Usha Agarwal vs State of Rajasthan

M.N. Bhandari, J.—By this criminal misc. petition, a challenge is made to the criminal proceedings in Case No. 65/2006, pending with the Special Judge, Sessions Court, Anti Corruption Act, Kota.

Learned counsel submits that petitioner was the Chairman of the Municipal Board thus falls in the category of ''public servant''. The previous sanction for prosecution was not taken before the order of cognizance of the offence as is required under section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ''the Act''), hence, order for cognizance of offence becomes illegal so as the criminal proceedings. The petition refers section 197 Cr.P.C. but arguments were not made for it.

It is further stated that in the judicial enquiry under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, petitioner has been exonerated thus criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue in those circumstances as it would otherwise amount to double jeopardy.

It is lastly contended that one co-accused namely Pooranmal, the then Assistant Engineer, was also implicated in the case, however, sanction for prosecution was not given, thus for the aforesaid reason also, petitioner is entitled to the relief as prayed for in this petition.

Learned PP has opposed the petition.

I have considered rival submissions of the parties and perused the record.

It is admitted that petitioner was the Chairman of the Municipal Board and claiming benefit under section 19 of the Act of 1988. For ready reference, section 19 of the Act of 1988 is quoted hereunder -

"19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.--

(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,--

(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),--

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;

(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;

(c)no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.

(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,--

(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction;

(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature."

Section 2(c) of the Act of 1988, defining the words "public servant", is also quoted hereunder -

"2. Definitions

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a) and (b)...............

(c) "public servant" means-

(i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty;

(ii) any person in the service or pay of a local authority;

(iii) any person in the service or pay of a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956;

(iv) any Judge, including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions;

(v) any person authorised by a court of justice to perform any duty, in connection with the administration of justice, including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner appointed by such court;

(vi) any arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by a court of justice or by a competent public authority;

(vii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election;

(viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty;

(ix) any person who is the president, secretary or other office-bearer of a registered cooperative society engaged in agriculture, industry, trade or banking, receiving or having received any financial aid from the Central Government or a State Government or from any corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or any authority or body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956;

(x) any person who is a chairman, member or employee of any Service Commission or Board, by whatever name called, or a member of any selection committee appointed by such Commission or Board for the conduct of any examination or making any selection on behalf of such Commission or Board;

(xi) any person who is a Vice-Chancellor or member of any governing body, professor, reader, lecturer or any other teacher or employee, by whatever designation called, of any University and any person whose services have been availed of by a University or any other public authority in connection with holding or conducting examinations;

(xii) any person who is an office-bearer or an employee of an educational, scientific, social, cultural or other institution, in whatever manner established, receiving or having received any financial assistance from the Central Government or any State Government, or local or other public authority.

Explanation 1.-Persons falling under any of the above sub-clauses are public servants, whether appointed by the Government or not.

Explanation 2.-Wherever the words "public servant" occur, they shall be understood of every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation."

The provisions aforesaid apply when it is a case of a public servant as defined under section 2(c) of the Act of 1988. It applies to the persons who are in the service of the government or the bodies referred therein or holds an office by virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election. Likewise, any person who is the President, Secretary or other office-bearer of a registered co-operative society which includes even the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, Vice-Chancellor etc.

Section 19 of the Act of 1988 further requires that a person so employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or the State is not removable from his service save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. The petitioner is not in service but was an elected Chairman. His election is not terminable save by an election petition. Section 19 of the Act of 1988 implies to the person employed and is called as ''public servant'' and not to a public representative.

Section 197 Cr.P.C. is also quoted hereunder -

"197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.

(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction-

(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government:

1Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression" State Government" occurring therein, the expression" Central Government" were substituted.

(2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.

(3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of Sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that Sub-section will apply as if for the expression" Central Government" occurring therein, the expression" State Government" were substituted.

(3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.

(3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon.]

(4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held."

The perusal of section 197 Cr.P.C. shows that protection is available to a public servant who is removable from office save by or with the sanction of the government. The provision aforesaid applies only on those who are in service and terminable save with the sanction of the government. The petitioner is an elected Chairman of the Municipality.

