number of its earlier decisions and held: (SCC p. 767, para 26)

“26. Thus, the law on the subject emerges to the effect that in the absence of any provision under the statute or statutory rules/regulations, the

Court should not generally direct re-evaluation.â€​

Another batch of writ petitions (having 77 writ petitioners) came to be listed before another learned Single Judge of the High Court. The subject and

issues were the same and the learned Single Judge admitted these writ petitions for final hearing notwithstanding the dismissal of several similar

petitions. The challenge made by the writ petitioners was to seven questions/answers in the written examination which, according to them, had

incorrect key answers. The learned Single Judge personally examined those seven questions and concluded [Ranjeet Kumar Singh v. State of U.P.,

2012 SCC OnLine All 268 : (2012) 4 All LJ 19] that: (Ranjeet Kumar case [Ranjeet Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All 268 : (2012)

4 All LJ 19] , SCC OnLine All para 42) “(a) The correct answer of Question 24 in History paper would be Option (1).

(b) For Question 25, History paper, Option (2) iscorrect.

(c) Option (2) is the correct answer of Question 36 ofHistory paper.

(d) Option (2) is the correct answer in respect toQuestion 37 of History paper.

(e) Question 40 of History paper is wrongly framed.

(f) In Question 43, there may be two correct answersi.e. Options (1) and (3).

(g) In Question 32 of Civics paper, Option (3) would bethe correct answer.â€​

The learned Single Judge then proceeded to observe: (SCC OnLine All para 54)

“54. … It cannot be doubted that being a selection body for appointment of Teachers in Secondary Schools, the Selection Board was under a pious

as well as statutory obligation to hold selection very carefully, meticulously and in the most honest and correct manner. The job of Selection Board

could not have been completed by mere holding a selection without caring whether examination is being conducted correctly and properly, whether all

the questions have been framed in a proper manner, whether the answer(s), if it is multiple-choice examination, have been given with due care and

caution so as to leave no scope of error or mistake therein, etc. In fact, if such a mistake is committed, it causes a multi-edged injury to an otherwise

studious, intelligent and well conversant student who understands the subject, well knows the relevant details and correct answers but suffers due to

sheer negligence of the examining body. The obligation of the examining body cannot be allowed to whittle out in any manner for any reason

whatsoever. For the fault of the examining body, a candidate cannot be made to suffer.â€​

On this basis, the learned Single Judge passed a judgment and order dated 8-2-2012 [Ranjeet Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All

268 : (2012) 4 All LJ 19] directing re-examination of the answer sheets of these 77 writ petitioners. It was further directed that in case these writ

petitioners are selected then those at the bottom of the select list would automatically have to be pushed out.

It must be recorded that the learned Single Judge did refer to and cited several decisions of this Court on the subject of re-evaluation but

unfortunately did not appreciate the law laid down. The learned Single Judge relied on Manish Ujwalv. Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati University

[Manish Ujwal v. Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati University, (2005) 13 SCC 744] but failed to appreciate that the six disputed answers under

consideration in that case were demonstrably wrong and this was not in dispute and even the learned counsel appearing for the University did not

question this fact. The decision is clearly distinguishable on facts.

Be that as it may, the issue that remained in Manish Ujwal [Manish Ujwal v. Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati University, (2005) 13 SCC 744] was

of the appropriate orders to be passed. While considering this, the following cautionary measures were suggested: (SCC p. 748, para 10)

“10. … it is necessary to note that the University and those who prepare the key answers have to be very careful and abundant caution is

necessary in these matters for more than one reason. We mention few of those; first and paramount reason being the welfare of the student as a

wrong key answer can result in the merit being made a casualty. One can well understand the predicament of a young student at the threshold of his

or her career if despite giving correct answer, the student suffers as a result of wrong and demonstrably erroneous key answers; the second reason is

that the courts are slow in interfering in educational matters which, in turn, casts a higher responsibility on the University while preparing the key

answers; and thirdly, in cases of doubt, the benefit goes in favour of the University and not in favour of the students.â€​

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge, the Board preferred Special Appeal No. 442 of 2012 before the Division Bench of

the High Court. Some candidates also preferred special appeals directed against the judgment and order dated 8-22012 [Ranjeet Kumar Singh v. State

of U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All 268 : (2012) 4 All LJ 19] . The special appeal filed by the Board was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court

on 13-3-2012 [U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board v. State of U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All 4494] . In some other special appeal filed

by a candidate, it was stated by the Board on 11-4-2012 that the answer sheets of all the candidates would be re-evaluated in the light of the judgment

of the learned Single Judge.

Following up on this, the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge was implemented on 10-9-2012 and the re-evaluated results of the

written examination of all candidates were declared. As a result of the re-evaluation, it appears that some candidates, who were declared successful

in the combined result declared on 14-9-2010 were now declared unsuccessful. The appellants before us were not affected by the re-evaluation of the

written examination and continued in the select list.

Thereafter, a set of petitions was filed including some before this Court and eventually it came to pass that those aggrieved by the order passed by

the Division Bench on 13-3-2012 [U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board v. State of U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All 4494] could file review

petitions.

On 12-5-2014 the Board published the final select list of candidates who had qualified in the written examination as well as in the interview. In this

final select list, the appellants did not find a place and, therefore, they challenged the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8-2-2012 [Ranjeet Kumar

Singh v. State of U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All 268 : (2012) 4 All LJ 19] . According to the appellants the learned Single Judge had incorrectly re-

evaluated the seven disputed questions and had arrived at incorrect answers to these questions.

The Division Bench heard all the review petitions as well as the appeals and passed an order dated 28-42015 [U.P. Secondary Education Service

Selection Board v. State of U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 9066] referring the seven disputed questions/answers for consideration by a one-man Expert

Committee. On or about 18-5-2015 the Expert Committee gave its report to which the appellants filed objections. Eventually, by the judgment and

order dated 2-11-2015 [U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board v. State of U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 5788 : (2016) 3 All LJ 405] the

Division Bench directed a fresh evaluation of the answer sheets on the basis of the report of the Expert Committee. This decision of the Division

Bench is under challenge before us.

During the pendency of the appeals in this Court, the third re-evaluation was completed by the Board. The result of the third re-evaluation has

been kept in a sealed cover. The sealed cover was initially filed before us but later returned to the learned counsel for the Board.

We are pained that an examination for recruitment of Trained Graduate Teachers advertised in January 2009 has still not attained finality even

after the passage of more than eight years. The system of holding public examinations needs to be carefully scrutinised and reviewed so that selected

candidates are not drawn into litigation which could go on for several years. Be that as it may, we have still to tackle the issues before us.

It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 and

the Rules framed thereunder do not provide for any re-evaluation of the answer sheets and, therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have

undertaken that exercise at all. Reference was made to the following passage from Mukesh Thakur [H.P. Public Service Commission v. Mukesh

Thakur, (2010) 6 SCC 759 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 286 : 3 SCEC 713] which considered several decisions on the subject and held: (SCC p. 765, para

20)

“20. In view of the above, it was not permissible for the High Court to examine the question papers and answer sheets itself, particularly, when the

Commission had assessed the inter se merit of the candidates. If there was a discrepancy in framing the question or evaluation of the answer, it could

be for all the candidates appearing for the examination and not for Respondent 1 only. It is a matter of chance that the High Court was examining the

answer sheets relating to Law. Had it been other subjects like Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics, we are unable to understand as to whether such

a course could have been adopted by the High Court. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that such a course was not permissible to the High

Court.â€​

A complete hands-off or no-interference approach was neither suggested in Mukesh  Thakur [H.P.  Public  Service Commission v.