The other ground is in reference to the judicial enquiry. It is submitted that in the judicial enquiry, petitioner has been exonerated. The question comes as to whether judicial enquiry under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act can have any effect on the criminal case, containing charges under the Act of 1988. It is now settled law that enquiry/investigation can take place separately as per the statutory provision and would be governed by respective provisions of law applicable therein and cannot have impact on the proceedings vis-�-vis.

It is also to be noticed that if in the judicial enquiry, required evidence is not led and it resulted in exoneration, it can nullify the criminal case where the prosecution may be in a position to bring the material evidence to show commission of alleged offence by the petitioner. For all these reasons, even second argument raised by learned counsel for petitioner cannot be accepted.

It is apart from the fact that standard of proof in the criminal and the judicial/departmental enquiry is quite different as has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, AIR 2006 SC 2129 : (2006) 3 CTC 494 : (2006) 11 JT 36 : (2006) 3 LLJ 1075 : (2006) 5 SCALE 582 : (2006) 5 SCC 446 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 1121 : (2006) 3 SCR 253 Supp : (2006) 3 SLJ 312 : (2006) AIRSCW 2709 : (2006) 4 Supreme 740 and Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another, AIR 1999 SC 1416 : (1999) 2 CTC 579 : (1999) 82 FLR 627 : (1999) 2 JT 456 : (1999) 1 LLJ 1094 : (1999) 2 SCALE 363 : (1999) 3 SCC 679 : (1999) SCC(L&S) 810 : (1999) 2 SCR 257 : (1999) AIRSCW 1098 : (1999) 3 Supreme 376 . If para 22 of the judgment in the case of Captain M Paul Anthony (supra) is looked into, it permits departmental proceedings while criminal case is pending. Paragraph 22 of the judgment is quoted as under -

"(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.

(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the large in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.

(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.

(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.

(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest."

It would be gainful to refer subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court where departmental enquiry was allowed to continue during pendency of the criminal case and denied to quash order of punishment pursuant to departmental enquiry.

In the case of Suresh Pathrella Vs. Oriental Bank of Commerce, AIR 2007 SC 199 : (2006) 111 FLR 898 : (2006) 10 SCALE 362 : (2006) 10 SCC 572 : (2007) 1 SCC(L&S) 224 : (2006) 8 SCR 564 Supp : (2007) 2 SLJ 1 , Hon''ble Apex Court held that acquittal in the criminal case cannot be taken as a bar for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent employee. It is after considering that standard of proof required in criminal trial and departmental enquiry is quite different. Relevant para 11 and 12 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted for ready reference thus -

"11. In our view, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are fallacious. This Court has taken the view consistently that acquittal in a criminal case would be no bar for drawing up a disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent officer. It is well settled principle of law that the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the disciplinary proceeding. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.

It is not the case of the appellant that the enquiry has been conducted without affording an opportunity to the appellant or behind the back of the appellant and thereby violated the principle of natural justice. It is, however, contended by the counsel for the appellant that the opinion of hand writing expert in respect of the complainant-GC Luthra said to have been procured by the Enquiry Officer after the enquiry was closed had not been furnished to the appellant, despite request and, therefore, a reasonable opportunity has been denied to him."

Same view was taken by the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board and Another Vs. Ram Sajivan and Another, (2007) 113 FLR 1172 : (2007) 3 LLJ 156 : (2007) 6 SCALE 276 : (2007) 9 SCC 86 : (2007) 2 SCC(L&S) 668 : (2007) 5 SCR 684 . In the aforesaid case, the delinquent was given benefit of probation in the criminal case. It was held that initiation of disciplinary proceedings is not a bar.

In the case of Uttaranchal Road Transport Corpn. and Others Vs. Mansaram Nainwal, AIR 2006 SC 2840 : (2006) 110 FLR 1165 : (2006) 7 JT 25 : (2006) 3 LLJ 505 : (2006) 7 SCALE 430 : (2006) 6 SCC 366 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 1341 : (2006) 5 SCR 168 Supp : (2006) AIRSCW 3928 : (2012) AIRSCW 648 : (2006) AIRSCW 1255 : (2006) 2 Supreme 213 : (2006) 5 Supreme 917 , the Hon''ble Apex Court held that acquittal in the criminal case cannot automatically affect the departmental enquiry. Therein, applying the judgment in the case of Captain M Paul Anthony, the order of termination was set aside. It was without discussing as to how the judgment in the case of Captain M Paul Anthony applies. Accordingly matter was remitted back to the High Court for afresh decision.

In a recent judgment in the case of Employers Management West Bokaro Colliery of TISCO Ltd. Vs. Concerned Workman, Ram Pravesh Singh, AIR 2008 SC 1162 : (2008) 1 CLT 781 : (2008) 116 FLR 1108 : (2008) 2 JT 272 : (2009) 1 LLJ 220 : (2008) 2 SCALE 158 : (2008) 3 SCC 729 : (2008) 1 SCC(L&S) 890 : (2008) AIRSCW 3595 : (2008) AIRSCW 1098 : (2008) 3 Supreme 207 : (2008) 2 Supreme 28 , it has been held that acquittal in a criminal case cannot be taken as a bar for departmental enquiry. Para 20 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder for ready reference thus -

"20. Tribunal has set aside the report of the Enquiry Officer and the order of dismissal passed by the Punishing Authority by observing that the charges against the respondent were not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It has repeatedly been held by this Court that the acquittal in a criminal case would not operate as a bar for drawing up of a disciplinary proceeding against a delinquent. It is well settled principle of law that yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the one in disciplinary proceedings. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities."

Same view has been taken by the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Naman Singh Sekhawat, (2008) 2 CLT 272 : (2008) 225 ELT 161 : (2008) 118 FLR 1121 : (2008) 4 JT 150 : (2008) 4 SCALE 360 : (2008) 4 SCC 1 : (2008) 3 SLJ 294 : (2008) AIRSCW 2813 , wherein, it has been held that after acquittal, initiation of departmental enquiry is permissible but exercise should be bona fide.

In the case of The Divisional Controller, KSRTC Vs. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2011) 13 JT 247 : (2012) 1 LLJ 320 : (2012) LLR 8 : (2011) 13 SCALE 33 : (2012) 1 SCC 442 : (2012) 1 SLJ 155 , it has been held in para 23 -

"23. In Management, Pandiyan Roadways Corp. Ltd. Vs. N. Balakrishnan, (2007) 114 FLR 613 : (2007) 7 JT 510 : (2007) 2 LLJ 1046 : (2007) 7 SCALE 758 : (2007) 9 SCC 755 : (2007) 6 SCR 873 , this Court re-considered the issue taking into account all earlier judgments and observed as under: (SCC pp. 766-67, paras 21-22)

"21. There are evidently two lines of decisions of this Court operating in the field. One being the cases which would come within the purview of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat. However, the second line of decisions show that an honourable acquittal in the criminal case itself may not be held to be determinative in respect of order of punishment meted out to the delinquent officer, inter alia, when: (i) the order of acquittal has not been passed on the same set of facts or same set of evidence; (ii) the effect of difference in the standard of proof in a criminal trial and disciplinary proceeding has not been considered (See: Commr. Of Police v Narender Singh, or; where the delinquent officer was charged with something more than the subject-matter of the criminal case and/or covered by a decision of the civil court (See: G.M. Tank, Jasbir Singh v Punjab and Sind Bank and Noida Entrepreneurs v NOIDA, SCC at p. 394, para 16

22.....''41. We may not be understood to have laid down a law that in all such circumstances the decision of the civil court or the criminal court would be binding on the disciplinary authorities as this Court in a large number of decisions points out that the same would depend upon other factors as well. (See: e.g. Krishnakali Tea Estate and RBI v. S Mani) Each case is, therefore, required to be considered on its own facts.

(See also Ram Tawekya Sharma v. State of Bihar and Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank)."