Mukesh Thakur, (2010) 6 SCC 759 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 286 : 3 SCEC 713] nor has it been suggested in any other decision of this Courtâ€"the case

law developed over the years admits of interference in the results of an examination but in rare and exceptional situations and to a very limited extent.

In Kanpur University v. Samir Gupta [Kanpur University v. Samir Gupta, (1983) 4 SCC 309] this Court took the view that: (SCC p. 316, para 16)

“16. … the key answer should be assumed to be correct unless it is proved to be wrong and that it should not be held to be wrong by an inferential

process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation. It must be clearly demonstrated to be wrong, that is to say, it must be such as no reasonable

body of men well-versed in the particular subject would regard as correct.†In other words, the onus is on the candidate to clearly demonstrate that

the key answer is incorrect and that too without any inferential process or reasoning. The burden on the candidate is therefore rather heavy and the

constitutional courts must be extremely cautious in entertaining a plea challenging the correctness of a key answer. To prevent such challenges, this

Court recommended a few steps to be taken by the examination authorities and among them are: (i) establishing a system of moderation; (ii) avoid any

ambiguity in the questions, including those that might be caused by translation; and (iii) prompt decision be taken to exclude the suspect question and

no marks be assigned to it.

20.Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [Maharashtra State Board of

Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] is perhaps the leading case on the subject and

concerned itself with Regulation 104 of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Boards Regulations, 1977 which reads: (SCC p.

37, para 10)

“104. Verification of marks obtained by a candidate in a subject.â€"(1) Any candidate who has appeared at the Higher Secondary Certificate

examination may apply to the Divisional Secretary for verification of marks in any particular subject. The verification will be restricted to checking

whether all the answers have been examined and that there has been no mistake in the totalling of marks for each question in that subject and

transferring marks correctly on the first cover page of the answer book and whether the supplements attached to the answer book mentioned by the

candidate are intact. No reevaluation of the answer book or supplements shall be done.

(2) Such an application must be made by the candidatethrough the head of the junior college which presented him for the examination, within two

weeks of the declaration of the examination results and must be accompanied by a fee of Rs 10 for each subject.

(3) No candidate shall claim, or be entitled to reevaluation of his answers or disclosure or inspection of the answer books or other documents as these

are treated by the Divisional Board as most confidential.â€​

The question before this Court in Paritosh Bhupeshkumar case[Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v.

Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] was: whether, under law, a candidate has a right to demand an inspection, verification and

reevaluation of answer books and whether the statutory regulations framed by the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary

Education governing the subject insofar as they categorically state that there shall be no such right can be said to be ultra vires, unreasonable and void.

This Court noted that the Bombay High Court [Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth v. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary

Education, 1980 SCC OnLine Bom 148 : AIR 1981 Bom 95] , while dealing with a batch of 39 writ petitions, divided them into two groups: (i) cases

where a right of inspection of the answer sheets was claimed; (ii) cases where a right of inspection and re-evaluation of answer sheets was claimed.

With regard to the first group, the High Court held the above Regulation 104(3) as unreasonable and void and directed the Board concerned to allow

inspection of the answer sheets. With regard to the second group of cases, it was held that the above Regulation 104(1) was void, illegal and

manifestly unreasonable and therefore directed that the facility of re-evaluation should be allowed to those examinees who had applied for it.

In appeal against the decision [Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth v. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education, 1980

SCC OnLine Bom 148 : AIR 1981 Bom 95] of the High Court, it was held by this Court in Paritosh Bhupeshkumar case [Maharashtra State Board of

Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] that the principles of natural justice are not

applicable in such cases. It was held that: (Paritosh Bhupeshkumar case [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v.

Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] , SCC p. 38, para 12) “12. … The principles of natural justice cannot be extended beyond

reasonable and rational limits and cannot be carried to such absurd lengths as to make it necessary that candidates who have taken a public

examination should be allowed to participate in the process of evaluation of their performances or to verify the correctness of the evaluation made by

the examiners by themselves conducting an inspection of the answer books and determining whether there has been a proper and fair valuation of the

answers by the examiners.â€​

On the validity of the Regulations, this Court held [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh

Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] that they were not illegal or unreasonable or ultra vires the rule-making power conferred by statute. It was

then said: (Paritosh Bhupeshkumar case[Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth,

(1984) 4 SCC 27] , SCC p. 42, para 16)

“16. … The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body. It

may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and

improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on

the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of

the Act. The legislature and its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide what policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered

by the Act and there is no scope for interference by the Court unless the particular provision impugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal

infirmity, in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the regulation-making power or its being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the

parent enactment or in violation of any of the limitations imposed by the Constitution. None of these vitiating factors are shown to exist in the present

case.…â€​

It was also noted by this Court that: (SCC p. 52, para 22)

“22. … the High Court has ignored the cardinal principle that it is not within the legitimate domain of the Court to determine whether the purpose

of a statute can be served better by adopting any policy different from what has been laid down by the legislature or its delegate and to strike down as

unreasonable a bye-law (assuming for the purpose of discussion that the impugned regulation is a bye-law) merely on the ground that the policy

enunciated therein does not meet with the approval of the Court in regard to its efficaciousness for implementation of the object and purposes of the

Act.â€​

Upholding the validity of Regulation 104, this Court then proceeded on the basis of the plain and simple language of the Regulation to hold that:

(Paritosh Bhupeshkumar case [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4

SCC 27] , SCC p. 48, para 20)

“20. … The right of verification conferred by clause (1) is subject to the limitation contained in the same clause that no revaluation of the answer

books or supplements shall be done and the further restriction imposed by clause (3), prohibiting disclosure or inspection of the answer books.â€​

This Court then concluded the discussion by observing: (SCC pp. 56-57, para 29)

“29. … As has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court, the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise,

prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich

experience of actual day-to-day working of educational institutions and the departments controlling them. It will be wholly wrong for the Court to

make a pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the problems of this nature, isolated from the actual realities and grass root problems involved in the

working of the system and unmindful of the consequences which would emanate if a purely idealistic view as opposed to a pragmatic one were to be

propounded. It is equally important that the Court should also, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, rule or

bye-law which would bring about the result of rendering the system unworkable in practice. It is unfortunate that this principle has not been adequately

kept in mind by the High Court while deciding the instant case.â€​

In Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public  Service  Commission [Pramod  Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission,

(2004) 6 SCC 714 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 883] the question under consideration was whether the High Court [Bihar Public Service Commission v.

Pramod Kumar Srivastava, 2003 SCC OnLine Pat 398 : (2003) 2 PLJR 801] was right in directing re-evaluation of the answer book of a candidate in

the absence of any provision entitling the candidate to ask for re-evaluation. This Court noted that there was no provision in the Rules concerned for

re-evaluation but only a provision for scrutiny of the answer book

“wherein the answer books are seen for the purpose of checking whether all the answers given by a candidate have been examined and whether

there has been any mistake in the totalling of marks of each question and noting them correctly on the first cover page of the answer bookâ€​. (Pramod

Kumar Srivastava case[Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 883] , SCC pp. 717-18,

para 7)

This Court reiterated the conclusion in Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v.

Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] that: (SCC p. 718, para 7)

“7. … in absence of a specific provision conferring a right upon an examinee to have his answer books reevaluated, no such direction can be

issued.â€​

The principle laid down by this Court in Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth[Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v.

Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] was affirmed in W.B. Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan  Das [W.B. Council

of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das, (2007) 8 SCC 242 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 871 : 5 SCEC 792] and it was reiterated that there must

be finality attached to the result of a public examination and in the absence of a statutory provision re-evaluation of answer scripts cannot be permitted

and that it could be done only in exceptional cases and as a rarity. Reference was also made to Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service

Commission [Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 883] , Board of Secondary

Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda [Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda, (2004) 13 SCC 383 : 5 SCEC 457] and Board of

Secondary Education v. D. Suvankar [Board of Secondary Education v. D. Suvankar, (2007) 1 SCC 603 : 5 SCEC 719] .

The  facts  in CBSE v. Khushboo Shrivastava [CBSE v. Khushboo Shrivastava, (2014) 14 SCC 523 : 6 SCEC 109] are rather interesting.

The respondent was a candidate in the All India PreMedical/Pre-Dental Entrance Examination, 2007 conducted by the Central Board of Secondary

Education (for short “CBSEâ€). Soon after the results of the examination were declared, she applied for reevaluation of her answer sheets. CBSE

declined her request since there was no provision for this. She then filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court and the learned Single Judge

[Khushboo Srivastava v. Union of India, 2008 SCC OnLine Pat 1553] called for her answer sheets and on a perusal thereof and on comparing her

answers with the model or key answers concluded that she deserved an additional two marks. The view of the learned Single Judge was upheld

[Khushboo Shrivastava v. Union of India, 2009 SCC OnLine Pat 1054 : (2009) 1 PLJR 867] by the Division Bench of the High Court.

In appeal, this Court in Khushboo Shrivastava case [CBSE v. Khushboo Shrivastava, (2014) 14 SCC 523 : 6 SCEC 109] set aside the decision of

the High Court and reiterating the view already expressed by this Court from time to time and allowing the appeal of CBSE it was held: (SCC p. 526,

paras 9-11)

“9. We find that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission [Pramod Kumar Srivastava

v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 883] has clearly held relying on Maharashtra State Board of Secondary

and Higher Secondary  Education v. Paritosh  Bhupeshkumar Sheth [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education

v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] that in the absence of any provision for the re-evaluation of answer books in the relevant rules, no

candidate in an examination has any right to claim or ask for reevaluation of his marks. The decision in Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public

Service Commission[Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 883] was followed by

another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda [Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan

Panda, (2004) 13 SCC 383 : 5 SCEC 457] in which the direction of the High Court for re-evaluation of answer books of all the examinees securing

90% or above marks was held to be unsustainable in law because the regulations of the Board of Secondary Education, Orissa, which conducted the

examination, did not make any provision for re-evaluation of answer books in the rules.

In the present case, the bye-laws of the All IndiaPre-Medical/Pre-Dental Entrance Examination, 2007 conducted by CBSE did not provide for re-

examination or re-evaluation of answer sheets. Hence, the appellants could not have allowed such re-examination or re-evaluation on the

representation of Respondent 1 and accordingly rejected the representation of Respondent 1 for re-examination/re-evaluation of her answer sheets.…

In our considered opinion, neither the learnedSingle Judge [Khushboo Srivastava v. Union of India, 2008 SCC OnLine Pat 1553] nor the Division

Bench [Khushboo Shrivastava v. Union of India, 2009 SCC OnLine Pat 1054 : (2009) 1 PLJR 867] of the High Court could have substituted his/its

own views for that of the examiners and awarded two additional marks to Respondent 1 for the two answers in exercise of powers of judicial review

under Article 226 of the Constitution as these are purely academic matters. …â€​

The law on the subject is therefore, quite clear and we only propose to highlight a few significant conclusions. They are: ]

30.1. If a statute, Rule or Regulation governing an examination permits the re-evaluation of an answer sheet or scrutiny of an answer sheet as a

matter of right, then the authority conducting the examination may permit it;

30.2. If a statute, Rule or Regulation governing an examination does not permit re-evaluation or scrutiny of an answer sheet (as distinct from

prohibiting it) then the court may permit re-evaluation or scrutiny only if it is demonstrated very clearly, without any “inferential process of

reasoning or by a process of rationalisationâ€​ and only in rare or exceptional cases that a material error has been committed;

30.3. The court should not at all re-evaluate or scrutinise the answer sheets of a candidateâ€"it has no expertise in the matter and academic matters

are best left to academics;

30.4. The court should presume the correctness of the key answers and proceed on that assumption; and

30.5. In the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to the examination authority rather than to the candidate.

On our part we may add that sympathy or compassion does not play any role in the matter of directing or not directing re-evaluation of an answer

sheet. If an error is committed by the examination authority, the complete body of candidates suffers. The entire examination process does not

deserve to be derailed only because some candidates are disappointed or dissatisfied or perceive some injustice having been caused to them by an

erroneous question or an erroneous answer. All candidates suffer equally, though some might suffer more but that cannot be helped since

mathematical precision is not always possible. This Court has shown one way out of an impasse â€" exclude the suspect or offending question.

It is rather unfortunate that despite several decisions of this Court, some of which have been discussed above, there is interference by the courts in

the result of examinations. This places the examination authorities in an unenviable position where they are under scrutiny and not the candidates.

Additionally, a massive and sometimes prolonged examination exercise concludes with an air of uncertainty. While there is no doubt that candidates

put in a tremendous effort in preparing for an examination, it must not be forgotten that even the examination authorities put in equally great efforts to

successfully conduct an examination. The enormity of the task might reveal some lapse at a later stage, but the court must consider the internal

checks and balances put in place by the examination authorities before interfering with the efforts put in by the candidates who have successfully

participated in the examination and the examination authorities. The present appeals are a classic example of the consequence of such interference

where there is no finality to the result of the examinations even after a lapse of eight years. Apart from the examination authorities even the

candidates are left wondering about the certainty or otherwise of the result of the examination â€" whether they have passed or not; whether their

result will be approved or disapproved by the court; whether they will get admission in a college or university or not; and whether they will get

recruited or not. This unsatisfactory situation does not work to anybody's advantage and such a state of uncertainty results in confusion being worse

confounded. The overall and larger impact of all this is that public interest suffers.

The facts of the case before us indicate that in the first instance the learned Single Judge [Ranjeet Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., 2012 SCC

OnLine All 268 : (2012) 4 All LJ 19] took it upon himself to actually ascertain the correctness of the key answers to seven questions. This was

completely beyond his jurisdiction and as decided by this Court on several occasions, the exercise carried out was impermissible. Fortunately, the

Division Bench [U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board v. State of U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 5788 : (2016) 3 All LJ 405] did not repeat

the error but in a sense, endorsed the view of the learned Single Judge, by not considering the decisions of this Court but sending four key answers for

consideration by a one-man Expert Committee.