In the case of "NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association Versus NOIDA and ors", reported in (2007) 10 SCC 385, it has been held that standard proof of enquiry is not the same as required in a criminal case. Even an acquittal in the criminal proceeding does not bar departmental enquiry thus a decision to drop the enquiry was held to be improper. Paras 11, 13, 14, 16 of the said judgment are quoted thus -

"11.A bare perusal of the order which has been quoted in its totality goes to show that the same is not based on any rational foundation. The conceptual difference between a departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings has not been kept in view. Even orders passed by the executive have to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness. (See: Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11 : AIR 1994 SC 11 : (1994) 4 JT 532 : (1994) 6 SCC 651 : (1994) 2 SCR 122 Supp , and Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. Vs. U.T., Chandigarh and Others, (2004) 136 PLR 899 : (2003) 10 SCALE 1016 : (2004) 2 SCC 130 : (2003) 6 SCR 1235 Supp . The conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this Court in several cases. Reference may be made to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others Vs. T. Srinivas, AIR 2004 SC 4127 : (2004) 102 FLR 1045 : (2004) 6 JT 292 : (2004) 3 LLJ 769 : (2004) 6 SCALE 467 : (2004) 7 SCC 442 : (2004) SCC(L&S) 1011 : (2004) AIRSCW 4558 : (2004) 6 Supreme 4 , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Others Vs. Sarvesh Berry, (2005) 104 FLR 305 : (2004) 10 JT 392 : (2005) 1 LLJ 588 : (2004) 10 SCALE 340 : (2005) 10 SCC 471 : (2005) 1 UJ 442 : (2004) AIRSCW 7290 : (2005) 1 Supreme 388 and Uttaranchal Road Transport Corpn. and Others Vs. Mansaram Nainwal, AIR 2006 SC 2840 : (2006) 110 FLR 1165 : (2006) 7 JT 25 : (2006) 3 LLJ 505 : (2006) 7 SCALE 430 : (2006) 6 SCC 366 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 1341 : (2006) 5 SCR 168 Supp : (2006) AIRSCW 3928 : (2012) AIRSCW 648 : (2006) AIRSCW 1255 : (2006) 2 Supreme 213 : (2006) 5 Supreme 917 ).

"8.....The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution is two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society, or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (in short the ''Evidence Act''). Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the department enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances.

A three-judge Bench of this Court in Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, etc., (1996) 9 AD 651 : AIR 1997 SC 2232 : (1997) 2 LLJ 902 : (1996) 9 SCALE 65 : (1997) 2 SCC 699 : (1997) SCC(L&S) 548 : (1996) 8 SCR 941 Supp : (1997) 1 SLJ 241 : (1997) AIRSCW 2098 : (1997) 1 Supreme 565 analysed the legal position in great detail on the above lines.

There can be no straight jacket formula as to in which case the departmental proceedings are to be stayed. There may be cases where the trial of the case gets prolonged by the dilatory method adopted by delinquent official. He cannot be permitted to, on one hand, prolong criminal case and at the same time contend that the departmental proceedings should be stayed on the ground that the criminal case is pending.

In Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another, AIR 1999 SC 1416 : (1999) 2 CTC 579 : (1999) 82 FLR 627 : (1999) 2 JT 456 : (1999) 1 LLJ 1094 : (1999) 2 SCALE 363 : (1999) 3 SCC 679 : (1999) SCC(L&S) 810 : (1999) 2 SCR 257 : (1999) AIRSCW 1098 : (1999) 3 Supreme 376 , this Court indicated some of the fact situations which would govern the question whether departmental proceedings should be kept in abeyance during pendency of a criminal case. In paragraph 22 conclusions which are deducible from various decisions were summarised. They are as follows:

(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.

(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the large in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.

(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.

(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.

(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.

The standard of proof required in departmental proceedings is not the same as required to prove a criminal charge and even if there is an acquittal in the criminal proceedings the same does not bar departmental proceedings. That being so, the order of the State Government deciding not to continue the departmental proceedings is clearly untenable and is quashed. The departmental proceedings shall continue."

It is to be understood that standard of proof required in two proceedings are quite different. In the criminal case charge is to be proved beyond doubt whereas same standard does not apply to the departmental/judicial enquiry. Rather, hear say evidence is also admissible and be considered. Looking to the difference of standard of proof conclusion in one proceeding cannot affect the other.

It is lastly contended that in the case of co-accused, sanction for prosecution has been denied. The order passed for it does not given reasons for denial of sanction for prosecution against co-accused Pooranmal Sharma. It is not a case where denial of sanction for prosecution is on merit finding no case, as alleged. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not co-relate the allegations made against him vis-�-vis Pooranmal Sharma. In absence of it, even the third argument carries no meaning so far as prayer made in the petition is concerned.

In view of the discussion made above, I do not find any merit in this petition. Hence, it is dismissed.