Having come to the conclusion that the High Court (the learned Single Judge [Ranjeet Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All 268 :

(2012) 4 All LJ 19] as well as the Division Bench [U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board v. State of U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 5788 :

(2016) 3 All LJ 405] ) ought to have been far more circumspect in interfering and deciding on the correctness of the key answers, the situation today

is that there is a third evaluation of the answer sheets and a third set of results is now ready for declaration. Given this scenario, the options before us

are to nullify the entire re-evaluation process and depend on the result declared on 14-9-2010 or to go by the third set of results. Cancelling the

examination is not an option. Whichever option is chosen, there will be some candidates who are likely to suffer and lose their jobs while some might

be entitled to consideration for employment.

Having weighed the options before us, we are of the opinion that the middle path is perhaps the best path to be taken under the circumstances of

the case.

The middle path is to declare the third set of results since the Board has undertaken a massive exercise under the directions of the High Court and yet

protect those candidates who may now be declared unsuccessful but are working as Trained Graduate Teachers a result of the first or the second

declaration of results. It is also possible that consequent upon the third declaration of results some new candidates might get selected and should that

happen, they will need to be accommodated since they were erroneously not selected on earlier occasions.

The learned counsel for the appellants contended before us that in case her clients are not selected after the third declaration of results, they will

be seriously prejudiced having worked as Trained Graduate Teachers for several years. However, with the middle path that we have chosen their

services will be protected and, therefore, there is no cause for any grievance by any of the appellants. Similarly, those who have not been selected but

unfortunately left out they will be accommodated.

As a result of our discussion and taking into consideration all the possibilities that might arise, we issue the following directions:

37.1. The results prepared by the Board consequent upon the decision dated 2-11-2015 [U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board v. State

of U.P.,

2015 SCC OnLine All 5788 : (2016) 3 All LJ 405] of the High Court should be declared by the Board within two weeks from today.

37.2. Candidates appointed and working as Trained Graduate Teachers pursuant to the declaration of results on the earlier occasions, if found

unsuccessful on the third declaration of results, should not be removed from service but should be allowed to continue.

37.3. Candidates now selected for appointment as Trained Graduate Teachers (after the third declaration of results) should be appointed by the State

by creating supernumerary posts. However, these newly appointed Trained Graduate Teachers will not be entitled to any consequential benefits.

Before concluding, we must express our deep anguish with the turn of events whereby the learned Single Judge [Ranjeet Kumar Singh v. State of

U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All 268 : (2012) 4 All LJ 19] entertained a batch of writ petitions, out of which these appeals have arisen, even though

several similar writ petitions had earlier been dismissed by other learned Single Judge(s). Respect for the view taken by a coordinate Bench is an

essential element of judicial discipline. A Judge might have a difference of opinion with another Judge, but that does not give him or her any right to

ignore the contrary view. In the event of a difference of opinion, the procedure sanctified by time must be adhered to so that there is demonstrated

respect for the rule of law.

With the above directions, the appeals and miscellaneous applications are disposed of.â€​

In H.P. Public Service Commission Vs. Mukesh Thakur & anr. reported in (2010) 6 SCC 759, which has been referred to in the case of Ran

Vijay Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that in the absence of any provision under the statute or

statutory rules/regulations, the Court should not generally direct revaluation, while observing thus:

The issue of revaluation of answer book is no more res integra. This issue was considered at length by this Court in Maharashtra State Board of

Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [(1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543] , wherein this Court rejected

the contention that in the absence of the provision for revaluation, a direction to this effect can be issued by the Court. The Court further held that

even the policy decision incorporated in the Rules/Regulations not providing for rechecking/verification/revaluation cannot be challenged unless there

are grounds to show that the policy itself is in violation of some statutory provision. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 39-40 & 42, paras 14 & 16)

“14. … It is exclusively within the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions of the statute

can best be implemented and what measures, substantive as well as procedural would have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the

efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act. … ***

… The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body. It may

be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and

improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on

the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of

the Act.â€​

The Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the scope of interference in academic matters, has laid down the following precedent law in Basavaiah

(Dr.) Vs. Dr.H.L. Ramesh, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 372:

“38. We have dealt with the aforesaid judgments to reiterate and reaffirm the legal position that in the academic matters, the courts have a very

limited role particularly when no mala fides have been alleged against the experts constituting the Selection Committee. It would normally be prudent,

wholesome and safe for the courts to leave the decisions to the academicians and experts. As a matter of principle, the courts should never make an

endeavour to sit in appeal over the decisions of the experts. The courts must realise and appreciate its constraints and limitations in academic

matters.â€​

In the series, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the following precedent law in University Grants Commission Vs. Neha Anil Bobde,

reportedin (2013) 10 SCC 519:

“31. We are of the view that, in academic matters, unless there is a clear violation of statutory provisions, the regulations or the notification issued,

the courts shall keep their hands off since those issues fall within the domain of the experts. This Court in University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao

[AIR 1965 SC 491] , Tariq Islam v. Aligarh Muslim University [(2001) 8 SCC 546 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1] and Rajbir Singh Dalal v.Chaudhary Devi Lal

University [(2008) 9 SCC 284 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 887] , has taken the view that the court shall not generally sit in appeal over the opinion

expressed by the expert academic bodies and normally it is wise and safe for the courts to leave the decision of the academic experts who are more

familiar with the problem they face, than the courts generally are. UGC as an expert body has been entrusted with the duty to take steps as it may

think fit for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in the university. For attaining the said standards, it

is open to UGC to lay down any

“qualifying criteriaâ€, which has a rational nexus to the object to be achieved, that is, for maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and

research. The candidates declared eligible for Lectureship may be considered for appointment as Assistant Professors in universities and colleges and

the standard of such a teaching faculty has a direct nexus with the maintenance of standards of education to be imparted to the students of the

universities and colleges. UGC has only implemented the opinion of the experts by laying down the qualifying criteria, which cannot be considered as

arbitrary, illegal or discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.â€​

The U.S. Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hiram G. Hill, Jr. et al. (437 US 153, 57 L Ed 2d 117, 98 S Ct 2279), in paragraph 15,

at page 146, while dealing with the plea of judicial review of reasonableness on Endangered Species Act, pointed out that such was not the function of

the court, and observed, “We have no expert knowledge on the subject of endangered species, much less do we have a mandate from the people

to strike a balance of equities on the side of the Tellico Dam.

There is a passage from Robert Bolt about the observations of Sir Thomas More quoted in the said judgment which, in the opinion of this Court, is

illuminative and of relevance:

The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's right. And I'll stick to what's legal ........ I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and

wrong, which you find such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester..... What would you

do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? ..... And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you - where would

you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?.... This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-Man's laws, not God's and if you cut them

down.... you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow them?..... Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's

sake"" R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I, p. 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed 1967).

This Court is in complete agreement with the lament of Sir Thomas More articulated by Robert Bolt, although the observation made by the U.S.

Supreme Court in the aforementioned report is having persuasive value only, and the same is not a binding precedent.

Apart from the above, a piquant situation has also arisen in this case that some of the petitioners herein, without any demur or protest to the earlier

answer key, by raising their objections in regard thereto, have directly approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking

redressal, and therefore, they are now estopped, from questioning the correctness of the answer key, as per the doctrine of constructive res judicata.

Therefore, at this belated stage, no relief can be granted to such candidates.

The doctrine of constructive res judicata has been engrafted under Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is artificial

form of doctrine of res judicata and provides that if a plea could have been taken by a party in a proceeding between him and his opponent, he should

not be permitted to take the plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding with reference to the same subject matter. Thus, it helps in raising

the bar by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why, this rule is called ‘constructive res judicata’.

The question, for the first time, arose before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Janapada Sabha, reported in AIR

1964 SC 1013, whether the concept of constructive res judicata can be applied in the writ petition or not? Although, in that case, the Hon’ble

Court rejected the application of the doctrine of constructive res judicata to writ petition filed under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of

India, but thereafter, in the leading case of Devilal Modi Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam reported in (1965) 1 SCR 686, the Hon’ble Apex Court,

clarifying the stand in this regard, held on considerations of public policy to prevent multifarious of legal proceedings between the same parties, the rule

of constructive res judicata postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a party in a proceeding between him and his opponent, he could not be

permitted to take tht plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which is based on the same cause of action and that this rule applies also

where prior proceeding is a writ proceeding.

The principle of Constructive Res-judicata has been beautifully explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment rendered in the case of

State of U.P. Vs. Nawab Hussain, reported in (1977) 2 SCC 806, Paras 3 and 4 of which is reproduced hereinbelow:-

The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council, it may be said to

be ""the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action"". This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality and

conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the

interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by

obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil

relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to

multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is

necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment

when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the

general principle of res judicata.

But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue

upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have

therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard:

I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the

court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could

have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.

This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by

suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has some times been referred to as

constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.

The judgment in Forward Construction Co. Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri, reported in (1986) 1 SCC 100, further clarified the position by

holding that an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might and

ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to of essentially connected with subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into

the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata

underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the CPC was applied to writ case.

More than 150 years ago, the English Court of Chancery, in Henderson Vs. Henderson, (1843) 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313, confirmed that a party

may not raise any claim in subsequent litigation which they ought to be raised properly in a previous action. In that case, The Vice Chancellor, Sir

James Wigram held thus:

“I believe I state the rule of the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a

Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special

circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter[s] which might have been brought forward as part of

the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted  part of

their case. . . . .  . . . .â€​

The said decision has also been followed and cited, as a good law, with approval numerous times, including:

•Johnson v Gore Wood & Co., [2000] UKHL 65

•Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v Zodiac Seats UK Limited, [2013] UKSC 46

•Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc, [1991] 2 AC 93

•Dexter v Vlieland-Boddy, [2003] EWCA Civ 14

•Aldi Stores v WSP Group plc, [2008] 1 WLR 748 •Henley v Bloom, [2010] 1 WLR 1770

This Court is conscious of the fact that the law laid down in Henderson Vs. Henderson (supra) is not a binding precedent, but the same carries

persuasive value.

Although plethora of case laws of the Hon’ble Apex Court, have been referred to in Ran Vijay Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

(supra), however, to facilitate the present adjudication, the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in those precedent laws, needs to be

briefly outlined in this judgment as well.

As pointed out by the Apex court in Central Board of Secondary Education & Anr. Vs. Aditya

Bandopadhyay & Ors., reported in (2011) 8 SCC 497, re-evaluation of answer books is not permissible. Decision of the Court in this regard, in

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 27, has been

approved and followed in subsequent decisions. If re-evaluation has to be allowed as of right, it may lead to gross and indefinite uncertainty, besides

leading to utter confusion. Barring re-evaluation of answer books and restricting remedy of the candidates only to re-totaling has been held to be valid.

However, in the context of the Right to Information Act, 2005, the examinee would have the right to seek inspection of the answer books or taking

certified copy thereof.

In President, Board of Secondary

Education, Orissa & Anr. Vs. D. Suvankar & Anr., reported in (2007) 1 SCC 603, the Hon’ble Apex Court endorsed the view taken by it in

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education (supra) and held that it is in the public interest that the results of public

examination when published should have finality attached to it. If inspection and verification in the presence of the candidates and re-evaluation are to

be allowed as of right, it may lead to gross and indefinite uncertainty in the examination process. Therefore, in such matters, the Court should be

extremely careful and reluctant to substitute its own views to that of the experts. However, the Apex Court sounded a note of caution that it would be

wholly wrong for the Court to take a pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the problems of this nature isolated from actual realities and grass root

problems. It is, in these circumstances, the Apex Court observed that award of marks by an examiner has to be fair and considering the fact that

reevaluation is not permissible, the examiner has to be not only careful and cautious but also has a duty to ensure that the answers are properly

evaluated. No element of chance or luck should be introduced. Absence of a provision for re-evaluation cannot be a shield for the examiner to

arbitrarily evaluate the answer scripts. That would be against the very concept for which re-evaluation is impermissible.

In Secretary W.B. Council of Higher Secondary Education Vs. Ayan Das & Ors., reported in (2007) 8 SCC 242, the view taken in President,

Board of Secondary Education, Orissa & Anr. Vs D. Suvankar & Anr. (supra) has been approved.

It appears that the aforesaid position regarding impermissibility of re-evaluation has been departed upon, when it is a case of erroneous evaluation

by using wrong answer key. In the case of Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2013) 4 SCC 690, the Apex Court was of

the view that if the model answer key which forms the basis for evaluation was erroneous/defective, the result prepared on the basis of such

evaluation would also be erroneous. Application of defective answer key would vitiate the result. In such a situation, the decision of the High Court to

refer the model answer key to experts for examination, who in the course of their examination found several answers to be wrong, was not interfered

with. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that in a case of such nature, the High Court would be entitled to mould the relief prayed for in the writ

petition.

There is no dispute to the proposition canvassed at the Bar that any matter pertaining to conduct of examination, for any purpose, be it for

recruitment to public service or in case of examinations conducted by the Board or University, scope of judicial review is very limited. Judges do not

assume the role of super-examiners and Courts are also not to act as appellate bodies. Courts ordinarily do not carry out a review of the assessment

or evaluation of answers or of marks awarded by the examiner. Once evaluation is done, Courts refrain from entering into the domain of re-evaluation

of the answers. Evaluation of answer scripts must be left to the experts in the field. Role of the Court in matters of evaluation of answers scripts is

minimal. Courts should not act as appellate bodies in such mattes and should not assume the role of superexaminers.

Now that the principles of law are before this Court, and according to those principles judicially adumbrated hereinabove, this Court deems it

proper to refer, in the following paragraph(s), to only those questions/answers, which in the opinion of this Court appear to be ‘demonstrably

wrong’, and expect those, this Court does not deem it appropriate, in light of the aforementioned precedential backdrop, to make any observation

with regard to correctness or otherwise, of those questions/answers, so as to substitute the findings of the experts by its own findings.

At this juncture, it is considered apt and expedient to quote the paper-wise question and correct answer as per the experts/respondent-

Commission, pertaining whereto, the present writ petitions have been filed, and this will also follow the analysis made in regard to those questions and

answers, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court. “G.K. Paper â€" I

Q.17 Which of the following objects are not associated with Ahar Culture sites

 (i) Rice   (ii) Black & Read ware

(iii) Copper Objects (iv) Painted Greyware Correct answer of RPSC (D) i.e. Painted Greyware.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the proof annexed with the report shows that all the other three options, except option (D), are

associated with the AHAR Culture, and therefore, answer (D) i.e. Painted Greyware is correct. Though learned counsel for the respondent has tried

to make out a case from the Books of the Rajasthan Board that Painted Greyware was also part of the AHAR Culture, but on examination of the

literature provided, answer (D)Â i.e. Painted Greyware, is holding the field.

Q.23 Maharana Pratap made Chawad his capital, it remained capital of Mewar till?

(i) 1597Â Â Â (ii) 1605

(iii) 1609Â (iv) 1615

Correct answer of RPSC (D) i.e. 1615

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

This Court has seen that the Book written by Colonel Tod, namely, History of Rajasthan (Part I) clearly mentions that Chawad remained capital of

Mewar until 1615. The rebuttal made by learned counsel for the petitioners on the strength of school books, which speaks that for twenty eight years,

even in 1615, Chawad continued to be the Capital of Mewar.

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the proof annexed with the report clearly shows that 1615 was the exact year of change of Capital.

Thus, the answer (iv) is correct. G.K. (Hindi & Sanskrit).

Q.24 Choose the leaders from the following who participated in the Bijolia Peasant Movement?

(i) Sadhu Sitaram Das (ii) Vijay Singh Pathik

(iii) Manikya Lal Verma (iv) Narayan Ji Patel Options:

(A) 1, 2, 4Â Â Â (B) 1, 2

(C) 1, 2, 3, 4Â (D) 1, 2,3

Correct answer of RPSC (C) i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

Various books examined point out the combination of the leaders, who participated in the Bijolia Peasant Movement, but the objection that Narayan Ji

Patel was not part of it, is clearly demonstrated to be wrong, as the proof submitted clearly shows that Narayan Ji Patel was involved as Farmer

Leader in the Bijolia Peasant Movement at the inception thereof, which started at his arrest for his refusal to render begaar in September 1918.

Therefore, option (C) i.e. 1,2,3,4 is correct.

Q.26 Who among the following was not related to Mahant Pyarelal case

 (i) Ram Karan (ii) Mohan Lal Jalori

 (iii) Thapankesari Singh Bahut (iv) Som Dut Lahri

Correct answer of RPSC (ii) i.e. Mohan Lal Jalori

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination of the proof annexed with the expert report, which shows that all the other three options, except option (ii) i.e. Mohan Lal

Jalori, were directly involved in the Murder of Mahant Pyare Lal. Therefore, option (ii) i.e. Mohan Lal Jalori is the correct answer.

Q.37 Which of the following text on music were written by Rana

Kumbha

(A) Sangeetraj    (B) Sangeet Mimosa

(C) Sudhprabhanth (D) Kala Nidhi

Options:

(1) A,B (2) A, C, D

(3) A, B, C (4) A, B, C, D

Correct answer of RSPC (1) i.e. A, B

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the answer (1) i.e. A, B, of the RPSC, is demonstrably erroneous, as the reason for excluding (C)

Sudhprabhanth is that the Granth ’Sudhprabhanth’ has been misspelt, as the correct name of Granth is “Sudhprabandhâ€, which renders

the answer wrong.

[Therefore, the correct answer to this question needs to be reexamined by the experts.]

Q.51 Which one of the following cities hosted the meeting of W.S.F. for the first time in India

 (i) Mumbai   (ii) New Delhi

 (iii) Jaipur (iv) Chennai

Correct answer of RPSC (1) Mumbai

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the said question is within syllabus under the heading “Globalization and its Impactâ€​.

Therefore, Answer (1) i.e. Mumbai is correct.

Q.53 Instrument of accession of J & K State with Union of India was signed on

(i) 22nd October, 1947 (ii) 24th October, 1947

(iii) 25th October, 1947 (iv) 26th October, 1947

Correct answer of RPSC (4) i.e. 26th October, 1947

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the said question is within syllabus under the heading of para 3 (India’s Federal System).

Therefore, Answer (4) i.e. 26th October,1947 is correct.

Q.98 Which of the following river is known as the Ganga of South

 (i) Krishna   (ii) Godawari

 (iii) Mahanadi (iv) Periyar

Deleted the question as the correct answer was Kaveri which is none of the options.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the deletion   of the question was done on the ground that some of the proof indicate that

‘Godawari’ was also known as ‘Ganga of South’.

Therefore, deletion of this question was rightly done.

Sanskrit:

6-^viq=%* v= lekl&

¼1½ uUrRiq:’k%

¼2½ cgqozhfg%

¼3½ vO;;hHkko%

¼4½ deZ/kkj;%

As per the expert report option No.1 and option No.2 both were correct, hence, as per the advice of the expert committee the question stands deleted.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the expert report is self explanatory coupled with the material showing that there are multiple correct

answers to this question.

Therefore, deletion of this question was rightly done.

8- ^v/;srk* bfr r`PizR;;kUrins /kkrwilxkSZ Lr% %

¼1½ vf/k + b.k

¼2½ vf/k + baM~

¼3½ vf/k + by~

¼4½ vf/k + ,M~

As per the expert report option No.1 and option No.2 both were correct, hence, as per the advice of the expert committee the question stands deleted.

The question is within syllabus.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the expert report is self explanatory coupled with the material showing that there are multiple correct

answers to this question.

Therefore, deletion of this question was rightly done.

43- ^gu~ /kkrks% yM~ydkj e/;eiq:’k ,dopus :iaL;kr~&

¼1½ vgr~

¼2½ vg%

¼3½ vgu~

¼4½ vgzu~

Option No.4 is the correct answer.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the proof rendered by the petitioners clearly show that option (3) i.e. vgu~ is the correct answer.

However, option (4) i.e. vgzu~ of the RPSC also seems to be correct.

[Therefore, the correct answer to this question needs to be re-examined by the experts.]

104- fuâ€​dze.klaLdkjL; dky%

¼1½ prqFksZ ekls

¼2½ f}rh; ekls

¼3½ “kâ€​Bs ekls

¼4½ v’Ves ekls

The question has been deleted as multiple options were correct.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that this question has

been rightly deleted on the ground of having multiple correct answers to this question.

109- iBudkSâ€​kykfHko`}ks dks;a fof/k% izkFkfedrka Hktrs?

¼1½ ini}fr%

¼2½ okD;fof/k%

¼3½ dFkki}fr%

¼4½ o.kZlekEuk;fof/k%

Option No.2 is correct answer.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the relevant proof indicate that option (1) ini}fr% and option (2) okD;fof/k%, both are correct

answers.

[Therefore, the correct answer to this question needs to be re-examined by the experts.]

117- ukVdfâ€​k{k.kfof/kâ€​kq nksâ€​kk.kkek/kkjs.k Jsâ€​B bfr& vkfnz;rsA

¼1½ d{kkfHku;fof/k%

¼2½ O;k[;k fof/k%

¼3½ leok; fof/k%

¼4½ jaxe’okfHku;fof/k%

Option No.3 is correct.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that option (3) i.e.

leok; fof/k% of the RPSC is correct.

Hindi:

26- ^tjB & tBj*â€​kCn&;qXe dk vFkZ gS&

 ¼1½ tM+hcwVh& “kjhj ¼2½ o`}&Tokyk

 ¼3½ toku&isV ¼4½ cwThat RPSC has considered option (4) i.e. cwsame was not examined by the Expert Committee.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the candidates did not question the validity of this question, when they were given opportunity by the

respondents to do so.

79- ^^dkO;â€​kksHkk;k% drkZjks /kekZ xq.kk%A** dkO; xq.k dh ;g ifjHkkâ€​kk fdl vkpk;Z us izLrqr dh gS?

 ¼1½ Hkkeg ¼2½ naMh

 ¼3½ eEeV ¼4½ okeu

That RPSC has considered option (4) i.e. okeu as correct answer. Since no objection with regard to correctness of this question was raised, the same

was not examined by the Expert Committee.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the candidates did not question the validity of this question, when they were given opportunity by the

respondents to do so.

103- fuEukafdr dgkuh vkanksyuksa ,oa muds lw=/kkjksa ls lEcfU/kr ;qXeksa esa ls dkSu lk ;qXe vlaxr gS?

¼1½ lspru dgkuh & eghiflag

¼2½ lekukarj dgkuh & deysâ€​oj

¼3½ vdgkuh & fueZy oekZ

¼4½ lgt dgkuh & jktsUnz ;kno

As per expert report option No.3 and option No.4 both were correct, hence, as per the advice of the expert committee the question stands deleted.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the report of the expert committee is self explanatory.

Therefore, the deletion of this question has rightly been done.

106- dkSu lk leqPp; lqesfyr ugha gS?

¼1½ u;s ckny] tkuoj vkSj tkuoj] t[e&eksgu jkdsâ€​k

¼2½ foiFkxk] ‘kj.kkFkhZ] vej oYyjh&tSusUnz

¼3½ vfHkeU;q dh vkRedFkk] NksVs NksVs rktey] VwVuk & jktsUnz ;kno

¼4½ ‘kkeh dkxt] [kqnk dh okilh] lchuk ds pkyhl pksj&ukfljk “kekZ

As per the expert report option No.2 and option No.3 both were correct, hence, as per the advice of the expert committee the question stands deleted.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the report of the expert committee is self explanatory.

Therefore, the deletion of this question has rightly been done.

113-^^ft.k cu Hkwy u tkaork xsan xo; fxMjkt fr.k cu tacqd rk[kM+k Ã…/ke eaMS vktA^^ mi;qZDr Nan ds vuqlkj flag ds ou esa dkSu /kekpkSdM+h

epk jgk gS?

 ¼1½ xhnM+ ¼2½ gkFkh

 ¼3½ xsaMk ¼4½ ‘kwdj

As per the advice of the expert committee the question stands deleted as the said question was found to be out of syllabus.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the report of the expert committee is self explanatory.

Therefore, the deletion of this question has rightly been done.

123- fgdky [k.M ;kstuk fdl fof/k dk foHkktu gS%&

¼1½ O;k[;ku fof/k

¼2½ lEck; fof/k

¼3½ iz;osf{kr v/;u fof/k

¼4½ O;fäjs[k fof/k

Question deleted as the question has been misprinted, ‘fgdky’ misprinted instead of ‘f}dky’

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the report of the expert committee is self explanatory.

Therefore, the deletion of this question has rightly been done.

G.K.(Social Science):

Q.7 Which one of the following Ishoyet is the eastern boundaries of the western Sandy plain in western Rajasthan

 (i) 15 cm   (ii) 25 cm

 (iii) 40 cm (iv) 80 cm

Correct answer of RPSC (3) i.e. 40 cm

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that though as per the RPSC, option (3) i.e. 40 cm is correct answer, but as per the proof rendered, it is

demonstratively proved that answer (2) i.e. 25 cm there.

[Therefore, the correct answer to this question needs to be re-examined by the experts.]

Q.8 According to Desertification and Land Degradation Atlas of India,

ISRO 2007 the total area under desertification in Rajasthan is

 (i) 70%   (ii) 67%

 (iii) 65% (iv) 59%

Correct answer of RPSC (2) i.e. 67%

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the answer (ii) of the RPSC i.e. 67% is correct.

Q.15 Which of the following statement about Ahar is not correct:(1) Excavation of Ahar has thrown light on various faces of human life.

(2) Houses were built on brick foundation.

(3) The super structures of either clay or mudbricks have all gone

(4) Aharians mixed quartz nodules and chips in clay to strengthen andbeatify the walls and foundation.

Correct answer of RPSC (2) i.e. Houses were built on Brick foundation.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the answer (2) of the RPSC i.e. ‘Houses were built on brick foundation’ is correct.

Q.84 Who according to the terman very superior contain

 (i) above 140.00 IQ   (ii) 120-125 IQ

 (iii) 110-115 IQ (iv) Below 110 IQ

Correct answer of RPSC (1) i.e. 140 IQ

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the answer (1) of the RPSC i.e. ‘above 140.00 IQ’ is correct.

Q.95 Latitudinal and Longitudinal extent of India is:

(i) 8’6’-37 4’N & 68 7’ E-97 25’E (ii)8’4’N-37 6’N & 68 7’E-97 25’ E (iii)6’4’N-37 6’N & 68

7’E-97 25’E(iv)6’4’N-37 4’N & 68 7’E-97 25’E Correct answer of RPSC (2) i.e. 8’4’N-37 6’N & 68

7’E-97 25’ E.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

The RPSC has demonstrated that the measurement of Latitudinal and Longitudinal extent is India has been made from ‘Kanyakumari’,

whereas the petitioners have shown that this should have been from ‘Indira Point’ in Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Thus, after a careful examination, this Court finds that the answer of the RPSC i.e. (2) i.e. 8’4’N-37 6’N & 68 7’E-97 25’ E

seems to be demonstrably erroneous. Hence, the southern-most point has been rightly taken as Indira Point.

[Therefore, the correct answer to this question needs to be reexamined by the experts.] Social Science:

Q. 13 According to 2011 census, the percentage of Male & Female literacy in India is

 (i) 83.78 & 76.60  (ii) 81.51 & 67.06

 (iii) 79.63 & 66.77 (iv) 82.14 & 65.0

Correct answer of RPSC is (4) i.e. 82.14 & 65.0

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Courts finds that there is no discrepancy in the language.

Q. 17 If personal income is Rs.50000/- and personal income tax is 2000/- consumption is 42,000/- personal interest payment 2000/-& personal saving

is 4000/- the disposable income equals

(i) 42,000/-Â Â (ii) 44,000/(iii) 46,000/- (iv) 48,000/-

Correct answer of RPSC is (4) i.e. 48,000/-

After a careful examination, this Courts finds that option (iii) i.e.

46,000/- also seems to be correct.

[Therefore, the correct answer to this question needs to be re-examined by the experts].

Q. 21 Money is what money does this definition of Money is given by

 (i) Hartley Withers   (ii) Marshall

 (iii) F.A.Walker (iv) Crowther

RPSC deleted the question due to multiple answers

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the report of the expert committee is self explanatory.

Therefore, the deletion of this question has rightly been done.

Q. 65 Consider the following statement about Generalist Civil Services

(i) They mainly work at most of the top of administrative position

(ii) They act as executive heads of some organizations

(iii) They advice to the Ministers

(iv) They act as head of some public enterprises

Select the correct answer by using the codes below:

Codes:

(1) i,ii,iii,iv (2) i,ii,iii

(3) i,iii (4) i

Correct answer of RPSC (1)

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the Generalist Civil Services work at all the above positions. Therefore, the answer of the RPSC (1)

i.e. i,ii,iii,iv is correct.

Q. 76 In Jainism, liberated person (jeevanmukt) is called

 (i) Arhat   (ii) Kewali

 (iii) Sthotipagya (iv) Saratavgarj

Correct answer of RPSC is (1) i.e. Arhat

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the expert report is self explanatory.

Therefore, the answer of the RPSC (1) i.e. Arhat is correct.

Q. 78 The language of Ashokan Inscription is

 (i) Prakrit   (ii) Prakrit & Kharoshthi

 (iii) Prakrit, Kharoshti & Aramaic (iv) Prakrit, Aramaic & Greek

Correct answer of RPSC is (4) i.e. Prakrit, Aramaic & Greek

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the answer of the RPSC (4) i.e. Prakrit, Aramaic & Greek seems to be demonstrably wrong.

[Therefore, the correct answer to this question needs to be re-examined by the experts.]

Q. 90 A common equilibrium establishes at a point where

(i) MU1/MU2 = P1/P2

(ii) MU1/MU2 = P1/P2Â marginal utility of income

(iii) MU1/P1 = MU2/P2Â marginal utility of income

(iv) all of these

Correct answer of RPSC is (4) i.e. All of these.

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the answer of the RPSC (4) i.e. all of these is correct.

Q. 112 Formal modes of people’s participation in administration include

(i) Elections

(ii) Pressure groups

(iii) Advisory committees

(iv) Right to Information

Select the correct answer by using the code given below:

(1) (i) and (iii)

(2) (ii) and (iii)

(3) (i), (iii) and (iv)

(4) (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)

Correct Answer of RPSC(3) i.e. Advisory committee

Answer changed as option(3) on the basis of proof submitted by the candidates.â€​

Analysis made in regard to the question and answer, with the assistance of learned counsel for both sides, and the observations made by this Court:

After a careful examination, this Court finds that the answer of the RPSC i.e. (iii) Advisory Committee seems to be demonstrably wrong.

[Therefore, the correct answer to this question needs to be re-examined by the experts].

After examining the questions and answers on two consecutive dates, this Court has only pointed out the questions, which are demonstrably

erroneous, but this Court is very hesitant to substitute the experts opinion by its own opinion, and therefore, this Court does not wish to substitute the

answers given by the experts by its own analogy, and only wishes that for gaining maximum accuracy and ultimate confidence of the participating

candidates, the questions earmarked for re-examination by the experts, as above, shall be rereferred to the expert committee.

In the present days, it has become a common feature that the number of selections conducted by the Commission are being called in question and

judicial review thereof is being sought, on one or the other pretext. These types of anomalies in the public recruitment examinations, obviously, leads to

a predicament of an educated unemployed youth, who although is aspiring for public employment â€" some of whom â€" at the threshold of their

career, but wailing in despair for his turn to come in the long queue of the educated unemployed.

In the face of the aforesaid determination, coupled with the above consummate exposition of law and the often proclaimed caveat that a court of

law ought not take upon itself the task of experts, examine the question papers and answers itself, record its opinion thereupon and issue consequential

operative directions, more particularly, in absence of any allegation of bias or mala fide or extraneous consideration against the expert committee in

hand vis-a-vis the disputed questions/answer key, this Court is neither inclined to enter into the grievance raised by the petitioners in relation to

evaluation of their answers to the various questions pertaining to the disputed Papers, including erroneous questions/answers therein, nor this Court is

inclined to grant any indulgence to the petitioners in regard thereto.

However, the respondent-Commission being a Constitutional Body, entrusted with the high responsibility of undertaking the recruitment to public

service, is expected to maintain a high standard for evaluation of the answer scripts so that purity of the selection process is not eroded and people of

the country continue to repose faith and trust in the conduct of selection by the Commission. It is all the more necessary, in the wake of the fact that

the respondent-Commission is being arrayed as party before this Court in regard to number of examinations conducted by it, that it is an onerous duty

cast upon the Commission to rule out each and every possibility, being compelled whereby, the unemployed youth is dragging themselves as litigant

before the courts, thereby burdening the courts, as well, with such unwarranted litigations. That being so, although, reevaluation is not permissible in

light of the aforesaid precedential backdrop, the respondent-Commission should consider and take appropriate steps to ensure fair and proper

evaluation of the answer scripts so as to minimize all possible errors on the part of examiners and scrutinizers.

Before parting with this judgment, this Court also deems it appropriate to observe that the respondent-Commission should always keep in mind,

while conducting the recruitment process for public employment, the constitutional and judicial mandates, as well as the verdicts delivered by the

Courts of the country, more particularly, the verdicts and mandates of Hon’ble Apex Court - past, present and future - on the Subject, in all times

to come, as well as exercise their own wisdom and resources optimally, so that the respondent-Commission, alongwith the State and its functionaries,

may not be dragged into unwarranted litigations, which certainly waste, amongst others, their precious time and resources. Furthermore, it is to be

borne in mind that the recruitment process of the kind in hand pertains to the post of Teacher, which is a reputed post, not only for the concerned

candidates and the society at large, but also for the respondentCommission.

In light of the aforesaid observations, the present writ petitions are disposed of with the direction to the respondent-Rajasthan Public Service

Commission to constitute an expert committee afresh, comprising of three or more members, other than the ones, who have remained members in the

earlier expert committee pertaining to the recruitment in question. The said Committee shall re-examine the correct answers to the questions,

pertaining whereto, in the foregoing paragraph, this Court has observed, “Therefore, the correct answer to this question needs to be re-examined

by the expertsâ€. Such fresh expert committee shall be constituted by the respondent-Commission within a period of seven days from today. The

expert committee to be constituted by the respondent-Commission, in pursuance of this judgment, shall submit its report, within a period of fourteen

days from the date of its constitution by the respondent-Commission, regarding correctness of the questions/answers, which have been found to be

‘demonstrably wrong’ by this Court, as hereinabove, in this judgment. To reiterate, this Court, by this judgment, has not granted any relief to

those petitioners, who have directly approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, without even raising any objection with

regard to the earlier answer key, which they cannot do now, at this belated stage, as already observed hereinabove. However, it is made clear that the

next phase of the recruitment in question shall be conducted, only after making compliance of this judgment. It is further made clear that after this

judgment, no further objections shall be entertained by this Court, except in rarest of rare cases.â€​

In light of the observations and directions contained in the aforequoted judgment, the present writ petition also stands disposed of in the same terms.